Additional Evidence on Analysts’ Decision to Issue Disaggregated Earnings Forecasts: Strategic Biasing

This study examines why analysts issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S. Some recent studies suggest that analysts with superior forecasting ability issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to build reputation in the marketplace and stop forecast disaggregation once their reputation has been established. Based on an analysis of I/B/E/S forecast data for U.S. firms from 1998 to 2008, we find that, in a given year, about 20%–34% of analysts disaggregate for some, but not for all the firms that they follow. This evidence of selective disaggregation by analysts suggests that reputation building alone does not fully explain the decision to disaggregate forecasts. We hypothesize that the decision to disaggregate earnings forecasts is at the firm‐level as well and is systematically related to the analysts’ bias in the issued forecasts. Our findings are that (a) analysts’ overall optimistic bias and forecast errors decrease monotonically with the level of forecast disaggregation, and (b) analysts that selectively disaggregate their forecasts for some firms or who do not persistently disaggregate a given firm's forecasts exhibit more positive bias and larger forecast errors. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the analysts who issue biased forecasts, for example, to curry favour with the management, are less likely to provide disaggregated information as part of the forecast.     

Optimistic bias in management forecasts by Japanese firms to avoid forecasting losses

Listed firms in Japan are effectively compelled to report management forecasts of sales, ordinary income, and net income along with actual earnings and sales each year. Prior studies report that Japanese managers tend to announce optimistic forecasts of earnings. We show that a large part (61.6%) of the overall optimistic bias in management earnings forecasts in Japan can be explained by loss forecast avoiding behavior of a small fraction (5.25%) of firms. Such behavior is caused in part by the view of the main bank and power group that the management forecast of earnings is the manager's earnings target. Our findings suggest that the Japanese stock market recognizes such loss forecast avoidance and accordingly discounts new information in management forecasts.     

High-Technology Intangibles and Analysts' Forecasts

This study examines the association between firms' intangible assets and properties of the information contained in analysts' earnings forecasts. We hypothesize that analysts will supplement firms' financial information by placing greater relative emphasis on their own private (or idiosyncratic) information when deriving their earnings forecasts for firms with significant intangible assets. Our evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. We find that the consensus in analysts' forecasts, measured as the correlation in analysts' forecast errors, is negatively associated with a firm's level of intangible assets. This result is robust to controlling for analyst uncertainty about a firm's future earnings, which we also find to be higher for firms with high levels of internally generated (and expensed) intangibles. Given that analyst uncertainty increases and analyst consensus decreases with the level of a firm's intangible assets, we also expect and find that the degree to which the mean forecast aggregates private information and is more accurate than an individual analyst's forecast increases with a firm's intangible assets. Finally, additional analysis reveals that lower levels of analyst consensus are associated with high-technology manufacturing companies, and that this association is explained by the relatively high R&D expenditures made by these firms. Overall, our results are consistent with financial analysts augmenting the financial reporting systems of firms with higher levels of intangible assets (in terms of contributing to more accurate earnings expectations), particularly R&D-driven high-tech manufacturers.     

Do Japanese Analysts Overreact or Underreact to Earnings Announcements?

Several recent studies have used U.S. analysts' forecasts to test for underreaction or overreaction to information in earnings announcements. These tests have provided mixed results. Evidence in Mendenhall (1991) is that analysts underreact. By contrast. results in De Bondt and Thaler (1990) show overreaction by U.S. financial analysts to earnings announcements. The current study contributes to this topic by examining over/underreaction by Japanese financial analysts. Test results show that Japanese analysts do not overreact to earnings announcements, market to book ratios and sales growth. Instead. there is strong evidence that Japanese analysts underreact to earnings announcements and that their underreaction is more pronounced for firms with mostly permanent earnings. Our results also show that Japanese analysts display larger forecast biases for earnings reported under U.S. GAAP as opposed to Japanese GAAP. Finally, we find that US. analysts discount information in earnings announcements to a larger degree (relying to a greater extent on information in past prices instead) when compared to their Japanese counterparts. Further, in contrast to their Japanese counterparts, these analysts display no optimistic bias. The results above suggest that the impact of each country's unique culture and capital norms will have to be taken into account by policy makers in evaluating the feasibility of harmonization of accounting standards.     

Do Analysts Disclose Cash Flow Forecasts with Earnings Estimates when Earnings Quality is Low?

Cash flows are incrementally useful to earnings in security valuation mainly when earnings quality is low. This suggests that when earnings quality decreases, analysts will be more likely to supplement their earnings forecasts with cash flow estimates. Contrary to this prediction, we find that analysts do not disclose cash flow forecasts when the quality of earnings is low. This is because cash flow forecast accuracy depends on the accuracy of the accrual estimates and the precision of accrual forecasts decreases for firms with low quality earnings. Consequently, as earnings quality decreases, cash flow forecasts become increasingly inaccurate compared to earnings estimates. Cash flow estimates that lack reliability are not useful to investors and, consequently, unlikely to be reported by analysts. This result provides an explanation for why analysts are less likely to report cash flow estimates when earnings quality is low.     

Japanese Corporate Groupings (Keiretsu) and the Characteristics of Analysts' Forecasts

This study examines differences in the characteristics of analysts' forecasts of earnings for keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms in Japan. Japanese industrial organization is characterized by enterprise groupings, keiretsu, composed of firms in different industries, but interrelated through cross-holdings of ownership. The strong interrelations of the Japanese keiretsu have been shown to increase the monitoring of managerial performance. An alternative view of keiretsu stewardship suggests the exclusionary environment within a keiretsu creates an information monopoly, resulting in greater information asymmetry between inside and outside constituents. These two views provide opposing predictions on how keiretsu groupings potentially affect the characteristics of earnings forecasts made by analysts: increased monitoring will improve the forecast characteristics of earnings, while the opposite is true under an information monopoly.Our results suggest that forecast accuracy (dispersion) is higher (lower) for keiretsu firms than non-keiretsu firms, supporting a monitoring role by keiretsu. The results also show that keiretsu firms' forecast characteristics are related to the strength of the keiretsu relationship, providing further evidence that it is indeed the keiretsu relationship that increases the monitoring of management, which ultimately improves the accuracy and dispersion of analysts' forecast.     

Sources of earnings variability and their effect on earnings forecasts

Previous research shows that analysts’ forecasts of earnings do not fully incorporate information contained in reported earnings variability. This study investigates whether the inefficient forecast is because of a failure to incorporate observable information on two components of earnings variability: variability in operating performance and income smoothing. Our results show that analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate information contained in earnings variability for firms with high income smoothing and for firms with low operating variability. A smaller serial correlation of forecast errors is observed for firms with low operating variability, which suggests that analysts recognize the permanence in earnings for such firms.     

“Big Bang” Accounting Reforms in Japan: Financial Analyst Earnings Forecast Accuracy Declines as the Japanese Government Mandates Japanese Corporations to Adopt International Accounting Standards

The mandated adoption of International Accounting Standards (IAS) for Japanese corporations did not result in improved earnings that forecast predictability. These findings contradict the research findings of Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001). Herrmann, Inoue, and Thomas’ (2003) research findings support the need for mandating the adoption of IAS. They found that Japanese managers were “manipulating” reported earnings by managing the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. Adoption of IAS decreases the availability of this practice and it was and is expected to increase disclosure and transparency. Increased disclosure and transparency are expected to decrease financial analyst forecast errors, which did not decrease for 139 firms examined in this study for the timeframe of 1999–2002. This research finding does not support the idea that adoption of IAS improves financial information used in decision making relative to forecasting earnings. Assuming that increased predictability indicates higher quality reported earnings and enhanced usefulness of financial information, the mandated adoption of IAS did not result in these. Assuming that adoption of IAS in Japan increased the level of transparency and disclosure by Japanese firms, which made it harder for Japanese firms to manage their earnings in order to meet the managerial earnings forecasts that these firms must make. Thus, after the adoption of IAS in Japan, forecast errors for managerial forecasts of earnings increased. This evidence is new to the literature.     

Are more able managers good future tellers? Learning from Japan

Baik et al. (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.     

The effect of repeat restructuring charges on analysts’ forecast revisions and accuracy

The primary objective of this study is to examine the effect of prior restructuring charges on analyst forecast revisions and accuracy. We find evidence that analysts respond differently to first-time restructuring firms than to repeat restructuring firms. Analysts revise their forecasts of both one-year-ahead earnings and five-year long-term growth in earnings more negatively for first-time restructuring firms than for firms with prior charges. When we examine forecast errors in the year subsequent to the restructuring, we find that current charges complicate analysts’ earnings forecast task. We further find that the decline in analyst forecast accuracy is mitigated by prior charges within past two years.     

Labor protection,information disclosure and analyst forecasts: Evidence from China’s Labor Contract Law

Labor protection increases employees’ stability and strengthens their monitoring role, improving firms’ information environment and increasing analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. Using the implementation of China’s Labor Contract Law as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that labor protection significantly improves analyst forecasts. This positive impact is stronger when agency problems are weaker, board independence is greater, corporate reputation is better and industry competition is more intense. Enhanced labor protection significantly reduces firms’ business risk and accrual-based earnings management, decreases stock price synchronicity and increases market pricing efficiency. Our findings of significant impacts of China’s Labor Contract Law on analysts’ forecasting behaviors offer important guidance for promoting the development of the Chinese capital market and policy making in labor protection.     

Economic policy uncertainty and analysts’ forecast characteristics

We examine the influence of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on the characteristics of analysts’ earnings forecasts over a thirty-year period, spanning a wide variety of political and economic conditions. Motivated by both theory and empirical evidence that suggest a decline in the quality of the information environment for firms as EPU increases, we establish that analysts’ forecast errors increase with EPU, as does the degree of forecast dispersion. Increased error and dispersion persist after controlling for several competing sources of economy-wide uncertainty. Cross sectional analysis exploring heterogeneity in forecast quality across both analyst and firm characteristics establishes that forecast error and dispersion increase with EPU across a broad spectrum of firms and levels of analyst expertise. We control for analysts’ experience overall and the years spent covering a particular industry and firm. Five alternative methods for classifying firms as policy sensitive versus policy neutral provide consistent evidence that analyst forecast errors and dispersion increase with EPU, even for firms not deemed to be particularly sensitive to policy.     

Real earnings management and the properties of analysts' forecasts

Prior literature generally finds analysts are able to identify and process complex financial information. However, research suggests that in certain settings, analysts struggle to fully incorporate into their forecasts all available information. We examine analysts' forecast properties in the face of a specific type of complex financial information: real earnings management (REM). First, we investigate the relation between measures of REM and analysts' forecast properties. We find REM measures are associated with greater forecast error and dispersion in the following year. However, REM measures, by definition, capture abnormal operating results, and thus include both firms engaging in manipulative REM as well as firms experiencing firm-specific economic shocks. Thus, we conduct cross-sectional tests of analysts' forecasts for firms with and without incentives to manipulate earnings. We find that firms with low incentives to engage in earnings management (i.e., firms most likely experiencing firm-specific economic shocks) generate the strongest positive relation between REM measures and the following year's analysts' forecast properties, suggesting analysts more fully incorporate the earnings implications of firms with high incentives (i.e., firms most likely engaging in manipulative REM). Our results are consistent across numerous REM proxies and indicators of earnings management incentives.     

Causal language intensity in performance commentary and financial analyst behaviour

We use automated techniques to measure causal reasoning on earnings‐related financial outcomes of a large sample of MD&A sections of US firms and examine the intensity of causal language in that context against extent of analyst following and against properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts. We find a positive and significant association between a firm's causal reasoning intensity and analyst following and analyst earnings forecast accuracy respectively. Correspondingly, analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is negatively and significantly associated with causal reasoning intensity. These results suggest that causal reasoning intensity provides incremental information about the relationship between financial performance outcomes and its causes, thereby reducing financial analysts’ information processing and interpreting costs and lowering overall analyst information uncertainty. Additionally, we find that decreases in analyst following are followed by more causal reasoning on performance disclosure. We also find that firms with a considerable increase of causal disclosure especially attract new analysts who already cover many firms. Overall, our evidence of the relationship between causal reasoning intensity and properties of analyst behaviour is consistent with the proposition that causal reasoning is a generic narrative disclosure quality characteristic, able to provide incremental information to analysts and guide analysts' behaviour.     

A re-examination of analysts’ superiority over time-series forecasts of annual earnings

We re-examine the widely held belief that analysts?? earnings per share (EPS) forecasts are superior to random walk (RW) time-series forecasts. We investigate whether analysts?? annual EPS forecasts are superior, and if so, under what conditions. Simple RW EPS forecasts are more accurate than analysts?? forecasts over longer horizons, for smaller or younger firms, and when analysts forecast negative or large changes in EPS. We also compare the accuracy of a third forecast of longer-term earnings based on a na?ve extrapolation of analysts?? 1-year-ahead forecasts. Surprisingly, this na?ve extrapolation provides the most accurate estimate of long-term (2- and 3-year-ahead) earnings. These findings recharacterize prior generalizations about the superiority of analysts?? forecasts and suggest that they are incomplete, misleading, or both. Moreover, in certain settings, researchers can rely on forecasts other than these explicit forecasts.     

Stock index adjustments and analysts’ forecast optimism: A quasi-natural experiment on the CSI 300 Index

As stock index adjustments comprise a basic system of capital market, their potential influence on analysts’ earnings forecasts is worthy of research. Based on a research sample of 23 adjustments to the CSI 300 Index from June 2007 to June 2018 and the backup stocks announced during the same period, this study examines the impact of additions to stock index on analysts’ forecast optimism using a staggered difference-in-differences model. The research results show that after stocks are added to the stock index, analysts’ earnings forecast optimism about these stocks increases significantly. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that this increase is more significant when the market is bullish, institutional ownership is low, the ratio of listed brokerage firms is low, star analyst coverage is low, firms show seasoned equity offering activity, the ratio of analysts from the top five brokerage firms ranked by commission income is high, and the analysts’ brokerage firms are shareholders. However, analyst-level tests find that analysts’ ability helps to reduce the impact of additions to stock index on earnings forecast optimism. Furthermore, additions to stock index significantly increase analyst coverage and forecast divergence. Economic consequences tests find additions to stock index significantly increases stock price synchronization, which is partly mediated by analysts’ earnings forecast optimism. This study enriches the literature on the impact of basic capital market systems and analyst behavior. The findings suggest that investors should rationally evaluate analysts’ earnings forecasts for stocks added to the stock index and obtain further information from various channels to improve asset allocation efficiency.     

The association between quarter length,forecast errors,and firms’ voluntary disclosures

Approximately 60 percent of adjacent fiscal quarters contain a different number of calendar days. In preliminary analyses, we find the change in quarter length is significantly associated with the changes in sales and earnings and that analysts condition on the prior quarter's results when making their forecasts. These results indicate that it is important for analysts to adjust for changes in quarter length when making forecasts. However, we find the quarterly change in days is positively associated with analysts’ sales and earnings forecasts errors, where forecast error equals the actual earnings minus the forecasted earnings. These results indicate that analysts systematically underestimate (overestimate) performance when quarter length increases (decreases). We find evidence indicating investors make similar errors as returns around earnings announcements are positively associated with the change in quarter length, but only when changes in firm performance is more sensitive to changes in quarter length. Corroborating these findings, managers are more (less) likely to discuss quarter length during conference calls when quarter length decreases (increases). These results are consistent with managers’ strategic disclosure incentives. In summary, our evidence suggests analysts and investors fail to fully take account of the quasi-mechanical effect that quarter length has on firm performance and managers strategically alter their voluntary disclosures to take advantage of these failures.     

The supply of analysts and earnings forecasts

Using a unique set of hand-collected data, this study examines whether a larger supply of prospective analysts leads to existing financial analysts' higher earnings forecast accuracy. We analyze the effect of the analyst supply proxied by the number of universities and the number of finance and economics universities located in the same city as the headquarters of brokerage firms. Our findings suggest that brokerage firms located closer to a larger supply of potential analyst candidates are associated with higher analyst forecast accuracy, as observed by a lower forecast error. We further find that the degree of employed analysts' effort acts as a mediator between the supply of prospective analysts and the accuracy of their earnings forecasts.     

Underwriting Relationships and Analyst Independence in Europe

This paper examines the accuracy of security analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for firms in 13 European countries. We document at least three key findings. First, we find strong evidence that lead and co‐lead underwriter analysts’ earnings estimates and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic than those provided by unaffiliated analysts. Second, we find that lead and co‐lead underwriter analysts’ earnings forecast and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic for underwriter stocks than for those they provide for other stocks. Third, we also find evidence that these biases found within earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are not driven by one particular country. In short, these findings suggest that affiliated analysts are more optimistic perhaps to maintain investment banking relations.     

Analyst forecast,accounting conservatism and the related valuation implications

This study investigates whether financial analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and whether it is more difficult for them to forecast earnings for less conservative firms, and then examines the impact of the findings on the return predictability of the value‐to‐price (V/P) ratio. After controlling for the other factors affecting forecast accuracy, such as earnings predictability and information uncertainty, I find that analysts incorporate accounting conservatism into their earnings forecasts and that forecasting earnings is more difficult for less conservative firms. Consequently, the return predictability of the V/P ratio is stronger for more conservative firms, and previously reported return predictability of the V/P ratio is an average across firms with differing levels of conservatism.