Plant closings: Lessons from the maine experience

This paper discusses the economics behind plant closings, suggests a possible role for public policy to ameliorate the effects of closings in some situations, and reviews Maine's experience with mandatory advance notice of closings and severance payments. The possibility of a less flexible labor market in Maine is noted, as are areas for future research. Finally, the economic and political history of Maine's experience with plant closing legislation is discussed in terms of its implications for similar legislation at the federal level.     

The legal framework of the EC single market

The European single market is underpinned by Community law, which is supreme and directly applicable in national courts. But the UK loses out because of disparities between national legal systems, and because Community law is interpreted to serve the political objective of European unity. There are several possible intermediates between full EU membership and complete withdrawal.
There is no legal barrier to the UK's exit from the EU should it wish to take that step.     

Market models of local government: Exit,voting, and the land market

This paper explores linkages between exit, voting, and the land market that are central to the study of local politics. It raises new questions about the desirability of Tiebout-type governmental structures. Decentralized political and locational choice may not produce an equilibrium solution, and when an equilibrium does exist, the outcome will be dependent upon the historical accidents of community size. The effect of migration on public choices depends on the preferences and incomes of migrants, on the production function for public services, and on the price of land. Migration may lead to public choices that generate more migration in the same or the opposite direction.     

The Euro System as a Laboratory for Neoliberalism: The Case of Spain

Since the 1970s, neoliberalism has evolved from ideology to political agenda, from political program to public policy, and from public policy to a system that replaces democratic control over economic policy with a system of elite economic management. This process of change has been possible due to the endorsement of a meta‐political theory that destroys democracy and legitimizes technocratic despotism, financial deregulation, the debasement of labor into a new proletariat, and the purging of constitutional politics. In this article, we analyze this profound transformation of social and legal relations in the “euro system” and, specifically, in the regressive policies that have emerged from the “crisis” in Spain, a peripheral country of the European Union. The problems in contemporary Europe are a direct consequence of the neoliberal version of European economic unity. Their solution will depend on the capacity of the member states to create a social Europe that strengthens institutional democracy and develops universal systems of social protection. This, in turn, will depend on the ability of citizens to remodel state institutions in accordance with new social goals that place life at the center.     

The Who,Where, What,How and When of Market Entry

This introductory, along with the eight articles contained within this Special Issue, highlights and brings greater clarity to entrant‐incumbent interactions and to firm movement – when entrants traverse market territories for the creation and/or delivery of offerings, where ‘markets’ include service or product categories, technology or resource spaces, industries, sectors and/or geographies. Collectively, this Special Issues explains that firm movement across market boundaries is highly consequential, influencing resource‐capability mixes inside firms, interfirm relations, market logic and industry value chains, and of course, people, communities and even nations. Specifically, we develop a field‐wide perspective of market entry by expanding on the framework of market entry that Zachary and his colleagues developed (Zachary et al., 2015) – i.e., the who (players such as incumbents, entrants, suppliers, etc.), when (the timing and sequence of entry), how (the strategy, resources, capabilities, etc.), where (the space of entry) and what (product, service, business model, etc.) – to include two additional categories: complements (networks, platforms, ecosystems) and non‐market elements (government, political, social and cultural arrangements). We also summarize the eight highly diverse and insightful articles that make this Special Issue, and conclude with a discussion to highlight foundational questions that point to new directions in future research in this field. In sum, we hope to inspire scholars to go beyond counting outcomes (e.g., entry/exit rates, or profiling successful versus unsuccessful entrants), to consider contexts, processes and contingencies (e.g., cost, time, collaboration, competition, interfirm relations, etc.) and to discover boundary conditions that inform a theory of market entry.     

Political exchange in mass party regimes and the transition from socialism

This paper contrasts the east European and the Chinese routes of exit from the Soviet-type economy and argues that a communist regime, if it is to remain in power, cannot renounce state ownership or control of large-scale industry and party control of managerial appointments, careers, and incomes: these two features make up an enforceable, efficient contract for political service in a monopolistic political market. These features were abandoned in the European route and preserved in the Chinese route because of the average versus modal character of party representation and membership in the two groups of countries, so that the modal nature of the Chinese party is the key to the regime’s survival and success under market reform. The approach also explains the failure of Gorbachev’s attempt to export the Chinese model to the Soviet Union in the form of perestroika.     

Survival of Small Firms: Guerrilla Warfare

Duopolistic interaction between a small firm and a large established firm is considered and compared to guerrilla warfare, The paper investigates a "hit and run" equilibrium in which the small firm enters the market, stays there for several periods, exits, stays out for several periods, and then reenters. Occasionally there may be a price war (or retaliation), but the small firm may also exit voluntarily, thereby avoiding possible confrontation. The amount of time that the small firm stays in the market and the timing of the price wars do not follow any predictable pattern, which is part of the mixed strategies that both firms play in equilibrium.     

浙江省新昌县房地产市场分析报告

本文以浙江省新昌县为例,探讨在目前政府严厉的宏观调控政策下经济较为发达的中小县城房地产市场发展状况以及未来城市建设的发展方向。本文以数据分析和市场总体分析为主,通过与周边及相应主要城市进行比较,得出目前新昌县的房价涨跌情况、各类住房供需情况以及未来发展状况。从现阶段看,目前房地产市场呈现量跌价稳的趋势,而未来的发展则逐步呈现供给饱和的态势。建议在未来的发展中以旧城改造以及城中村改造为主,以防止无限制地向城市外围扩张而导致的供给过量问题。     

Applying Game Options in a Loan Exit Model

This study explores market exit decisions of financial institutions into a duopolistic loan in the evaluation concept. A game options approach is used to analyze how uncertainty influences loan decisions. Suppose that the loan market only contains two financial institutions (the leader and follower), and these two roles can be chosen freely. The financial effect for outside shock follows the Poisson downward jump process, and the leader and follower exit the thresholds and are compared to the loan market in the continuous time diffusion process. This study obtains the following results: In the exiting model, the exit costs for the leader are influenced by those of the follower. If the ratio of the leader to follower exit costs is stable, the first-in-first-out or last-in-first-out optimal evaluation models are derived during two financial institutions exiting the loan market.     

Political Leadership,Conflict and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace

The emphasis in constitutional political economy has been that new rules and institutions can be devised that improve the welfare of a society. Given the number of societies that are infected with political conflict and as a result lower levels of welfare, this paper attempts to analyse why we do not see more constitutional conventions aimed at eliminating conflict. The key idea is that expressively motivated group members may create incentives for instrumentally motivated group leaders such that it leads them to choose conflict rather than compromise. Nonetheless, it is not argued that such a peace is impossible to obtain. This leads to a further question, that if such a constitutional agreement could be found, would the expressive perspective alter the conventional instrumental perspective on the sort of constitutional reform that should be undertaken?     

Out of Welfare: Functioning of Income Support in Torino

This paper explores the opportunities provided by a file of longitudinal data regarding income support benefits for able bodied poor in order to understand the functioning of the local social assistance system in Torino. The features of this system, its selective-categorized character and the differences from universalistic systems are analyzed. In this framework, the duration of the periods users receive benefits has been studied by means of event history analysis. The probability of exit from welfare is related to socio-demographic characteristics of recipients. In particular we observe a lower propensity to exit for female headed households and households with children. The probability of exit appears to be affected also by labour market conditions, being higher when these are more favourable. The exit rate does not decrease as time elapsed in welfare moves on. We observe the existence of different styles of assistance among the different social services within the city. Difficulties related to the interpretation of the empirical results, given the selective-categorized features of the social assistance system, are emphasized. Finally, we discuss some theoretical issues about evaluation of income support policies.All the sections of this paper are the result of the cooperation of the authors. Nicola Negri has coordinated the various steps of the work and has written Section 5 with Contini. Nicoletta Bosco has mainly worked with Nicola Negri to prepare the data archive and has written Sections 2 and 3. Dalit Contini has discussed with Negri and Bosco the model of empirical analysis and has implemented it; she has written Sections 4 and 6. All authors share Section 1 and 7.     

CHOICES AND OPPORTUNITIES: Low-Income Rental Housing in Indonesia*

Rental housing is increasingly acknowledged as a valuable housing solution in developing countries and is therefore becoming a focus for policy discussions. This paper describes the rental market in Indonesia based on the results of 60 semi-structured renter-related interviews. It appears that the rental subsector is housing a large and highly varied portion of the urban population quite effectively. The results of this survey indicate that rental units are generally produced on a small scale on or near the same property as the owner's home. The unit construction occurs in increments as funds become available and is rarely financed formally. This represents an easy and flexible form of investment for a group otherwise generally uninterested in placing savings in formal institutions. The typical rental property owner is less motivated by profit accumulations than by the security of a steady supplemental income and the possibility of a future unit for his children. As a result, tenant-landlord relationships tend to be quite casual and family-like, unlike the exploitative relationship often described. Further studies need to explore how future policy could support the activities of the Indonesian rental market and improve the quality of rental units that are being produced.     

The influence of seller learning and time constraints on sequential bargaining in an artificial perishable goods market

This paper investigates the formation of prices in a perishable goods market where agents bargain repeatedly through pair-wise interactions. After extensive field observations, we chose to focus on two aspects that seem important to actors of this market: the passage of time and update in judgement when gathering information. The main feature of the market is that a seller bargaining with a buyer has incomplete information about buyer's willingness to pay and is not sure how her trading partner will evaluate an offer or compare it with other options. On the other hand, buyers have limited time to look for goods and cannot meet all possible sellers before making a decision. Hence agents cannot calculate the best price to offer but receive information through limited interactions, and use this information to choose their actions.An agent-based model was built to represent a framework that mimics the observed market institution and where agent's possible behaviors and learning was made as consistent as possible with gathered data. Simulations were run, first for sensitivity analysis concerning main parameters, then to test the dependance of agents’ learning to (a) the time buyers can spend on the market and (b) the frequency of update in learning by sellers. To validate the model, features produced by the simulated market are compared to the stylized facts gathered for negotiation about four goods. We reproduce the main features of the data on the dynamics of offers, transaction prices and agents’ behavior during the bargaining phases.     

Adolph Löwe's Political Economics: Instrumentalism as Enlightened Intervention

A bstract Adolph Lowe's work was dedicated chiefly to developing "political economics" as a foundation for economic theory and instrumental analysis to direct a politically free economy along the path of economic growth
This paper argues that the public management inherent in instrumentalism is not likely to be acceptable in the U S or the U K, except in national economic emergency Yet, the formerly planned economies of central and eastern Europe, whose history is one of stringent control, may have a political preference for a Lowe type of instrumentalism to avoid the results of uncontrolled market processes
The reception accorded Lowe's political economics by economists, as members of a professional community, reflects their methodological preferences and policy views Those who are skeptical of the market clearing capability of the price mechanism, and explain capitalist development as an ongoing historical process, are more likely to be appreciative of instrumental analysis as a policy tool     

Competition in large markets

This paper evaluates the simplifying assumption that producers compete in a large market without substantial strategic interactions using nonparametric regressions of producers' choices on market size. With such atomistic competition, increasing the number of consumers leaves the distributions of producers' prices and other choices unchanged. In many models featuring non‐trivial strategic considerations, producers' prices fall as their numbers increase. I examine observations of restaurants' sales, seating capacities, exit decisions, and prices from 222 US cities. Given factor prices and demographic variables, increasing a city's size increases restaurants' average sales and decreases their exit rate and prices. These results suggest that strategic considerations lie at the heart of restaurant pricing and turnover. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of political risk on FDI exit decisions

Do political risks drive exit decisions by multinational companies (MNC)? What mechanisms can protect a multinational subsidiary in a host country that is characterized by weak institutions and high political risks? Using multinational plant-level data for Russia in the period 2000-2016 and applying the Cox proportional hazard model, we find significant effects from elevated host-country political risk when we compare the year of entry to the year of exit. MNCs are particularly sensitive to problems associated with law, order, and social conditions in Russia and the presence of the military in politics in the home country. Institutional similarity does not reduce the hazard of exits, and MNCs from high-risk countries exit less when home-country risk increases. Subsidiaries from countries that have imposed sanctions on Russia are less likely to exit, though sanctions interact with host-country risks, making them more severe. Being large and being part of a greenfield project help subsidiaries to build resistance against host-country political risks. These findings provide empirical evidence that support our conclusions regarding foreign direct investment volatility in countries with high risk.     

Is it a Timing or a Probability Effect? Four Simulations and an Application of Transition Rate Models to the Analysis of Unemployment Exit

Among the applications of event history analysis, in the last 10 years the lion's share has been played by proportional transition rate model. This type of models suffers from a major draw-back: it does not allow us to distinguish whether a covariate affects the event timing (the event occurs sooner/later) or the overall probability of the ultimate event occurrence (the chances of occurrence are constantly higher/lower). Thus, a positive/negative effect of a covariate found using a proportional transition rate model might reflect an acceleration/deceleration in the timing of the event and/or a high/low probability of the ultimate event occurrence (Yamaguchi, 1992). This paper shows how this problem can be reformulated in terms of the proportionality/non proportionality of the covariate effects. A twofold solution to disentangle the timing/probability problem is presented: this solution consists of a test of the proportionality of the covariate effects and a computation of the survival function at the end of the time interval studied. Two applications are discussed. The first one is based on four simulated processes. The second is based on an analysis of unemployment exit in Italy, with particular attention being paid to the effects of unemployment benefits. In the conclusion, implications for future applications of event history analysis are discussed.     

A retrospective on the subprime crisis and its aftermath ten years after Lehman’s collapse

This paper reviews the interactions between policymaking, the financial system and the U.S. economy before, during and after the subprime crisis, with particular attention to current controversies about the policy decisions that led to Lehman’s downfall and their lessons for the future. The first part of the paper documents and analyzes the interactions between policy, financial markets and the economy during the acute and subsequent moderate phases of the crisis as well as during the later gradual exit from the zero lower bound and the extremely slow reduction in high powered money and bank reserves. The remaining parts develop alternative aspects of the thesis that mutual uncertainties inflicted by financial institutions on policymakers and by the latter on financial markets were at the root of the non-negligible surprises that the crisis inflicted on everybody. In particular, it discusses the political economy of bailout operations, reviews and evaluates recent controversies about the reasons for not rescuing Lehman Brothers, and informally presents the structure and policy lessons from a general equilibrium model of the financial sector highlighting the consequences of policy actions that have raised (Knightian) bailout uncertainty. The last section takes a brief look ahead and discusses some longer term consequences of the crisis.     

我国私募股权基金退出机制现状、问题及对策

按照私募股权基金(PE)退出方式的主次,分别从首次公开募投(IPO)退出、并购退出、其他退出三个层面对我国PE退出现状进行了实证考察。分析结果显示,IPO退出方式收益可观,因而是PE的首选退出方式。近年来,IPO在政策影响下受阻,导致PE机构变现压力越来越大。在此形势下,我国PE市场亟待开辟新的退出渠道。但是,我国PE市场的退出机制存在场外市场不发达、中介服务体系不完善、PE二级市场功能缺位等主要问题。因此,本文从加快发展新三板,完善多层次资本市场;完善PE市场的中介服务体系;完善PE二级市场,这三个方面提出开辟新退出渠道的措施。     

A City Divided by Political Philosophies: Residential Development in a Bi-Provincial City in Canada

This paper examines the impact of two distinct political ideologies on the development of residential dwellings, particularly single-family residences, in Lloydminster, a bi-provincial city in Canada. Lloydminster is a city of about 22,000 which straddles the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. The two provinces are recognized for the dissimilarities in their political orientations. These dissimilarities are reflected in different taxation policies, different Medicare and health insurance policies and different auto insurance policies, which have given rise to a quantitative and qualitative split in the market for single-family residences in Lloydminster. This duality of the housing market is manifested in Saskatchewan's "affordability" and Alberta's "desirability." Alberta's tax policies have attracted "place entrepreneurs" to build upscale residences on its side for homeowners in high income brackets, who benefit from its tax policies. Saskatchewan's health care and auto insurance advantages have attracted those with such priorities and with moderate incomes. It is contended here that while distinct policies may have contributed to an uneven bi-provincial housing market, the disparity between the markets has been sustained and reinforced by all players who construct the housing reality through myths and perceptions as well as interpretations of policies and their underlying ideologies.