中国企业跨国并购热中的风险因素及其规避措施

中国企业在跨国并购中应该采取恰如其分的风险规避措施:采取多种渠道增强与目标公司所在国政府的沟通;作出科学的跨国并购决策和计划;搜集财务信息减少信息不对称,运用金融工程化解金融风险;做好并购对象的筛选工作;进行技术整合,降低跨国并购技术风险;要致力于跨文化整合。     

中国企业跨国并购的信号作用

基于信号理论,采用2006—2017年中国沪深两市上市公司在发达国家或地区的跨国并购数据,实证检验了跨国并购的信号作用。研究发现:跨国并购行为是有效的信号,能够向客户传递积极信息,提高企业销售收入;并购方所有权性质、国际化程度、所在行业集中度以及标的方所在国家或地区发展程度会影响信号作用的强弱。研究表明,企业可以通过跨国并购的信号作用改变其利益相关者的认知和行为,且在跨国并购完成或者终止决策之前,企业的跨国并购行为就能够基于信号作用对企业产生一定的积极影响。     

跨国并购中的企业文化整合探讨

随着我国企业规模的日益扩大,跨国并购已逐渐成为我国企业开拓国际市场、夯实自身实力的有效手段,但在跨国并购中对企业文化整合的重视程度不够,影响了并购的效果。本文分析了我国企业跨国并购中文化整合效果不佳的原因,并设计出了我国跨国并购企业文化整合方案,这对于今后解决我国跨国并购企业文化整合问题具有一定的借鉴意义。     

中国企业海外并购溢价决策影响因素实证分析

以主并企业为研究对象,结合信息不对称理论、行为金融理论和企业国际化理论等,构建分析框架并实证检验了中国上市公司海外并购溢价决策的影响因素。研究结果显示:信息不对称程度是影响中国上市公司海外并购溢价决策的基本因素,海外并购高溢价在一定程度上属于我国企业"走出去"交纳的"学费";企业高管的自利与过度自信心理特征会放大并加剧中国上市公司的海外并购溢价程度;高国际化程度能有效抑制中国上市公司的海外并购溢价水平。     

经济全球化下企业并购问题讨论综述

企业并购是市场经济永恒的话题。在我国加入WTO的条件下,企业并购的形势发生了重要的变化。虽然我们现在还难以准确地描述企业并购的新变化、新规律,但是,至少有几条大的脉络清晰可见。一条是:外国资本将更多地以跨国并购的形式进入中国,大规模的跨国并购浪潮即将来临;另一条是:面对强龙压境,国内企业猛然觉醒,或联合,或并购,以图自保,并伺机反攻;还有一条是:一些已做大、做强的国内企业纷纷走出国门,参与国际跨国并购,或与跨国公司结成联盟,积极分享经济全球化带来的巨大利益。这一切新的变化,将对我国的经济体制和经济发展产生深刻的影响。如何看待这些变化成为经济学界和实业界关注的焦点。     

对企业并购中财务处理问题的相关思考

一、企业并购中存在的问题 1．信息不对称导致企业价值评估难于做到非常准确。 在确定目标企业后，并购双方最关心的问题莫过于以持续经营的观点合理估算目标企业的价值并作为成交的底价，这是并购成功的基础。目标企业的估价取决于并购企业对其未来自由现金流量和时间的预测。也就是说，目标企业价值的评估风险根本上取决于信息不对称程度的大小。     

我国企业跨国并购的现状、风险分析及应对策略

近年来,随着经济全球化程度日益加深、世界性产业结构调整升级和"走出去"战略的完善,跨国并购越来越成为各国企业国际直接投资的首要选择,跨国并购在当今经济社会掀起新的浪潮。与此同时,中国企业跨国并购的步伐也随之不断加快。但对于发展中国家的企业而言,企业跨国并购在带来收益的同时还存在着较大风险。本文主要结合相关案例,就我国企业跨国并购的风险及其应对策略进行分析。     

信息不对称与并购支付方式的理论分析

信息不对称是影响并购支付方式的主要因素,不同的并购支付方式包含着关于公司价值的主要信息,因而不同支付方式的市场反应也不同,从而影响着并购双方股东的短期超额收益和并购后公司的业绩.因而关于信息不对称下公司并购支付方式的选择成为西方财务理论界关注的焦点.文章通过对信息不对称框架下并购支付方式的选择及不同支付方式的短期及长期影响的文献进行梳理,希望为后续的研究提供某些借鉴,并为我国日益增长的跨国并购活动提供一些理论上的支持.     

企业跨国并购中的供应链整合研究

跨国并购是对原有供应链进行重构、整合的过程,本文提出企业并购中的供应链整合要素,分析企业跨国并购对供应链整合产生的影响,进而构建企业跨国并购中的供应链整合框架。从供应链内、外部整合到供应链战略整合,并购的类型涉及供应链在企业跨国并购整合中扮演的角色和地位,进而关系到供应链整合的模式。供应链跨国运营整合、供应链信息整合、供应链文化整合以及供应链跨国人力资源整合,这些整合策略之间彼此关联并相互作用,共同形成供应链整合的支持体系。     

贷款信息披露认证效应研究——来自制造业上市公司并购宣告收益的证据

上市公司信息披露的主要目的之一是减轻信息不对称对企业价值的损害.本文通过对2005—2014年207个以现金为支付方式的制造业上市公司股权收购样本的研究,发现信息不对称程度与收购方并购宣告累积异常收益率显著负相关;控制并购宣告前披露高管人事变动信息、增资增发信息、投资信息后,发现贷款信息披露与收购方并购宣告收益显著正相关.进一步研究发现,贷款信息披露可以显著地降低信息不对称对收购方并购宣告收益的损害.并且认为,银行贷款具有认证作用,对贷款信息的披露可以改善由于信息不对称造成的投资者逆向选择,从而提高企业的市场价值.     

Product differentiation, cost‐reducing mergers, and consumer welfare

Abstract.  Cost synergies are an explicitly recognized justification for a two‐firm merger, and empirical techniques are now widely used to assess the impact of cost‐reducing mergers on prices and welfare in the post‐merger market. We show that if the merger occurs in a vertically product differentiated market, then the merger will lead to a reduction in product offerings that limits the usefulness of pre‐merger empirical estimates. Indeed, we further show that in such markets, two‐firm mergers will typically lead to higher prices regardless of the merger's cost savings. JEL classification: L10, L41     

Horizontal Mergers Under Asymmetric Information About Synergies

This paper analyses a situation in which there are three quantity‐setting firms, two of which are considering whether or not to merge. When these two firms have private information about the potential cost‐saving synergies of the merger, they may have an incentive to overstate them. This is because if they succeed in making the non‐merging rival firm believe that the synergies are high, the rival firm reduces output and the merger becomes more profitable. Under some conditions, anticipating that the rival will form such a belief, low‐synergy firms that would never merge under complete information will mimic high‐synergy firms by merging. Such pooling behaviour by the merging firms can have a negative impact on social welfare.     

并购后组织结构设置与并购绩效——基于多重因素的调节效应

并购后对被并购企业的组织地位进行调整是并购后组织结构设置中的一项重要决策.在中国情境下,并购后保留被并购企业的法人资格会比取消其法人资格更有利于主并企业的并购绩效.同时,区域因素、并购前绩效以及相对规模对并购后的组织结构和并购绩效之间的关系具有显著的调节作用,即:当跨区域并购时,并购后保留被并购企业的法人地位对主并企业的并购绩效的积极作用会越大;被并购企业并购前绩效越高,则并购后取消其法人 地位对主并企业的并购绩效的积极作用会越大;被并购企业的相对规模越大,则并购后保留其法人地位对主并企业的并购绩效的积极作用会越大.     

Bilateral Agreements in a MultiFirm Industry: Technology Transfer and Horizontal Merger

The paper studies the profitability of technology transfer and horizontal merger between two asymmetric firms in a multifirm Cournot oligopoly. If there is only one technologically advanced firm and one or many technologically backward firm(s), a profitable technology deal between two asymmetric firms exists if and only if the collaborating firms are "close" in terms of their initial technology levels. With more than one advanced firm such a technology deal is "always" profitable. Contrary to that, a profitable bilateral horizontal merger occurs if and only if the gap of technologies between the two partners is larger than a critical level. The paper also studies the relative profitability of these two bilateral arrangements.     

Partial ownership and cross-border mergers

Partial ownership can be used as a screening device by a foreign firm which wants to merge with a local firm whose productivity is private information. As partial ownership is confined to sharing future merger profits, it cannot achieve complete separation in all cases but improves expected merger gains also in an equilibrium which is not fully separating. Without partial ownership, the foreign firm potentially discriminates against high productivities. In a pooling equilibrium with partial ownership, however, it will potentially discriminate against intermediate productivities.     

EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS*

We characterize incentive‐efficient merger outcomes when payments can be made both in cash and stock. Each firm has private information about both its stand‐alone value and a component of the (possibly negative) potential synergies. We study two cases: when transfers can, and cannot, be made contingent on the value of any new firm. When they can, we show that redistributing shares of any nonmerging firm generates information rents and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of efficient merger rules. When they cannot, private information undermines efficiency more when it concerns stand‐alone values than synergies. Here, acquisitions emerge as optimal mechanisms.     

FAILING FIRM DEFENCE WITH ENTRY DETERRENCE

Under the principle of the failing firm defence a merger that would be blocked due to its harmful effect on competition could be nevertheless allowed when (i) the acquired firm is actually failing, (ii) there is no less anticompetitive alternative offer of purchase, (iii) absent the merger, the assets to be acquired would exit the market. We focus on potential anticompetitive effects of a myopic application of the requirement (iii) by studying consequences of a horizontal merger on entry in a Cournot oligopoly with a failing firm. Entry is deterred if the merger is cleared and, when the industry is highly concentrated, consumer welfare is higher under a prohibition because long‐run gains due to augmented competition exceed short‐run losses due to shortage of output.     

Human Capital and Growth: New Evidences from African Data

Assuming that all firms have rising marginal costs, merger between a dominant firm and one of the firms in the competitive fringe is considered. The effects on market price and output, profits and market power are shown when the dominant firm operates as a two-plant firm after merger and output arises from both plants. It is proved that if merger offers no efficiency gain, then market price always rises; and if merger results in efficiency gain, then market price falls if and only if there are sufficiently large number of firms in the fringe. In any case, there is profit incentive for merger to take place. [611]     

A pre-emption model of mergers

This paper studies the paradox of the value destroying mergers in a sequential negotiation model in which the synergy accrued from the mergers is private information. This study shows that in a simultaneous competitive bidding process, the winner’s curse of overpaying rarely occurs but may arise in the target firm initiated sequential negotiations; and if the merger is successful then the outcome is never value destroying for the combined firm. Thus the acquirer’s overpayment cannot be considered as the ‘winner’s curse’ that results from the post-announcement competitive bidding but rather than the result of the target’s strengthened bargaining power in the sequential negotiations. The implications and intuition of such value-destroying mergers thus differ substantially from that of existing pre-emptive mergers and acquisitions models that use a simultaneous bidding mechanism. The results also imply that the ‘acquisition premium’ accrues to the target firms.     

Merger profitability in mixed oligopoly

We analyse merger profitability in a mixed-oligopoy Cournot model. The “merger paradox” is qualified by showing that there are profitable gains for the firms participating in a horizontal merger that is not a merger to a monopoly. In particular, it is shown that merger sustainability depends on both, the privatization degree of the mixed firm and the number of non-merging firms.