A risk assessment model for banks

Summary. This paper proposes a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction among banks, where the actual risk an individual bank bears also depends on its interaction with other banks and investors. We develop a two-period general equilibrium model with three active heterogeneous banks, incomplete markets, and endogenous default. The model is calibrated against UK banking data and therefore can be implemented as a risk assessment tool for regulators and central banks. We address the impact of monetary and regulatory policy, credit and capital shocks in the real and financial sectors.We are grateful to Lea Zicchino, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the Bank of England, and the third Conference in Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Syros, for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England.This revised version was published online in January 2005 with corrections to the Cover date.     

基于超效率模型的中国商业银行效率评价

DEA方法的C2R模型无法解决对相对有效单元进一步识别的问题,超效率模型通过重新定义生产可能集,从而能够对所有决策单元进行充分评价和排序。本文以四大国有商业银行和11家股份制商业银行为研究样本,利用C2R模型和超效率模型对2001～2003年中国商业银行的经营效率进行了实证分析。结果表明,超效率模型确实能够对所有决策单元进行充分评价和排序。尽管2001～2003年商业银行的整体效率有提高趋势,但仍不尽如人意。光大、民生、招行、浦发、中行表现相对突出,其他还有待提高。股份制商业银行的效率普遍高于国有商业银行。     

Duration gaps with futures and swaps for managing interest rate risk at depository institutions

Duration gaps for depository institutions are derived for economic net worth, economic net income, and book value interest income. The duration gaps previously constructed for on-balance sheet accounts are expanded to off-balance sheet accounts, including futures contracts and swap agreements. These expanded duration gaps are indicators of the sensitivity of the market value of net worth and income measures to interest rate fluctuations. Managers of depository institutions can establish these duration gaps as targets and can utilize futures markets and swap agreements to affect the target values. The developments in this article are based on a single factor model of interest rate movements, but the results can be extended.The work in this article is based partly on Bierwag and Kaufman (1989), a study prepared for and funded by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. We have benefited from comments of discussants and participants at presentations at HEC Jouy-en-Josas, the meetings of the European Finance Association, and seminars at the University of Delaware, Loyola University of Chicago, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Florida State University, and the University of Illinois, Chicago.     

Threshold citation analysis of influential articles,journals, institutions and researchers in accounting

We use a threshold citation approach to measure the influence of articles, journals, institutions and researchers in accounting research. The Journal of Accounting Research, the Journal of Accounting and Economics and Accounting Review are the 3 most influential journals in accounting research. The 3 most influential institutions in accounting research are the University of Chicago, the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Michigan, while the 3 most frequently cited authors in accounting research are Richard G. Sloan, Robert E. Verrecchia and Paul M. Healy.     

Do Central Banks React to House Prices?

We estimate the Federal Reserve's, the Bank of England's, and the Bank of Japan's responses to house prices. We show that generalized method of moments estimates of a Taylor rule augmented with house prices are biased and dispersed. We then use full‐information methods and estimate the policy rule together with a VAR for the nonpolicy variables. These estimates are also biased. We propose an alternative approach and estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model embedded with a monetary rule with a direct response to house prices. We find that house prices played a separate role in the reaction functions of these central banks.     

THE ROBUSTNESS OF ABNORMAL RETURNS FROM THE EARNINGS YIELD CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGY

We examine the sensitivity of the abnormal profitability of the earnings' yield (E/P)‐based contrarian investment strategy to the following two risk measurement issues: (a) return‐measurement interval over which systematic risk is estimated and (b) time variation in systematic risk. We conduct our analysis using the capital asset pricing model to parameterize risk. We find that the estimates of systematic risk of E/P‐ranked portfolios are not sensitive to the return‐measurement interval. Consequently the abnormal profits to the E/P‐based contrarian investment strategy observed in prior studies are not artifacts of the return‐measurement interval. Furthermore, although both the raw and abnormal returns to E/P‐ranked portfolios exhibit mean reversion, time variation in systematic risk ensuing from this mean‐reverting behavior does not substantially affect abnormal profits to E/P‐ranked portfolios. JEL classification: G11, G12, G14     

Optimal portfolios when stock prices follow an exponential Lévy process

We investigate some portfolio problems that consist of maximizing expected terminal wealth under the constraint of an upper bound for the risk, where we measure risk by the variance, but also by the Capital-at-Risk (CaR). The solution of the mean-variance problem has the same structure for any price process which follows an exponential Lévy process. The CaR involves a quantile of the corresponding wealth process of the portfolio. We derive a weak limit law for its approximation by a simpler Lévy process, often the sum of a drift term, a Brownian motion and a compound Poisson process. Certain relations between a Lévy process and its stochastic exponential are investigated.Received: January 2003Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 60F05, 60G51, 60H30, 91B28; secondary: 60E07, 91B70JEL Classification: C22, G11, D81We would like to thank Jan Kallsen and Ralf Korn for discussions and valuable remarks on a previous version of our paper. The second author would like to thank the participants of the Conference on Lévy Processes at Aarhus University in January 2002 for stimulating remarks. In particular, a discussion with Jan Rosinski on gamma processes has provided more insight into the approximation of the variance gamma model.     

An integrated multi-model credit rating system for private firms

This paper presents a integrated credit risk modelling approach for private firms which fulfil 2001 Basel Accord requirements in the case of the adoption of the foundation approach. Our model comprises: (a) a bottom-up technique to initially assess the through-the-cycle one-year Probability of Default (PD) and (b) a top-down approach to refine and calibrate this historical PD in a forward-looking credit risk assessment based on next year’s economic outlook. We present findings from applying this model to a large sample of client firms of the Bank of Rome.     

Internationalization and Stock Market Liquidity*

What is the impact of internationalization (firms raising capital and trading in international markets) on the liquidity of the remaining firms in domestic markets? To address this question, we assemble a panel database of nearly 2,900 firms from 45 emerging economies over the period 1989–2000, constructed from annual and daily data. First, we find evidence of migration. The domestic trading of firms that cross-list or issue depositary receipts in foreign public exchanges tends to decrease, while a significant proportion of their trading activity concentrates in international markets. Second, this migration is negatively related to the liquidity of the remaining firms in their home market through two separate channels. There are liquidity spillovers within markets: Aggregate domestic trading activity is positively associated with the liquidity of individual firms in the same market. Moreover, the proportion of trading abroad is negatively related to the liquidity of firms in the domestic market. * The paper was revised while Schmukler was visiting the IMF Research Department. We thank Tatiana Didier and Juan Carlos Gozzi Valdez for truly outstanding research assistance. We are grateful to Franklin Allen and Marco Pagano for very useful and detailed comments. We also received very helpful suggestions from Gordon Alexander, Luca Benzoni, Stijn Claessens, Peter Henry, Eduardo Loyo, Ugo Panizza, Valery Polknichenko, Helene Rey, Michael Schill, Frank Warnock, two anonymous referees, seminar participants at Dartmouth College, the Econometric Society Meetings (Chile), the NBER IASE Meeting in PUC-Rio (Brazil), the University of Minnesota, the University of Virginia (Darden School of Business), the University of Zurich, and the World Bank. For help with the data, we thank particularly Florencia Moizeszowicz and also Pamela Dottin, Monica Erpen, Dori Flanagan, Marina Halac, Angela Marshall, Konstantinos Tzioumis, Richard Webster-Smith, and Cheryl Workman. Levine is grateful for generous financial support from the BSI Gamma Foundation. Schmukler thanks the World Bank Latin American Regional Studies Program and Research Support Budget for ample financial support. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank.     

Deposit Insurance and Risk Management of the U.S. Banking System: What is the Loss Distribution Faced by the FDIC?

We examine the question of deposit insurance through the lens of risk management by constructing the loss distribution faced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We take a novel approach by arguing that the risk management problem faced by the FDIC is similar to that of a bank managing a loan portfolio, only in the FDIC’s case the risk arises from the potential for loss of the individual banks in its portfolio. We explicitly estimate the cumulative loss distribution of FDIC insured banks using two variations of the Merton model and find that reserves are sufficient to cover roughly 99.85% of the loss distribution, corresponding to about a BBB+ rating. However, under different stress scenarios (higher correlations, fat-tailed bank returns, increased loss severity) that level can be much lower: approximately 96% corresponding to about a B+ rating.JEL classification: G210, G280.Any views expressed represent those of the author only and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.     

When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

We show that asymmetry in bidders’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit auctions in which the final value of the good is common knowledge. This effect appears to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination when there are significant differences between bidders. Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller’s revenue than does the auction type. Consistent with the finding in Sade et al. (2006) that the discriminatory auction is more susceptible to collusion than the uniform-price auction, asymmetry in capacity constraints has a greater impact in discriminatory auctions.We thank Emmanuel Morales-Camargo, Ira Luria and Yelena Larkin for their excellent research assistance. We have benefited from comments by Yishay Yafeh, Eugene Kandel, Dan Levin, David Genesove, Eric Hughson, Steve Rock, Peter Bossaerts, David McAdams two anonymous referees, participants at the 2005 International Meeting of the Economic Science Association in Montreal, the 2006 winter meeting of the Econometric Society in Boston, and seminar participants at the University of Cincinnati, Hebrew University, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Tel-Aviv University, the University of Notre Dame, and Ben-Gurion University. Sade thanks the Israel Science Foundation (ISF 480/05) and the Krueger Center for Finance at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for partial financial support.     

Forecast uncertainty and the Taylor rule

In this paper, we derive a modification of a forward-looking Taylor rule by integrating two variables that measure the uncertainty of inflation and GDP growth forecasts into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model. We show that certainty-equivalence in New Keynesian models is a consequence of log-linearization and that a second-order Taylor approximation leads to a reaction function that includes the uncertainty of macroeconomic expectations. To test the model empirically, we use the standard deviation of individual forecasts around the median Consensus Forecast as a proxy for forecast uncertainty. Our sample covers the euro area, the United Kingdom, and the United States for the period 1990Q1–2016Q4. We find that the Bank of England and the European Central Bank have a significantly negative reaction to inflation forecast uncertainty. Our findings also reveal that the Federal Reserve (Bank of England) lowers (raises) its interest rate in response to higher GDP growth forecast uncertainty. We conclude by offering some implications for optimal monetary policy rules and central bank watchers.     

Nonlinearity in Deviations from Uncovered Interest Parity: An Explanation of the Forward Bias Puzzle

We provide empirical evidence that deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition display significant nonlinearities, consistent with theories based on transactions costs or limits to speculation. This evidence suggests that the forward bias documented in the literature may be less indicative of major market inefficiencies than previously thought. Monte Carlo experiments allow us to reconcile these results with the large empirical literature on the forward bias puzzle since we show that, if the true process of UIP deviations were of the nonlinear form we consider, estimation of conventional spot-forward regressions would generate the anomalies documented in previous research.This paper was partly written while Lucio Sarno was a Visiting Scholar at the International Monetary Fund. Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (Grant No. RES-000-22-0404) is gratefully acknowledged. The authors are indebted for useful conversations or constructive comments to Josef Zechner (editor), three anonymous referees, Ulf Axelson, Magnus Dahlquist, Paul De Grauwe, Hans Dewachter, John Driffill, Bob Flood, Gordon Gemmill, Campbell Harvey, Peter Kenen, Rich Lyons, Angelo Melino, Chris Neely, Anthony Neuberger, Carol Osler, David Peel, Dagfinn Rime, Piet Sercu, Per Str?mberg, Shinji Takagi, Gabriel Talmain, Mark Taylor, Timo Ter?svirta, Dan Thornton, Shang-Jin Wei, Mike Wickens and Mark Wohar, as well as to participants at the 2005 European Finance Association Annual Conference, Moscow; 2004 Society of Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics Annual Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; the 2004 European Financial Management Association Conference, Basel; and seminars at the International Monetary Fund, Swedish Institute for Financial Research, Central Bank of Norway, University of Oxford, Catholic University of Leuven, University ofWarwick, Chinese University of Hong Kong, York University, University of Exeter, University of Kent, and University of Edinburgh. The authors alone are responsible for any errors that may remain and for the views expressed in the paper.     

Capital changes at large affiliated banks

The federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in December 1981. If these guidelines are binding, then banking organizations may respond to the costs of regulation in various ways. If the regulations are not binding, then further reliance may be placed on market discipline. This study develops two models of changes in the equity capital to assets ratio of large banks affiliated with bank holding companies—a regulatory model in which capital regulations are a binding influence and a market model in which financial markets influence capital ratios. The two models are examined empirically through a disequilibrium framework and maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The results suggest that most banks are predominantly influenced by regulatory forces. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Florida State University     

The NAB foreign currency option losses in the context of a disaster myopia model

In this paper the author develops a model that expands on the ‘disaster myopia’ analysis of Guttentag and Herring and provides an eight-stage process which incorporates the ‘availability heuristic’ of Tversky and Kahneman. The eight-stage disaster myopia process might be recognised as a model which encapsulates the key elements of serious bank loss experiences. The model is shown to be consistent in explaining the earlier bank loss experiences such as Barings Bank and Daiwa Bank. In this paper this model is applied to the recent National Australia Bank (NAB) losses in currency option trading and suggestions are made as to how it might be used to improve the processes of corporate governance that appear to be unable to recognise problems early enough.     

A monetary policy feedback rule in Korea's fast-growing economy

In Korea's high-growth economy, the Bank of Korea had been willing to tolerate double-digit inflation, provided that it remained at `non-explosive' levels. In this article, we estimate a monetary policy feedback rule for Korea and find that the upper threshold of tolerable inflation for the Bank of Korea was about 20%. It appears that the Bank of Korea's disciplined, rule-like approach to monetary policy was able to control inflation and keep it away from explosive levels, despite the well-known empirical regularity that inflation becomes more variable at higher levels. After 1983, however, our regime-switching model suggests that the inflation target has been 6%. We also find little evidence that the Bank of Korea has targeted real growth, except for a period in the mid-1980s when industrial production growth suggested that the economy was overheating, relative to an implicit growth target of 7.4%. We conclude with a discussion of possible reasons for Korea to choose to stabilize inflation at lower levels since the mid-1980s.     

Skewness of Returns, Capital Adequacy, and Mortgage Lending

We calibrate a simulation model of credit value-at-risk for mortgage lending to UK experience. Simulations to capture the skewness of returns that might arise in the context of a financial crisis suggest that the IRB calculations of the new Basel Accord can substantially understate prudential capital adequacy. The same model shows that raising capital requirements has only a small impact on bank funding costs. We conclude that Pillar 2 supervisory review should increase capital requirements above IRB levels for secured bank assets—those whose returns can potentially fall furthest, relative to other, normally “riskier” assets, in extreme outcomes. JEL classification: G21, G28, R31. Presented at the December 2003 conference at the University of Tor Vegata, Rome. We are grateful for comments from William Lang, Mario Onarato, Larry Wall, and from an anonymous referee. All errors and omissions are our own responsibility. “The lady doth protest too much, methinks. The Queen's response to the players in Hamlet, Act 3, scene 2.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit

Bank credit has evolved from the traditional relationship banking model to an originate-to-distribute model. We show that the borrowers whose loans are sold in the secondary market underperform their peers by about 9% per year (risk-adjusted) over the three-year period following the initial sale of their loans. Therefore, either banks are originating and selling loans of lower quality borrowers based on unobservable private information (adverse selection), and/or loan sales lead to diminished bank monitoring that affects borrowers negatively (moral hazard). We propose regulatory restrictions on loan sales, increased disclosure, and a loan trading exchange/clearinghouse as mechanisms to alleviate these problems.     

Proposing an interval design feature to Central Bank Digital Currencies

We are witnessing the creation of a new class of financial market products in the form of Central Bank Digital Currencies. While those instruments are still at an embryonic stage and their final form and shape is still unknown, it is already obvious that they are extremely flexible instruments due to their potential digital features. This paper adds to the extensive and rapidly growing literature by proposing a new type of Central Bank Digital Currency with an embedded time-limitation design feature based on a validity interval within which time-period the digital currency is an effective claim against the central bank. We call this interval Central Bank Digital Currency. Focusing on four use cases, we analyze the merits of the proposed interval design feature. We find that there are several potential applications in the context of liquidity management, lending, monetary policy of central banks and derivative transactions. It can be argued that interval CBDC have several potential advantages, including the reduction of counterparty credit risk, enabling remuneration, and enlarging the monetary and fiscal toolkit.