回报计划感知价值对计划忠诚的影响分析——顾客满意的中介作用

文章关注回报计划能否创造顾客忠诚这一核心问题,以参与超市回报计划的顾客为调查对象,从顾客价值视角出发,提出了回报计划感知价值、顾客满意与计划忠诚之间的关系,探讨了顾客满意在回报计划感知价值与计划忠诚之间的中介作用.通过问卷调查,利用因子分析及线性回归分析验证了研究假设.实证分析结果表明:经济功能价值、社交情感价值对顾客满意均有着显著的正向影响,顾客满意对行为计划忠诚与态度计划忠诚也都有着显著的正向影响;顾客满意在经济功能价值与行为计划忠诚之间起着部分中介效应,在经济功能价值与态度计划忠诚之间起着完全中介效应,在社交情感价值与态度计划忠诚之间起着部分中介效应.     

在线参与方式对顾客参与意愿及注视效果的影响

通过眼动实验考察不同在线参与方式（匿名VS.非匿名）对顾客在线参与意愿及注视效果的差异影响，并考察品牌强度的调节效应。结果表明：非匿名在线参与方式（VS.匿名在线参与方式）带来更长的注视时间、更多的注视次数和更长的决策时间，且对于非匿名在线参与方式（如转发朋友圈），顾客关注品牌信息多于奖励信息。同时，研究表明匿名在线参与意愿（如关注公众号）高于非匿名在线参与意愿（如转发朋友圈），但是这种影响关系受到品牌强度的调节作用。对于弱品牌，顾客会更倾向选择匿名在线参与方式（如关注公众号）；而对于强品牌，顾客对匿名和非匿名在线参与方式的参与意愿无显著差异。     

大型超市顾客感知价值对顾客忠诚的影响

消费者根据对产品和服务的感知进行购买决策。他们的忠诚既是企业的营销目标,也是企业获取顾客的有效途径。以顾客感知价值作为前因,探究超市顾客感知价值要素对顾客忠诚的影响作用,可为超市实施基于顾客价值创造的忠诚营销计划指明努力的方向。     

转换障碍对顾客忠诚作用的实证分析

建立了结构方程模型用于检验积极转换障碍和消极转换障碍与顾客忠诚之间的关系,运用LISREL软件对223个方便样本数据展开分析。结果说明：转换障碍通过顾客满意对顾客忠诚产生调和作用;积极转换障碍对顾客满意和顾客忠诚产生正向作用,消极转换障碍对顾客满意和顾客忠诚产生负向作用。此结论与其他研究者的结论有所差异,可解释的原因为：在消极转换障碍较高的市场中,消费者会产生较高的不满情绪,从而导致转换意图（行为忠诚）的产生。     

浅谈外贸企业如何运用CRM提升客户忠诚度

客户忠诚度引申于客户满意度，它是指客户达到满意后而产生的对某种产品品牌或公司的信赖、维护和希望重复购买的一种心理倾向。当客户对企业的满意程度达到一定水平时，客户会有忠诚于企业的意愿；当这种满意程度得到进一步提升时，客户会产生忠诚于企业的行为。     

顾客参与对购买意愿影响的经验研究——以电子优惠券为例

市场上的电子优惠券之所以能够蓬勃兴起和运营商终端设备的普及,是由于顾客参与发挥了重要作用。随着电子优惠券使用的日益频繁,电子优惠券市场竞争日益激烈,运营商应该如何维持和吸引新的客户群体加入会员体制,成为市场的关注重点。本文研究中将顾客参与的四个维度即工作认知、搜寻信息、付出努力、人际互动作为本研究的自变量,顾客购买意愿作为因变量,而顾客感知价值作为中介变量,旨在运营商网站或终端设备上获取和使用电子优惠券作为研究对象。从电子优惠券的消费情境出发,研究顾客参与、顾客感知价值的关系以及对顾客购买意愿的影响,以求通过实证研究的结果为竞争激烈的运营商市场提供一定的建议。     

企业应以超值服务培养顾客忠诚

市场经济条件下，企业效益来自于顾客对企业的忠诚。所谓顾客忠诚，即顾客受情感驱使在某一段时间内自觉放弃其他可供选购的对象，而对某一特定产品表现出来的偏好与优先选择行为。顾客忠诚的意义在于能为企业带来持续的收入和利益；顾客忠诚一旦建立，企业因受重复销售与工作配额的影响，收入与市场份额将会上升，成本会下降。另外，据有关调查资料表明，企业50％到80％的利润来自20％的固定顾客。美国经济学教授威仑德说：顾客就如同工厂和设备一样，也是一种资产。因此，企业必须通过有效经营，培养顾客忠诚，寻求效益最大化。哪些因素可…     

促进企业信用政策的优化的模糊方法

1问题的提出企业对顾客发放信用是依其信用标准而定的。信用标准抬顾客获得企业的交易信用所应具备的条件。如果顾客达不到信用标准，便不能享受企业的信用或只能享受较低的信用优惠。通常企业通过“五户’系统来设定信用标准。该标准指的是：（1）品质（ter）：指顾客的信誉，即履行偿债义务的可能性；（2）能力卜aPa灯）：指顾客的偿债能力，即其流动资产的数量和质量以及与流动负债的比率；（3）资本卜apital）：指顾客的财务实力和财务状况；（4）抵押（Collaed）：指顾客拒绝付款或无力支付款项时能被用作抵押的资产；（5）条件（cond…     

酒店顾客射频识别技术使用意愿研究

智慧酒店的出现和迅速发展对顾客行为研究提出了新的课题。顾客信息技术使用意愿直接关系到顾客对酒店的满意度和酒店信息技术投资的回报。文章基于TAM模型,从人口统计特征视角出发,以射频识别技术为例,使用Mplus6.0软件进行数据分析,对酒店顾客信息技术使用意愿进行了实证研究。结果表明,当对射频识别技术产品进行投资时,酒店管理者应考虑顾客使用射频识别技术意愿这个重要前提,而年龄因素对顾客使用信息技术的意愿具有显著的影响;与此同时,酒店使用信息技术产品则有益于顾客体验和员工表现。     

酒店顾客对节能环保的态度偏好及支付意愿研究

研究顾客对酒店节能环保的态度及支付意愿有助于酒店进行产品细分及制定营销策略.本文通过对广交会期间酒店顾客的问卷调查,研究了酒店顾客对节能环保的态度、支付意愿及其相互关系.结果表明:第一,酒店顾客对住宿舒适度无直接影响的节能环保措施,支持程度都很高,而对存在直接影响的节能环保措施,支持度则相对稍低;第二,酒店顾客对节能环保的态度可以细分为“态度评价”和“决策影响”两个因子,对节能环保认同态度较高的顾客群体并不一定会为之付出更高的消费代价;第三,依据前述两个因子,可将酒店顾客区分为“决策敏感型”和“决策迟钝型”两类.决策敏感型顾客在选择酒店时更多地会受酒店节能环保措施的影响,也愿意为此付出更多的费用.     

A note on internal and external reference in efficiency wage models

According to Bewley, a workers’ morale depends on being treated fairly within firms. This implies that the internal comparison of the own wage with wages paid to other workers within the firm affects individual effort determination. By contrast, the standard efficiency wage models only consider a comparison of the own wage with external income opportunities as the only determinant for individual effort. We provide a simple efficiency wage framework in which both the internal and external perspectives can affect individual effort determination. Our framework suggests that the internal reference is essential for the existence of real wage rigidity while the external reference ensures an upward-sloping wage-setting curve.      

Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers

This paper considers collusion between a supervisor and an agent within a Principal–Supervisor–Agent model. Other papers consider the possibility of collusion after the supervisor has exerted costly effort to obtain hard (“verifiable”) evidence regarding the agent’s actions, information which, if reported would result in the agent being fined with a certain probability. That is, collusion occurs because the supervisor may accept a bribe in exchange for hiding the information he has obtained. This paper allows the supervisor and the agent to enter into a collusive contract either before or after the supervisor has exerted effort to find verifiable information regarding the agent’s actions. The former type of collusion, which occurs after the supervisor has exerted effort, entails ex-post corruption, while the latter, which occurs before the supervisor has exerted effort, entails preemptive corruption. This paper shows that although raising the supervisor’s reward discourages ex-post corruption, it can simultaneously encourage preemptive corruption. Hence, raising the supervisor’s reward will not always discourage collusion. This result further implies that though privatizing law enforcement can always be used to eliminate ex-post corruption, it cannot be used to eliminate preemptive corruption. Furthermore, when compared to ex-post collusion, an equilibrium without corruption is always socially preferred. However, when compared to preemptive collusion, an equilibrium without corruption may not always be socially preferred.     

A Theory of Tenure for the Teaching University

In this paper we challenge the presumption that academic tenure is an outmoded institutional form for the small teaching university. Starting from the premise that tenure is granted on the basis of research (reflected in a minimum required number of publications), we argue that tenure has value for a university concerned solely with teaching (as opposed to research) because research enhances human capital and incentives for its accumulation are necessary to improve the quality of faculty teaching over the lifecycle. However, while human capital accumulation and research effort create future value, contracting on either basis is not feasible because neither can be measured objectively. Numbers of publications, the usual proxy for research, meter the desired activity only imperfectly due to randomness in the publication process. In these circumstances, an employment contract that offers tenure, compared with contracts that a) reward only teaching and b) supplement teaching payments with a direct reward for publications, can better generate the optimal level of human capital. The minimum publication requirement of the tenure contract induces the optimal level of research with less variation in expected income, avoiding inefficient behavioural responses to the greater riskiness of a contract rewarding only realised publications.     

Labor migration and risk aversion in less developed countries

"In this paper we question the pioneering work of Todaro, which states that rural-to-urban labor migration in less developed countries (LDCs) is an individual response to a higher urban expected income. We demonstrate that rural-to-urban labor migration is perfectly rational even if urban expected income is lower than rural income. We achieve this under a set of fairly stringent conditions: an individual decision-making entity, a one-period planning horizon, and global risk aversion. We obtain the result that a small chance of reaping a high reward is sufficient to trigger rural-to-urban labor migration."     

Large Stakes and Big Mistakes

Workers in a wide variety of jobs are paid based on performance, which is commonly seen as enhancing effort and productivity relative to non-contingent pay schemes. However, psychological research suggests that excessive rewards can, in some cases, result in a decline in performance. To test whether very high monetary rewards can decrease performance, we conducted a set of experiments in the U.S. and in India in which subjects worked on different tasks and received performance-contingent payments that varied in amount from small to very large relative to their typical levels of pay. With some important exceptions, very high reward levels had a detrimental effect on performance.     

Research cycles

This paper studies the dynamics of fundamental research. We develop a simple model where researchers allocate their effort between improving existing fields and inventing new ones. A key assumption is that scientists derive utility from recognition from other scientists. We show that the economy can be either in a regime where new fields are constantly invented, and then converges to a steady state, or in a cyclical regime where periods of innovation alternate with periods of exploitation. Our analysis provides a rigorous foundation to the Kuhnian theory of scientific evolution. We show that scientists' care for reputation has a strong impact on research dynamics and tends to favor innovation. Especially, innovation fads may emerge. We also study welfare and find that the academic reputational reward system can help align scientists' short-term incentives with society's long-term interests.     

THE FOCAL POINT IN THE TRAVELLER'S DILEMMA: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

This paper provides an experimental test of the traveller's dilemma. Our investigation aims to address the research hypothesis that introducing a reference point à la Schelling (set equal to the Pareto optimal solution) might drive people away from rationality even when the size of the penalty/reward is high. Experimental findings reported in this paper provide answers to this question showing that the reference point did not encourage coordination around the Pareto optimal choice.     

公立高校科研奖励过度问题研究——知识发展流程视角

从70所公立样本高校 “科研奖励办法”政策文本内容及其7类16种奖项共计651频次计量结果发现：科研成果尤其是学术论文是奖励对象的重点；奖励对象多少与样本高校类型和层次呈反方向变化；各类型高校对ESI高被引论文等特别是教学型高校对各个等级科研项目存在严重的重复奖；科研项目奖励金额大小与高校类型和层次也呈反方向变化，一些教学型高校对各级科研项目奖励金额往往存在大于或等于科研项目经费本身等极不合理的现象。公立高校的科研奖励和奖励过度违背科研劳动及知识发展流程理论。最后提出对策：提高保健层，试行年薪制；保障基本承认层，提高声誉奖；完善和规范提高层与特别奖励层。     

Rewarding effort

According to liberal egalitarian ethics, individuals should be rewarded for factors under their control (the principle of responsibility), but not for factors outside their control (the principle of equalization). The paper analyses the effects of two requirements on how to reward effort within a liberal egalitarian framework: the requirement of equal reward and the requirement of solidarity. We show that it is impossible to establish a framework that satisfies the principle of equalization in all respects, and that a generalized version of the egalitarian equivalent mechanism is a very plausible liberal egalitarian approach. We should like to thank Aanund Hylland, Dirk Van de Gaer and two anonymous referees for extremely valuable comments.     

The artist–art dealer relationship as a marketing channel

This article studies the relationship between the artist and the art dealer, interpreted as being the two members of a “marketing channel”, as defined by industrial organization and marketing science literature. The result for both parties depends on the individual effort that each of them puts in; uncoordinated effort levels are shown to result in an inefficient outcome. Efficiency, subject to different institutional settings and agreements, is studied here with specific reference to the visual arts. The results may easily apply to the stage of creation of a number of different artistic goods. Possible ways to reach efficient outcomes in marketing channels in artistic fields are suggested and discussed.