Institutional investor horizon and stock price synchronicity: Do product market competition and analyst coverage matter?

This paper provides new insights into the relation between institutional investment horizon and stock price synchronicity and investigates whether this relationship depends on the intensity of product market competition and analyst coverage. Based on a sample of French listed companies, we find that long-term (short-term) institutional investors are associated with lower (higher) stock price synchronicity. The results also show that the negative effect of long-term institutional investors is more accentuated for firms in less competitive markets and with high analyst coverage. An additional analysis shows that the synchronicity reduction effect does not vary during the financial crisis. Overall, these findings suggest that unlike their short-term counterparts, long term investors reduce asymmetric information and help disseminate firm-specific information into stock prices.     

The impact of portfolio diversification on mean reverting components of stock indices

Positive autocorrelations are introduced into stock index portfolios when they are formed from individual stock indices while negative autocorrelations are induced in returns by increasing the investment horizon. Using monthly data of six international stock indices, this paper examines the diversification effect with different investment horizons on autocorrelations of stock index portfolios. The results show that portfolio diversification does not alter the impact of the investment horizon on autocorrelations. Different investment horizons, however, have great impact on the diversification effect on autocorrelations. With short (long) horizons, the average autocorrelation coefficient increases (decreases) with an increase in the portfolio size, suggesting that mean-reverting component dominates the delayed adjustment effect in long horizons and vice versa in short horizons. Our results are robust across two 10-year sub-periods.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee of this Journal for the comments on an earlier version of this paper and the Research Committee of Hong Kong Baptist University for the financial support in this research.     

Investment Horizon Effects

Abstract:   Boudry and Gray (2003) have documented that the optimal buy‐and‐hold demand for Australian stocks is not necessarily increasing in the investment horizon when returns are predictable. Such finding is in contrast with Barberis (2000) who shows that positive monotonic horizon effects predominate for US stocks. Using a closed‐form approximation to the asset allocation problem, this paper relates the return dynamics to the investor's portfolio choice for different investment horizons. In the special case of a single risky asset, it is shown that return predictability under stationarity may induce both positive and negative horizon effects in the optimal allocation to the risky asset. The paper extends previous empirical results by solving for the optimal portfolio when two risky assets with predictable returns are available for investment.     

Understanding investors’ reliance on disclosures of nonfinancial information and mitigating mechanisms for underreliance

This study uses two experiments to examine whether nonprofessional investors rely on voluntarily disclosed nonfinancial information (NFI) and the factors that affect their reliance on such information. Results from experiment one suggest that nonfinancial disclosure affects high-experience (long-term) investors more than low-experience (short-term) investors. In addition, more investing experience seems to compensate the insensitivity to NFI caused by a short-term investment horizon. Results from experiment two suggest that merely requiring participants to evaluate firms’ performance separately based on the financial and nonfinancial measures (NFMs) – or merely presenting the NFMs in a more readable format – does not significantly alter the reliance on the nonfinancial disclosure for low-experience and short-term investors. However, when the two interventions are implemented simultaneously, NFI significantly affects the amount invested by those investors.     

Time Diversification: Empirical Tests

This paper investigates the relationship between the performance of equity and the length of the investment horizon used by investors. We examine optimal portfolio time diversification and two definitions of ex ante time diversification. Using almost two centuries of US and UK data we find some support for the hypothesis that equity represents a significantly better investment over long investment horizons than over short investment horizons. Where this result holds, the likely explanation is mean-aversion in fixed-income asset returns. However, these results are sensitive to changes in investor risk preference, changes in utility function specification, changes in the sample period used, changes in investor constraints, and the definition of time diversification adopted. They also differ between the US and UK markets.     

研发开放度与企业创新绩效的关系研究：组织学习的中介作用

研发活动的开放水平与企业从外部环境中获取异质性知识的可能性密切相关。对知识进行系统的组织学习决定企业能否有效利用知识以获得创新产出。构建包含组织学习中介效应的企业研发活动开放度与创新绩效关系模型。考量基于湖南、广东和浙江等地312家企业数据的实证调查表明,企业提升研发活动开放程度和增强组织学习对创新绩效都产生了显著的积极作用,并且组织的探索式学习在研发开放度与企业创新绩效之间起中介作用。     

科创板差异化表决权安排制度略论

我国科创板引入了差异化表决权安排制度,其内涵丰富,包括但不限于双重股权结构。公司自治理念、股东平等内涵的演变及效率价值为差异化表决权安排的设定和存续提供了充足的理论基础。通过分析评价我国相关文件和法律法规对差异化表决权的时间要求、企业准入模式与市值要求、持股主体资格、特别表决权倍数、自动转换机制、信息披露要求、控股股东的信义义务、监督模式、中小股东利益保障和司法保障的规定,提出相关建议,以期进一步完善差异化表决权安排制度。     

中小股东仅能“搭便车”么?——来自深交所社会公众股东网络投票的经验证据

本文利用深交所的社会公众股东网络投票数据,研究了中小股东参与网络投票与公司决策的影响因素和经济后果。结果表明,大股东代理问题严重、机构投资者持股比例较高的公司,中小股东的网络投票参与率较高;中小股东的网络投票参与率与公司股票异常回报正相关,并且这种关系随着大股东代理问题的严重程度而增强。与小股东利益更为相关的股权分置改革提案中,中小股东投票参与率更高,并且这种更高的投票参与率在股权分置改革提案中能为中小股东增进财富。     

Forum Selection in International Business Contracts: Home Bias Portfolio Puzzle and Managerial Moral Hazard

We provide an economic analysis of forum selection in international business contracts. International business contracts or multi-state transactions within federally structured countries might be subject to more than one sovereign adjudication system. In case of conflict between the transacting parties, the appropriate tribunal must be identified. We examine the question of business firms' optimal choice of the forums to adjudicate future business disputes. We extend the investment model approach to litigation by applying a portfolio theory type analysis. We show that firms that prefer higher expected income and lower income volatility are better off diversifying the forums under which they litigate business disputes. This stands in contrast to real-world business practice that consistently shows a clear preference to selecting the home court and legal system to settle international business disputes. In a fraction of the cases, both parties gain by selecting a certain forum, because of specialization for example, and it becomes optimal to ignore diversification. In most cases, however, the relevant factors that affect forum selection are zero sum and priced ex ante, court bias, for example. Once priced, there is no incentive to disregard diversification. We hypothesize that, in addition to specialization, factors such as managerial moral hazard explain the real-world behavior of firms: managers are less likely to be blamed, ex post, for choosing the home court. We suggest that, as international barriers decline and international trade grows, firms will diversify the forums in which they adjudicate international business disputes.     

管理者短视偏差对企业投资行为影响研究——一个基于股东短期利益压力视角的实证

基于股东短期利益压力的视角,以沪深两市2003～2009年间的A股上市公司为对象,采用多元回归分析就管理者短视偏差与企业短期投资间的关系及其对企业未来盈利能力、业绩水平和财务困境的影响进行研究。实证结果表明,管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资水平越高;管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资对企业未来盈利能力和业绩水平的削弱作用越强,意味着管理者短视偏差企业进行的短期投资降低了企业未来盈利能力和业绩水平;管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资对企业当期陷入财务困境可能性的削弱作用越弱,说明管理者短视偏差企业进行的短期投资虽然增大了企业风险,但是并不会加大企业当期陷入财务困境的可能性。     

A Survey of Managerial Incentives and Investment Bias — Common Structure but Differing Assumptions

Recent models within the agency framework concerning investment bias are reviewed, based upon a simplified structure of the pertinent information asymmetry. Tabulated overviews of contractual structures, critical assumptions, main and ancillary results, implications for future research and management are provided. As a general conclusion, the theoretical case of investment bias is rich and wide-ranging. It is now of interest to develop models and perspectives that focus more on economic fundamentals rather than pursuing additional variations of particular assumptions. Moreover, further research is needed in empirical testing and case studies. In particular, the framework promises to bring new perspectives and managerial implications on the administrative use of capital budgeting methods.     

Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

Abstract:  Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders.