WELFARE COST OF INFALTION IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

We study the welfare cost of inflation in a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Nominal prices and wages are subjected to Taylor‐style adjustments in the benchmark model. We find that the welfare cost of inflation in a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is much higher than its counterpart in a real business cycle model. We also find that the welfare cost of inflation increases linearly with the inflation rate with the introduction of monopolistic competition but rises faster as the inflation rate increases with the introduction of nominal rigidity. Alternative price and wage setting schemes, such as Rotemberg and Calvo‐style adjustments would yield welfare costs of moderate inflation that are 2–10 times higher.     

Government Spending and Welfare with Returns to Specialization

We explore a novel channel through which government spending can stimulate consumption and welfare through its effects on aggregate productivity, without directly affecting either utility or production possibilities. In the presence of monopolistic competition and increasing returns to specialization, it is shown that government spending can partly alleviate the inefficiencies of monopolistic competition. This is because government spending generates an endogenous increase in total factor productivity by increasing the variety of intermediate goods. If the degree of increasing returns to variety is large enough, a rise in such wasteful government spending may increase consumption levels enough to increase welfare.
JEL classification : E 60     

Comparison of deep integration in the Melitz,Krugman and Armington models: The case of The Philippines in RCEP

We estimate the welfare effects of a modern mega-preferential trade agreement--the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership--with three versions of market structure: (i) perfect competition, Armington style; (ii) monopolistic competition based on Krugman (1980); and (iii) monopolistic competition in the style of Melitz (2003). We develop a new numerical model of foreign direct investment (FDI) with heterogeneous firms and extension of the Krugman model that allows small countries to impact the number of varieties. We hold both the trade and FDI responses constant across the three market structures. We find that in all three market structures, there are substantial gains from deep integration, but virtually no gains from preferential tariff reduction. Both our Krugman and Melitz style models produce significantly larger welfare gains than the Armington structure, especially if third countries benefit at least partially from the deep integration reforms via either spillovers or wider liberalization.     

Trade liberalization gains under different trade theories: a case study for Ukraine

We analyze the deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) between Ukraine and the EU using a multi-regional general-equilibrium simulation model. Three alternative trade structures are implemented: (a) a standard specification of perfect competition based on the Armington assumption of regionally differentiated goods; (b) monopolistic competition among symmetric manufacturing firms; and (c) a competitive selection model of heterogeneous manufacturing firms. Across these structures the DCFTA indicates relatively large gains for Ukraine of more than 3 percent. We show, however, that the gains for Ukraine are lower when we consider monopolistic competition in manufacturing. This is attributed to a movement of resources into Ukraine’s traditional export sectors to the EU, which produce under constant returns. While there is little danger of deindustrialization dominating the overall welfare gains, we do observe substantially lower gains when we consider monopolistic competition. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical confirmation of the theoretic predication that the relative gains from trade in monopolistic competition models might be lower than under perfect competition in the context of a numeric simulation of economic integration. Under the popular heterogeneous-firms monopolistic competition theory we find significant firm selection effects indicating welfare impacts for Ukraine that are less than under the Armington structure but above those found under symmetric firms and monopolistic competition. These results are important considerations for Ukraine’s overall development strategy.     

Fragmentation and Welfare in Monopolistic Competition

We examine the welfare effect of fragmentation with a general‐equilibrium model of monopolistic competition. Using the efficiency property of monopolistic competition models, we develop a diagram that is used to show that fragmentation of production arises, i.e. firms in a country specialize in developing blueprints and out‐source the manufacturing of their products to the other country. Such fragmentation allows countries to benefit from trade due to two different sources: comparative advantage and product diversity. We show how these two sources result in gains from trade induced by this production fragmentation.     

The Interaction Between Technology Adoption and Trade When Firms are Heterogeneous

This paper develops a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms to study the interaction between technology adoption and trade in a world of two countries facing different technology adoption costs. It shows that a reduction in the technology adoption cost in one country increases productivity, induces more firms to adopt advanced technology, and improves welfare in this country, while decreasing productivity, inducing more firms to switch back to old technology, and reducing welfare in the other country. Furthermore, although a reduction in transport costs always makes the country with the lower adoption cost better off, it can hurt the other country.     

Pitfalls in Restructuring the Electricity Industry

Abstract. This paper models some reductions in output that may follow the opening of electricity markets to competition. Specifically, we show that vertical separation of electricity generation, transmission and distribution could reduce welfare compared to the previous system of vertically integrated monopoly, if grid owners can act as monopolistic retailers or, alternatively, set access prices that maximize merchandizing surplus. Moreover, we show that a rule of non‐discriminatory pricing would not remedy any of these problems. Hence, to secure the efficiency gains of deregulation, the re‐regulation of the remaining monopolistic core – the electric grid – cannot rely on simple rules like cost‐based non‐discriminatory pricing.     

Do exclusivity arrangements harm consumers?

This paper explores the ramifications of exclusivity arrangements, e.g., iPhone’s partnership with wireless carriers, for market competition and consumer welfare. Two firms compete in a primary good market, and a monopolistic firm offers a value-adding good. The primary good can be consumed alone, while the value-adding good must be consumed with the primary good. The monopolistic firm forms an exclusivity partnership with one of the primary good providers. Buyers are able to consume the value-adding good only if they patronize the monopolistic firm’s exclusive partner. This practice allows the monopolistic firm to extract surplus from the primary good market. Surprisingly, consumers benefit from the exclusivity arrangement. However, overall social welfare declines, despite improvements to consumer welfare.     

Privatization and entries of foreign enterprises in a differentiated industry

We investigate whether or not privatization is beneficial from the viewpoint of social welfare in a monopolistic competition model. We discuss the relationship between the welfare effects of privatization and the degree of foreign direct investment in the private sector, which is an important problem in developing countries and in transition economies such as China and Central and Eastern European countries. We find that, in the long run, privatization of a public firm is more likely to improve welfare when the country depends on foreign capital in the private sector, whereas the opposite tendency exists in the short run.     

Capital Inflow in the Presence of Endogenous Labour Supply and Monopolistic Competition

This paper examines the impact of capital mobility within the context of a simple general equilibrium model where the supply of labour is endogenous and the producer services sector is subject to monopolistic competition. It is shown that the presence of monopolistic competition influences the size of all comparative static results. The paper also shows that the size of the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption of the final good plays a crucial role in determining the impact of changes in the supply of capital on utility-maximising labour supply and welfare. Specifically, it is shown that capital mobility has no impact on optimal labour supply if the elasticity of substitution is equal to unity. The impact of a small capital inflow on welfare can be negative if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently larger than unity.     

市场结构、环境税与福利效应分析

运用短期局部均衡分析方法研究完全竞争市场和垄断市场条件下环境税对社会福利的影响.结果显示:在完全竞争市场条件下,对企业征收环境税可以增进社会福利.而在垄断市场条件下,环境税的福利效应具有不确定性,这取决于垄断造成的扭曲程度.如果垄断造成的扭曲较小,环境税仍然可以提高社会福利.但无论是增进抑或降低社会福利,对垄断企业征收环境税都不可能实现最优化,因为环境税在矫正污染外部性的同时,垄断造成产量水平下降导致福利损失增加,所以只能追求一个次优的结果,次优环境税低于完全竞争条件下的标准环境税.     

国有企业对市场绩效的影响——基于古诺双寡头垄断模型的分析

假设在国有企业主导的垄断竞争市场上,国有企业的经营目标是追求收入最大化,把国有企业引入古诺双寡头模型,一家国有企业与一家民营企业在不同的目标约束下展开古诺竞争,博弈最后的均衡结果与两家民营企业的古诺模型均衡结果相比较,发现国有企业的这种特殊的经营目标扭曲了资源配置,从而造成社会福利的损失。     

企业在同质产品市场的差异化战略行为——一个对我国反垄断立法的产业组织理论解释

我国在加入WTO后,一些重要的服务领域面临着全面对外开放。由于转换成本的存在,使得该领域中本来在购买前功能相近的同质商品或服务,在购买后成为异质的商品。企业因而拥有相对于消费者的事后垄断的权力。为此,企业有动机在初期采取战略行为吸引消费者。这既缓和了后续阶段的企业间竞争,也在整体上将该行业的产品价格维持较高水平。它可能会降低社会效率和消费者福利。文章通过分析企业间在同质商品市场竞争的市场效果和福利后果,为在我国该领域反垄断立法提供了理论解释。     

Who benefits from China’s coal subsidy policies? A computable partial equilibrium analysis

Using a computable partial equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and based on global coal production, trade and consumption data in 2014, this study simulates the economic and welfare impacts of China’s coal subsidies at the industry level. Simulation results show that, first, the government’s subsidies have greatly promoted China's coal output, but may aggravate the overcapacity in China’s coal industry. Second, China's coal subsidies have significant trade destruction effects and its coal imports fall by more than 20% annually. Third, if considering the environmental cost, China's coal subsidies cause not only huge net welfare loss to China, but also harm to the global environment, thus no country benefits from China's coal subsidies.     

On the growth and welfare effects of monopolistic distortions

The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap” may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can lead to stagnation in the long term.      

Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction

One of the main elements of the recent reform of electricity trading in the United Kingdom is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyze this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with demand uncertainty. We find that under perfect competition there is a trade-off between efficiency and consumer surplus between the two auction rules. We also establish that a move from uniform to discriminatory pricing under monopoly conditions has a negative impact on profits and output (weakly), a positive impact on consumer surplus, and ambiguous implications for welfare and average prices.     

Protection for sale under monopolistic competition: Beyond the CES

We extend the protection for sale model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) by introducing a general model of monopolistic competition with variable markups and incomplete pass-through. We show that the structure of protection emerging in the political equilibrium not only depends on the weight attached by the government to consumer welfare when making its policy decision, but also on the degree of market power of firms and on the terms-of-trade variations due to the degree of pass-through. Our results highlight the importance of preferences in shaping the structure of protection and are consistent with the occurring of protectionism also in unorganized industries.     

Ad valorem versus unit taxes: monopolistic competition, heterogeneous firms, and intra-industry reallocations

Real-world industries are composed from heterogeneous firms and substantial intra-industry reallocations take place, i.e. high productivity firms squeeze out low productivity firms. Previous tax-tool comparisons have not included these central forces of industry structure. This paper examines a general equilibrium monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms and intra-industry reallocations. We show that the welfare superiority of ad valorem over unit taxes under imperfect competition is not only preserved but amplified. The additional difference between the tools arises because unit taxes distort relative prices, which in turn reduces average industry productivity through reallocations (the survival and increased market share of lower productivity firms). Importantly, numerical solutions of the model reveal that the relative welfare loss from using the unit tax increases dramatically in the degree of firm heterogeneity.     

Unemployment and welfare consequences of international outsourcing under monopolistic competition

This paper challenges the conventional academic view that international outsourcing is just another form of gainful trade. Contrary to that view, we show that labour‐service outsourcing can reduce the high‐wage country's welfare even when product‐market trade is beneficial, within a model that combines involuntary unemployment and monopolistic competition. Outsourcing's impact on welfare is worsened by a definite loss of jobs and a possible contraction in the range of varieties produced worldwide. While owners of capital benefit from outsourcing under certain conditions, labour's welfare always falls.     

浅析现代经济增长理论的演变

经济增长不仅是经济学研究的永恒主题,更是全世界都普遍关注的问题。从亚当·斯密开始,经济学家就不断地对经济增长进行探索。正是由于经济增长与全世界人民的福利息息相关,所以我们对经济增长的研究就显得格外重要。然而随着经济全球化的发展,传统经济增长理论已经不能解释现代社会经济发展过程中出现的种种现象。理论和现实之间的矛盾促使我们探求现代经济增长理论,以更好地解释世界。因此,对现代经济增长理论的演变进行探索,具有积极的理论和现实意义。本文从经济增长的事实入手,首先界定了现代经济增长的概念,然后对现代经济增长理论的发展脉络进行梳理和阐述,分别对哈罗德一多马模型、新古典经济增长模型（外生增长理论）和新增长模型（内生增长理论）进行了详细分析。通过分析可见现代经济增长理论经历了由技术外生增长到内生增长、市场结构由完全竞争到垄断竞争的演变。