UNEMPLOYMENT,LABOR MARKET TRANSITIONS,AND RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION

It is commonplace in the debate on Germany's labor market problems to argue that low wage dispersion is a major reason for the high unemployment rate. This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment and residual wage dispersion for individuals with comparable attributes. In the conventional neoclassical point of view, wages are determined by the marginal product of the workers. Accordingly, increases in union minimum wages result in a decline of residual wage dispersion and higher unemployment. A competing view regards wage dispersion as the outcome of search frictions and the associated monopsony power of the firms. Accordingly, an increase in search frictions causes both higher unemployment and higher wage dispersion. The empirical analysis attempts to discriminate between the two hypotheses for West Germany analyzing the relationship between wage dispersion and both the level of unemployment as well as the transition rates between different labor market states. The findings are not completely consistent with either theory. However, as predicted by search theory, one robust result is that unemployment by cells is not negatively correlated with the within‐cell wage dispersion.     

STICKY WAGE, EFFICIENCY WAGE AND KEYNESIAN UNEMPLOYMENT

Abstract.  This paper provides a model of involuntary unemployment by combining the insights of the sticky wage theory and the efficiency wage theory. It implies that employed workers tend to supply more effort in response to economic downturns. Thus, a negative shock to an economy has intriguing impacts on the unemployment. The model also shows that a negative demand shock may have a relatively small effect on output since changes in work effort serve to partially mitigate the effects of the shock. Moreover, it yields some implications that complement the existing 'work sharing' literature.     

BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL SHOCKS, RELATIVE WAGE RIGIDITIES AND LOW-SKILLED UNEMPLOYMENT

The contrast between the evolution over the last decades of the European Union (EU) and the US unemployment rates, especially for the low-skilled, is well known. A consensus view is that these different outcomes can be explained by the interactions between common shocks and specific institutional setups. In this paper, we emphasize the interactions between technological changes and wages rigidities. We construct a fully calibrated general equilibrium model with two types of jobs and two types of workers, and with search unemployment. Our simulations show that with wage rigidities, technological changes suffice to generate a continuous rise in the low-skilled unemployment rate and an almost unchanged high-skilled unemployment rate. Without wage rigidities, the unemployment rates remain unchanged but the wage dispersion widens.     

UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN: AN EFFCIENCY WAGE PERSPECTIVE

Many OECD economies suffered a productivity slowdown beginning in the early 1970s. However, the increase in unemployment that followed this slowdown was more pronounced in European economies relative to the USA. In this paper we present an efficiency wage model, which enables us to identify two basic channels through which the productivity slowdown can affect workers' effort incentives. Predictions of the model are consistent with the different trends in unemployment across countries over this period in the face of a similar slowdown in productivity. We also demonstrate how the link between growth and unemployment depends upon labour market institutions in such a way that we can reconcile the mixed empirical results observed in the literature.     

SEARCH DIRECTION AND WAGE DISPERSION*

In a directed search model, we allow the unemployed and the vacancies to choose whether to send or receive wage offers. This determines the market structure. There are several equilibria but a unique evolutionary stable one. Wage offers are made under incomplete information about the number of offers, and the equilibrium strategies involve mixing. This results in wage dispersion. We show that if the unemployment–vacancy ratio is close to unity, the stable equilibrium consists of two submarkets with opposite search directions. Otherwise, the long side of the market sends offers. The stable equilibrium is efficient, given the frictions.     

WAGE DISPARITY,TEAM PERFORMANCE,AND THE 2005 NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

This paper provides an empirical analysis of salary disparity and team performance in the National Hockey League during the first decade of the twenty‐first century. We find that the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) reduced average salaries immediately after it was introduced but did not change the trajectory of average salaries nor did it alter the salary disparity on the average team. Salary disparity harms overall team performance primarily through reduced defensive performance and this relationship was not altered by the 2005 CBA. (JEL J31, J42, L83)     

R&D INVESTMENTS AND SEQUENTIAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS*

This paper analyses how the structure of wage bargaining affects R&D investment by firms that increases the productivity of labour in a Cournot duopoly. We find that total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. Thus sequential wage negotiations reduce the incentive for firms to innovate and affect the productivity of labour. When wage negotiations are sequential the productivity of labour is greater (lower) in the follower (leader) firm than when negotiations are simultaneous. We also obtain that for same parameter values it is possible for the firm with the lower productivity to end up paying a higher wage than the firm with the higher level of labour productivity.     

RESIDUAL WAGE DISPERSION WITH EFFICIENCY WAGES

This article extends a classic on‐the‐job search model of homogeneous workers and firms by introducing a shirking problem. Workers choose their effort levels and search on the job. Firms elicit effort through wages and monitoring; an inverse relationship between wages and monitoring rates is derived. Wages play a dual role by allocating labor supply and motivating employee effort. This gives rise to an equilibrium wage distribution that contrasts with existing literature. In particular, I show that a hump‐shaped and positively skewed wage distribution, as observed empirically, can be derived even when firms and workers are, respectively, identical.     

CURRENCY AREAS AND MONETARY COORDINATION*

We integrate a monetary search model into open‐economy macro to analyze the gains from coordinating on inflation. Search frictions and local congestion lead to a determinate exchange rate between two currencies. Relative prices deviate from the law of one price. Because the deviations depend on the cross‐country differential in money growth, each country is tempted to inflate to exploit the deviations. Policy coordination reduces inflation and improves welfare for all countries. In contrast to traditional models, the gains from coordination continue to exist even after each country optimally sets a direct tax on the foreign use of the country's currency.