PRICE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF OLIGOPOUSTIC MERGERS

When oligopolists merge, the new firm enjoys a lower cost structure than any of its premerger constituent parts. This is because of rationalization economies which are created as facilities previously operated at disparate marginal cost levels come under common control. The resultant price-decreasing force is countered by the loss of competition due to the merger. The latter can stem not only from reduction in the number of competitors, but also from the possibility that, with a more concentrated market structure, firms'conjectures about each others'reactions will move in the direction of being more cooperative. The paper shows that, under normal conditions, the effects of diminished competition outweigh those of rationalization so that a price increase will result from the merger. In addition, the equivalence of merger to the imposition of taxes is exploited to derive a market-share based test for mergers to cause welfare decreases. This complements a test proposed by Farrell and Shapiro that works only for welfare increases.     

COMPETITION,REGULATION AND WELFARE IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

In this paper we consider a simple model of an industry with network externalities, where a benefit to each consumer from network services depends on the size of the network. We first consider a single network and cover the cases with and without fixed cost of entry. We then turn to the two‐network industry, where the incumbent network and a new entrant network compete for the market and may differ both in their marginal costs and demand structures. In addition, we identify several situations where public policy may play a crucial role in sustaining socially advantageous network service provision.     

BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND DEVELOPMENT*

We ask whether barriers to entry are a quantitatively important reason for the income gap between developing countries and the United States. We develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the effects of barriers to entry and the other main distortions typically considered in the development literature. We carry our model to the data and ask it to match the main development facts from the Penn World Table. We find that this requires large barriers to entry in developing countries, which account for about half of the income gap with the United States.     

ON THE OUTPUT EFFECTS OF BARRIERS TO TRADE*

We study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a Hecksher–Ohlin trade model into an optimal‐growth framework. The model predicts that a more open economy will have higher factor productivity. Furthermore, there is a “selective development trap” to which countries may or may not converge, depending on policy. Income at the development trap falls as trade barriers increase. Hence, cross‐country differences in barriers to trade may help explain the dispersion of per capita income observed across countries. The effects are quantified, and we show that protectionism can explain a relevant fraction of TFP and long‐run income differentials across countries.     

QUALITY AND WELFARE IN MIXED DUOPOLY: EFFECTS OF CAPACITY REDUCTION*

Under rationing of a public service due to its lower price and higher quality, the “privatization” could be regarded as a reduction in the capacity of the public service. We develop a model of mixed duopoly in which the service is vertically differentiated, a public firm is in a Stackelberg leader position, rationing happens, and the market is not covered. In one of two possible cases, it is shown that any reduction in the capacity of a public service will lower total surplus unless the price of the public service is too low and its quality is too high.     

WELFARE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN EDUCATION

Distortive effects of government intervention, especially in international trade, have received considerable attention. But not much literature exists on similar effects of public policies toward education. This paper provides a review of government intervention in education and its likely effects on economic growth and equity. Although governments may act with good intentions, educational policies often have adverse effects on social welfare. Less government involvement in education might actually lead to greater and more equally distributed real income, especially in developing countries.
Section I of this paper identifies and documents the extent of government-induced distortions directly or indirectly related to education. Section II assesses the likely effect of such distortions on social welfare. The final section discusses the role of government in education.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOW WITH TARIFF-RIDDEN AND QUOTA-RESTRICTED IMPORTS*

The welfare effects of foreign capital inflow and changes in the foreign price and tariff rate of a tariff-ridden imported good are considered for a small country for both 3 times 2 and 3 times 3 trade models with a quota-restricted imported good (whose special case is a nontraded good). For the 3 times 2 model, foreign capital inflow does not affect home welfare when there is no tariff on imports, but it harms the home country if a tariff is imposed on the imports to the extent that the tariff-ridden imported good is more capital intensive than the exported good. On the other hand, for the 3 times 3 model the foreign-capital inflow benefits the home country if the tariff rate is below a certain level under the analogous capital-intensity assumptions. The welfare effects of changes in the foreign price of the tariff-ridden good and its tariff rate remain the same for both models.     

OPTIMAL CONTROL OF EXTERNALITIES IN THE PRESENCE OF INCOME TAXATION*

A substantial literature examines how the Pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation. Additional literature considers distributive concerns. It is demonstrated, however, that simple first‐best rules—unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution—are correct in the model examined. Specifically, setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms (and subsidies equal to marginal benefits) can generate a Pareto improvement, as can a marginal reform toward the first‐best. Qualifications and explanations for differences from previous work are also presented.     

ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS

This article studies the welfare effects of credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, credit arrangements can be welfare reducing, because high consumption by credit users drives up the price level, reducing consumption by money users who are subject to a binding liquidity constraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Both price discrimination and nonlinear pricing are essential features of an optimal mechanism.     

WELFARE LOSSES FROM NON‐TARIFF BARRIERS: THE JAPANESE BEEF QUOTA CASE*

A standard method of estimating deadweight losses caused by import quotas is to estimate a utility function by data over a period in which the quota is not imposed, and to use the estimated utility function to evaluate the virtual price of quota‐laden imports. This method, however, is not applicable if preferences are different between quota and non‐quota periods. In order to overcome this difficulty, the present study introduces a method of estimating a utility function directly from data in a quota period. This method is applied to the estimation of deadweight losses attributable to the Japanese beef quota.     

OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY*

The dynamic behavior of a price‐fixing cartel is explored when it is concerned about creating suspicions that a cartel has formed. Consistent with preceding static theories, the cartel's steady‐state price is decreasing in the damage multiple and the probability of detection. However, contrary to those theories, it is independent of the level of fixed fines. It is also shown that the cartel prices higher when a more competitive benchmark price is used in calculating damages.     

A UNIFIED ANALYSIS OF TRADE GAINS IN THE PRESENCE OF PUBLIC GOODS*

It has long been known that free trade is potentially (after lumpsum compensatory transfers) beneficial for each trading country if the autarkic and post‐compensation free‐trade equilibria are perfectly competitive, with market distortions limited to non‐negative taxes on imports and exports. However these conditions are merely sufficient. It can now be shown that, under alternative sufficient conditions, free trade is potentially beneficial to each trading country even in the context of public goods.