Euro money market spreads during the 2007–? financial crisis

In the paper we investigate the empirical features of euro area money market turbulence during the recent financial crisis. By means of a novel Fractionally Integrated Heteroskedastic Factor Vector Autoregressive model, we find evidence of a deterministic level factor in the EURIBOR-OIS (OIS) spreads term structure, associated with the two waves of stress in the interbank market, following the BNP Paribas (9 August 2007) and Lehman Brothers (16 September 2008) “shocks”, and two additional factors, of the long memory type, bearing the interpretation of curvature and slope factors, respectively. The unfolding of the crisis yields a significant increase in their persistence and volatility. We also find evidence of a declining trend in the level and volatility of OIS spreads since December 2008, associated with ECB liquidity policies.     

Central bank reserves and interbank market liquidity in the euro area

The market-oriented approach promoted by the European Central Bank in the design of its refinancing operations creates incentives to credit institutions to use actively the interbank market to manage their liquidity needs. In this context, we examine the ability of the overnight segment to guarantee the timely provision of unsecured funds to banks to smoothly absorb their liquidity shocks. This paper specifically focuses on the speed of reversion of transaction costs and available depth to their equilibrium levels in this market for overnight unsecured funds. The reported evidence points to time-varying liquidity adjustments and identifies liquidity, market activity and the institutional setting of the ECB’s refinancing operations as significant determinants of the observed resiliency regimes. Our analysis also shows how the speed of mean reversion of market liquidity, by affecting the level and the volatility of the overnight market rate, also affects the anchoring of the yield curve in the euro area.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

Monetary Policy Transmission with Interbank Market Fragmentation

This paper shows how interbank market fragmentation disrupts the transmission of monetary policy. Fragmentation is the fact that banks, depending on their country of location, have different probabilities of default on their interbank borrowings. Once fragmentation is introduced into standard theoretical models of monetary policy implementation, excess liquidity arises endogenously. This leads short-term interest rates to depart from the central bank policy rates. Using data on monetary policy operations, I show that this mechanism has been at work in the euro area since 2008. The model is used to analyze conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures.     

Funding liquidity risk: Definition and measurement

Funding liquidity risk has played a key role in all historical banking crises. Nevertheless, a measure for funding liquidity risk based on publicly available data remains so far elusive. We address this gap by showing that aggressive bidding at central bank auctions reveals funding liquidity risk. We can extract an insurance premium from banks’ bids which we propose as a measure of funding liquidity risk. Using a unique data set consisting of all bids in all auctions for the main refinancing operation conducted at the ECB between June 2005 and October 2008 we find that funding liquidity risk is typically stable and low, with occasional spikes especially around key events during the recent crisis. We also document downward spirals between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity. As measurement without clear definitions is impossible, we initially provide definitions of funding liquidity and funding liquidity risk.     

Investigating risk contagion initiated by endogenous liquidity shocks: evidence from the US and eurozone interbank markets

This paper investigates liquidity spillovers between the US and European interbank markets during turbulent and tranquil periods. We show that an endogenous model with time-varying transition probabilities is effective in describing the propagation of liquidity shocks within the interbank market, while predicting liquidity crashes characterised by changed dynamics. We show that liquidity shocks, originating from movements of the spread between the Asset Backed Commercial Paper and T-bill, drive regime changes in the euro fixed-float OIS swap rate. Our results support the idea of endogenous contagion from the US money market to the eurozone money market during the global financial crisis.     

Bank-to-bank lending channel and the transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evidence from France

Good liquidity is essential for the banking system to function properly and supply credit to the real sector. However, several banks all over the world face large shocks to their liquidity supply due to numerous factors. This study contributes to the literature on the transmission of liquidity shocks by investigating the bank-to-bank lending behavior of French banks during the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). In addition, we examine the factors strongly influencing the liquidity of the interbank deposits market. First, using a fixed-effects model on a sample of 85 French banks for the period from 2005 to 2010, we find that the deposits channel plays an important role in the transmission of liquidity shocks across the banking system. Second, we use difference-in-difference methodology to study the effects of liquidity shock on bank lending. Our results show that French banks reduced their bank-to-bank lending significantly during the financial crisis period. Moreover, our results suggest that the reduction could have been due to deposit activities.     

Underpricing in the euro area bond market: New evidence from post-crisis regulation and quantitative easing

We conduct an extensive study of underpricing in the euro area bond market and find strong evidence of underpricing. In cross-sectional regressions we find patterns that are consistent with bookbuilding-based theories of underpricing and inconsistent with liquidity-based explanations. The underpricing has increased considerably during the financial crisis and has remained at an elevated level since. We also show that secondary market liquidity in the euro area bond market is significantly lower in the post-crisis period than pre-crisis. These results are consistent with recent US evidence and may represent unintended side effects of new regulation enacted in the wake of the financial crisis, such as Basel III and the Volcker Rule. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that the ECB’s corporate sector purchase programs has led to a decrease in underpricing.     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

The interbank network across the global financial crisis: Evidence from Italy

This study examines the effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) on interbank market connectivity using network analysis. More specifically, using data on Italian banks’ bilateral interbank positions between 1998 and 2013, we analyze the impact of the following events on each bank's network centrality: the liquidity crisis in August 2007, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Eurosystem's long term refinancing operations (LTROs) between 2009 and 2012, the sovereign debt crisis in July 2011, and the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in 2012. The results show that the 2007 liquidity crisis and especially the collapse of Lehman Brothers are associated with a marked reduction of the relative interconnectedness of the Italian banking sector (i.e., a shift in the distribution of banks’ centrality to the left, away from the most connected bank). In the following years, the system progressively recovered its initial patterns of integration among banks, which coincided with the main Eurosystem's monetary policy interventions. However, the average outcome conceals different results across banks, depending on their characteristics and initial positions within the system.     

商业银行流动性危机传染机理研究

银行危机传染往往给一个国家或地区的经济带来巨大的损失.不完全的银行间拆借市场中隐含了更大的银行危机传染的可能性;银行间的长期资产越多,银行间拆借的短期利率和银行间存款的长期利率越高,银行间拆借市场就越稳定,在遭受流动性冲击时,这一市场发生银行危机传染的可能性就越小.适量的银行存款对传染效应具有阻碍作用.为防范系统性风险,中国商业银行应逐步建立完备的银行间存款市场,减少政府干预,让市场约束力来强化商业银行的风险管理意识.     

A re-examination of Libor rigging: a time-varying cointegration perspective

Using a time-varying cointegration framework, this paper examines the alleged manipulation of the London interbank offered rate (Libor) during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Bank quotes are found to be poor indicators of their financing costs in the crisis period. The aberration in the estimated values of the cointegrating and error correction parameters governing the long-run equilibrium relationship between bank quotes and the final Libor suggests banks were submitting lower quotes. Further analysis which controls for an individual bank’s credit risk, market wide credit and liquidity risks, and a common market factor, demonstrate possible evidence of Libor rigging during the crisis period.     

Tail risk in the European sovereign bond market during the financial crises: Detecting the influence of the European Central Bank

Since 2008, the European Central Bank (ECB) is conducting an expansionary monetary policy on an unprecedented scale. The consequence is a historical low interest rate environment in the eurozone and inflated prices for the majority of euro area government bonds. This paper presents a study of the tail behavior of triple-A rated euro area government bonds during the financial crisis 2007/08, the European sovereign debt crisis and the episode of expansionary monetary policy by the ECB. First, the analysis determines whether daily returns of euro area government bonds exhibit fat tails. Second, tests are conducted for variation in tail risk among euro area government bonds with different maturities. Third, it is estimated whether the tail behavior has significantly changed during the financial crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis and the resulting market interventions by the ECB. The study is based on daily data of the spot yield curve for triple-A rated euro area government bonds with a remaining maturity from three months to thirty years. Evidence is found for fat tails for the left-and right-hand side of the return distribution for all considered bond maturities in the sample. Moreover, the results indicate a convex term structure of tail risks and a structural change in the tail behavior of short-term bonds with a remaining maturity of less than one year during the past two crises. In contrast, the test outcomes for the majority of the considered long-term bonds do not indicate any significant change in the tail behavior, despite the introduction of unconventional asset purchase programs by the ECB which directly target these securities.     

Explaining cross-border large-value payment flows: Evidence from TARGET and EURO1 data

We analysed the distribution of the TARGET cross-border interbank payment flows from both a cross-section and a time-series point of view using average daily data for the period 1999–2002. Our findings were, first, that “location matters” in the sense that bilateral payment flows seem to reflect an organisation of interbank trading between countries in which the size of the banking sector, geographic proximity and cultural similarities play a significant role. This result was also confirmed by a model developed drawing on the gravity models literature. Second, we found that the payment traffic in TARGET is strongly affected by technical market deadlines. In addition, such traffic is positively related mainly to the liquidity conditions and to the turnover of the euro area money market (particularly the unsecured overnight segment). Our model also provides a good explanation of the determinants of the interbank payments settled in the EURO 1 system.     

Voluntary Reserve Targets

We study monetary policy implementation through an operating regime involving voluntary reserve targets (VRTs). Operating regimes based on reserve requirements may lead to a collapse in interbank trade, as they have since the financial crisis. We show that, no matter the abundance of reserves, VRTs encourage market activity and support the central bank's control over interest rates. We consider (i) the impact of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity injections by the central bank on market outcomes and (ii) a comparison with the implementation framework currently adopted by the Federal Reserve. Overall, a VRT framework may provide several advantages over other frameworks.     

Quantifying preferential trading in the e-MID interbank market

Interbank markets allow credit institutions to exchange capital for purposes of liquidity management. These markets are among the most liquid markets in the financial system. However, liquidity of interbank markets dropped during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and such a lack of liquidity influenced the entire economic system. In this paper, we analyse transaction data from the e-MID market which is the only electronic interbank market in the Euro Area and US, over a period of 11 years (1999–2009). We adapt a method developed to detect statistically validated links in a network, in order to reveal preferential trading in a directed network. Preferential trading between banks is detected by comparing empirically observed trading relationships with a null hypothesis that assumes random trading among banks doing a heterogeneous number of transactions. Preferential trading patterns are revealed at time windows of 3-maintenance periods. We show that preferential trading is observed throughout the whole period of analysis and that the number of preferential trading links does not show any significant trend in time, in spite of a decreasing trend in the number of pairs of banks making transactions. We observe that preferential trading connections typically involve large trading volumes. During the crisis, we also observe that transactions occurring between banks with a preferential connection occur at larger interest rates than the complement set—an effect that is not observed before the crisis.     

Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.     

Optimal allotment policy in central bank open market operations1

This article derives a central bank's optimal liquidity supply towards a money market with an unrestricted lending facility. We show that when the effect of liquidity on market rates is not too small, and the monetary authority is concerned with both interest rates and liquidity conditions, then the optimal allotment policy may entail a ‘discontinuous’ reaction to initial conditions. In particular, the model predicts a threshold level of liquidity below which the central bank will not bail out the banking system. An estimation of the liquidity effect for the euro area suggests that the discontinuity might have contributed to the Eurosystem's tight response to occurrences of underbidding during the period June 2000 through March 2004.     

The Interbank Market after August 2007: What Has Changed,and Why?

After the onset of the financial crisis, spreads between interbank interest rates on unsecured and secured deposits for the major world currencies became exceptionally large and volatile. First, we find that the phenomenon was mainly driven by aggregate—rather than bank‐specific—factors, notably risk aversion, and accounting practices; by contrast, funding liquidity, capital shortage, and central bank interventions were not important determinants. Second, prior to August 2007, the spread was broadly insensitive to key borrower characteristics, whereas afterward it became somewhat more reactive to measures of creditworthiness. Third, conditions for big borrowers became relatively more favorable during the crisis, suggesting that moral hazard risks related to the “too‐big‐to‐fail” argument have increased. These results are discussed in the light of theories on the interbank market during a crisis.     

Words are not all created equal: A new measure of ECB communication

We develop a field-specific dictionary to measure the stance of the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy (dovish, neutral, hawkish) and the state of the Eurozone economy (positive, neutral, negative) through the content of ECB press conferences. In contrast with traditional textual analysis, we propose a novel approach using term-weighting and contiguous sequence of words (n-grams) to better capture the subtlety of central bank communication. We find that quantifying ECB communication using our field-specific weighted lexicon helps to explain future ECB monetary decisions when considering an augmented Taylor rule. Regarding European stock market volatility, we find that markets are more (less) volatile on the day following a conference with a negative (positive) tone about the euro area economic outlook. Our indicators significantly outperform a textual classification based on the Loughran–McDonald or Apel–Blix Grimaldi dictionaries and a media-based measure of economic policy uncertainty.