Collusive tax evasion and social norms

Although collusive tax evasion by buyers and sellers of commodities and also by employers and employees is widespread all over the world, it has rarely been analyzed in the tax evasion literature. To fill this gap and to compare collusive tax evasion with independent tax evasion, this paper develops a simple noncooperative game-theoretic model and confirms the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Because collusive tax evasion involves social interaction, this paper focuses on the effect of social norms and theoretically and empirically demonstrates that the tax compliance norm has a stronger negative effect on the magnitude of collusive tax evasion than on independent tax evasion. The reason for this result is that in a collusive tax evasion game with multiple equilibria social norms affect the range of equilibria and act as an equilibrium selection device, whereas social norms need to be strongly internalized to change the behavior of taxpayers who evade taxes unobservedly.     

Tax compliance in a social setting: The influence of social norms,trust in government,and perceived fairness on taxpayer compliance

Voluntary tax compliance is important for governments around the world as they try to manage budget deficits. Traditional methods to improve tax compliance, such as increased audits, can be costly to implement. The purpose of this study is to examine the influence that social factors have on individuals' tax compliance intentions. Results of a survey of 217 U.S. taxpayers found support for the influence of social factors on tax compliance. This research concludes that social norms influence compliance intentions indirectly through internalization as personal norms. Specifically, as the strength of social norms in favor of tax compliance increases, personal norms of tax compliance also increase, and this leads to a subsequent increase in compliance intentions. We also conclude that trust in government has a significant influence on both perceived fairness of the tax system and compliance decisions. This study adds to current tax research in two important ways. First, the results suggest that the influence of social norms on tax compliance is largely through internalization as personal norms. Second, to the best of our knowledge this is also the first tax compliance study in which perception of fairness is modeled as a function of trust rather than vice-versa. This research may help taxing authorities develop less costly and more effective strategies for increasing taxpayer compliance.     

影响纳税人税收遵从决策的因素

税收遵从决策是纳税人行为选择的一个复杂过程,其中起作用的因素很多,除了经济因素,还包括非经济因素。按照经典的逃税模型——A-S模型①所揭示的主要因素是稽查概率和罚款率,除此之外影响纳税人遵从决策的因素还包括:税收遵从成本、税制、纳税人个体特征、对政府的满意程度以及税收文化等。     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.     

新个人所得税法对扣纳双方的影响及应对——基于扣缴人义务及纳税人行为视角

新个人所得税法在实践中的运行效果取决于征纳双方在税收征管过程中的耦合作用.一方面,作为联系税务机关与纳税人的中介与桥梁,扣缴人在个税预扣预缴及汇算清缴方面发挥着重要作用;另一方面,税制结构变化与缴税申报模式转变对纳税人影响深远.在新个人所得税下,扣缴人的扣缴清缴合规、沟通保密及判定审查等义务均有不同程度的增加、拓展或提...     

Compliance costs for personal income tax in a transition country: the case of Slovenia

The evaluation of taxpayers' compliance costs has grown in significance within tax system research over the last 15 years. In 2001, two surveys of VAT and personal income taxpayers were conducted in Slovenia to evaluate compliance costs for the 2000 fiscal year. This paper presents the results of research into compliance costs for personal income tax in Slovenia. The results show that compliance costs for personal income tax are relatively low, primarily because most taxpayers consider filing their tax declaration to be a simple procedure, which means that consultancy costs are low.     

Taxpayers' Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: A Critique and a New Measure

The work of Feldstein (1995 and 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in economists' approaches to analysing taxpayers' behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of tax non‐compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. In this context, measures of ‘tax gaps’ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures of tax non‐compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper, we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which ignore the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of non‐compliance. This potentially applies both to indirect taxes (such as the ‘VAT gap’) and direct (income) taxes. Further, where these conventional tax gap measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax compliance rate, they will likely have a tax‐base‐reducing effect and hence generate a smaller increase in realised tax revenues than would be anticipated from the tax gap estimate.     

纳税人税收遵从行为博弈分析

创建基于行为博弈的税收遵从均衡模型,将处于相同税收境况的纳税人视为一个群体,则个体纳税人选择税收遵从策略从纳税人群体角度来看就是以一定的概率选择该种策略。面对正常税务检查与严格税务检查并存的环境,纳税人税收遵从博弈稳定均衡策略形成不但取决于税制的特性,而且依赖于其他纳税人的税收遵从决策。依据税收遵从博弈均衡的形成机理,提出建立我国税收遵从激励监督机制的对策。     

The runaway taxpayer

In order to analyze the determinants of tax evasion, the existing literature on individual tax compliance typically takes a ‘prior-to-audit’ point of view. This paper focuses on a ‘post-audit, post-detection’—so far unexplored—framework, by investigating what happens after tax evasion has been discovered and noncompliant taxpayers are asked to pay their debts. We first develop a two-period dynamic model of individual choice, considering an individual that has been already audited and detected as tax evader, who knows that Tax Authorities are looking for her to cash the due amount. We derive the optimal decision of running away in order to avoid paying the bill, and show that the experience of a prior tax notice reduces the probability to behave as a scofflaw. We then exploit information on ‘post-audit, post-detection’ tax compliance provided by an Italian collection agency for the period 2004–2007 to empirically assess the relationship between prior tax notices and unlawful behavior. The evidence from alternative logit model specifications supports our theoretical prediction: successful tax notices are negatively correlated with the probability of running away.     

博弈模型的扩展分析

偷逃税行为最现实的原因是纳税人和征税人之间的信息不对称。因此,其治理可从内外两个方面入手:"内"是在内部建立激励机制;"外"是通过制度的重新设计和调整,增强对纳税行为的控制和约束,堵塞纳税人的寻租途径。     

The value of honesty: empirical estimates from the case of the missing children

How much are people willing to forego to be honest, to follow the rules? When people do break the rules, what can standard data sources tell us about their behavior? Standard economic models of crime typically assume that individuals are indifferent to dishonesty, so that they will cheat or lie as long as the expected pecuniary benefits exceed the expected costs of being caught and punished. We investigate this presumption by studying the response to a change in tax reporting rules that made it much more difficult for taxpayers to evade taxes by inappropriately claiming additional dependents. The policy reform induced a substantial reduction in the number of dependents claimed, which indicates that many filers had been cheating before the reform. Yet, the number of filers who availed themselves of this evasion opportunity is dwarfed by the number of filers who passed up substantial tax savings by not claiming extra dependents. By declining the opportunity to cheat, these taxpayers reveal information about their willingness to pay to be honest. In our analysis, we develop a novel method for inferring the characteristics of taxpayers in the absence of audit data. Our findings indicate both that this willingness to pay to be honest is large on average and that it varies significantly across the population of taxpayers.     

The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion

We study the effectson tax enforcement and tax policy of unintentional complianceerrors by taxpayers and administrative errors by tax auditors.The government can impose both penalties for misreporting andrewards for honest reporting. Maximal sanctions will not be appliedbecause errors are possible, so evasion cannot be eliminatedcostlessly. Under optimal policy intentional evasion can be deterred,but innocent tax evaders must be penalized whether they haveunintentionally evaded or have been mistakenly convicted. Thisdeters intentional evasion, but limits redistribution. Withoutrewards for honest reporting, the revelation principle need notapply, so intentional evasion can occur.     

论偷税故意

在税收执法实践中,认定偷税是否应考虑行为人的主观故意性一直是争议最为激烈,且至今没有解决的问题之一。这一问题得不到解决,不但会对纳税人造成不公平,同时也会极大地损害税务机关自身的形象,侵蚀纳税人对税法的遵从度和对税务机关的信赖度。如果从习惯法来理解偷税的故意性,从偷税与偷税罪的关系以及近期国家税务总局一些相关的规范性文件来进行分析,可以拓宽解决这一问题的思路。     

Punishing in the public interest: Exploratory Canadian evidence pertaining to convictions and incarcerations for tax offences

Although naming and shaming is a deterrence strategy used by tax authorities, ostensibly to increase tax compliance, the contents of tax conviction notices in which taxpayers are named and shamed have not been investigated in empirical research. To this end, this study uses a sample of 2,570 taxpayers convicted of tax offences by the Canadian tax authority over a ten-year period (2006 through 2015) to identify key characteristics of convictions and incarcerations for tax crimes, and to understand how key conviction characteristics are associated with incarceration. Over this period, findings show that 55% of tax convictions in Canada relate to failure to file tax returns, and that 14% of convicted individuals are incarcerated for an average of 17 months. The mean unreported income per convicted taxpayer is $89,978, the mean unremitted excise tax per convicted taxpayer is $15,330, and the mean fine amount per convicted taxpayer is $48,201. Males are more likely to be convicted of a tax crime than females. Further, professionals are far more likely to be incarcerated than non-professionals. Results also indicate that underreporting related to excise tax as a form of tax evasion is more likely to result in harsher sentencing than underreporting related to income tax. Lastly, we observe a downward trend in convictions and incarceration over the 10-year span, such that the total convictions and incarcerations at the end of the sample period are roughly one-third of the convictions at the beginning. Implications for public policy are discussed.     

Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance

The existence of a private cost borne by audited taxpayers affects the tax enforcement policy. This is so because tax auditors will face now two sources of uncertainty, namely, the typical one associated with taxpayers’ income and that associated with the taxpayers’ idiosyncratic attitude towards tax compliance. Moreover, the inspection policy can be exposed to some randomness from the taxpayers’ viewpoint due to the uncertainty about the audit cost borne by the tax authority. In this paper we provide an unified framework to analyze the effects of all these sources of uncertainty in a model of tax compliance with strategic interaction between auditors and taxpayers. We show that more variance in the distribution of the taxpayers’ private cost of evading raises both tax compliance and the ex-ante welfare of taxpayers. The effects of the uncertainty about the audit cost faced by the tax authority are generally ambiguous. We also discuss the implications of our model for the regressive (or progressive) bias of the effective tax system.     

税收心理学的基本概念

税收遵从是近年来公共财政学研究领域的一个热点问题,其研究方法主要采用了经济分析的框架。事实上,税收遵从问题是一个复杂的行为问题,除了经济因素之外,还有一些诸如社会影响、社会规范、态度、道德伦理、价值观等因素也对税收遵从具有重要的影响。对这些因素进行研究就涉及到心理学和社会学的方法,为此甚至产生了专门的税收心理学,其主要运用社会调查、受控实验等方法研究纳税人和税收政策制定者的偏好、认知、态度等。     

国外税收遵从的实践

西方国家普遍认为税务管理的目标是规范纳税人行为,提高纳税人自觉遵从税法的程度。本文介绍了税务遵从实践中美国和澳大利亚的经验,并针对我国税务管理提出了几点建议:科学认识我国目前的征管现状,构建以提高税收遵从为导向的税务管理体系;以提高税收遵从为目标指导下一步信息化建设;提倡"合作遵从",构建和谐的征纳关系;以税收遵从为指导解决征管资源有限和经济高速发展的矛盾。     

An expanded model of taxpayer compliance: empirical evidence from the United States and Hong Kong

There are a number of differences in the tax system structures of the U.S. and Hong Kong. In addition, the literature suggests there are significant differences between U.S. and Hong Kong (Chinese) cultures. This study explores whether taxpayer compliance is influenced by these differences.Fischer et al.’s (1992) expanded model of taxpayer compliance is used as the underlying theoretical framework. The model is empirically tested using a structural equations approach with a convenience sample of Hong Kong and U.S. taxpayers. Results indicate education has a direct, negative effect on compliance in both groups. This effect is moderated by an indirect, positive link between education, moral development, and compliance. The significant differences noted are that U.S. (Hong Kong) taxpayers used higher (lower) stages of moral reasoning, had more (less) favorable attitudes toward the tax system, and were more (less) compliant. These results suggest that efforts to increase taxpayer compliance need to be tailored to the structure of the tax system and the predominant culture of the taxpayers.     

论公共产品效率与税收遵从的互动

公共产品效率最大化是构建公共财政体制的关键。公共产品效率不仅关系到资源配置、经济发展与社会和谐,也关系到纳税人权利受尊重和保护的程度、纳税人对政府的评价与信任等,最终将作用于纳税人的税收遵从决策。公共产品效率与税收遵从具有高度相关性。     

Tax morale and public spending inefficiency

Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon and encouraging tax compliance is an important and debated policy issue. Many studies have shown that tax cheating has to be attributed to a considerable extent to the tax morale of taxpayers. The aim of the present paper is to shed light on the relationship between the taxpayer and the public sector; specifically, we investigate whether public spending inefficiency shapes individual tax morale. Combining data from Italian municipalities’ balance sheets with individual data from a properly designed survey on tax morale, we find that the attitude towards paying taxes is better when resources are spent more efficiently. This evidence seems not to be driven by some confounding factor at the municipality level or by spatial sorting of citizens and proves robust to accounting for alternative measures of both inefficiency and tax morale. We also find that the negative effect of inefficiency is larger if the level of public spending is lower and/or the degree of fiscal autonomy is higher.