Asking questions

We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model sheds light on the communication protocols that arise in welfare maximizing mechanisms.     

Item non-response on income and wealth questions

This study investigates the mechanisms determining item nonresponse focusing on three issues: First, is there significant heterogeneity in item non-response across financial questions and in the association of covariates with item non-response across outcomes? Second, can the informational value of surveys be improved by matching interviewers and respondents based on their characteristics? Third, how does offering a “don’t know” answer option affect respondent behavior? The questions are answered based on detailed survey and interviewer data from the German Socioeconomic Panel using a broad set of income and wealth outcomes. We find considerable heterogeneity in non-response across financial items, little explanatory power of interviewer-respondent matches and strong evidence that ‘‘don’t know’’ answers result from mechanisms that differ from those yielding valid responses and outright refusals to respond.     

Comparing continuous and discrete contingent valuation questions

This paper explores two commonly used methods to elicit an individual's willingness to pay (WTP) for a public good in contingent valuation studies. Currently, the most preferred method is the take-it-or-leave valuation question, or discrete valuation question (DVQ), where the respondent accepts or rejects a suggested cost for the good. The traditional method, the continuous valuation question (CVQ), simply asks an individual to state his WTP for the suggested change in the provision of a public good like cleaner air. We introduce a simple way to compare the results from these two methods. We also test the anchoring behavior suggested in the psychological literature on choice under uncertainty. The results do not support the anchoring hypothesis, but suggest the hypothesis that people perceive the two tested valuation questions differently.I would like to thank Prof. Glenn Harrison, University of South Carolina, Prof. P-O Johansson, Stockholm School of Economics, Prof. Jason Shogren, Iowa State University, and two referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Incentive and informational properties of preference questions

Surveys are frequently used by businesses and governments to elicit information about the public’s preferences. They have become the most common way to gather preference information regarding goods, that are not (or are not yet) bought or sold in markets. In this paper we apply the standard neoclassical economic framework to generate predictions about how rational agents would answer such survey questions, which in turn implies how such survey data should be interpreted. In some situations, the standard economic model would be expected to have no predictive power. For situations where it does have predictive power, we compare different survey formats with respect to: (a) the information that the question itself reveals to the respondent, (b) the strategic incentives the respondent faces in answering the question, and (c) the information revealed by the respondent’s answer. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented as a plenary address to the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economics in Oslo, as an invited paper at the Japanese Forum on Environmental Valuation meeting in Kobe, and at a NOAA conference on stated preference methods.     

The open source movement: Key research questions

The paper analyzes the incentives of individual programmers and of commercial companies to participate in open source projects. While these incentives are in our opinion well accounted for by the economic paradigm, much empirical and theoretical work is still needed to answer the many interesting questions suggested by the open source movement.     

Resolving questions about bias in real and hypothetical referenda

Despite 10 years of research on behavior in hypothetical referenda, conflict remains in the literature on whether or not the mechanism generates biased responses compared to real referenda, and the nature and source of any such bias. Almost all previous inquiry in respect of this issue has concentrated on bias at the aggregate level. This paper reports a series of three experiments which focuses on bias at the individual level and how this can translate to bias at the aggregate level. The authors argue that only an individual approach to hypothetical bias is consistent with the concept of incentive compatibility. The results of these experiments reflect these previous conflicting findings but go on to show that individual hypothetical bias is a robust result driven by the differing influence of pure self-interest and other- regarding preferences in real and hypothetical situations, rather than by a single behavioral theory such as free riding. In a hypothetical situation these preferences cause yea-saying and non-demand revealing voting. This suggests that investigation of individual respondents in other hypothetical one-shot binary choices may also provide us with insights into aggregate behavior in these situations. Alphabetical list of authors no seniority of authorship attributed.     

谈政府审计工作中的四个和谐问题

和谐审计是和谐社会的重要组成部分.政府审计机关作为代表国家依法行使审计监督权的政府部门,应在构建和谐社会建设中发挥自己应有的作用,努力实现和谐审计.文章对政府审计机关在审计工作中如何实现四个和谐的问题,提出了自己的观点.     

谈政府审计工作中的四个和谐问题

和谐审计是和谐社会的重要组成部分。政府审计机关作为代表国家依法行使审计监督权的政府部门，应在构建和谐社会建设中发挥自己应有的作用，努力实现和谐审计。文章对政府审计机关在审计工作中如何实现四个和谐的问题，提出了自己的观点。     

A million answers to twenty questions: Choosing by checklist

Several decision models in marketing science and psychology assume that a consumer chooses by proceeding sequentially through a checklist of desirable properties. These models are contrasted to the utility maximization model of rationality in economics. We show on the contrary that the two approaches are nearly equivalent. Since the number of preference discriminations that an agent can make increases exponentially in the number of properties used, checklists provide a rapid procedural basis for utility maximization.     

Heterogeneous anchoring and the shift effect in iterative valuation questions

In this article, we consider starting point bias as a heterogeneous phenomenon, that is, respondents in contingent valuation surveys do not anchor in the same way. We study the consequences of a mistaken assumption of homogeneous anchoring for the analysis of the shift effect in multiple-bounded dichotomous choice format, when respondents really have heterogeneous anchoring. We show that the shift effect, generally interpreted as incentive incompatibility or “yea”-saying, can be the spurious outcome of disregarded heterogeneous anchoring.     

Economic inequality and paretian welfare economics: Some insinuating questions

This paper examines the academic soundness of the Pareto welfare criterion as a normative rule for evaluating alternative economic inequality scenarios and suggests that the criterion has several weaknesses, which weaken its usefulness. First, the Pareto principle is of limited use in the inequality debate because labor markets hardly satisfy the conditions of perfect competition, the pivotal assumption of the theory. Second, the proposition that competitive equilibrium leads to the “common good” of society is difficult to defend. Third, the Paretian welfare economics barely answers the questions society demands, because perfect competition does not guarantee fairness in the determination of relative prices in the initial situation of income distribution. Fourth, in the distribution theory, the marginal productivity principle determines the rewards to the factors of production. If we assume that rent, wage and interest incomes are determined by this theory, then questions arise about how profits, the potentially huge surpluses generated by the businesses, are distributed. Fifth, income distribution, being a public policy topic, is a political issue. However, Pareto's primary motivation in formulating the principle was to alienate the income distribution debate from political and policy discourses. Finally, by invoking the Pareto principle, economists are in fact avoiding the real issues of the public debate on personal distribution of income. Personal income distribution truly refers to division of income generated by a group of people working together and therefore, ought to be analysed with reference to the sector of employment. Thus, Tommy Franks' earning should be compared with that of a private, while an ordinary worker's salary should be compared with that of the CEO. History testifies that the public earning structure is much more equitable than that of the private sector. This poses a very serious question: Which earning structure reflects improvement in social welfare: public or private?     

Economic inequality and paretian welfare economics: Some insinuating questions

Capitalists, managers, unions and government today have espoused employee ownership and participation in order to further their own selfish ends. By so doing, they unwittingly usher in full workers' democracy, and concomittant radical transformations of the socioeconomic system which, ironically, will curtail their power. These transformations would stem from our populist ideological roots and would promote profound changes in the distribution of political power and in the way the society deals with technology.