董事会治理效率:成因与特征研究——来自中国上市公司的数据

董事会是公司治理系统的核心 ,其运作效率对于公司业绩与持续发展具有决定性作用。本文提出了董事会治理的概念框架 ,并运用中国上市公司数据进行了实证研究 ,试图揭示董事会治理的效率成因与效率特征 ,为中国上市公司改善董事会治理提供经验参照。     

论供应链信任治理机制

本文分析了供应链治理的特点,在论述信任机制是供应链治理的基本机制的基础上,建构了一种多层次的供应链信任治理结构体系,即由供应链信任评审机制、信任产生机制以及信任保障机制三方面组成供应链信任治理机制体系。     

信任与家族企业治理

家族企业是家族资产占控股地位、家族规则与企业规则的结合体。它的所有权和控制权表现为一种连续的状况 ,包括从所有权与控制权不可分离的紧密持有形式到企业上市后 ,家庭成员对资产和经营管理保持临界控制权的企业。     

中国商业银行董事会治理实证研究

商业银行不同于其他企业,董事会治理对于商业银行具有特别重要的意义。本文通过上市银行的实证分析,试图对中国商业银行董事会治理进行研究,为中国商业银行治理提供理论帮助和实践范式。     

论董事会特征与自愿性信息披露——来自深市国有上市公司的经验证据

以深市国有上市公司为例,实证分析了四个董事会特征与自愿性披露水平的关系。通过使用自愿性披露水平的衡量指标——信息披露指数,研究发现独立董事人数、第一大股东所派董事人数、执行董事人数均与披露水平显著地正相关,董事会规模与披露水平负相关,但并不显著。另外,公司规模与披露水平显著正相关,而银行借款水平则与此显著负相关。研究表明,应该继续完善独立董事制度,同时需要审慎思考第一大股东对上市公司信息披露行为的影响。     

论董事会特征与自愿性信息披露——来自深市国有上市公司的经验证据

以深市国有上市公司为例,实证分析了四个董事会特征与自愿性披露水平的关系。通过使用自愿性披露水平的衡量指标——信息披露指数,研究发现独立董事人数、第一大股东所派董事人数、执行董事人数均与披露水平显著地正相关,董事会规模与披露水平负相关,但并不显著。另外,公司规模与披露水平显著正相关,而银行借款水平则与此显著负相关。研究表明,应该继续完善独立董事制度,同时需要审慎思考第一大股东对上市公司信息披露行为的影响。     

高管薪酬、董事会治理与分类转移

本文研究了高管薪酬和董事会治理对分类转移的影响。研究表明,货币薪酬会诱使高管向上转移利得,股权激励和缺乏区分度的薪酬制度会诱使高管同时向下转移费用和向上转移利得;而勤勉、独立和两职分离的董事会能够在一定程度上识别并抑制这两种不同方式的分类转移;但董事会对分类转移的抑制程度小于高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发程度。进一步地,良好的市场、法制和媒体监督环境能够有效缓解高管薪酬对分类转移的诱发作用,而董事会能够有效弥补法制建设和媒体监督不足导致的分类转移治理缺陷,并在较高质量的审计环境下对分类转移发挥更强的抑制作用。本文首次结合制度背景和媒体监督研究了公司核心治理机制对不同分类转移方式的影响和原因,并创新性地对向上转移利得的程度进行了衡量,为监管部门及公司治理机制、会计准则的制定者提供经验证据。     

消费者认知信任影响因素分析

伴随我国市场经济的快速发展,市场竞争不断加剧,部分企业为提高产品利润,逐渐忽视了企业诚信的价值.所以企业失信而引发的纠纷在不断增多,这势必会极大损害消费者对企业的信任,进而影响企业的生存发展.企业要想在激烈的市场竞争环境中实现持续健康发展,还需重视消费者的信任度,努力赢得消费者信任.因此,为了引导企业有效赢得消费者信任...     

董事会建设、政治治理与职业经理人制度——基于国有企业改革案例的比较分析

本文从我国国有企业公司治理的理论和实践出发,首先阐明了我国国有企业公司治理的特殊属性和改革方向,之后从职业经理人制度设计如何处理好国有企业董事会、党组织、职业经理人及其他治理主体关系的角度,对某国有企业推进两家不同性质的成员企业试点职业经理人制度的实践过程进行比较分析,以期为国有企业试点推广职业经理人制度提供更坚实的理...     

董事会权力结构比较研究——兼论对我国公司治理的借鉴意义

董事会是公司权力执行机关 ,具有股东与公司在权力上的承接关系。但由于信息不对称 ,可能导致董事滥用权力造成损害性后果 ,且股东及监事的监督作用又具有滞后性。因此 ,对发达国家公司法律制度与我国制度现状进行有效评析 ,借鉴与设计有效的董事会内部权力制衡构架 ,对完善我国公司治理结构具有现实意义。     

Corporate governance and family business performance

Family business continuity plans commonly establish a governance structure for the family and for the family business. The purpose of those structures is to improve strategy and control mechanisms of the family business and, to organize the communication and relationship between family owners and business executives. This research focuses on assessing the impact of those structures on family business performance. Specifically, the study assesses the impact a professional board of directors has on a company's performance. The research team selected a set of 22 family businesses. Some of these families have undergone a process of developing a family protocol over the last seven years. The authors captured the relevant information for this research by sending out a survey to each family member and to each non-family director or executive.     

股权结构、董事会特征与会计信息质量关系的实证研究——来自A股上市公司的经验证据

选取2001-2005年期间被我国证券监督委员会公开处罚的财务报告舞弊的上市公司为研究样本,并选取了股权结构、董事会特征等方面的10个指标,对公司治理结构与会计信息舞弊的关系进行实证研究。研究发现:独立董事比例、审计委员会的设置与会计舞弊显著负相关,董事会规模、控制股东的性质、监事会规模与会计舞弊显著正相关。     

安徽省上市公司董事会治理与公司绩效关系的实证研究

以安徽省上市公司为研究样本,对董事会治理与公司绩效的关系进行实证分析,结果表明:适当的董事会规模、董事薪酬与董事持股比例对公司绩效有积极作用;独立董事比例、董事会领导权结构与董事变更对公司绩效影响不显著;过多的董事会会议不利于公司绩效的提高。     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Has It Brought About Changes in the Boards of Large U. S. Corporations?

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is considered by many to have made the most sweeping changes affecting corporate governance since the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934. About 4 years after its passing, however, many governance experts question whether the time and expense of compliance engender any real reforms. This article examines whether corporations have restructured their boards in response to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and finds evidence that companies are implementing changes that should strengthen the monitoring ability of their boards.     

Ethics Programs, Board Involvement, and Potential Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Governance

Board composition, insider participation on compensation committees, and director compensation practices can potentially cause conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders. If these corporate governance structures result in situations where actions beneficial to directors do not also benefit shareholders, then shareholders may suffer.Corporate ethics programs usually address conflicts of interest that may arise in the firm's activities. Some boards of directors take active roles in their firms' ethics programs by actively overseeing the programs. This paper empirically examines the relationship between ethics programs and potential conflicts of interest and the relationship between board involvement in a firm's ethics program and potential conflicts of interest.Evidence in this paper shows that firms with ethics programs have a lower percentage of inside directors on their compensation committees than do firms without ethics programs. Firms in which boards are actively involved in the programs have more independent boards (higher percentage of independent directors and lower percentage of inside directors) and are more likely to compensate outside directors with equity than are firms in which boards are not actively involved in the programs. Supplemental analyses show that the incidence of potential conflicts of interest is not significantly different between firms without ethics programs and firms in which boards are not actively involved in the programs. Taken together, the evidence in this paper indicates that a board actively involved in an ethics program, and not the simple existence of an ethics program, is related to the incidence of potential conflicts of interest.     

Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance

The monitoring role performed by the board of directors is an important corporate governance control mechanism, especially in countries where external mechanisms are less well developed. The gender composition of the board can affect the quality of this monitoring role and thus the financial performance of the firm. This is part of the “business case” for female participation on boards, though arguments may also be framed in terms of ethical considerations. While the issue of board gender diversity has attracted growing research interest in recent years, most empirical results are based on U.S. data. This article adds to a growing number of non-U.S. studies by investigating the link between the gender diversity of the board and firm financial performance in Spain, a country which historically has had minimal female participation in the workforce, but which has now introduced legislation to improve equality of opportunities. We investigate the topic using panel data analysis and find that gender diversity – as measured by the percentage of women on the board and by the Blau and Shannon indices – has a positive effect on firm value and that the opposite causal relationship is not significant. Our study suggests that investors in Spain do not penalise firms which increase their female board membership and that greater gender diversity may generate economic gains.     

基于政治关联的国有企业董事会结构与公司治理效率分析

本文以我国地方控股国有上市公司为研究样本,实证研究检验了公司与政府之间的政治关联对公司董事会结构和公司治理效率的影响。研究发现我国国有公司的政治关联水平对董事会结构存在显著的负面影响,政治关联主要通过影响地方控股国有上市公司董事会的"人文结构"特征而弱化公司治理的效率。     

公司治理机制对公司现金持有量的影响——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国部分上市公司为样本实证研究了公司治理机制对公司现金持有量的影响。结果表明,公司治理机制并未对公司现金持有量形成显著影响,从公司现金持有量的视角为我国上市公司治理机制的不完善性提供了经验证据。     

Women’s Roles on U.S. Fortune 500 Boards: Director Expertise and Committee Memberships

This study examines the presence and roles of female directors of U.S. Fortune 500 firms, focusing on committee assignments and director background. Prior work from almost two decades ago concludes that there is a systematic bias against females in assignment to top board committees. Examining a recent data set with a logistic regression model that controls for director and firm characteristics, director resource-dependence roles and interaction between director gender and director characteristics, we find that female directors are less likely than male directors to sit on executive committees and more likely than male directors to sit on public affairs committees. There is little if any evidence of systematic gender bias in director assignment to other board committees. We find some evidence that boards evaluate resource dependence differently for women than men. Craig A. Peterson Western Michigan University, Grand Rapios, MI 49503, USA Craig A. Peterson is associate professor of finance at Western Michigan University, Grand Rapids Regional Center. In addition to corporate governance, his research interests include investment management and corporate finance. James Philpot is assistant professor of finance and general business at Missouri State University. His research interests include corporate governance, financial planning and financial education.