CUT‐THROAT FRINGE COMPETITION IN AN EMERGING COUNTRY MARKET: TAX EVASION OR THE ABSENCE OF MARKET POWER?*

Brazil's established soft‐drink firms recently lost ground to multiple low‐price entrants, with small‐scale operations and minimal advertising. While incumbents attributed such undercutting to entrants' lower costs from non‐compliance with the law, ‘generics’ counterargued that incumbents' high prices stemmed from unilateral market power rather than cost heterogeneity. By estimating a structural model, I can single‐handedly explain established brands' high prices through low equilibrium price elasticities of demand. Tax evasion in the fringe, while plausible, appears to be offset by higher procurement costs or less efficient scale. More generally, a competitive informal sector can alleviate the allocative distortions in certain concentrated industries.     

Kurzfristige Kehrtwende bei der Beschaffung neu zu errichtender Anlagen für die Netzreserve in Deutschland

Shortly before the decision of the Electricity Market Law on June 22, 2016 took place, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) changed its mind with respect to the procurement of new power plants for the German grid reserve. Other than originally planned, this is no longer organized via a competitive bidding process. Instead, the responsibility for the procurement will be transferred to the transmission system operators, which therefore face the challenge of implementing an appropriate procurement mechanism. This paper presents an economic explanation for this short-term change. Our analysis reveals that the proposed transfer of the concept for the procurement of spare capacity to the procurement of the grid reserve was not appropriate. The bidders would have been exposed to significant risks, in particular due to high cost and calculation uncertainties, which are also critical with respect to the achievement of the objectives of the grid reserve. Therefore, we consider the decision of refusing the original procurement concept as the right step, although we consider a competitive procedure advantageous. However, such a procedure has to take the special requirements of the grid reserve into account. Yet this problem remains even after the transfer of responsibility from the BMWi to the transmission system operators.     

COMPETITION AND COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT*

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper provides a rationale for the observed pattern in public procurement of underinvestment in design specification. We propose a two‐stage model in which the sponsor first decides how much to invest in design specification and auctions the project to horizontally differentiated contractors. After the contract has been awarded and implemented, the sponsor and contractor receive new information about the optimal project design and renegotiate the contract to accommodate changes in the initial project's design. We show that the sponsor's optimal strategy is to underinvest in design specification, which makes significant cost overruns likely. Since no such underinvestment occurs when contractors are not horizontally differentiated, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.     

Toward universal telephone access: Market progress and progress beyond the market

The last 10 years have seen an explosion in access to telephone services worldwide based on rapid technology advance in increasingly competitive markets. The mobile phone has driven expansion in subscribers and access, especially in the developing world. This paper estimates global mobile footprint coverage based on 2002 data and calculates that as much as 77 percent of the world's population may live in an area covered by a mobile signal. Nonetheless, many people remain without access to telephony. The paper estimates the maximum likely cost in terms of cross subsidy within the industry and outside financing for achieving universal access using competitively awarded subsidies to private providers in a reformed market. This upper-end cost is estimated at $5.7 billion, with costs that could not be supplied by a reasonable tax on existing providers (and so required from outside the sector) estimated at $1.8 billion.     

Public Procurement Auctions and Competition in Turkey

This paper empirically investigates the effect of the competitive environment (number of participants) on the cost of procurement. We use a unique dataset provided by the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) of Turkey that covers all of the government procurement auctions for the years 2004–2006. First, after controlling for possible endogeneity, we show that the number of bidders significantly and negatively affects the procurement price. Thus, the existence of a more competitive environment significantly decreases procurement costs in Turkey. Second, when auctions are open to foreign participation, the auction price tends to be lower. Finally, prices in services and goods sectors are more sensitive to changes in the number of bidders than is true for the construction sector. The results of this paper have several policy implications for e-procurement and efficient procurement design.     

Piecewise procurement of a large-scale project

This paper studies the optimal piecewise procurement of a large-scale project. In the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the dynamic procurement game, it is found that (1) unlike the static setting, the procurer's optimal strategy depends on the number of suppliers and more importantly, it is nonmonotonic. As one more supplier participates in the procurement auction, the procurer softens competition in the initial stages by including more cost “types” while increasing competition in the mature stages; (2) this, in turn, implies that existing suppliers might favor participation of additional suppliers; (3) absent scheduling and/or resource constraints, the procurer prefers to procure the project as one piece if the suppliers' technology exhibits constant or increasing returns, and no additional suppliers are enticed to bid; and (4) the optimal dynamic mechanism can be easily implemented via a sequence of dominant strategy auctions of the Vickrey type.     

A retrospective study on the regional benefits and spillover effects of high-speed broadband networks: Evidence from German counties

This study aims to assess the economic benefits of high-speed broadband within and across neighboring counties in Germany. Utilizing a balanced panel dataset of 401 German counties with data from 2010 to 2015 as well as different panel estimation techniques, we find that an increase in average broadband speed has a significantly positive effect on regional GDP in the average German county. Furthermore, we find that broadband deployment in German counties induces not only substantial economic benefits in terms of direct effects within counties but also positive regional externalities across counties. According to our estimation results, an increase in average bandwidth speed by one unit (1 Mbit/s) induces a rise in regional GDP of 0.18%. This effect is almost doubled if we also take regional externalities into account (0.31%). Moreover, we find that regional agglomeraton effects are of particular relevance for rural counties. Our cost-benefit analysis of subsidies based on conservative estimates suggests efficiency gains, as the total economic per capita benefits (€164) of subsidy programs to encourage broadband expansion exceeded their associated per capita costs (€114).     

Food subsidies in Egypt: reform options,distribution and welfare

Egypt's food subsidies (in 1996/97 5.5 percent of government expenditures) cover rationed cooking oil and sugar (23 percent of subsidy cost) and unrationed bread and flour (77 percent). The subsidies enhance food security but are nontargeted and have substantial leakages. This paper uses a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate the short-run effects of alternative food-subsidy scenarios. Government savings from reduced spending finance uniform cuts in direct tax rates across all household types. The model uses a 1996/97 database with detailed household information. The targeting of cooking oil and sugar subsidies to “the needy” (the bottom two quintiles in rural and urban areas) has a progressive effect while elimination of this subsidy is regressive. Disaggregated household consumption changes are small (±0.3 percent). The targeting of all food subsidies is pro-needy, partly due to important indirect effects. The consumption of the needy increases by 0.5 percent with little change for the nonneedy. Food subsidy elimination is regressive: the needy suffer a consumption loss of 1.1 percent. If the government savings instead are transferred to the needy, the impact is reversed: consumption increases by 4.2 percent for needy households while the nonneedy register a small loss. The overall policy implication is that food subsidy reform can benefit the needy with at worst only a modest negative impact on the nonneedy. If the subsidy is entirely eliminated, targeted government programs would be necessary to protect the needy from the negative impact.     

Taxation and Durable Goods Monopoly*

This paper studies the role of taxation in durable good markets with dynamic monopolies. By conditioning the marginal tax rate on the volume of trade, the regulator can provide incentives for the monopolist to accelerate trade. When marginal cost pricing generates a loss for the monopolist, strategic delay cannot be avoided under regulatory budget constraint and the effects of tax policy depend on the monopolist's ability to commit. In the context of binary consumer types, we find a tax policy involving “back-loaded subsidy” that achieves the second-best outcome with commitment. In contrast, without commitment, a “front-loaded subsidy” improves welfare.     

End-user engagement within innovative public procurement practices: A case study on public–private partnership procurement

The purpose of this paper is to establish a model for an end-user engagement process within innovative public procurement practices. Even though the importance of the public service end-user has been recognized by researchers and policy makers for some time, there's a genuine lack of commonly acknowledged user engagement tools for both procurer's and supplier's practical implementation. We focus on the way value creation can be enhanced through actively engaging end-users as co-creators of value in public procurement. The study employs an intensive single-case methodology, where the findings are based on qualitative data gathered on a Public–Private Partnership (PPP) -based school property procurement in Finland. The end-user's value potential does not rest only with creating individual user value but also with increasing e.g. the public service's social, environmental and political value. Our findings support the existing theoretical understanding according to which the most significant end-user value is achieved through interactive dialogue in the design phase of the public procurement project. The most significant advantages of active end-user engagement are especially seen in the usability of the provided public service. Study results also indicate positive effects of end-user's independent value creation and the sensation of involvement in the user's individual value experience.     

Opportunity Cost Pass‐Through from Fossil Fuel Market Prices to Procurement Costs of the U.S. Power Producers

This paper investigates the transmission of fossil fuel commodity spot market price changes to procurement costs of U.S. power producers. We measure and compare the speed and magnitude with which spot prices predict procurement costs using restricted access fuel price data. Natural gas spot prices are quickly reflected in procurement costs. Coal spot prices offer very little predictive power to coal procurement costs. Although not causal, the empirical results also show differences across regulatory status. These findings may have implications for the electricity market deregulation literature that creates marginal cost curves as a competitive benchmark.     

Intra-operator mobile plan switching: Evidence from linked survey and billing microdata

This paper examines consumers' intra-operator mobile phone plan switching in Ireland. It models the factors associated with switching outcomes, including the direction of change in expenditure and whether those who are observed to switch plans tend to arrive at more or less optimal plans given their usage. A dataset is employed that combines survey responses from mobile consumers with the same consumers' actual usage data in the period 2017–2019; this was collected by Ireland's national regulatory authority. The cost each consumer would have incurred on every plan offered in the market based on their observed usage is estimated. Using models that allow for selection into switching, associations between switching outcomes and demographic and user characteristics are modelled. Controls are included for plan and user attributes, including demographics and proxies for user sophistication and access to alternative communication options. A substantial proportion of intra-operator switchers in the sample increase expenditures when they switch plan. While many switchers move to plans that are more optimal given their usage, a slight majority move to plans that charge a higher price premium over the best available plan (based on observables) than the consumer's previous plan did. Few observable characteristics of consumers or plans seem to be significantly associated with which switches achieve greater optimality, although fixed operator effects are large and significant. These findings add to the weight of evidence which finds that many consumers fail to arrive at the best price even after switching.     

Jobs and agricultural policy: Impact of the common agricultural policy on EU agricultural employment

This paper investigates the relationship between EU agricultural subsidies and the outflow of labor from agriculture. We use more representative subsidy indicators and a wider coverage (panel data from 210 EU regions over the period 2004-2014) than has been used before. The data allow to better correct for sample selection bias than previous empirical studies. We find that, on average, CAP subsidies reduce the outflow of labor from agriculture, but the effect is almost entirely due to decoupled Pillar I payments. Coupled Pillar I payments have no impact on reducing labor outflow from agriculture, i.e. on preserving jobs in agriculture. The impact of Pillar II is mixed. Our estimates predict that an increase of 10 percent of the CAP budget would prevent an extra 16,000 people from leaving the EU agriculture sector each year. A 10 percent decoupling would save 13,000 agricultural jobs each year. However, the budgetary costs are large. The estimated cost is more than € 300,000 per year (or more than € 25,000 per month) per job saved in agriculture.     

Cost leadership strategy and experience curves

Investing in cost leadership by rapidly riding down the experience curve is a common way to establish a firm's competitive advantage. Its success depends, in part, on the factors that underlie the experience curve. In this paper we make the distinction between cost declines that occur at any point in time and cost declines that may occur over time. This leads us to consider a revised experience concept in which the dynamic interrelationship between a firm's production rate, cumulative production and unit cost is explicitly considered. We provide a detailed analysis of various scale-learning relationships and their strategic implications for establishing competitive advantage through an investment in cost leadership. We also prove analytically that such investment should take place only in the presence of learning.     

Optimality of simple procurement auctions

We consider procurement auctions for the projects where the cost of production is subject to ex-post shocks—cost overruns. The contractor may default due to these overruns, which affects the buyer’s expected cost. Here the lowest-bid auction emerges as the procurement mechanism that: (i) minimizes the expected transfers to the contractors, and (ii) requires the lowest surety bond to achieve a given probability of default. Since surety bonds are costly to post, the above makes a combination of the lowest-bid auction with the surety bond the optimal, i.e., the expected cost minimizing procurement mechanism in a wide range of parameters.     

采购限制下的电子采购策略库存水平分析

库存是影响供应链成本性能的主要因素之一,有效地减少库存可以降低整个供应链的成本性能,因此库存管理是优化供应链运作、提高竞争优势的重要手段。论文针对库存管理中的(s,S)策略,建立了库存水平变化的模型,分别分析了无采购条件限制和有采购条件限制下的库存水平的变化,并分别给出了期望值和方差。     

Spatial Price Discrimination: The Use of Parking Coupons by Downtown Retailers

Price discrimination in monopolistically competitive markets affects firms' joint profits through several pecuniary and nonpecuniary externalities. Discrimination is a public good if the net effect is positive. Using a random utility shopping destination choice model we investigate the effect of a downtown parking coupon program that discriminates in favor of suburban consumers and against consumers based downtown. The program appears profitable for downtown stores collectively, but in the noncooperative Nash equilibrium stores do not participate. Participation is thus subject to free-riding. As the subsidy rate required to induce participation rises, profits fall. Whatever the subsidy rate, social surplus declines.     

INFORMATION REVELATION AND BUYER PROFITS IN REPEATED PROCUREMENT COMPETITION*

I investigate how procurement costs are affected by the information that buyers reveal about sellers' behavior, in a setting with two sequentially offered contracts for which a seller's privately known costs are identical. Expected prices are lowest when sellers learn nothing until all contracts are allocated, are higher when they learn all sellers' price offers as contracts are allocated, and typically are even higher when they learn only the winner's identity, or the winner's identity and price offer. The results suggest that buyers engaged in repeated procurement may pay less by revealing minimal or extensive information, rather than an intermediate amount.     

Taxes,Inflation, Speculation and the Cost of Homeownership*

This article formulates a measure of the cost of homeownership which accounts for (1) the tax subsidy to homeowning, (2) the element of expected inflation in mortgage interest rates and (3) speculation about appreciation in real house prices. Each component of the total cost of homeowning is estimated annually across the decade of the 1970s. Total real costs are found to have trended down during the period, primarily because of a decline in the real interest rate and increases both in the real tax subsidy and in expectations of real appreciation.     

Dynamics of the transition process towards partnership thinking in centralized public procurement

This research paper seeks to increase the knowledge of the transition process from transactional arm's length tendering towards partnership thinking in centralized public procurement. In centralized public procurement, the professional public purchaser forms a triadic partnership relationship with the public unit managing the procurement implementation and the private organization. A triadic partnership relationship in a home nursing procurement setting is investigated to further the understanding of the relationship dynamics related to the transitioning of public and private actors towards partnership thinking. The research shows how transactional procurement logic hinders the transition to partnering by establishing challenges for initiating and nurturing public–private partnerships (PPPs) and how partnership thinking changes this procurement logic. It illustrates the transactional procurement logic of single actor and the logic underlying the relationship of two actors to engender and intensify the problems of triad in the centralized public procurement process and vice versa; that is, a shared understanding from jointly agreed procurement goals between two actors is identified as promoting triadic partnering. Managerial implications are given for those public and private organizations engaging in PPPs and seeking to understand the ways of managing them in the context of centralized public procurement, particularly during the transition towards partnership thinking.