独立董事的声誉资本对公司治理效率的影响

本文运用我国上市公司2010～2012年的年报数据实证分析独立董事对公司治理效率的影响,研究结果表明,独立董事的实践经验、薪酬比重、参与公司会议的次数以及声誉资本对上市公司的绩效和公司治理效率具有不同程度的显著性影响。独立董事的声誉资本作为一种激励与约束相容的方式能够有效提升上市公司的治理水平,对公司绩效提高产生积极的作用。因此,在聘请独立董事时,把握好独立董事的贡献与薪酬关联的“度”以及充分利用好独立董事的声誉资本对于完善公司治理结构和提升公司治理水平至关重要。     

独立董事创新机制的研究

本文认为,企业在不同的环境、不同的发展阶段及不同的战略中,应有内外部不同的独立董事机制,以降低企业在运营过程中的决策风险。针对当前独立董事机制实际运行过程中存在的诸多缺陷,如股份公司商业逻辑不清晰,决策层、执行层、监管层界限不明,公司信息不对称或披露不及时,独立董事产生机制、激励机制不能有效保护股东利益等,文章提出必须建立独立董事市场化模式,将之推向市场,促使独立董事职业化;建立有效激励机制,明确独立董事的权利和责任,责权分明,与薪酬挂钩;建立简单、准确、可操作性强的独立董事评价体系,确保激励机制正常作用的发挥。     

安徽省上市公司董事会治理与公司绩效关系的实证研究

以安徽省上市公司为研究样本,对董事会治理与公司绩效的关系进行实证分析,结果表明:适当的董事会规模、董事薪酬与董事持股比例对公司绩效有积极作用;独立董事比例、董事会领导权结构与董事变更对公司绩效影响不显著;过多的董事会会议不利于公司绩效的提高。     

我国上市公司独立董事制度若干特征分析

From three different perspectives, namely, the basic characteristics of independent directors, the percentage of independent directors on board and its relation to company performance, and the remuneration for independent directors and its relation to company performance, we could summarize implementation characteristics of the independent director institution in China: the age distribution of independent directors is relatively even and the majority of them are academic staff and researchers with business administration backgrounds; a positive relationship between the independent director’s remuneration and company performance, as well as between the number of independent directors on board and the company performance. Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2003, (6): 110–121     

Some consequences of the early twentieth-century British divorce of ownership from control

Because ownership was already more divorced from control in the largest stock market of 1911 (London) than in the largest stock market of 1995 (New York), the consequences for the economy, for good or ill, could have been considerable. Using a large sample of quoted companies with capital of £1 million or more, this article shows that this separation did not generally operate against shareholders' interests, despite the very substantial potential for agency problems. More directors were apparently preferable to fewer over a considerable range, as far as their influence on company share price and return on equity was concerned: company directors were not simply ornamental. A greater number of shareholders was more in shareholders' interest than a smaller, despite the enhanced difficulties of coordinating shareholder ‘voice’. A larger share of votes controlled by the board combined with greater board share ownership was also on average consistent with a greater return on equity. Corporate governance thus appears to have been well adapted to the circumstances of the Edwardian company capital market. Hence the reduction in the cost of capital for such a large proportion of British business conferred a substantial advantage on the economy.     

董事会权力结构比较研究——兼论对我国公司治理的借鉴意义

董事会是公司权力执行机关 ,具有股东与公司在权力上的承接关系。但由于信息不对称 ,可能导致董事滥用权力造成损害性后果 ,且股东及监事的监督作用又具有滞后性。因此 ,对发达国家公司法律制度与我国制度现状进行有效评析 ,借鉴与设计有效的董事会内部权力制衡构架 ,对完善我国公司治理结构具有现实意义。     

公司治理中推行独立董事制度的必要性

随着所有权与经营权的分离 ,公司的健康发展与公司有效治理直接相关 ,而董事会的运作效果是公司治理的核心 ,推行独立董事制度对于建立高校运作的董事会 ,保护中小投资者的利益及实现公司有效治理意义重大。     

The Relationship Between Stock Price Changes and Trading Volume:

This study tests Karpoff's (1987) cosUy short sales hypothesis that attempts to explain the asymmetric relationship be- tween stock price changes and trading volume. Since short sales are disallowed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore, the data set offers a polar case of costly short sales. We document an asymmetric price change-volume relationship that is consistent with previous empiri- cal evidence based on US. data sets. More importantly we find a polar case of the asymmetric price change-volume relationship that supports Karpoff's (1987) costly short sales hypothesis: a positive correlation between positive price change and volume, but no signif- icant relationship between negative price change and volume.     

公司治理机制与财务业绩:效率还是盈利

本文基于杜邦分析体系(DuPontAnalysis),以我国资本市场在2002-2004年期间的上市公司年度数据为研究样本,实证检验了公司治理水平的提高对促进企业绩效增长的实现路径。研究表明,上市公司的治理水平越高,高管人员也就越加重视通过公司内部资源整合、完善营销策略和客户管理等方式提高资产营运效率。而且公司治理水平对改善企业绩效的影响并没有突出体现在努力提高主营业务收入或降低生产成本环节,而主要是通过加强资产管理和提高营运效率来实现的。     

股权结构、公司治理与企业业绩——来自中国上市公司的新证据

在充分考虑股权替代变量之间可能存在多重共线性问题的基础上 ,本文对股权结构在公司治理中作用的各种理论假设进行了检验。研究发现 ,经理人员持股比例与上市公司业绩相关性不显著 ;国有股比例与上市公司业绩显著负相关 ;法人股比例与上市公司业绩正相关 ;社会公众股比例对公司财务业绩的影响虽然是负面的 ,但极不显著 ,而与公司市场业绩显著正相关 ;股权集中度与公司业绩显著负相关。     

Tone at the Top: An Ethics Code for Directors?

Recent corporate scandals have focused the attention of a broad set of constituencies on reforming corporate governance. Boards of directors play a leading role in corporate governance and any significant reforms must encompass their role. To date, most reform proposals have targeted the legal, rather than the ethical obligations of directors. Legal reforms without proper attention to ethical obligations will likely prove ineffectual. The ethical role of directors is critical. Directors have overall responsibility for the ethics and compliance programs of the corporation. The tone at the top that they set by example and action is central to the overall ethical environment of their firms. This role is reinforced by their legal responsibilities to provide oversight of the financial performance of the firm. Underlying this analysis is the critical assumption that ethical behavior, especially on the part of corporate leaders, leads to the best long-term interests of the corporation. We describe key components of a framework for a code of ethics for corporate boards and individual directors. The proposed code framework is based on six universal core ethical values: (1) honesty; (2) integrity; (3) loyalty; (4) responsibility; (5) fairness; and (6) citizenship. The paper concludes by suggesting critical issues that need to be dealt with in firm-based codes of ethics for directors.     

公司治理机制下独立董事功能分析

独立董事具有监督公司管理层,评价董事会,树立公司形象等功能,但其自身存在信息不灵、缺乏动力及不能真正独立等缺欠。应从对其功能合理定位,完善选拔机制与选聘程序、完善激励与约束机制,建立健全相关法律法规体系等方面施以对策,以更好地发挥独立董事的功能及作用。     

我国ST上市公司治理缺陷与董事问责制关系的实证研究

我国ST公司治理的缺陷主要外化表现在关联交易的增加,公司业绩持续恶化,资产空心化状态不断加剧。董事问责机制的缺乏是我国上市公司治理结构的制度缺陷。董事问责制缺乏与上市公司治理缺陷之间具有较高的相关性,非公允关联交易是导致我国上市公司业绩持续恶化和资产空心化的主要原因之一。     

Foreign Investment in Brazilian Public Offerings: The Role of Board Composition

Recently, foreigners have been responsible for negotiating more than half of the shares issued by the companies listed in the Brazilian Stock Market. In order to understand the characteristics of companies that influence the increase of international financing, the aim of this article was to investigate the relation between foreign investment in public offerings and board composition. We examine data of 183 Brazilian IPOs and subsequent offerings from 2004–2016 using OLS regression. The empirical result suggested that companies that have a foreign director as a board member and are in a special listing segment of B3—bound by rules of corporate governance—tend to attract more foreign investment. This means that foreigners are sensitive to good corporate governance practices when financing Brazilian firms’ IPOs or that issue new shares. Our findings imply that improvements in the corporate governance practice of companies could increase their ability to raise foreign capital.

RESUMERecientemente, más de la mitad de las acciones emitidas por las empresas cotizadas en la Bolsa de Valores brasileña fueron negociadas por extranjeros. El objeto de este estudio consistió en investigar la relación existente entre las inversiones extranjeras en las ofertas públicas y la composición de sus juntas directivas, para entender las características de las empresas que contribuyen a aumentar el financiamiento internacional. Utilizando la regresión de mínimos cuadrados ordinarios dinámicos (MCOD, OLS en inglés), examinamos datos de la Oferta Pública Inicial Brasileña 183 (IPO) así como ofertas subsiguientes del período 2004-2016. El resultado empírico obtenido sugiere que las empresas cuya junta directiva tiene como miembro un director extranjero y constan en un segmento de cotización especial (B3), sujeto a normas de gobernanza corporativa, suelen atraer más inversiones extranjeras. Esto implica que, al financiarlas, los extranjeros son más susceptibles a que las empresas brasileñas que abren su capital o emiten nuevas acciones, usen buenas prácticas de gobernanza corporativa. Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que la implementación de mejoras en las prácticas de gobernanza corporativa de las empresas puede aumentar su financiamiento internacional.

RESUMORecentemente os estrangeiros passaram a ser responsáveis pela negociação de mais da metade das ações emitidas pelas empresas listadas na Bolsa de Valores brasileira. Para entender as características das empresas que influenciam o aumento do financiamento internacional, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo o estudo da relação entre o investimento estrangeiro nas ofertas públicas e a composição das diretorias. Examinamos dados de 183 IPOs (Oferta Pública Inicial) e de ofertas subsequentes, de 2004 a 2016, usando a regressão MQO (OLS na sigla em inglês). O resultado empírico sugere que as empresas que têm um diretor estrangeiro na diretoria e que estão no segmento de listagem especial da B3—sujeitas às normas de governança corporativa—tendem a atrair mais investimentos. Isso significa que os estrangeiros estão alerta quanto às boas práticas de governança ao considerar empresas brasileiras que abrem o capital ou que emitem ações novas. Os nossos achados sugerem que melhorias nas práticas de governança corporativa das empresas podem elevar o financiamento internacional das empresas.     

上市公司环境治理的现状与对策

公司环境治理是公司治理的重要组成部分。目前,上市公司环境治理问题主要表现在环境会计信息披露不完善,缺乏强有力的政府干预、市场约束以及非政府组织和公民的监督。改善上市公司环境治理需要培育良好的环境治理的外部社会制度环境,倡导环境责任投资理念,加强利益相关者与公民的参与,完善上市公司环境责任报告。     

Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance

The monitoring role performed by the board of directors is an important corporate governance control mechanism, especially in countries where external mechanisms are less well developed. The gender composition of the board can affect the quality of this monitoring role and thus the financial performance of the firm. This is part of the “business case” for female participation on boards, though arguments may also be framed in terms of ethical considerations. While the issue of board gender diversity has attracted growing research interest in recent years, most empirical results are based on U.S. data. This article adds to a growing number of non-U.S. studies by investigating the link between the gender diversity of the board and firm financial performance in Spain, a country which historically has had minimal female participation in the workforce, but which has now introduced legislation to improve equality of opportunities. We investigate the topic using panel data analysis and find that gender diversity – as measured by the percentage of women on the board and by the Blau and Shannon indices – has a positive effect on firm value and that the opposite causal relationship is not significant. Our study suggests that investors in Spain do not penalise firms which increase their female board membership and that greater gender diversity may generate economic gains.     

Ethics Programs, Board Involvement, and Potential Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Governance

Board composition, insider participation on compensation committees, and director compensation practices can potentially cause conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders. If these corporate governance structures result in situations where actions beneficial to directors do not also benefit shareholders, then shareholders may suffer.Corporate ethics programs usually address conflicts of interest that may arise in the firm's activities. Some boards of directors take active roles in their firms' ethics programs by actively overseeing the programs. This paper empirically examines the relationship between ethics programs and potential conflicts of interest and the relationship between board involvement in a firm's ethics program and potential conflicts of interest.Evidence in this paper shows that firms with ethics programs have a lower percentage of inside directors on their compensation committees than do firms without ethics programs. Firms in which boards are actively involved in the programs have more independent boards (higher percentage of independent directors and lower percentage of inside directors) and are more likely to compensate outside directors with equity than are firms in which boards are not actively involved in the programs. Supplemental analyses show that the incidence of potential conflicts of interest is not significantly different between firms without ethics programs and firms in which boards are not actively involved in the programs. Taken together, the evidence in this paper indicates that a board actively involved in an ethics program, and not the simple existence of an ethics program, is related to the incidence of potential conflicts of interest.     

公司治理机制对公司现金持有量的影响——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

本文以我国部分上市公司为样本实证研究了公司治理机制对公司现金持有量的影响。结果表明,公司治理机制并未对公司现金持有量形成显著影响,从公司现金持有量的视角为我国上市公司治理机制的不完善性提供了经验证据。