Competition in wholesale markets: Do MNOs compete to host MVNOs?

This paper extends previous research examining wholesale market shares of mobile network operators (MNOs). This study demonstrates that wholesale market concentration has decreased over time because of the increase of competition of MNOs for hosting mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs). However, differences in wholesale market shares between MNOs have not disappeared. We propose that those operators that are late entrants in a market and belong to an international group with a proactive attitude towards hosting virtual operators positively influences wholesale market shares of MNOs. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data from 2000 to 2010 corresponding to MNOs and virtual operators in five European countries with high development of the virtual mobile industry. By closely examining KPN we show how being an international mobile group specialising in the wholesale market across Europe has enabled it to exploit complementarities that exist between traditional and virtual businesses.     

An analysis of the disruptive impact of the entry of Free Mobile into the French mobile telecommunications market

The issue of disruptive operators has recently gained interest among researchers and regulators. From a regulator's perspective, disruptive operators can increase competitive rivalry in markets dominated by a handful of large companies, thereby allowing consumers to obtain more benefits in terms of price and quality. Largely overlooked in this discussion has been the impact that the specific identity, complementary assets of operators, and their strategies have on the marketplace dynamics. In this paper we explore the impact that one such operator – Free Mobile – has had on the French mobile telecommunications market. Drawing on a wide range of secondary sources, our analysis finds that the entry and subsequent growth of Free Mobile has had a complex and multi-faceted impact on the market. Their growth has been at the expense of the other three mobile network operators active in the French market, while their innovative business model, which enables it to compete on the basis of low costs, has been copied by its rivals. The specific characteristics of Free Mobile and of its strategy have contributed to a significantly alteration to how competition occurs in this market. This, in turn, triggers a strong incentive for restructuring, which is actually restrained by regulatory concerns.     

Incumbency and market share within European mobile telecommunication networks

The structure of mobile telecommunication markets varies considerably across Europe, ranging from monopolies with a handful of subscribers to markets with five operators and many millions of subscribers. Where competitive markets occur, there is also an incumbent operator possessing substantial first mover advantages. This paper explores these advantages, asking whether the incumbent has remained the largest operator as the market has developed. This question is investigated using data from 49 European countries. The analysis finds that in most countries the incumbent continues to be the largest operator measured by market share. In some countries, later entrants into the market have struggled to gain market share, contributing to the highly concentrated nature of many mobile markets. The extent to which the geographical footprint of an operator influences its market share is also examined.     

Economic implications of a co-investment scheme for FTTH/PON architectures

Due to the high costs associated with the deployment of the passive infrastructure of FTTH networks, a few alternative operators have pondered the possibility of making co-investments based on a network sharing model. The purpose of this article is to explore economic aspects of a co-investment scheme for present and future FTTH/PON architectures. The article describes the cost reductions that can be achieved when a co-investment scheme is used, as well as the relationship between market shares and the cost per home connected. A cost model was employed to calculate the investment per home passed and the investment per home connected. The investment per home passed for an alternative operator indicates significant cost reductions when a co-investment scheme is used. On the other hand, the results show that when the incumbent's market share is equal or higher than the total market share of all the alternative operators that share the network infrastructure, the investment per home connected for an alternative operator is higher than that for the incumbent operator. Moreover, to be cost competitive with the incumbent operator, the necessary market share that each alternative operator should achieve is much lower than that of the incumbent operator.     

Diffusion and competitive relationship of mobile telephone service in Guatemala: An empirical analysis

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of diffusion process of mobile telephone service and the competitive relationships between mobile and fixed-line services in Guatemalan telecommunications market. We investigated the best-suited model to explain the diffusion process of mobile telephone in Guatemala by estimating diffusion curves using empirical data. Moreover, we explored affecting factors which characterize the diffusion pattern of mobile telephony in Guatemala through statistical analysis. Finally, in order to understand the effects of competition in the diffusion process of Guatemalan mobile phone service, we attempted to clarify the competitive relationship between mobile and fixed-line services using the Lotka-Volterra model. As a result, the logistic model was found to be the best model for describing the diffusion pattern. Moreover, investment in telecommunications, the subscribers of fixed-line services, and the number of operators in mobile market were found as significant determinants of mobile diffusion process. Results from the Lotka-Volterra model showed that the relationship between mobile and fixed-line services has changed from pure competition to amensalism.     

Network effects in mobile telecommunications markets: A comparative analysis of consumers' preferences in five Latin American countries

It has been shown that the presence of demand-side externalities can induce the market to benefit the largest firms in terms of market share, usually named as network effect by the theoretical literature. On the one hand, macro-level approach in the empirical literature of network effects commonly use the assumption that a network's overall size matters more to consumers' decisions (global network effects). On the other hand, micro-level studies have suggested that social networks are more relevant to consumers' choices than the overall network size (local network effects). Based on microdata from five Latin American countries, we compare the choice of a particular operator over choosing the largest operator by individual consumers. Our research shows that country-level network size is one among a set factors that determine consumers' choices of mobile operators, once individual and operators' country presence heterogeneity are considered. We find that consumers' local network decisions are important for the choice of operator in the majority of cases considered, and that this result is conditional on the chosen operator's market share. Furthermore, network characteristics and consumer preferences, such as coverage, tariffs, and network importance also affect the choice of mobile network for the Latin American context.     

Estimating Consumer Inertia in Repeated Choices of Smartphones*

For a sample of 9,799 subscribers to a single mobile operator, we observe switching between mobile handsets between July, 2011, and December, 2014. We estimate a discrete choice model in which we account for disutility from switching to different operating systems and brands. Our estimation results indicate the presence of significant inertia in the choice of operating systems and brands. We use our model to simulate market shares in the absence of switching costs and conclude that the market shares of Android and smaller operating systems would increase at the expense of the market share of iOS in such a context.     

Net neutrality and market power: The case of South Africa

Net neutrality rules have been implemented in many developed countries, often in response to concerns over network operator market power and potential blocking or throttling of content. However, developing countries typically have significantly lower levels of internet penetration and usage. Market power in respect of internet access looks quite different given that mobile is the predominant means of connection and there are often three or more mobile operators. In South Africa, there is a quasi-monopoly in the paid satellite broadcasting market and broadband providers zero-rating content from third parties (such as Netflix) may bring about more competition. We test the main theories of harm arising in the net neutrality debate, including network operator market power and exclusion among content providers using data on the number of announced prefixes and peers and IP addresses and considering examples of bundling and zero-rating conduct by operators. We find that net neutrality rules are less likely to be required in South Africa and other developing countries and that strict enforcement of such rules could in fact hinder competition in markets for content, telecommunications networks and other related markets.     

User benefits and operator costs of mobile number portability in Japan and impact on market competitiveness

This paper aims to review the process of mobile phone operators agreeing to introduce mobile number portability (MNP) in Japan. A study group formed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications estimated the proportion of MNP users and analyzed the user benefits and associated costs to introduce MNP. Owing to the particular market structure and technology available, MNP was expected to yield a larger benefit in the Japanese mobile market than that seen in other countries. Based on the results of the research reviewed with respect to the market situation one year after introducing MNP, the increased competition in the mobile phone market was onfirmed by decreasing call charges and a reduction in the share of the dominant operator.     

Employer discrimination and market structure: Does more concentration mean more discrimination?

We formalize Gary Becker’s dynamic conjecture that competitive forces drive discriminating employers from the market in the long run, using a dynamic model of a monopolistically competitive industry characterized by sunk costs and sequential entry. An advantage of this formalization is that it demonstrates the importance of the structure of production costs, as well as market power, in explaining the long-run survival of discriminatory firms. In addition, we show that, despite decades of empirical research on this connection, there is no consistent theoretical relationship between the degree of market concentration within an industry and the degree of discrimination. However, we do find an indirect link in which market liberalization has a more pronounced effect in reducing discrimination in more concentrated markets.     

Termination-discriminatory pricing,subscriber bandwagons,and network traffic patterns: the Taiwanese mobile phone market

This article studies network effects induced by termination-based price discrimination in the evolving Taiwan mobile phone market. An econometric model that estimates the effects attests to the formation of bandwagon behavior among network subscribers. It is shown that networks with a large subscriber base will recruit a disproportionately greater share of new users ceteris paribus compared with low-penetration operators. The strength of the subscriber bandwagon varies closely with the price differential of intra- and inter-network calls. Also, analysis of network traffic reveals that an average mobile phone user consumes considerably less inter-network than intra-network airtime; consequently, mobile phone use is largely clustered within respective networks and hindered from traversing others.     

Infrastructure investment and optimal access regulation in the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization

In this paper, we compare the optimal access regulation under three different market configurations that approximate the different stages of telecommunications market liberalization. We show that in the first stage of market liberalization the regulator has to balance between static efficiency and investment and that the optimal access price may be above marginal cost. In the second stage, two different outcomes are possible. If entrants tend to underinvest, the regulator balances between static efficiency and investment. If entrants tend to overinvest, the regulator sets the access price as low as possible in order to prevent or limit infrastructure duplication. Interestingly, we find that in the third stage of market liberalization the regulator may decide to promote infrastructure duplication and to set the access price above the price in the first stage of market liberalization, even if telecommunications network operators tend to overinvest in infrastructure duplication.     

Network liberalization and developing countries: The case of Chile

The opening of Chile's telecommunications infrastructure to private and foreign investment has led to a rapid modernization of the network and to improvements in universal service. In 1994 all remaining regulatory entry barriers to the local, long-distance and international markets were removed for both service providers and network operators. Full digitization of switches and specific characteristics of the Chilean network structure have led to fierce price competition in the market. In spite of the small market size the strategic behaviour of the main market players is unlikely to succeed. As a result the market is likely to remain highly competitive. While the liberalization process has so far spurred the universal service goal, further improvements will mainly depend on whether entry takes place in the local market.     

The competition among mobile network operators in the telecommunication supply chain

In the mobile telecommunication sector, the high competitiveness has increased the complexity of strategic interactions among operators. As the vertical integration has become anything but a choice and not a compelling technical solution, the contest takes place at different levels of the components of the operator value chain: the network infrastructure, the service development and supply, and the relationship with consumers.Mobile virtual network operators act as retailers and concentrate on the last segment of the value chain by establishing commercial agreements with hosting network operators, which act as manufacturers, to get access to radio communications infrastructure. Productive processes of mobile services offered by operators are different and this difference is imperceptible to customers. Processes difference mainly consists in the infrastructural diversity of the operators and implies different consequences on each network service element.A model has been defined to analyze the consequences of such diversity in the competition among HNOs, MNOs, and MVNOs by focusing the attention on the characteristics of the call path, in dependence of the types of operators. In fact, many variables interact to define the call path, such as marginal costs and revenues, infrastructural investments, and interconnection charges among operators. The analysis of the results, obtained by the model, gives information on variations of retail prices, market shares, and profit allotment, to adopt the proper strategies. In particular, the model results shed light on how certain MVNOs should enter the markets and adopt a collaborative strategy with HNOs. The model owns the capability of being applied to different contexts, thus representing for the regulator a potential instrument of relevant usefulness.     

Competitive dynamics in Polish telecommunications, 1990–2000: growth,regulation, and privatization of an infrastructural multi-network

This paper analyzes the relationship between governmental regulatory policies and competitive dynamics amongst private operators and the national monopolist, TP SA, in three network segments of the Polish telecommunications sector. Special attention is paid to the evolution of organizational strategies in a regulatory environment characterized by constant strategic indecision and reorientations of national policy makers. The paper finds that regulatory/competition coevolution has taken diverse forms in the three network subsegments, with asymmetric duopoly operating in the local fixed network, hidden competition at work in the long-distance fixed network, and oligopolistic technology-driven competition characterizing the high-growth cellular network. The conclusion reached is that Polish telecommunications to date has been stuck in a broad stage of pre-competitive market maneuverings by domestic and international capital, in preparation for privatization of the national operator and for full liberalization as part of EU integration.     

Effective competition and ineffective mobile industry regulation in South Africa

The most striking feature of South Africa’s mobile market is the skewed allocation of spectrum and a seemingly endless sequence of failed attempts to hold an auction for it. A shortage of spectrum (or the inefficient assignment of it) is blamed, among other things, for South Africa’s relatively slow LTE 4G speeds. Through historical accident, the country has two mobile data networks in addition to the four licensed mobile operators. The response of operators has been to innovate using roaming and network sharing agreements; as we explore in this paper, these have become the de facto spectrum allocation process.This paper looks at how the de facto industry structure has been moulded by spectrum holdings and sharing arrangements and asks how spectrum management could be improved. We observe that, although the number of mobile operators has effectively been reduced to 3 (a number which would raise concern in some circles), there exist a variety of arrangements between those three and other spectrum and network operators. The smallest of the current three mobile operators is still not able to offer a nationwide mobile service without a roaming agreement but, at the same time, the two larger operators depend critically on spectrum and roaming agreements themselves, mainly with the two physical data network operators that function as wholesale providers.The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) was established as a consequence of a new constitution that was adopted in 1996 and it helped to create new institutional arrangements for the burgeoning mobile industry. The authority has nevertheless continued to be hampered, as we shall demonstrate, by political imperatives. This has been pointed out by other authors over the past twenty years and we add to this body of evidence by considering the spectrum auction planned (again) for 2021.The “2021” auction is in fact an iteration of the auction originally announced in May 2010 and then abandoned (Song, 2011). The same thing happened again in 2016 (Paelo & Robb, 2020). Late in 2020, the regulator again announced an auction, due to take place during 2021 but by the second quarter of the year, two of the four national operators had already obtained a court injunction to stop it. The process is intertwined with a political imperative to establish a public wireless open-access network, which we discuss in detail.We describe how the industry has navigated around policy and regulatory dysfunction and how competitive interaction among the South African operators has managed to prevail. Following Hausman & Taylor’s (2013) lead in their work on the United States, in this paper we provide a commentary on apparently perverse outcomes from significant regulatory, judicial and legislative actions (or, perhaps more accurately, inactions) governing the South African mobile telecommunications industry from the commencement of the current constitutional arrangements in 1996 to the present.     

When good intentions are not enough: Sequential entry and competition in the Turkish mobile industry

A decade into the liberalization of the Turkish mobile industry, the sector remains one of the most concentrated in Europe. This paper analyzes the links between the regulatory environment and competitive outcomes in the Turkish context. The paper argues that 7 years of duopoly incumbency resulted in a significant first-mover advantage. It then focuses on the role of the regulatory tools that could potentially restrain the incumbent operators’ first-mover advantage and stimulate competition: national roaming, interconnection regulation, and number portability.