The role of firm resources and organizational attributes in determining entry timing: a cross-industry study

We investigate the factors that influence the timing of entry of firms into new industries based on new technology. Consistent with previous research, it is hypothesized that firm resources and organizational attributes influence entry timing. Unlike previous research, there is specific consideration of how industry setting—specifically, the extent to which it offers first mover advantages—influences the ability to predict timing of entry. The ability to explain entry timing differed across industries, with success occurring in the industry with strong first mover advantages. Two categories of resources, technological and marketing, were found to be associated with early entry. The organizational attributes that influenced early entry were commitment to a threatened market and (surprisingly) greater size. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

First mover advantages in international business and firm‐specific political resources

While the currently prevailing conceptual framework of first mover advantages (FMAs) specifies various market mechanisms through which first movers can gain pioneering benefits, it is incomplete by failing to consider the role of political resources in creating FMAs. In this context, this article aims to add the political mechanism to the current classification of FMA mechanisms. The article further serves as a window to an understanding of the long‐term process of acquiring, sustaining, and exploiting firm‐specific political resources in international business, which has been neglected in prior studies on business–government relations. Detailed analysis of three case studies suggests that the causal relationship between political resources and FMAs is a complex one; while non‐market strategies can be used successfully by first movers, they can also be used by late movers to neutralize FMAs. The article proposes a model for understanding the link between FMAs and political resources. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

TIMING AND INTENSITY EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS

This paper examines the investment timing and intensity conditions under which advantages may exist for first movers in environmental investments. The potential advantages on which the paper focuses are timing and intensity of investments in recent pollution-reducing manufacturing technologies that produce salable product at the same time that they reduce pollution. The data come from 50 chemical bleached paper pulp manufacturers in eight countries. The model measures the impact of the independent variables on growth in profits from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, controlling for national differences in environmental regulations, among other variables. Results indicate a positive relationship between timing of investments and profit growth. There is also evidence that more intense investment patterns, when not tempered by sufficient time to absorb the investments, may lead to lower profit growth.     

Decomposing Pioneer Survival: Implications for the Order‐of‐Entry Effect

In contrast to previous studies of pioneer survival that directly compare the survival of market pioneers with later entrants, this paper proposes that a market pioneer, as the first entrant, operates under two distinctly different survival processes, one during the initial monopoly period and another during the later competition period. The two processes of market pioneers need to be separately estimated and compared with the survival process of later entrants. This paper demonstrates a method for decomposing the pioneer's survival and empirically shows how researchers can compare the pioneer survival in two periods with that of later entrants and identify period‐specific advantages of pioneering. Our empirical analysis using data collected from two different types of industries—a low‐tech (i.e., newspaper) industry and several high‐tech industries—reveals several interesting new findings that illustrate the advantages of decomposing pioneer survival. For example, this paper shows that when treating first‐mover survival as a single process, one can only find an oversimplified pattern showing that first movers have a survival chance equal to that of second movers in the newspaper industry, but a lower one than the second movers in high‐tech industries. However, when analyzing the first‐mover's survival as a sequence of monopoly and competition processes, new insights emerge. In the newspaper industry, the pioneers can have survival advantages in both the monopoly and the competition periods relative to the second movers, and there is a significant survival advantage for those second entrants who delay market entry until the first entrant exits. In contrast, the overall pioneer survival disadvantage identified in the high‐tech industries when treating the survival as a single process comes from the survival disadvantage in the competition period but not in the monopoly period. Furthermore, our empirical analyses using data from two types of industries reveal completely different patterns with regard to the pioneer survival advantage, which suggests that being first can benefit pioneers in both two‐market periods in low‐tech industries but can be extremely risky for pioneers to gain any survival advantages in both two‐market periods in high‐tech industries because the former markets have relatively low market and technology uncertainties, and organizational change is less important; whereas the latter industries have significantly high market and technology uncertainties, technological advances emerge frequently, and firms are required to adapt themselves quickly to a fast‐changing environment.     

Pioneering Advantages and Entrepreneurs' First‐mover Decisions: An Empirical Investigation for the United States and China

New ventures are often launched for the purpose of pioneering an innovative new product or service in the marketplace. Entrepreneurs or founders of new ventures thus often have to make the decision whether to be the market pioneer or the first mover. While being a first mover potentially is advantageous, it also involves taking risks and facing uncertainties. Entrepreneurs must assess the benefits and risks of pioneering in the first‐mover decision‐making process to realize the potential competitive advantages associated with being a pioneer. Previous research has shown how entrepreneurs perceive potential gains and losses associated with exploring opportunities as the key defining element of entrepreneurial decision‐making. Past studies have also indicated that cultural and business environmental factors affect both perceptions and decision‐making. However, studies to date have insufficiently addressed the relationship between entrepreneurs' perceived pioneering advantages/disadvantages and their first‐mover decisions, with little attention to cross‐national differences. This study includes hypotheses postulating how entrepreneurs' perceived advantages and disadvantages of pioneering affect the number of first‐mover decisions made by entrepreneurs in two different cultural contexts, the United States and China. We collect data from 152 U.S. entrepreneurs and 140 Chinese entrepreneurs over a four‐year period and carry out empirical tests on the hypotheses using Poisson regression models. Our results provide insight on how culture affects perceptions of advantages and disadvantages of pioneering, and how these perceptions impact the likelihood of making a first‐mover decision. We find that a higher level of perceived advantages will drive first‐mover decisions, whereas perceived disadvantages will deter first‐mover decisions. The negative effect of perceived erosion disadvantages on the number of first‐mover decisions was higher for Chinese entrepreneurs, consistent with the high risk‐aversion culture in China. However, this effect was not found for perceived uncertainty disadvantages, suggesting that the risk‐averse characteristics of Chinese entrepreneurs is an oversimplification, and that the Chinese cultural, business, and legal environment helps offset uncertainty disadvantages. We also find an interesting positive moderating effect of perceived advantage on the relationship between perceived disadvantages and the number of first‐mover decisions in China only. That is, if perceived advantages are low, Chinese entrepreneurs are more risk averse than U.S. entrepreneurs; but if perceived advantages are high, Chinese entrepreneurs are more risk‐seeking than U.S. entrepreneurs. This finding again challenges the risk aversion conclusion found by previous studies of Chinese managers.     

Entry timing and innovation strategy in feature phones

Research summary : This inductive study examines how firms make decisions about the timing of innovations, focusing on the mobile handset industry during the feature‐phone era. Through qualitative and quantitative data, we reveal how individual technology‐entry decisions are influenced by a portfolio‐level timing preference, and how this preference informs other aspects of innovation strategy, too. Early movers address greater, more uncertain revenue opportunities with broader, less selective innovation portfolios. Conversely, late movers target lower, more certain revenue opportunities with narrower, more selective portfolios. While timing per se seems unrelated to performance, a timing‐strategy alignment is. Future research on the equifinal configurations we propose—broad/nonselective for early movers and narrow/selective for late movers—could thus help resolve the debate about the link between timing and performance. Managerial summary : We study how firms make decisions about the entry of new product features, in this case mobile phone technologies. During development firms weigh the scale and likelihood of features' commercial success. Some firms display a preference for earlier entry, which offers temporary monopoly rewards if uncertainty resolves favorably, while others tend to opt for later entry, which offers greater certainty but lower rewards due to competitive preemption. The innovation portfolios of these companies thus pursue differently structured opportunities, bringing about different strategic approaches. Since early movers aim for big hits to compensate for a higher failure rate, they launch a broader set of features and exert little selective pressure on the development portfolio. By contrast, late movers' lower payoffs reduce their tolerance for failure, making them launch fewer features and emphasize selectiveness; i.e., they invest in learning from the resolution of uncertainty so as to choose features more discriminately. When we examine innovation performance, timing has no significant effect but matching timing with feature breadth does. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Better late than never: a study of late entrants in household electrical equipment

For the most part, studies on timing of entry have attempted to determine the advantages that early entrants may be able to develop and hold over subsequent entrants. Given that a large number of firms attempt to enter at a much later stage in the development of the market, it is particularly surprising that little research has attempted to examine the differences in the ability of late movers to penetrate the market. In this paper, we focus exclusively on late movers and examine the extent to which their early success can be tied to existing market conditions, their resource strengths, and their strategic positioning. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Timing Product Replacements under Uncertainty—The Importance of Material–Price Fluctuations for the Success of Products That Are Based on New Materials

Being first to market with new products is one of the most enduring pieces of strategic advice handed to managers. This view also emphasizes the importance of launching new products that are based on new materials as soon as possible. However, when the input costs of products that embody new materials are uncertain because of volatile material prices, the advantage of being an early mover comes along with the risk of paying unexpectedly high material prices. Real‐option theory suggests delaying material substitution under uncertainty even if the new material enables superior product performance. Firms who have created the flexibility to switch between alternative inputs can benefit from responding to opportunities or threats that arise from changes in the environment. The current study formalizes this logic in a switching‐option model and tests it on a sample of material substitution projects from the manufacturing sector. Our findings shed light on how input‐cost fluctuations influence the timing–performance relationship and bring into question the common advice to launch new products as soon as possible. Instead, our results suggest that firms who align the timing of market launch to trends and fluctuations of material prices improve their competitive positions. These insights suggest novel ways for new product development (NPD) managers how to successfully use external information at the back‐end of the NPD process and how to compete in an era defined by volatile material prices and technological change.     

Orchestrating resources for FMA in coopetitive NPD

The rapid introduction of new products in high‐tech industries is a key competence for firms wanting to benefit from the first‐mover advantage (FMA). Prior studies call for forging links between FMA and the resource‐based view, as the resources at the disposal of a firm tend to influence the likelihood and timing of market entry. Analysing the way firms orchestrate internal and external resources enables a better understanding of this link. More precisely, synchronising the combination of internal and external resources is important in determining the development time of new products. This issue becomes vital when the NPD process regroups competitors due to the short age of the acquired knowledge. An in‐depth case study of the product development strategies of four competitors that collaborated to develop Ethernet solutions identifies three different product introduction strategies based on different resource orchestrations and timing: pioneer, wise and slow. The firms that structured their resources early to make them available for bundling during coopetition were able to introduce products faster than firms that structured their resources during coopetition. Furthermore, our results show that only prepared firms are able to reap benefits from knowledge gained through coopetitive NPD.     

Performance implications of delayed competitive responses: evidence from the U.S. retail industry

The timing of competitive actions and responses is a key management concern that has important performance consequences. This study focuses on the timing and consequences of competitive responses. Theory predicts a negative linear relationship between response delay and responder performance mirrored by an opposing positive linear relationship between response delay and first mover performance. In contrast, our study suggests that response delay has a curvilinear relationship with responder performance, and a linear relationship with first mover performance. We test our propositions using retail industry data and discuss the implications. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What doesn't kill you makes you stronger: The evolution of competition and entry‐order advantages in economically turbulent contexts

We examine the evolution of competition and entry‐order advantages in markets under macroeconomic distress. Through formal modeling of early‐mover advantages along industry life cycles subjected to economic shocks and based on simulation findings, we propose that such shocks exogenously induce temporary industry discontinuities that shift the relative value of distinct asset endowments, thereby switching the bases for competitive advantages vis‐à‐vis those found in stable contexts. A vital trade‐off then emerges between a firm's financial flexibility and its pace of investments in isolating mechanisms, such that the former operates as a contingency factor for the latter. As such, flexibility superiority boosts early‐entrants' advantages, while it alternatively gives laggards a much desired strength to out trump first‐mover rivals. Our study informs entry‐order advantage theory and management practice in economically turbulent contexts. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do early birds get the returns? An empirical investigation of early‐mover advantages in acquisitions

We explore whether pioneering advantages exist for early‐mover acquirers in industry acquisition waves by examining both combined (target and acquirer) and acquirer stock returns. Combined abnormal returns are higher for acquisitions that occur at the beginning of acquisition waves. However, for acquirers' returns, only strategic pioneers—those acting in manners consistent with having superior information—capture significant advantages. Specifically, early‐mover acquirers who realize superior stock returns are those that conduct acquisitions in related industries, during industry expansionary phases, and finance their acquisitions as financial theory suggests they should when they possess an informational advantage—with cash. Our findings extend the first‐mover literature to corporate practices and link these practices to acquisition returns. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Internet companies' growth strategies: determinants of investment intensity and long‐term performance

To exploit first‐mover advantages, pioneers may be motivated to amass customers before rivals enter the market. Likewise, when they enjoy increasing returns due to network effects, static scale economies, or learning effects, companies have incentives to invest aggressively in growth. This paper presents econometric analysis of factors that determined the intensity of Internet companies' investments in growth, and analyzes the long‐term performance consequences of such investments. Results indicate that first movers spent significantly more on upfront marketing than non‐pioneers. Contrary to expectations, however, firms in markets that exhibited increasing returns did not spend more on their early customer acquisition efforts than other sample companies. Although the typical sample company did not earn positive long‐term returns, heavy early investments in growth were nevertheless economically rational. In most cases, reducing marketing outlays would have worsened a bad outcome, consistent with an inverted ‘U’ relationship between long‐term returns and upfront marketing spending. Thus, the typical sample company invested in marketing, ex ante, at levels close to those that would have maximized returns, observed ex post. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry in the presence of dueling options

This paper investigates the influence of industry uncertainty on the decision by established firms to enter a new industry. Specifically, we examine the tension between the option to defer , which discourages entry in the presence of uncertainty, and the option to grow , which may encourage entry in the presence of uncertainty when there are early mover advantages. Empirical analysis on data from a broad array of industries revealed that the effect of uncertainty on entry is not monotonic. Our findings are the first to find support for the nonmonotonic effect of uncertainty that has only recently emerged in theoretical treatments of real options theory, and amplify the importance of considering both the option to defer and the option to grow when contemplating entry. Furthermore, we found evidence that the relationship between uncertainty and entry is moderated by: (a) irreversibility, which influences the value of the option to defer; (b) the total value of growth opportunities; and (c) early mover advantages, which magnify the value of growth options. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Comparative Study of Pioneer Entry Decisions in the United States and China

According to the resource‐based view of the firm, competitive advantages arise from control and deployment of productive resources that are rare and difficult to imitate. Through early entry, pioneers can gain preferential access to key resources. However, the value of that access depends on the presence of isolating mechanisms that limit or prevent competitive imitation. Isolating mechanisms increase the desirability of early entry by lengthening the time horizon over which the firm can earn Ricardian rents on those resources. To explore these implications of the resource‐based view, this study examines the impact of isolating mechanisms on pioneer advantages by analyzing the market entry timing decisions of 209 U.S. and 302 Chinese entrepreneurs. We hypothesize that the stronger intellectual property and legal protections available in the United States are an isolating mechanism that should increase the perceived importance of differentiation and cost advantages in the United States relative to China. Consistent with this argument, we find evidence that the relationships between the number of successful first‐mover decisions and (1) perceived pioneer differentiation advantages and (2) perceived cost advantages are relatively stronger in the United States than in China. We also argue that the importance of personal relationships in China constitutes an isolating mechanism that should increase the perceived importance of preemptive pioneer advantages in China relative to the United States. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that the coefficient linking perceptions of pioneer preemptive advantages with the number of successful first‐mover decisions is significant in the Chinese sample and not in the U.S. sample, but the difference between these coefficients is not significant. These results provide support for the argument that the availability of strong IP and legal protection encourages early entry decisions by entrepreneurs because these protections enhance the pioneer's ability to build a differentiated position in the minds of target customers and secure a cost advantage over later entrants. The results also support the argument that strong personal connections and the practice of reciprocity play a key role in the success of Chinese entrepreneurs.     

Shared knowledge and product design glitches in integrated product development

Product development processes based on the joint collaboration of the cross-functional team, suppliers, and customers can minimize project glitches. Glitches in the product development project can cause project cost over-runs and delay a project past when first mover advantages are possible. While previous theoretical work has suggested a negative relationship between shared knowledge and product development glitches, empirical studies have not identified how different types of shared knowledge are associated with each other and the design glitches. This study proposes a model of the relationship between specific types of shared knowledge and design glitches in integrated product development (IPD) projects. We test our model using a sample of 191 projects from the automotive industry in the United States. The major findings were that: (1) shared knowledge of the development process can be built by improving a team's shared knowledge of customers, suppliers, and internal capabilities, (2) shared knowledge of the development process for a project reduces product design glitches, and (3) reduced product design glitches improve product development time, cost, and customer satisfaction.     

Toward a Model of New Product Preannouncement Timing

For products and services ranging from software to the latest motion picture, the use of new product preannouncements (NPPAs) has become commonplace. In the weeks and months (and perhaps years) before the release of a new product, a company may share information with various groups, including customers, competitors, and producers of complementary products. These prelaunch communications serve various purposes—for example, building interest for the new product, obtaining feedback from customers, or encouraging consumers to delay purchases until the new product becomes available. Despite the key role that NPPAs play in the successful release of new products, however, almost no research has been conducted to explore the proper timing for such communications. Bryan Lilly and Rockney Walters provide a starting point for these investigations, by describing the elements of an NPPA and presenting a model of the factors that influence NPPA timing. Drawing on existing research and interviews with managers from firms in a wide range of industries, they offer insights into the nature and the timing of NPPAs, and they provide recommendations for improving the effectiveness of NPPAs. Their conceptual model lists four sets of factors that affect NPPA timing: expected reactions of competitors; product-related factors, such as the product's complexity and innovativeness; buyer-related factors, such as the length of the buying process; and firm-related factors, including final determination of the product's feature set. The relative strength of these effects depends on the objectives and the audience for the NPPA. For example, a late NPPA—that is, one close to the product's release date—effectively shields a new product from rapid competitive responses. On the other hand, an early NPPA allows channel members and customers to gain familiarity with complex or innovative products. Their findings suggest that early NPPAs are most appropriate for complex or highly innovative products as well as those that carry high, but avoidable switching costs for buyers. Late NPPAs are recommended if the firm expects sales of the new product to cannibalize those of existing products. Late NPPAs are also appropriate if a product's feature set is not yet frozen. To improve the effectiveness of NPPAs, managers must clearly define their objectives and carefully match the timing and the content of the NPPA to the target audience.     

The Contribution of In‐house and External Design Activities to Product Market Performance

Design may be seen as one of several key factors contributing to new product development, along with research and development, marketing, manufacturing, purchasing, etc. More and more, creative design comes to the fore, and many companies believe that superior design will be the key to winning customers. It has the ability to create corporate distinctiveness and also possesses the potential to give a product an individual or new look. Furthermore, the model of open innovation suggests that firms can and should use external and internal knowledge flows in order to create valuable ideas, and also internal and external paths to the market. Also, in the design process, a common trend toward external design skills has emerged in recent years. Due to cost and control factors, firms are increasingly outsourcing design activities. By using a sample of Belgian companies, this paper explores the contribution of design activities to product market performance. While there is mounting evidence that design can be seen as a strategic tool to successfully spur sales of new product developments at the firm level, the topic of design innovation has not yet been linked to the open innovation concept. In this paper, it is empirically tested whether design activities conducted in house differ in their contribution to new product sales from externally acquired design. So, do design activities that have been developed only with internal resources lead to a greater success than those that have been carried out with external sources of knowledge? Using a large cross‐section of manufacturing and service firms, the effects on sales of products new to the market and of imitations or significantly improved products of the firm are investigated. At first glance, the findings indicate that externally acquired design is not superior to in‐house design activities: the results show that only design activities that are mainly conducted with internal knowledge sources play a crucial role regarding the product innovation's success with market novelties. Design conducted in collaboration with external partners, however, has no significant influence. This is not the case for imitations, that is, products only new to the firm. Their success is also influenced by design activities developed with external collaborators. This effect is robust for several modifications of the model specification. In contrast to earlier literature on new technological developments, this paper argues that external design may not affect the sales of market novelties as the “market news” may spill over quickly to rivals through common suppliers including external designers.     

First Product Success: A Mediated Moderating Model of Resources,Founding Team Startup Experience,and Product‐Positioning Strategy

The success of the first product is of paramount importance for the future development of the new venture. Developing and launching a first product in the Chinese market is even more challenging than in a well‐developed market economy because of weak enforcement of intellectual property laws, a general consumer distrust of new products developed by Chinese firms, and the immediate threat of copycat. This article develops a mediated moderating model to examine first product success in Chinese new ventures, in which product‐positioning strategy (conceptualized as the degree of product differentiation) mediates the impacts of marketing resources, technical resources, and founding team startup experience on product success (conceptualized as timing of product launch and product market and financial performance). Furthermore, we argue that founding team startup experience moderates the impact of marketing and technical resources on building strong product‐positioning strategy. We test our conceptual model using a sample of 909 new products developed by 909 Chinese new ventures in a two‐step selection model. The empirical results provide important insight for new ventures' first product development. Product differentiation does not mediate the impact of marketing resource on product success; but it fully mediates the impact of technical resources on timing of product launch and partially mediates the impact of technical resources on product performance. Marketing resources have significant direct positive effects on both product performance and timing of product launch. Surprisingly, the impacts of marketing resources on product differentiation and product performance are negatively, not positively, moderated by founding team experience. When the founding team has nine years or less startup experience, an increase in marketing resources leads to a significant increase in product differentiation; and when the founding team has more than nine years of startup experience, an increase in marketing resources will not lead to an increase in product differentiation. The impact of marketing resources on product performance is smaller for founding teams with more prior startup experience than those with less prior startup experience. The impacts of technical resources are not moderated by founding team startup experience. Technical resources positively affect product market and financial performance directly as well as through its positive impacts on product differentiation. However, technical resources can negatively affect timing of the product launch because developing a highly differentiated produce can potentially delay the launch of the product. Therefore, new ventures have to be mindful in managing the available resources to succeed in the first product development.     

Second Mover Advantage and Entry Timing

We describe a model of entry timing assuming that a second mover can benefit from observing the experience of a first mover. We focus on how market attractiveness characteristics such as size and cost affect the time until first entry. The effects depend on whether the number of participants is exogenous or endogenous. In the former case, a more attractive market leads to earlier entry. In the latter case, it leads to later entry. Treating the number of firms as an integer, free entry leads to non‐monotone, but testable, effects of market attractiveness on entry timing.