Antidumping duties, undertakings, and foreign direct investment in the EU

We study the effects of EU antidumping policy when foreign firms can ‘jump’ antidumping duties through foreign direct investment (FDI) in the EU. We show that duty jumping or duty pre-empting FDI occurs if the EU administration has broader objectives than protecting EU industry's profitability and if cost advantages of foreign firms are transferable abroad. The (expectation of) price undertakings reduces the incentives to engage in FDI and may even discourage FDI as long as products are not too differentiated. The results are consistent with recent empirical findings on antidumping jumping FDI.     

Partisanship and antidumping

This paper empirically examines the influence of political partisanship on antidumping protection, which has become the most frequently used contingent trade remedy in the last 20 years. First, we show that the number of antidumping initiations from the labor intensive industries increases when there is a left-wing government in power. In addition, the evidence on the governments' decision to impose antidumping duty demonstrates that the increase in the leftist orientation of the governments is associated with an increase in the likelihood of an affirmative antidumping outcome from the petitions of labor intensive industries. Although antidumping is an administrative protection which includes a set of necessary procedures and rules to follow, our findings clearly point out the political bias in AD actions in the form of partisan preferences.     

R&D intensity,financing cost and antidumping

Existing studies have established a stylized fact that worldwide antidumping (AD) activity is concentrated in R&D intensive industries. We build on this issue and analyse the effect of the interaction between financing costs and R&D intensity on AD practices using cross-country cross-industry data. Our findings suggest that R&D intensive industries file disproportionately more AD investigations when financing cost is high.     

How antidumping measures affect US imports from China: A mesoeconomic perspective of the excess price changes

This paper studies the impact of US antidumping (AD) measures on US import volumes and prices from China, employing both theoretical analysis (mesoeconomics) and empirical analysis (difference in differences). Using US customs data, we find that US AD measures have substantial trade-dampening effects at the product level, and the exogenous increases of costs caused by AD duties push up the import prices of influenced import goods more than the increases in costs. We also build a mesoeconomic model that gives a reasonable and analytical explanation for our empirical findings.     

Trade liberalization, antidumping, and safeguards: Evidence from India's tariff reform

This paper is the first to use product-level data to examine empirically whether countries use antidumping and safeguard exceptions to unwind commitments to lower tariffs in the face of domestic political-economic pressure. We focus on the case of India, a country that underwent a major exogenous tariff reform program in the early 1990s and subsequently initiated substantial use of safeguard and antidumping import restrictions. We first estimate structural determinants of India's import protection using the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model and provide evidence from its pre-reform tariff data of 1990 that is consistent with the theory. We then re-estimate the model on the Indian tariff data after the trade liberalization is complete and find that the model no longer fits, a result consistent with theory and evidence provided in other settings that India's 1991-1992 IMF arrangement can be interpreted as resulting in an exogenous shock to India's tariff policy. However, when we re-estimate the model on data from 2000-2002 that more completely reflects India's cross-product variation in import protection by including both its post-reform tariffs and its additional non-tariff barriers of antidumping and safeguard import protection, the significance of the Grossman and Helpman model determinant estimates is restored. We interpret these combined results as evidence that India unwound its commitment to reduce tariffs through use of antidumping and safeguard protection in the face of political-economic pressure. The estimates are also economically important and provide one explanation for separate results in the literature that the magnitude of import reduction associated with India's use of antidumping is similar to the initial import expansion associated with its tariff reform. Finally, we interpret the implications of our results for the burgeoning research literature examining the effects of liberalization on India's micro-level development.     

Heterogeneous beliefs, price dispersion, and welfare-improving price controls

Summary. We consider a search market model where agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the distribution of prices. A suggestive example shows that Jevon's Law of One Price and standard welfare results are not robust to small heterogeneous errors in beliefs. In particular we show that a price ceiling above marginal cost can reduce price dispersion and improve welfare (by lowering aggregate search costs) without decreasing quantity supplied. These results are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence. Received: July 27, 1999; revised version: May 24, 2000     

论我国企业的倾销规避、反倾销和反反倾销

入世以来，我国企业与国外企业在倾销和反倾销领域里矛盾依然很大。客观上讲，这既有对方的原因，也有国内企业自身的原因。国内企业既要从自身做起，严于律己，避免倾销产生，防止授人以柄，从而减小出口障碍，使市场得到平稳开拓；又要充分利用世贸组织赋予我们的权利，积极反倾销，使我国国内市场得到合法的保护，促进国内市场的有序竞争；还要勇敢地面对国外的反倾销，主动地纠正国外针对我国反倾销中的偏差，消除不合理的反倾销给我国出口造成的消极影响。     

Price undertakings, VERs, and foreign direct investment: the case of foreign rivalry

Abstract.  Antidumping (AD) petitions are often withdrawn in favour of voluntary export restraints (VERs) and price undertakings. This paper compares these policy options in the presence of protection-jumping foreign direct investment (FDI), with special emphasis on rivalry between foreign firms. We show that a VER is less likely to induce FDI than a price undertaking or AD. As a result, by settling AD cases with VER agreements, the importing country can pursue a more protectionist policy without triggering FDI. In this sense the GATT ban on VERs following the proliferation of AD uses was a sensible decision.     

倾销和反倾销过程中不同集团利益及其关系的经济分析

倾销与反倾销过程涉及到多个利益集团的利益。除倾销企业和被倾销企业两个主要当事方外,受这一过程影响的还包括进口国倾销商品的消费者和相关的非倾销企业等,从而形成了出口国倾销企业与进口国被倾销企业之间、进口国被倾销企业与进口国消费者之间以及出口国倾销企业与出口国或第三国非倾销企业之间的多重矛盾关系。本文以一般经济理论为基础,分析了倾销和反倾销对上述四个主要集团利益的影响,并在此基础上揭示了存在于这一过程中的主要矛盾。     

Chinese firm and industry reactions to antidumping initiations and measures

China has been the subject of large numbers of both antidumping initiations and measures. This article explores the reactions of Chinese firms and industries to these actions by using dynamic system GMM estimator and industrial panel data on all Chinese firms in the industry, foreign firms operating within China and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for aggregated firms group between 1997 and 2007. We find that antidumping actions by developed and developing countries negatively impact industrial profits and employee and firm numbers and also exports, but improve labour productivity. We also find that different kinds of firms show different responses. All firms together in an industry react to antidumping the most, and foreign and SOE firms show a much smaller response. Further, antidumping effects from different countries are different. Developed countries’ antidumping actions have more negative impact than developing countries’ actions; the effects of US actions are different from the European Union’s.     

Analyst earnings forecast revisions and the persistence of antidumping relief

Panel corrected standard errors with instrumental variables and effects are invoked to assess the significance of earnings forecast revisions around critical dates in non-steel AD petitions filed in 1985–1987. These petitions were filed between two important US trade law revisions (1984 and 1988), and the period encompasses significant stock market advances and declines. Event studies have been invoked to assess the value of AD petitions. However, they do not estimate the temporal distribution of any abnormal returns. Because analysts make quarterly earnings forecast revisions over several horizons, we can assess the short and long run value of petitions. We find that AD petitions tend to depress earnings forecasts in the year of the petition. However, second year earnings forecasts tend to be revised upwards. There is no effect on five year (long term) earnings growth forecasts. Hence any benefits of protection do not persist. There is evidence that analysts anticipate the filing by revising forecasts in the three months in advance of the filing. We also find that AD petitions do not affect the accuracy of forecasts.     

Seasonality,price discrimination,and welfare

We discuss a potential limitation to a widely accepted result, namely that an output increase is a necessary condition for welfare to increase with price discrimination. We use a theoretical model to show that the existence of seasonal demand fluctuations may allow for a simultaneous reduction in average output and increase in average welfare. We also discuss a number of extensions of our basic model.     

Inventories and antidumping: the case of orange juice trade

The United States and Brazil are key players in the international market for orange juice, mainly frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ). The U.S. orange juice industry benefits from one of the highest levels of import protection in U.S. agriculture. Additional trade protection was recently added with a U.S. industry victory in an antidumping trade suit against Brazil. We study the impact of FCOJ imports from Brazil on U.S. prices using time series econometric models and find only a weak FCOJ domestic price response to imports from Brazil, because extremely large U.S. inventories mute the price impact of any fluctuation in imports. Our findings imply that the antidumping tariffs were unjustified based on a material injury argument.     

关于我国进出口贸易中的倾销、反倾销问题的研究

文章对我国进出口贸易中的倾销、反倾销问题进行了研究 ,并提出了相关对策与建议。     

Money,price dispersion and welfare

Summary. We introduce heterogeneous preferences into a tractable model of monetary search to generate price dispersion, and then examine the effects of money growth on price dispersion and welfare. With buyers search intensity fixed, we find that money growth increases the range of (real) prices and lowers welfare as agents shift more of their consumption to less desirable goods. When buyers search intensity is endogenous, multiple equilibria are possible. In the equilibrium with the highest welfare level, money growth reduces welfare and increases the range of prices, while having ambiguous effects on search intensity. However, there can be a welfare-inferior equilibrium in which an increase in money growth increases search intensity, increases welfare, and reduces the range of prices.Received: 25 July 2003, Revised: 12 December 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E31, D60.B. Peterson, S. Shi: We thank Gabriele Camera, Aleksander Berentsen and an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. We have also received valuable comments from the participants of the workshop at Michigan State, the Purdue Conference on Monetary Theory (2003) and the Midwest Macro Meeting (Chicago, 2003). Shi gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Bank of Canada Fellowship and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The opinion expressed here is the authors own and does not reflect the view of the Bank of Canada.Correspondence to: S. Shi     

Inflation, price dispersion, and market structure

In this paper, we use a novel data set containing prices from bazaars, convenience stores, and supermarkets in Istanbul to re-examine the relationship between price dispersion and inflation. Although existing evidence is mixed, we find positive and significant relationships between dispersion, on the one hand, and lagged dispersion and unexpected product-specific inflation on the other. We also find evidence that dispersion is initially decreasing in anticipated aggregate inflation but is eventually increasing. Finally, average price duration and dispersion are lowest in the bazaar. This is intuitive, since menu and search costs should be minimal in that market structure.     

Deregulation,news releases,and price discovery

We hypothesize that the firm’s regulatory environment influences the sensitivity of its equity value to information. Using intraday stock price data of utilities operating in differing regulatory environments we test for systematic differences between the responsiveness of stock prices of utility firms operating in deregulated and regulated environments to a common information set. Our findings reveal sharp differences in responses, with those of utilities operating in deregulated environments the strongest, and the responses of utilities in highly regulated environments the weakest. While the evidence supports our hypothesis, in a broader sense, the evidence suggests that deregulation aids in the process of price discovery. We also find evidence that suggests that deregulation, per se, does not lead to higher stock price volatility.      

Product differentiation,price discrimination and collusion

The existing literature which analyses the relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discriminate. Within the Hotelling framework, three different collusive schemes are studied: perfect collusion on discriminatory prices; perfect collusion on a uniform price; collusion not to discriminate. We obtain that the critical discount factor of the first and the third collusive scheme does not depend on the product differentiation degree, while the critical discount factor of the second collusive scheme depends positively on the product differentiation degree. Moreover, we show that imperfect collusion is more difficult to sustain than perfect collusion.     

Consumer confusion,obfuscation and price regulation

This paper studies firms’ obfuscation choices in a duopoly setting where two firms differ in their marginal costs of production. We show that the high‐cost firm chooses maximum obfuscation while the low‐cost firm chooses minimal (maximal) obfuscation if the cost advantage is large (small). We argue that in this setting there is a new role for price regulation as it leads to more transparent pricing. Moreover, a price cap benefits social welfare as it shifts production to the more efficient low‐cost firm.