供应链合作价值创造中的交易成本经济学理论

交易成本的内涵应进行界定,即交易成本中应包含企业内部的组织成本.从交易成本经济学理论的角度研究发现,供应链合作价值主要来源于两个方面:第一,治理结构的合理安排有利于提高经济效率;第二,供应链合作有利于控制机会主义倾向.供应链合作价值创造的影响因素包括资产专用性、交易频率、不确定性、控制性、处罚机制和依赖性六种.这些因素可分为交易特征和关系特征两大类,据此可建立供应链合作价值创造的权变模型.     

The Costs of Inflation Revisited

Neoclassical treatments of inflation understate the costs associated with inflation, even at very low levels. A comparative institutions perspective that recognizes the epistemological properties of prices and the institutional process by which inflation takes place, reveals the costs of inflation to be both larger and more widespread than standard treatments suggest. This paper makes use of insights from Austrian economics, public choice theory, and the new institutional economics to argue that inflation imposes costs by undermining the coordinative properties of the price system. Not only are there the direct costs of increased economic error, but actors also divert resources away from direct want-satisfaction into attempts to either prevent or cope with the increased degree of uncertainty inflation imposes. These resource costs are best understood from a comparative institutions perspective, as traditional measures of economic well-being, such as GDP, cannot distinguish between exchanges that directly satisfy wants, and exchanges that are attempts to correct or prevent utility-diminishing activities. The analogy between these coping costs and rent-seeking behavior is explored. In addition, inflation imposes costs by undermining the coordinative properties of markets and inducing actors to, on the margin, prefer to seek wealth or allocate resources through the political process.     

劳动力规模、组织成本与农业生产合作组织演变——基于民国以来的历史分析

中国农业生产合作组织的演变具有显著的周期性特征和地域性差异,但是已有研究只是选择性地关注短期内农业生产合作组织的效率问题及其影响下的去集体化过程,或者只是简单地强调国家强制性制度安排下的合作化过程。本文认为,不同社会经济条件下的劳动监督成本和协调成本差异决定组织成本差异,组织成本差异决定各种农业经济组织的相对效率结构,因而决定农业经济组织的周期性演变及其多样化特征。进一步的研究表明:战争、气候灾难等消极性因素和人口死亡率下降、人口寿命延长等积极性因素是劳动力规模及其劳动监督成本波动的诱因,因而是农业经济组织长期性演变的终极决定因素。利用1911-2011年中国省级、县级的各类人口和合作社数据,本文从宏观层面初步验证了这种观点。     

The Costs of China's State-owned Enterprises

MOCT-MOST: Economic Policy in Transitional Economies -     

The Bioeconomics of Cooperation

When transactions and information are costly and exchange is non-simultaneous, ‘institutions matter’. They matter because exchange under these circumstances subjects the participants to potentially harmful behaviors by other participants, among which are: opportunistic behavior, agency, the free-rider problem, cheating, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Institutions constrain these behaviors, allowing the participants to take advantage of the gains from trade and specialization, and thereby facilitating cooperation. Individuals adhere to institutional rules because they gain by doing so. Because the individual gains are inseparable from the structure of the institutions, the institutions themselves necessarily become the focus of the analysis—as we see in the new institutional economics (NIE). The new group selection position in biology involves a similar shift in focus from the level of the individual to the group when studying the evolution of altruism. But some of the proponents of group selection go further, arguing that altruism in biology evolves because it is in the interest of the group, but not the individual. In fact, group level analysis is necessary in biology, as in the NIE, because it allows for the discovery of ‘institutions’ that constrain cheating, opportunistic behavior, etc., thereby making participation in the group in the long-run self-interest of the individual. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

跨国公司的兼并收购成本

跨国公司的并购活动不但规模日益增大,而且通过利用资本市场并购活动能更顺利地进行。这种国际间资本流动需要考虑成本,跨国公司的并购成本可以从并购过程所涉及的各项进行分析,包括对目标公司的评估成本、协商确认并购活动、并购进行过程。评估目标公司成本常采用现金流折现法,也可采用基于古诺模型的公司评估方法,更多地考虑市场因素,多角度分析目标公司的可能价格。     

The Costs of Deception: Evidence from Psychology

Recently, it has been argued that the evidence in social science research suggests that deceiving participants in an experiment does not lead to a significant loss of experimental control. Based on this assessment, experimental economists were counseled to lift their de facto prohibition against deception to capture its potential benefits. To the extent that this recommendation is derived from empirical studies, we argue that it draws on a selective sample of the available evidence. Building on a systematic review of relevant research in psychology, we present two major results: First, the evidence suggests that the experience of having been deceived generates suspicion that in turn is likely to affect the judgment and decision making of a non-negligible number of participants. Second, we find little evidence for the reputational spillover effects that have been hypothesized by a number of authors in psychology and economics (e.g., Kelman, H.C., 1967. Psychological Bulletin. 67, 1–11; Davis, D.D. and Holt, C.A., 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton). Based on a discussion of the methodological costs and benefits of deception, we conclude that experimental economists' prohibition of deception is a sensible convention that economists should not abandon.     

The Effect of Privatization on Public Transit Costs

In an effort to reduce operating deficits, increase productivity, and improve the quality of services, the public transit sector has been moving away from public ownership and operation and towards a franchising arrangement whereby a local government authorizes a private firm to manage and operate the city's public transit system. Profit maximization considerations imply that private managers have stronger incentives for cost efficiency. One such example is the city of Indianapolis which began privatization efforts in its transit operations in 1996. Based upon monthly data from January 1991 through March 1997, this study examines the effect of privatization on the city's cost of providing mass transit. The primary implication of the study is that Indianapolis has experienced an annual 2.5% reduction in operating costs since privatizing the management of its public transit system.     

研究与开发成本问题研究

研究与开发成本，在会计学上有其特定的含义。研究，指为了获得新的科学或技术知识而进行的独创性的、有计划的调查分析活动；开发，指为了创造新的或有实质性改进的产品、材料、设备和工艺等，而在开始商业使用之前所从事的将研究成果或其他知识付诸应用的一系列活动。     

论北美自由贸易区的环境合作

北美自由贸易区开创了在自由贸易框架内开展环境合作的先例，建立了责无旁贷事作的主导机构，允许成员国制定本国的环境标准，并构建了一套争端解决机制处理贸易－环境纠纷。1994年以来环境合和取得一定进展，包括调和贸易和环境的关系，鼓励公众参与、调查和公布污染情况，预防争议的发生等。北美自由贸易区的种种创新做法如争端解决程序，机构建设及其职权设置都有重要参考意义。     

The Marginal Costs of Electricity Supply in Victoria*

This paper discusses some of the determinants of the costs of supplying electricity by season, by time of day and by location. A model is constructed of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria grid to illustrate the propositions. It is found that current tariffs bear little relationship to the opportunity costs of supplying electricity.     

The Home Bias in Equities and Distribution Costs

We show that incorporating distribution costs into a general equilibrium model of international portfolio choice helps to explain the home bias in international equity investment. Our model is able to replicate observed investment positions for a wide range of parameter values, even if agents have an incentive to hedge labor income risk by purchasing foreign equity. This is because the existence of a retail sector affects both the correlation of domestic returns with the domestic price level and the correlation between financial and non‐financial income.     

转换成本四维度对顾客保留影响的实证研究

在关系营销时代,消费者与企业之间的关系维持成为业界和学术界关注的焦点。根据转换成本相关理论,企业可以通过合理设置各种障碍来防止顾客流失,从而达到保留顾客的目的。本文在梳理文献的基础上,将转换成本划分为四维度,分别是进入程序转换成本、退出程序转换成本、社会转换成本和利益损失成本。由于忠诚的顾客不一定是有价值的顾客,所以,用顾客保留替代顾客忠诚,将其作为研究转换成本对维持现有顾客影响的最终落脚点。实证研究发现,利益损失成本对顾客满意有最强正向影响,只有进入程序转换成本对顾客信任有直接影响,只有社会转换成本对顾客保留有直接影响等。为此,企业可以通过合理设置转换成本来提高顾客满意及保留顾客。     

世界500强企业发展的基本经验及我国企业发展的思路

自美国《财富》杂志公布世界500家最大企业以来,世界500强企业越来越受到世人的关注。世界500强企业的发展经验,对发展壮大我国企业具有重要借鉴和启示作用。     

The Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations

The present paper analyses the evolution of costly cooperation in a multi-group population. Building on insights first developed in modern biology the idea of viscous population equilibria is introduced (a population is said to be viscous when a (sub)population of players is spatially or genetically clustered). A simple model then analyses how the combined effect of viscosity within multiple subgroups and different levels of between-group segregation influences the evolution of cooperation. The results suggest that a key issue in the evolution of cooperation is the shifting balance between the need to protect cooperators and propagation of the tendency to cooperate.     

The Effect of Communication Media on Cooperation

Abstract. We examine how communication affects cooperation with the help of seven standard public goods experiments that only differ with respect to the medium of pre‐play communication. Our treatments include bidirectional and unidirectional communication via (mostly electronic) auditory and/or visual channels. The results suggest that successful cooperation is attributable to the opportunity of ‘coordinating’ behavior in the communication phase. Furthermore, both the level and the stability of cooperation significantly interact with the communication medium, even though the content of communication is remarkably similar across the communication treatments.     

The Costs of Implementing the Majority Principle: The Golden Voting Rule

In a context of constitutional choice of a voting rule, this paper presents an economic analysis of scoring rules that identifies the golden voting rule under the impartial culture assumption. This golden rule depends on the weights β and (1−β) assigned to two types of costs: the cost of majority decisiveness (‘tyranny’) and the cost of the ‘erosion’ in the majority principle. Our first main result establishes that in voting contexts where the number of voters n is typically considerably larger than the number of candidates k, the golden voting rule is the inverse plurality rule for almost any positive β. Irrespective of n and k, the golden voting rule is the inverse plurality rule if β ≥ 1/2 .. This hitherto almost unnoticed rule outperforms any other scoring rule in eliminating majority decisiveness. The golden voting rule is, however, the plurality rule, the most widely used voting rule that does not allow even the slightest ‘erosion’ in the majority principle, when β=0. Our second main result establishes that for sufficiently “small size” voting bodies, the set of potential golden rules consists at most of just three rules: the plurality rule, the Borda rule and the inverse plurality rule. On the one hand, this finding provides a new rationalization to the central role the former two rules play in practice and in the voting theory literature. On the other hand, it provides further support to the inverse plurality rule; not only that it is the golden rule in voting contexts, it also belongs, together with the plurality rule and the Borda method of counts, to the “exclusive” set of potential golden voting rules in small committees. We are indebted to Jim Buchanan, Amichai Glazer, Noa Nitzan, Ken Shepsle, and an anonymous referee for their useful comments.     

关税、垄断和偷窃的福利成本

近来,试图对垄断和关税的福利成本进行估算的论文大量发表①.这些论文的结论表明,经济学家们所痛斥的关税和垄断的福利成本实际上微不足道.