Consequences of further opening of the Korean dairy market

This paper develops a simulation of Korean dairy policy that is tailored to the data, institutions, and policies in South Korea. It compares potential effects of changes in trade and domestic policy to baseline projections to 2015. Beverage milk continues to be supplied from domestic sources, implying imports compete in the manufacture of tradable products. We model manufactured dairy product supply, demand, and trade on a milk fat and non-fat-solid component basis reflecting product fungibility over the 10-year horizon used for our trade policy analysis. We find that if the domestic price support is removed with no change in trade policy, the market price of raw milk falls by about 2% and raw milk production declines by 4.5%. Under substantial tariff cuts of 30–40% with no effective change in domestic dairy policy, Korean fat and non-fat-solid prices fall by 7% and 11%, fat and non-fat-solid imports rise by 9% and 7% and Korea raw milk production falls by about 2% relative to the baseline. Prices of Korean farmer-owned dairy inputs, labor, and capital fall by about 1%.     

Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance. Recently, a number of countries worldwide have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. This two-stage auction uses a core-selecting payment rule. The number of possible packages a bidder can submit grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. For larger auctions with dozens of licenses bidders cannot be expected to reveal all their valuations during such an auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices on efficiency and revenue: simple “compact” bid languages versus complex “fully expressive” bid languages and simple “pay-as-bid” payment rules versus complex “core-selecting” payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction?s efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction?s revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, achieves the lowest efficiency and revenue among all treatment combinations.     

‘Double marginalization’ problems: evidence from the Korean fixed-to-mobile service market

In this paper, examination of the possibility of a ‘double marginalization’ problem existing in the Korean telecommunication industry is conducted and suggestions are made for the provision of a new scheme to eliminate this possibility by changing the pricing system for fixed-to-mobile calls. Based on five key economic characteristics in the Korean mobile market, a simple model for double marginalization in the telecommunication market is introduced. Evidence was found to suggest that a double marginalization problem is likely to exist within Korea's telecommunication industry as it is presently structured, and that this problem is further likely to have an adverse effect on the industry by inflating the price of fixed-to-mobile calls. Two alternatives are proposed to effectively remedy this double marginalization issue. It is also shown that prices of fixed-to-mobile calls could be lowered by changing the caller pays principle into a receiver pays principle.     

Spectrum auctions in India: lessons from experience

Spectrum auctions have been used with significant success in many developed countries. From a regulatory and policy perspective, spectrum auctions ensure the efficient use of spectrum by allocating it to those entities that value it most, while also generating revenues for governments. But auctions may lead to unexpected outcomes due to unanticipated problems with their design leading to unexpected bidder behavior such as collusion and over-bidding. The key challenge before regulatory agencies is to design auctions in such a way as to meet the objective of fostering competition while at the same time ensuring that bidders can effectively use the spectrum for their business. While India was one of the early adopters of spectrum auctions, its success in service provision has been low. This paper critically examines issues in auction design that contributed to this delay and reviews the key elements in the design process namely a coherent regulatory framework, choice of service areas, flexibility for service area consolidation, standards and their role, convergence, managing public service regulation and managing defaults. The paper compares the handling of these elements in auctions in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Australia with the objective of drawing lessons for Indian policy makers.     

Estimating consumer surplus in the mobile telecommunications market: The case of Korea

This paper estimates consumer surplus in the Korean mobile telephone services (MTS) market. The Korean mobile telecommunications market has grown rapidly since 1997 when competition was introduced and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology was commercialized. Because consumer surplus is relevant to the controversy over establishing an appropriate price level between consumers and service providers, the need for a robust measurement of benefit from MTS is increasing. The measured net consumer surplus estimated by means of elasticities of demand reached about US$48.8 billion in the period 1996–2004 and the changes amounted to about US$8.8 billion during the same period. In particular, after competition was introduced into the market with an accompanying price decrease and increase in the number of subscribers, consumers have benefited greatly. Therefore, it can be inferred that a facility-based competition policy and the reduction in price of access such as handset subsidies all played a positive role in the early diffusion of MTS in Korea. The estimated consumer surplus in this paper does not include network externality (option externality); if this were considered, the total social welfare of the consumer would be larger.     

Spectrum management reform: Rethinking practices

Unparalleled growth in wireless communications has increased the pressure for more spectrum to support more users, more uses and more capacity. To alleviate that pressure, major regulatory changes were introduced in several countries in two key areas of spectrum management, namely spectrum assignment and allocation. This paper analyzes those changes and discusses strategies and tactics for deregulating the use of radio spectrum. Spectrum management reforms are considered within the theoretical framework of transition economics, which is concerned with optimal reform speed and sequencing. The paper shows how Anglo-Saxon and European countries have been implementing gradual reforms. Meanwhile, Central American reformers have chosen a fast transition from command-and-control regulation to market mechanisms. Transition economics is used to evaluate the advantages and drawbacks of different spectrum reform strategies.     

Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions

In spectrum auctions, bidders typically have synergistic values for combinations of licenses. This has been the key argument for the use of combinatorial auctions in the recent years. Considering synergistic valuations turns the allocation problem into a computationally hard optimization problem that generally cannot be approximated to a constant factor in polynomial time. Ascending auction designs such as the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA) and the single-stage or two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) can be seen as simple heuristic algorithms to solve this problem. Such heuristics do not necessarily compute the optimal solution, even if bidders are truthful. We study the average efficiency loss that can be attributed to the simplicity of the auction algorithm with different levels of synergies. Our simulations are based on realistic instances of bidder valuations we inferred from bid data from the 2014 Canadian 700 MHz auction. The goal of the paper is not to reproduce the results of the Canadian auction but rather to perform “out-of-sample” counterfactuals comparing SMRA and CCA under different synergy conditions when bidders maximize payoff in each round. With “linear” synergies, a bidder's marginal value for a license grows linearly with the total number of licenses won, while with the “extreme national” synergies, this marginal value is independent of the number of licenses won unless the bidder wins all licenses in a national package. We find that with the extreme national synergy model, the CCA is indeed more efficient than SMRA. However, for the more realistic case of linear synergies, SMRA outperforms various versions of CCA that have been implemented in the field including the one used in the Canadian 700 MHz auction. Overall, the efficiency loss of all ascending auction algorithms is small even with high synergies, which is remarkable given the simplicity of the algorithms.     

Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.     

Riding the US wave: spectrum auctions in the digital age

Given its significant technological advantages compared to analog broadcasting, digital television (DTV) will be the television system of the future. However, it requires a full replacement of analog television sets by digital receivers, as DTV can only be watched with special equipment. In order to make this transition happen smoothly without losing the analog television audience, both signals have to be simulcasted until a substantial coverage with DTV broadcasting has been achieved. Australia and the US meanwhile have established a regulatory framework to lead this transition towards the end of analog broadcasting, the so-called analog switch-off. Part of the US regime is the FCC's obligation to reassign analog frequencies after the switch-off has taken place by means of auction. Spectrum auctions, however, originate not from the US but from New Zealand, where they have been used since the end of 1989 and ever since been subject to legal and political criticism. The article outlines the principles of both the DTV and spectrum auctions regulation and shows the links between both areas of telecommunications regulation. It concludes by suggesting that the analog switch-off is a unique opportunity to reconsider current spectrum policies, as it frees large amounts of the radio spectrum that are today occupied by analog broadcasting and will soon be subject to one of the biggest frequency reassignment processes in the history of telecommunications regulation.     

The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market efficiency

This paper describes a conceptual framework to articulate clear rights of access to radio spectrum in a way that would foster an efficient market-based allocation of the resource. In this approach, regulators partition spectrum rights across the dimensions of space, time, frequency, and direction of propagation. They devolve each partition, called a licensed electrospace region (LER), to licensees who may buy, sell, aggregate, and subdivide their LERs at will. All signals outside an LER must have a power level of less than a regulated limit with de minimis exceptions. In addition, even within an LER, transmitter power or field strength must fall below a separate regulator-set level for the band. Licensees may deploy any devices and provide any services that do not violate these rules.     

Royalties vs. upfront lump-sum fees in data communication environments

Mobile communications markets worldwide, today, are saturated, the number of mobile network operators (MNOs) in market is declining, mobile revenues are stagnant or falling, MNOs are becoming wireless Internet service providers, and economies of scope are strengthening. This paper challenges existing dominant views on spectrum assignment and license fee payments, estimates spectrum fees that MNOs would have paid under royalties and then compares them with upfront lump-sum fees actually paid by 3G licensees. This paper further proposes that governments need to consider assigning additional spectrum to incumbents as needs arise without using auctions and adopting royalties as a way of collecting spectrum fees should they collect them.     

The value of 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrums in India and implications for auction design

The sequence of events leading up to the upcoming auction of 1800 MHz spectrum in India has led to the auctions acquiring an extraordinary significance for the future of the Indian mobile industry. A key feature of the auction design proposed by the regulator TRAI is the benchmarking of the reserve price of 1800 MHz to the price of 2100 – 3G spectrum revealed in the 2010 auction. In the context of the low number of LTE devices available and the fragmentation in the 1800 MHz band, this paper proposes reducing the duration of spectrum holding to ten years (from the current level of twenty years), and calibrating the reserve price of 1800 MHz with its value with GSM deployment. An economic model is used to compute the value of startup and incremental 1800 MHz spectrum. The estimated values are shown to differ from the value of 2100 MHz spectrum at a pan-India level and also in their distribution across circles. A new set of reserve prices are computed based on the estimation. The estimated values are also shown to be close to the AGR-adjusted price revealed in the 2001 auction. A reserve price based on the 2001 auction is also provided. Concomitant features of the auction are suggested to give coherence to the auction design.     

Announcement effects and market efficiency in a thin market: An empirical application to the Singapore equity market

Studies of share price responses to public announcements have assumed that there is no serious thinness in trading. This paper reports the findings of a study of price responses of thinly-traded shares in the Singapore equity market. With appropriate methodological refinements for thinness in trading, the announcement effects of earnings, dividends and capitalisation changes are studied. The results suggest that there are statistically significant abnormal returns during the months up to and including the month of announcement. With some minor exceptions, there appears to be no significant abnormal returns during the months after the announcements: semi-strong form efficiency is thus observed. These results are consistent with prior findings in the developed capital markets.The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions. This paper has benefitted from financial assistance of the Department of Commerce of the University of Queensland.     

Bids for the UMTS system: An empirical evaluation of the Italian case

The aim of this paper is to analyze the licensing of the telecommunication spectrum as a public good and the search for equilibrium prices through bilateral bargaining and multilateral bidding. It develops a general model of price setting under dynamic uncertainty and applies it to the Italian auction for Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS). The empirical application shows that the model can be used both to determine the base price as well as other desirable characteristics to organize an auction and to better understand, after the auction is closed, what really happened in terms of the critical factors involved. After recalling some basic concepts on spectrum rights and reviewing the general experience with UMTS auctions in Europe, the formal model and its application are presented. The results confirm certain views on the Italian auction, which are widely shared but were never tested before, namely that: (i) given the initial price, the number of licenses offered for the bidding should have been fewer, or alternatively, (ii) given the number of licenses, the base price should have been higher and (iii) the main bidder underpaid for the license. The model also allows us to quantify the bidders’ reservation price and the State and the bidders’ implicit bargaining powers.     

Global political economy of technology standardization: A case of the Korean mobile telecommunications market

This paper examines empirical cases of standardization in the Korean mobile market as vehicles for approaching the broader political and institutional context of standardization in telecommunications. A consideration of Korean standardization in the mobile telecommunications market is particularly interesting because it reveals how the state's political interests influence standards decisions, which are primarily driven by market and technological changes in telecommunications. Judged from the social construction of technology perspective which sheds light not only on technology itself but also on political, social and economic interests that surround transformations in technology, this paper highlights power relations among the major actors that have made technology standards decisions in Korea regarding second (2G) and third-generation (3G) mobile telephony. The paper also attempts to show how the Korean government has dealt with the diverse interests of various market actors while pursuing its own policy agenda.     

Markups in a dual labour market: The case of the Netherlands

We follow the production function approach to assess markups, which requires the estimation of the output elasticity of a flexible input. In the basic setup we estimate a structural value added production function, using temporary contract hours as flexible input. We find rather stable markups in the Netherlands in the period 2006–2016. We show that extending the flexible input incorrectly with fixed contract hours results in an increasing markup. Findings are robust to an alternative setup, in which a gross output production function is specified and materials are used as flexible input. Implications for applied work and policy are discussed.     

Entry deterrence: The case of a buyer with market power

The model considers a seller operating under the threat of an arbitrarily large number of unknown potential entrants and facing a strategic buyer. It is shown that the seller's Nash best response function slopes downward in price-output space, while that of the buyer slopes upward. The Nash equilibrium may be associated with a lower probability of entry than the equilibrium at which the buyer behaves non-strategically. With the buyer as the Stackelberg leader, the price is shown to decrease relative to that at the Nash equilibrium, but the probability of entry may rise or fall.     

Stock market surveillance and market performance: The case of Taiwan

In this paper we investigate the effect of warning announcements on the price behaviour of stocks. We also study the effects of various corrective treatments (trading halts, call trading and 100% payment/delivery with order) on the performance of stocks in the Taiwan stock market. It is found that warning announcements serve to improve the performance of stocks, except in the case of consecutive warnings. Generally speaking, the corrective measures taken after the consecutive warnings are able to reduce the volatility, the abnormal returns and the excess liquidity of the stocks.The authors are Professors from the National Sun Yat-sen University, and the Securities and Exchange Commission respectively.     

Attention allocation to multiple goals: The case of for‐profit social enterprises

The complexity of issues firms have to attend to make it impossible for CEOs to give their full attention to all issues concurrently. Drawing on the “attention‐based view” of the firm, this paper opens the black box of attention allocation in for‐profit social enterprises by showing how attention structures and the context in which the firm operates interplay. Utilizing empirical data on 148 for‐profit social enterprises, findings show that the attention structures—other‐regarding values, utilitarian identity, and resource availability—have a significant impact on the relative attention to social goals, while past firm performance as a context variable moderates these relations. Applying the principles of structural and situated attention, this paper makes an important contribution to management theory and attention allocation in for‐profit social enterprises. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analysing the C-Band spectrum auctions for 5G in Europe: Achieving efficiency and fair decisions in radio spectrum management

This paper offers a detailed analysis of selected regulatory parameters used as instruments to promote efficiency with fairness for all stakeholders (in the legal sense of equity) in 5G spectrum auctions. Data were collected from sixteen auctions for the C-band that took place in the Member States of the European Union (EU) and in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2017 and 2020 for the introduction of the fifth generation (5G) of mobile communication technology. The selected instruments of intervention are: spectrum packaging, spectrum caps, set-asides, geographical scope of the license, license duration, various forms of license obligations, reserve prices and auction format.Significant differences were observed in national approaches to spectrum packaging, license obligations and reserve prices for efficiency purposes. Our analysis also shows that European national regulators are paying increasing attention to concerns over fairness of decisions on spectrum, or equity, especially by creating opportunities for local private networks to access the spectrum and by imposing requirements on network operators to guarantee more uniform population coverage of newly created 5G networks.