宏观产权制度与企业产权制度构成要素的比较及其功能研究

本文以诺斯关于制度的三要素划分为依据,比较了宏观产权制度和企业产权制度的构成要素,并就这些要素的结合所产生的功能进行了研究.结论认为,政府和企业均应不断地创新产权制度的正式约束,诱导产权制度的非正式约束演进,革新实施机制,以调整政府行为和规范企业行为.     

基于经营难度系数的我国机场企业领导人员薪酬设计

科学合理地确定机场企业领导人员的薪酬结构,最大限度地调动其积极性,对机场的飞行安全,经营服务以及持续发展具有重要作用。文章在充分分析机场企业异质性的基础上,提出了基于经营难度系数的薪酬设计方案,即通过构造机场企业的经营难度系数,同时引入机场企业的安全影响度、生产指标完成率、管理测度率和资产保值增值率等要素进行综合考核,从机场企业经营情况、安全情况和服务情况三个方面分别得出第一责任人的年薪,其它班子成员则根据一定比例得出。     

企业产权制度的比较制度分析——基于企业内收入公平分配的视角

企业产权制度分为单一物质资本产权、单一国家资本产权、单一劳动联合体产权和联合产权制度.基于企业内收入分配动态公平性视角的分析表明,联合产权制度外的企业产权制度,在知识经济社会会产生两极分化或平均主义两种不公平现象.联合产权制度不是要素产权的简单拼盘,其中具有集体产权性质的劳动联合体产权确保了企业的竞争优势和企业对于员工的凝聚力.联合产权是现代企业制度的普遍形式,是公平分配的微观基础.     

生产要素对粮食产量的贡献系数分析

文章以河南省为案例,对2001年￣2003年全省109个县的数据进行定量分析,认为在既定的技术条件下,灌溉是影响粮食生产的第一要素,同时对其他要素的贡献系数又产生直接影响。灌溉对粮食产量贡献系数与当年的降水量密切相关。为保证粮食生产的稳定发展,政府应加强农田水利设施的建设,治理水污染,推广节水设备与技术,提高用水效率,同时对各种生产要素进行合理的配置。     

日本创新集群的发展及启示——以九州半导体创新集群为例

创新集群由企业、研发机构、协调支援机构等要素构成,是通过各个要素间的分工合作,创造和运用新的知识和技术,实现竞争优势的组织网络。利用这一概念性框架,对日本九州半导体集群进行分析,得出如下结论:九州半导体集群向创新集群升级,具有由政府主导、要素条件完备、重视产学官合作等特点,其成功经验对我国发展创新集群具有积极的借鉴和参考意义。     

区域经济增长的城乡结构效应分析——以广东、江苏、浙江三省为例

从城乡协调这一视角可将经济结构分解成产业结构、就业结构、收入结构和消费结构四个要素（变量）,在分析广东、江苏和浙江该四个要素与经济增长的相关性基础上,通过对广东、江苏和浙江三省1978—2005年的结构变量对经济增长贡献率的计量分析发现,产业结构和就业结构变量对经济增长发挥了积极的作用,而反映城乡收入差距和消费差距的收入结构和消费结构对三省经济增长有着负面的影响。要推进区域经济的快速增长,就完善城乡结构而言,既要加快产业结构和就业结构的调整,实现由第一产业为主导转向第二、第三产业为主导和农业人口向非农就业的转化,同时,还必须兼顾城乡收入差距和消费能力这两个重要要素,逐步缩小城乡收入差距,提高农村居民的消费能力。     

劳动力与资本错配效应:来自十九个行业的经验证据

本文构建了不完全市场条件下的一般均衡模型,引入要素相对流动系数表征要素错配水平,利用我国2004-2010年19个行业的面板数据测算要素错配度及其对我国经济产出效率的影响。根据劳动力和资本相对流动系数可知,我国各行业均存在不同程度的劳动力和资本错配,要素拥挤与稀缺现象并存,且资本错配程度较深。但近年来劳动力和资本错配的程度均有所改善,其中资本错配改善平均能使产出效率提高1.37%;而劳动力错配改善的提升作用为0.91%。这是因初始资本错配的程度较深,故改善空间较大,金融体系改革的边际贡献较高。要素配置效率行业分解的结果显示,信息传输、计算机服务和软件业更加偏向于技能型劳动力,故存在严重的劳动力结构性稀缺;而水利、环境和公共设施管理业、教育和卫生、社会保障和福利业则存在人员冗余及效率较低等问题,劳动力稀缺和剩余并存的问题未得到有效解决是我国劳动力配置效率偏低的主要原因。     

资产质量、资产反应系数与公司治理

公司治理结构不仅直接作用于资产信息的质量，还能通过影响管理层使用资产的效率，进而影响公司资产质量。本文从董事会特征和股权结构两个维度度量公司治理，发现公司治理水平高的企业资产质量也高。进一步研究发现，资产质量和资产反应系数与公司治理特征的相关关系具有同向变动的趋势，这对资产质量进行深入研究提供了一条新的路径。     

资产质量、资产反应系数与公司治理

公司治理结构不仅直接作用于资产信息的质量，还能通过影响管理层使用资产的效率，进而影响公司资产质量。本文从董事会特征和股权结构两个维度度量公司治理，发现公司治理水平高的企业资产质量也高。进一步研究发现，资产质量和资产反应系数与公司治理特征的相关关系具有同向变动的趋势，这对资产质量进行深入研究提供了一条新的路径。     

引入管理者要素的企业生产模型

本文以新制度经济学家提出的交易费用概念为出发点,明确引入管理者要素构建的生产者努力函数对传统生产模型进行了修正.新模型中生产者直接参与生产,而管理者通过影响生产者的努力系数间接参与生产过程.本文探讨了均衡条件下企业对生产者、管理者需求弹性的变化规律,一是劳动者需求价格弹性仅受企业内相对工资水平与生产技术的影响,劳动者绝对工资数量的多寡、产品价格的高低都不起作用;二是企业对劳动力的需求交叉弹性为负数,这意味着新模型中的生产者与管理者要素是互补品而非替代品.     

Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership

This paper compares domestically and foreign-owned plants with respect to their debt-to-assets ratio and analyzes to which extent the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. To derive hypotheses about influence of corporate taxation on a firm's debt financing we adapt a standard model of taxation and financing decisions of firms for the case of international debt shifting activities of foreign-owned firms. We estimate the average difference between a foreign-owned and a domestically owned firm's debt ratio, treating the mode of ownership as endogenous. Using data from 32,067 European firms, we find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country. Moreover, this gap in the debt ratio increases with the host country's statutory corporate tax rate.     

所有制、制度环境与公司治理效率

资本所有制作为资本所有权的制度安排是企业有效治理的前提条件。企业治理制度的形成具有路径依赖的特性 ,是与各个国家和企业所处的环境因素分不开的。在既定的经济技术和制度环境下 ,只要企业所有权安排得当 ,任何与其经济技术和制度环境相适应的资本所有制形式都是可以有效的。衡量治理效率的标准是治理成本的最小化或治理主体收益的最大化。为了提高治理效率 ,我国应根据不同企业的情况适时进行治理制度的改革和创新 ,并努力创造适于企业生存的制度环境。     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

宁波市民营企业产权结构分析

本文以浙江省宁波市296家民营企业的调查数据为依据,用多个计量模型来检验家族企业中产权结构和企业绩效之间的关系。我们发现,企业绩效与管理层及最大股东的股份额密切相关,却与包括单个最大股东和其家庭成员在内的家庭股份份额无显著相关性。本文结果说明,即使是在市场机制尚不成熟的环境下,内生产权理论的结论也基本适用。但家庭股份份额却对企业绩效没有显著影响这一结果说明,需要对家族企业的产权结构的变化做进一步的研究。     

Partial vertical ownership

A backward ownership interest held by a downstream firm yields a partial rebate of the upstream margin. Input demand increases with backward ownership, and the upstream firm optimally responds by raising price. With symmetric costs, every downstream firm's equilibrium input/output choice is invariant across a class of ownership profiles, including uniform ownership. Moreover, equity trading results in uniform holdings, so partial vertical ownership may have no real effects. With asymmetric costs ex ante, equity trading amplifies the asymmetries and shifts output toward lower-cost firms. With homogeneous goods, this improves producer and total surplus. With differentiated goods, it may harm consumers.     

我国企业成长力分析的理论基础和指标体系构建

企业成长力是企业成长性和企业成长模式选择的决定因素,是企业成长所依赖的资源和能力。企业成长力的内涵可以从动机和能力两个维度以及企业家和组织两个层次加以理解,相应地,我们将企业成长力分解为企业家抱负、企业家能力、企业制度与治理以及组织战略与能力四个要素。各种要素对企业成长性的影响程度因制度和产业环境以及企业自身资源的异质性而不同。     

产业共性技术研发政府支持合同

建立了产业共性技术研发三阶段博弈模型,基于政府视角研究了以企业研发投入最大化为目标的共性技术支持合同的最优设计问题,并分析了合同性质。研究结果表明:足够多的政府预算是共性技术研发最优合同存在的前提,企业的最优研发投入随着政府预算的增加而增加,且其增长速度比政府支持投入的增长速度更快;企业的最优研发投入与共性技术市场化预期收益、企业及政府投入对共性技术研发成功的影响系数正相关,与双方单位投入成本系数负相关。     

Income misattribution under formula apportionment

Alternatives to the current system of separate tax accounting, such as the proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in Europe, would apportion a firm's worldwide profits using formulas based on the location of employment, capital or sales. This paper offers a new method of evaluating the accuracy of these apportionment rules and the ownership distortions they create. Evidence from European company accounts indicates that apportionment formulas significantly misattribute income, since employment and other factors on which they are based do a very poor job of explaining a firm's profits. For example, the magnitude of property, employment and sales explains less than 22% of the variation in profits between firms, and the prediction estimates from using such a formula exceed half of predicted profits 64% of the time, and exceed twice predicted income 11% of the time. As a result, the use of formulas rewards or punishes international mergers and divestitures by reallocating taxable income between operations in jurisdictions with differing tax rates. The associated ownership distortion is minimized by choosing factor weights to minimize weighted squared prediction errors, for which, based on the European evidence, labor inputs should play little if any role in allocation formulas. But even a distortion-minimizing formula creates large incentives for inefficient ownership reallocation due to the enormous variation in profitability that is unexplained by formulary factors, implying that significant resource allocation costs would accompany European adoption of formulary apportionment methods.     

International Cross-Ownership and Strategic Trade Policies

The paper analyzes a model of strategic trade policies in the presence of international cross-ownership of firms that are heterogenous both in terms of costs and in terms of extent of foreign ownership. The equilibrium pattern of taxes and subsidies is characterized for any arbitrary cross-ownership profile, and any number of heterogenous firms. The equilibrium subsidy (or tax) given to any firm is shown to depend, in a separable manner, on the firm's characteristics and on the covariance of the distribution of cost and foreign ownership across firms. A neutrality theorem is proved concerning the Nash equilibrium of the game between governments: in equilibrium, the pattern of trade, the value of each firm, and world welfare are independent of the ownership pattern.     

The environmental performance of firms: The role of foreign ownership, training, and experience

In this paper we extend the debate on the environmental implications of foreign direct investment in developing countries by examining a new mechanism through which foreign influence can affect the environmental performance of firms. We focus on the extent to which key workers who have had previous training or experience in a foreign owned firm transfer and utilise their knowledge gained to the benefit of the local environment. To this end we use detailed firm-level data on manufacturing firms in Ghana. Our econometric results suggest that the foreign training of a firm's decision maker does reduce fuel use, particularly so in foreign owned firms. Foreign ownership per se does not influence fuel use or total energy use but is found to increase electricity use, perhaps the cleanest form of energy used by Ghanaian firms.