On the Value of Transparency in Agencies with Renegotiation

In this paper we study when it is advantageous to improve corporate transparency by allowing shareholders direct access to corporate information and when it is preferable to rely on a reporting system in which shareholders only gain access to information that management chooses to disclose. We show that in an agency model that allows for contract renegotiation, the desirability of a fully transparent reporting regime hinges on the stewardship properties of the information in question. Specifically, information that is mainly useful for predicting future events and of little use for evaluating past actions should only be made available to the public through management's self‐interested disclosures. Only if the information is useful for making inference about managerial actions can it be optimal to have full corporate transparency, so that outsiders have independent access to the same information as management.     

Moral Hazard and Information Sharing: A Model of Financial Information Gathering Agencies

We propose a theory of information gathering agencies in a world of informational asymmetries and moral hazard. In a setting in which true firm values are certified by screening agents whose payoffs depend on noisy ex post monitors of information quality, the formation of information gathering agencies (groups of screening agents) is justified on two grounds. First, it enables screening agents to diversify their risky payoffs. Second, it allows information sharing. The first effect itself is insufficient despite the risk aversion of screening agents and the stochastic independence of the monitors used to compensate them.     

Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard

In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high‐ and low‐loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no‐commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced.     

Resource Accounting and Executive Agencies

Executive agencies have had several years' experience of the introduction and development of accruals based accounting systems. Senior agency managers therefore provide an authoritative source of information on the problems that could follow from introducing it more widely across government. A survey of senior managers revealed that, despite major improvements in accounting information systems, agencies still face difficulties in implementing accruals accounting. Government departments also seem unlikely to accept easily the switch from cash accounting to accruals accounting without extensive training. The effort and resources required for this should not be underestimated.     

Management and Accounting Developments in Executive Agencies

The executive agency programme has moved ahead rapidly since its introduction in 1988 and by 1996 over 70% of all civil servants were working under executive agency conditions. This has resulted in a major change in the structure of the civil service and in the management of the activities of central government. The question that then emerges concerns the benefits, if any, that these changes have brought about. This paper reports the results of a survey of a sample of senior managers in executive agencies. The survey attempted to ascertain the extent to which agencification was felt to have led to increases in autonomy and freedom to manage and also to obtain the views of managers on a range of issues including changes in operational effectiveness and quality of service delivery. These, after all, are some of the key measures of the success or otherwise of the agencification programme. The survey also examined changes in specific management accounting practices and a broad overview of the findings is provided in the paper. In general, it seems that the senior managers of executive agencies do feel that agencification has achieved many of the benefits hoped for and that is has brought about changes and improvements in management and management accounting practices.     

Leases with Purchase Options and Double Moral Hazard

Abstract:  The purpose of this paper is to explain why leases have a purchase option and how the exercise price of this option is determined. We follow Demski and Sappington's (1991) approach by using a double moral hazard setting. One limitation of their model is that the agent has unlimited liability. The agent has to have enough wealth and the obligation to buy the firm when the principal decides to exercise the put option. In our paper, this problem is resolved by using a call option, which is a feature of many lease contracts. We show that leases with a purchase option can completely resolve the double moral hazard problem even if all the variables in the model are unverifiable. It is the threat of being the residual claimant that induces the lessor to provide an efficient level of effort. On the other hand, it is the opportunity of being the residual claimant that induces the lessee to maintain the asset efficiently. Finally, the model predicts that certain leased assets are not properly accounted for under the current accounting standards for leasing.     

Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open‐market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature these policies are indistinguishable. However, Freeman's argument that the central bank should absorb losses associated with default to provide risk sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman's argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and open‐market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.     

论金融道德风险

本文对金融道德风险的内涵进行了深刻的分析,并从九个方面做出了准确的定义.提出了规范性、社会性、个体性的道德风险分类标准,并分别进行了分类和论述.     

Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort.     

道德风险与金融危机

不可否认,当前的金融危机给政策的面貌带来了翻天覆地的冲击.在一个接一个的国家里,我们看到政府恐慌地做出膝跳反射似的反应,并把他们的政策手册扔到一边:前所未有的救助和国有化开始出现,审慎的财政政策灰飞烟灭,毫无保留的凯恩斯主义已经回归.很多人宣称,我们尝试的自由市场已经失败,现在应该进行更广泛的监管和更积极的宏观经济管理.     

商业银行道德风险的表现、成因与治理

近年来,英国巴林银行的倒闭、东南亚金融危机和美国"次贷危机"等金融事件,引起社会对道德风险问题的广泛关注.商业银行的决策者或各层面人员为实现短期经营目标而对银行长期利益目标的损害、银行从业人员利用职权牟取个人私利等道德风险问题日益突出.     

信用评级机构及其道德风险

本文对信用评级机构加剧金融市场波动的成因进行了分析,指出现有机制下信用评级机构存在道德风险的必然性,并就化解道德风险提出了个人的看法。     

Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information

The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well-known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high-quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high-quality borrowers may put up more collateral.     

Moral Hazard in Lending and Labor Market Volatility

When the economy experiences a sharp economic downturn, credit spreads widen and project financing costs for firms rise as funding sources begin to dry up. The economy experiences a lengthy recovery, with unemployment rates slow to return to “full employment” levels. We develop a model that displays these features. It relies on an interaction between labor search frictions and firm‐level moral hazard that is accentuated during recessions. The model is capable of addressing the “Shimer puzzle,” with labor market variables exhibiting significantly more volatility on average as a result of the heightened moral hazard concerns during these episodes that significantly deepen and prolong periods of high unemployment, as vacancy postings fall dramatically and the job‐finding rate declines. Our mechanism is also found to induce internal shock propagation causing the peak response of output, unemployment, and wages to occur with a several quarter delay relative to a model without such frictions. Many other labor market variables also show slower recovery—their return to preshock level occurs at a slower pace for a number of periods after the peak response.     

Leverage and Risk Taking under Moral Hazard

Journal of Financial Services Research - In this paper, I analyze the effectiveness of different capital regulations in mitigating the effects of moral hazard that exists only for systemically...     

银企关系中的道德风险成因与防范——一个博弈分析框架

银企信贷关系中存在道德风险,给银行和社会造成了诸多危害。本文在银企之间博弈分析的基础上提出建立和完善破产清算机制,建立和健全社会信用保障体系,降低银行的监督成本,推进利率市场化建设,都有助于道德风险的防范。     

Deposit Insurance and Forbearance Under Moral Hazard

We study the efficacy of forbearance using a real options approach. Our model endogenizes moral hazard embedded in credit risk undertaken by the bank. The bank's interest rate risk is modeled as duration mismatch. Other modeling improvements over previous studies include such features as stochastic interest rates and deposits, continuous interest payments on an ongoing deposit portfolio, and a stochastic forbearance period. We find that the bank does have an incentive to engage in undue risk taking. Even in the presence of moral hazard, however, forbearance can still be a desirable course of action in reducing the FDIC's expected liability. In addition, the capital ratio plays an extremely important role in determining the fair insurance premium. Finally, using the mismatch of asset and deposit durations as the correct measurement of interest rate risk, our model reveals that an optimal asset variance may exist for a particular bank, contrary to what the contingent claims framework would predict. Therefore, we resolve the puzzle that banks in practice do not increase asset risk to take full advantage of the limited liability.     

Leverage,Moral Hazard,and Liquidity

Financial firms raise short‐term debt to finance asset purchases; this induces risk shifting when economic conditions worsen and limits their ability to roll over debt. Constrained firms de‐lever by selling assets to lower‐leverage firms. In turn, asset–market liquidity depends on the system‐wide distribution of leverage, which is itself endogenous to future economic prospects. Good economic prospects yield cheaper short‐term debt, inducing entry of higher‐leverage firms. Consequently, adverse asset shocks in good times lead to greater de‐leveraging and sudden drying up of market and funding liquidity.     

Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring

The paper analyses the relationship between deposit insurance, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking. In a stylised banking model we show that deposit insurance may reduce moral hazard, if deposit insurance credibly leaves out non-deposit creditors. Testing the model using EU bank level data yields evidence consistent with the model, suggesting that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to limit the safety net and permit monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. We further find that credible limits to the safety net reduce risk taking of smaller banks with low charter values and sizeable subordinated debt shares only. However, we also find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits in banks' liabilities.     

金融资产处置中的道德风险

不可忽视的道德风险 经济学中的道德风险一般是指代理人为达到自己的目标而从事不利于委托人利益最大化的行为.比如企业的经营者不尽最大努力去实现企业的价值,或者虽然他们不做什么错事,但工作起来不十分卖力.这种行为既不构成法律和行政责任问题,股东又很难追究他们的责任,存在于这些经营者身上的是道德问题.道德风险存在于一切委托代理领域,代理人之所以能够背离委托人的目标,其主要原因是信息的不对称.