The asymmetric effects of uncertainty on inflation and output growth

We study the effects of growth volatility and inflation volatility on average rates of output growth and inflation for post‐war US data. Our results suggest that increased growth uncertainty is associated with significantly lower average growth, while higher inflation uncertainty is significantly negatively correlated with lower output growth and lower average inflation. Both inflation and growth display evidence of significant asymmetric response to positive and negative shocks of equal magnitude. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inflation Uncertainty, Output Growth Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Performance

We use a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditionally heteroskedastic (GARCH) model of inflation and output growth to examine the causality relationship among nominal uncertainty, real uncertainty and macroeconomic performance measured by the inflation and output growth rates. The application of the constant conditional correlation GARCH(1,1) model leads to a number of interesting conclusions. First, inflation does cause negative welfare effects, both directly and indirectly, i.e. via the inflation uncertainty channel. Secondly, in some countries, more inflation uncertainty provides an incentive to Central Banks to surprise the public by raising inflation unexpectedly. Thirdly, in contrast to the assumptions of some macroeconomic models, business cycle variability and the rate of economic growth are related. More variability in the business cycle leads to more output growth.     

Inflationary equilibrium in a stochastic economy with independent agents

We prove the existence of stationary monetary equilibrium with inflation in a “Bewley” model with constant aggregate real variables but with idiosyncratic shocks to the endowments of a continuum of individual agents, when a central bank stands ready to borrow or lend fiat money at a fixed nominal rate of interest and the agents face borrowing constraints. We also find that, in the presence of real micro uncertainty about individual endowments, the rate of inflation is higher (equivalently, the real rate of interest is lower) than it would be in a “certainty-equivalent economy”; to wit, one in which every agent’s endowment is replaced by its expected value. Thus, underlying microeconomic uncertainty and borrowing constraints are shown to generate additional inflation.     

The Measurement and Behavior of Uncertainty: Evidence from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters

We examine matched point and density forecasts of output growth, inflation and unemployment from the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters. We construct measures of uncertainty from individual histograms, and find that the measures display countercyclical behavior and have increased across all forecast horizons since 2007. We also derive measures of forecast dispersion and forecast accuracy, and find that they are not reliable proxies for uncertainty. There is, however, evidence of a meaningful co‐movement between uncertainty and aggregate point predictions for output growth and unemployment. These results are robust to changes in the composition of the survey respondents over time. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The current economic outlook is dominated by fears of continued industrial unrest and uncertainty regarding wage increases. The key issues for output and expenditure will be the outcome of the almost inevitable conflict between the monetary objectives and wage inflation. The most recent indicators provide some evidence of the type of problems the economy will face during 1979. The figures for industrial output and consumption suggest that, by end of 1978, the growth of output was slowing down and the figures for wholesale and retail prices suggest that inflation was picking up. Adherence to the monetary targets is already, on a short-term basis, requiring little or no growth in the real money supply and accompanying high interest rates. The latest official longer-term indicators also point to a slowdown in domestic demand.
Inflation would probably have increased by now had it not been for the recent tight monetary policy and the resulting stability of the exchange rate. We have earlier argued that earnings increases of about 12% will be consistent with the current financial background. But earnings increases of 15% or more will put extreme pressure on the company sector and would bring into sharp focus the choice between finanacing wage increases and letting the exchange rate fall with resulting higher inflation rates: or holding the monetary targets and accepting the short-term consequences for output and unemployment.     

Some empirical evidence on the real effects of nominal volatility

It has been argued that volatility in nominal macroeconomic aggregates has had a negative effect on real output, in particular that such volatility contributed to slow output growth in the early 1980s. This paper reexamines the effects of volatility in nominal macroeconomic aggregates in the context of a modern simultaneous equation framework where the volatility of, nominal macroeconomic variables is modeled as the conditional variance of two variables of interest: the federal funds rate and inflation. The empirical framework is the recently developed multivariate GARCH-in-mean vector autoregressive model. We confirm evidence that inflation volatility and tight monetary policy have directly affected output growth, but find that volatility in the federal funds rate has not.     

Forecasting macroeconomic risks

We construct risks around consensus forecasts of real GDP growth, unemployment, and inflation. We find that risks are time-varying, asymmetric, and partly predictable. Tight financial conditions forecast downside growth risk, upside unemployment risk, and increased uncertainty around the inflation forecast. Growth vulnerability arises as the conditional mean and conditional variance of GDP growth are negatively correlated: downside risks are driven by lower mean and higher variance when financial conditions tighten. Similarly, employment vulnerability arises as the conditional mean and conditional variance of unemployment are positively correlated, with tighter financial conditions corresponding to higher forecasted unemployment and higher variance around the consensus forecast.     

Evaluating predictive densities of US output growth and inflation in a large macroeconomic data set

We evaluate conditional predictive densities for US output growth and inflation using a number of commonly-used forecasting models that rely on large numbers of macroeconomic predictors. More specifically, we evaluate how well conditional predictive densities based on the commonly-used normality assumption fit actual realizations out-of-sample. Our focus on predictive densities acknowledges the possibility that, although some predictors can cause point forecasts to either improve or deteriorate, they might have the opposite effect on higher moments. We find that normality is rejected for most models in some dimension according to at least one of the tests we use. Interestingly, however, combinations of predictive densities appear to be approximated correctly by a normal density: the simple, equal average when predicting output growth, and the Bayesian model average when predicting inflation.     

Evaluating Point and Density Forecasts of DSGE Models

This paper investigates the accuracy of forecasts from four dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models for inflation, output growth and the federal funds rate using a real‐time dataset synchronized with the Fed's Greenbook projections. Conditioning the model forecasts on the Greenbook nowcasts leads to forecasts that are as accurate as the Greenbook projections for output growth and the federal funds rate. Only for inflation are the model forecasts dominated by the Greenbook projections. A comparison with forecasts from Bayesian vector autoregressions shows that the economic structure of the DSGE models which is useful for the interpretation of forecasts does not lower the accuracy of forecasts. Combining forecasts of several DSGE models increases precision in comparison to individual model forecasts. Comparing density forecasts with the actual distribution of observations shows that DSGE models overestimate uncertainty around point forecasts. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE REAL WAGE GAP

Over the past year a gap has opened up between the growth of manufacturing productivity and that of real wages. This gap cannot persist indefinitely, but it can be closed in many different ways. The best that can happen is that wage settlements fall while output and productivity accelerate. The worst outcome would be continued stagnation of real output and no deceleration of wages, in which case the required productivity improvement would have to come about through renewed labour shedding. There are worrying signs that this has started to happen. An intermediate solution might involve a fall in the exchange rate, with some improvement in competitiveness boosting real output (so that UK producers get a larger share of buoyant consumer spending) and some rise in prices holding back real wages.
We continue to believe that the most likely outcome is a rise in output and a fall in the rate of wage settlements. In our June forecast this occurs despite a fall in the real exchange rate. In these circumstances we expect the growth of unit labour costs to fall back from its current high level so that the current 3 per cent inflation rate becomes a true "core" rate. But a moderate fall in the real exchange rate may prove hard to achieve, especially if the oil price continues to weaken. We therefore explore what would happen if the required depreciation happens more rapidly, so that interest rates have to remain high to prevent it getting out of control. In this case we would expect lower growth and higher inflation than we forecast in June.     

Optimal monetary policy under incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty: A long-run perspective

This paper examines the role of monetary policy in an environment with aggregate risk and incomplete markets. In a two-period overlapping-generations model with aggregate uncertainty, optimal monetary policy attains the ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation. This policy aims to stabilize the savings rate in the economy by changing real returns of nominal bonds via variation in expected inflation. Optimal expected inflation is procylical and on average higher than without uncertainty. Simple inflation targeting rules closely approximate the optimal monetary policy.     

ARE EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF MACROECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY ALIKE?

Abstract There is a plethora of time series measures of uncertainty for inflation and real output growth in empirical studies but little is known whether they are comparable to the uncertainty measure reported by individual forecasters in the survey of professional forecasters. Are these two measures of uncertainty inherently distinct? This paper shows that, compared with many uncertainty proxies produced by time series models, the use of real‐time data with fixed‐sample recursive estimation of an asymmetric bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model yields inflation uncertainty estimates which resemble the survey measure. There is, however, overwhelming evidence that many of the time series measures of growth uncertainty exceed the level of uncertainty obtained from survey measure. Our results highlight the relative merits of using different methods in modelling macroeconomic uncertainty which are useful for empirical researchers.     

Inflation targeting and monetary policy in Canada: What is the impact on inflation uncertainty?

Inflation uncertainty has been demonstrated both theoretically and empirically to lower real output. This paper examines the impact of inflation targeting in Canada on inflation uncertainty, as well as persistence. Our results indicate that inflation targeting lowered inflation persistence, but actually increased uncertainty. Such an effect may be due to the failure of the previous formal target, the M1 money supply, to successfully combat inflation.     

Oil exports and the Iranian economy

This paper presents an error-correcting macroeconometric model for the Iranian economy estimated using a new quarterly data set over the period 1979Q1–2006Q4. It builds on a recent paper by the authors, Esfahani, Mohaddes, and Pesaran (in press), which develops a theoretical long-run growth model for major oil exporting economies. The core variables included in this paper are real output, real money balances, inflation, exchange rate, oil exports, and foreign real output, although the role of investment and consumption are also analysed in a sub-model. The paper finds clear evidence for the existence of two long-run relations: an output equation as predicted by the theory and a standard real money demand equation with inflation acting as a proxy for the (missing) market interest rate. The results show that real output in the long run is influenced by oil exports and foreign output. However, it is also found that inflation has a significant negative long-run effect on real GDP, which is suggestive of economic inefficiencies and is matched by a negative association between inflation and the investment–output ratio. Finally, the results of impulse responses show that the Iranian economy adjusts quite quickly to the shocks in foreign output and oil exports, which could be partly due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of Iran's financial markets.     

Forecasting and forecast narratives: The Bank of England Inflation Reports

We analyze the narratives that accompany the numerical forecasts in the Bank of England’s Quarterly Inflation Reports, 1997–2018. We focus on whether the narratives contain useful information about the future course of key macro variables over and above the point predictions, in terms of whether the narratives can be used to enhance the accuracy of the numerical forecasts. We also consider whether the narratives are able to predict future changes in the numerical forecasts. We find that a measure of sentiment derived from the narratives can predict the errors in the numerical forecasts of output growth, but not of inflation. We find no evidence that past changes in sentiment predict subsequent changes in the point forecasts of output growth or of inflation, but do find that the adjustments to the numerical output growth forecasts have a systematic element.     

Measuring output gap nowcast uncertainty

We propose a methodology for gauging the uncertainty in output gap nowcasts across a large number of commonly-deployed vector autoregressive (VAR) specifications for inflation and the output gap. Our approach utilises many output gap measures to construct ensemble nowcasts for inflation using a linear opinion pool. The predictive densities for the latent output gap utilise weights based on the ability of each specification to provide accurate probabilistic forecasts of inflation. In an application based on US real-time data, nowcasting over the out-of-sample evaluation period from 1991q2 to 2010q1, we demonstrate that a system of bivariate VARs produces well-calibrated ensemble densities for inflation, in contrast to univariate autoregressive benchmarks. The implied nowcast densities for the output gap are multimodal and indicate a considerable degree of uncertainty. For example, we assess the probability of a negative output gap at around 45% between 2004 and 2007. Despite the Greenspan policy regime, there still remained a substantial risk that the nowcast for output was below potential in real time. We extend our methodology to include distinct output gap measures, based on alternative filters, and show that, in our application, the nowcast density for the output gap is sensitive to the detrending method.     

LOWER OIL PRICES AND THE UK ECONOMY

Demand for oil remains weak, and OPEC production is running ahead of quota in most member countries, so the possibility that oil prices could fall in the near future has increased. In this Forecast Release we examine the medium-term impact on the UK economy of lower oil prices. We find that, if the government does not intervene to protect the exchange rate, there is an immediate stimulus to output growth. The inflation rate, though, is 1–2 percentage points higher after three years.     

Replication of Grier,Henry, Olekalns and Shields (2004): the Asymmetric Effects of Uncertainty on Inflation and Output Growth

In their influential work Grier et al.(The asymmetric effects of uncertainty on inflation and output growth. Journal of Applied Econometrics 2004; 19 : 551–565) examine the effects of growth and inflation uncertainties on their average rates. The current study replicates their main results and performs a similar analysis on a more recent dataset. Their findings are confirmed to a large extent. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Euro area real-time density forecasting with financial or labor market frictions

We compare real-time density forecasts for the euro area using three DSGE models. The benchmark is the Smets and Wouters model, and its forecasts of real GDP growth and inflation are compared with those from two extensions. The first adds financial frictions and expands the observables to include a measure of the external finance premium. The second allows for the extensive labor-market margin and adds the unemployment rate to the observables. The main question that we address is whether these extensions improve the density forecasts of real GDP and inflation and their joint forecasts up to an eight-quarter horizon. We find that adding financial frictions leads to a deterioration in the forecasts, with the exception of longer-term inflation forecasts and the period around the Great Recession. The labor market extension improves the medium- to longer-term real GDP growth and shorter- to medium-term inflation forecasts weakly compared with the benchmark model.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: EARNINGS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CAR INDUSTRY: THE BEST AND WORST OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

The Chancellor has described the cost in terms of lost output and higher unemployment of getting inflation down as ‘well worth paying’. Yet the trade-off so far is a miserable 1.25 per cent off the underlying rate of growth of earnings for an unemployment increase approaching 600,000, some 2–3 per cent off the underlying rate of inflation for a 3 per cent drop in GDP and a 7 per cent fall in manufacturing output. The question is clear: why is it that in the UK we seem to have to pay such a high price in terms of lost output and higher unemployment to make only modest progress on reducing wage and price inflation? One possible answer is in terms of the NAIRU; another stems from the way in which we measure retail price inflation. Using the example of the car industry as a backdrop, we examine the relationship between unemployment and inflation and ask whether there is a role for government to play in improving the trade-off. Our conclusion is that the present non-interventionist stance is probably appropriate but that the government should be doing more to educate both sides of the wage bargain - a challenge picked up by the Prime Minister in his recent speech to the CBI. This is especially appropriate at the present time, because price inflation is falling but wage inflation is lagging behind. It is not a cut in real wages that is required but an equi-proportionate deceleration in both wages and prices. By joining the ERM, we will ultimately obtain German rates of inflation; low wage settlements would both shorten the time-scale and reduce the unemployment cost of convergence.