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1.
Many conditions have been introduced to ensure equilibrium existence in games with discontinuous payoff functions. This paper introduces a new condition, called regularity, that is simple and easy to verify. Regularity requires that if there is a sequence of strategies converging to s* such that the players’ payoffs along the sequence converge to the best-reply payoffs at s*, then s* is an equilibrium. We show that regularity is implied both by Reny’s better-reply security and Simon and Zame’s endogenous sharing rule approach. This allows us to explore a link between these two distinct methods. Although regularity implies that the limits of e{\epsilon}-equilibria are equilibria, it is in general too weak for implying equilibrium existence. However, we are able to identify extra conditions that, together with regularity, are sufficient for equilibrium existence. In particular, we show how regularity allows the technique of approximating games both by payoff functions and space of strategies.  相似文献   

2.
We analyze a myopic strategy adjustment process in strategic-form games. It is shown that the steady states of the continuous time limit, which is constructed assuming frequent play and slow adjustment of strategies, are exactly the best-reply matching equilibria, as discussed by Droste, Kosfeld, and Voorneveld (2000. Mimeo, Tilburg University). In a best-reply matching equilibrium every player ‘matches’ the probability of playing a pure strategy to the probability that this pure strategy is a best reply to the pure-strategy profile played by his opponents. We derive stability results for the steady states of the continuous time limit in 2×2 bimatrix games and coordination games. Analyzing the asymptotic behavior of the stochastic adjustment process in discrete time shows convergence to minimal curb sets of the game. Moreover, absorbing states of the process correspond to best-reply matching equilibria of the game.  相似文献   

3.
We consider n-person games with quasi-concave payoffs that depend on a player's own action and the sum of all players' actions. We show that a discrete-time, stochastic process in which players move towards better replies—the better-reply dynamics—converges globally to a Nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each Nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic, adjusted best-reply dynamics. We present an example of a 2-person game with a unique equilibrium where the derivatives of the best-reply functions have different signs and the better-reply dynamics does not converge.  相似文献   

4.
We consider transferable-utility, cooperative games, featuring differently informed players. Parties can exchange endowments or undertake joint production, but not pool information. Coalitional contracts must therefore comply with members’ private information. Qualitatively different shadow prices then arise: some for material endowments, others for knowledge. We focus on computable core solutions, generated by shadow prices. Such solutions obtain under standard regularity assumptions.  相似文献   

5.
We show that equilibria of a class of participation games (Palfrey and Rosenthal in Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983; Journal of Public Economics 24(2):171–193, 1984) exhibit minimal heterogeneity of behavior so that players’ mixed strategies are summarized by at most two probabilities. We then establish that, except for a finite set of common costs of participation, these games are regular. Thus, equilibria of these voting games are robust to general payoff perturbations and survive in nearby games of incomplete information. Thanks to participants of the 2006 MPSA conference for comments on an early version.  相似文献   

6.
We introduce a new condition, weak better-reply security, and show that every compact, locally convex, metric, quasiconcave and weakly better-reply secure game has a Nash equilibrium. This result is established using simple generalizations of classical ideas. Furthermore, we show that, when players’ action spaces are metric and locally convex, it implies the existence results of Reny (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) and Carmona (J Econ Theory 144:1333–1340, 2009) and that it is equivalent to a recent result of Barelli and Soza (On the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous and Qualitative Games, University of Rochester, Rochester, 2009). Our general existence result also implies a new existence result for weakly upper reciprocally semicontinuous and weakly payoff secure games that satisfy a strong quasiconcavity property.  相似文献   

7.
The analogy-based expectation equilibrium, or simply analogy equilibrium, analyzes equilibrium stereotypes by imposing consistency of infinitely large action samples with the expectation that broad classes of opponent types behave identically. This paper introduces the payoff-confirming analogy equilibrium (PAE) to refine the set of analogy equilibria. The concept imposes additionally that sample marginal of own payoffs be consistent with one’s expectations. Robust incorrect equilibrium stereotypes, i.e. non-Bayesian Nash PAE are shown to exist. General conditions are given for the prevalence of such stereotypes under correct expectations on exogenous uncertainty. In monotone selection games susceptible to winner’s curse, naive behavioral equilibrium leading to aggravation of adverse selection has been shown to match plausible informational assumptions of experienced, but behaviorally biased, equilibrium play. Here, behavioral equilibrium is matched with a corresponding PAE with an incorrect prior and correct prior is shown to imply correct overall expectations.  相似文献   

8.
This paper studies the role of strategic teaching in coordination games and whether changing the incentives of players to teach leads to more efficient coordination. We ran experiments where subjects played one of four coordination games in constant pairings, where the incentives to teach were varied along two dimensions—the short run cost of teaching and the long run benefit to teaching. We show which aspects of the game lead subjects to adopt long run teaching strategies, and show that subjects try to manipulate their opponent’s actions to pull them out of a situation of coordination failure. We also show that extending a model of decision making by introducing a forward-looking component helps to track teachers’ behaviour more accurately, and describes the way players behave in a more unified way across both teachers and learners.  相似文献   

9.
We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this game a catalog game. Our main objective is to show that catalog games have Nash equilibria. The Nash existence problem for catalog games is particularly contentious due to payoff discontinuities caused by tie-breaking. We make three contributions. First, we establish under very mild conditions on primitives that no matter what the tie-breaking rule, catalog games are uniformly payoff secure, and therefore have mixed extensions which are payoff secure. Second, we show that if the tie-breaking rule awards the sale to firms which value it most (i.e., breaks ties in favor of firms which stand to make the highest profit), then firm profits are reciprocally upper semicontinuous (i.e., the mixed catalog game is reciprocally upper semincontinuous). This in turn implies that the mixed catalog game satisfies Reny’s condition of better-reply security—a condition sufficient for existence (Reny in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999). Third, we show by example that if the tie-breaking rule does not award the sale to firms which value it most (for example, if ties are broken randomly with equal probability), then the catalog game has no Nash equilibrium. This paper was written while the second author was Visiting Professor, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Universite Paris 1, Pantheon-Sorbonne. The second author thanks CES and Paris 1, and in particular, Bernard Cornet and Cuong Le Van for their support and hospitality. The second author also thanks the C&BA and EFLS at the University of Alabama for financial support. Both authors are grateful to Monique Florenzano and to participants in the April 2006 Paris 1 NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference for many helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Finally, both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose thoughtful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper. Monteiro acknowleges the financial support of Capes-Cofecub 468/04.  相似文献   

10.
This paper studies convergence and stability properties of T. Sjöström's (1994, Games Econom. Behav.6, 502–511) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibrium using monotonic evolutionary dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environments using as a solution concept one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies and one round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies. However, there are other sets of Nash equilibria, whose payoffs may be very different from those desired by the social choice function. With monotonic dynamics, all these sets of equilibria contain limit points of the evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore, even if the dynamics converge to the “right” set of equilibria (i.e., the one which contains the solution of the mechanism), it may converge to an equilibrium which is worse in welfare terms. In contrast with this result, any interior solution of the best-reply dynamics converges to the equilibrium whose outcome the planner desires. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D70, D78.  相似文献   

11.
Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho–Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements even under a “best case” scenario (teams that rapidly develop strategic play in games of this sort), it implies that one must rely on learning models, and past empirical research with these models, when predicting equilibrium outcomes.  相似文献   

12.
In this note, we emphasize the role of consumers’ risk aversion in the non-existence of sunspot equilibria in incomplete market economies. We prove that there are no sunspot equilibria if the fundamentals of the underlying economy admit a unique equilibrium for any distribution of endowments. This substantiates Mas-Colell’s (Economic analysis of markets and games: essays in honor of Frank Hahn. MIT, Cambridge, 1992) conjecture. We also prove that, in a two-consumer economy, no sunspot equilibrium exists under the more relaxed condition that the underlying economy admits a unique equilibrium for the initial endowment. This is a generalization of Corollaries 1 and 2 of Hens and Pilgrim (Econ Theory 24:583–602, 2004).   相似文献   

13.
We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot games. To test the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice. Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data.   相似文献   

14.
Summary We prove the existence of equilibrium in behavior strategies for extensive form games when the game has infinite actions. The result is derived under the assumption that the behavior strategies satisfy the bounded measurability condition. The condition implies that the behavior strategies are restricted to those which can be viewed as continuous functions from the set of initial histories to the space of probability distributions over action spaces which satisfy the Lipschitz bound.I am grateful for the helpful comments of an anonymous referee.  相似文献   

15.
This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player’s best response is an order statistic of the cohort’s action combination. Unlike previous experiments using order statistic coordination games, the new experiment holds the payoff function constant and only changes cohort size and order statistic.

Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Related research available at  相似文献   

16.
We propose a single framework for studying the existence of approximate and exact pure strategy equilibria in payoff secure games. Central to the framework is the notion of a multivalued mapping with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective fixed point theorem, we first show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem that covers a number of known games. Then a short proof of Reny’s (Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999) equilibrium existence theorem is provided for payoff secure games with metrizable strategy spaces. We also give a simple proof of Reny’s theorem in its general form for metric games in an appendix for the sake of completeness.  相似文献   

17.
This paper shows the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria for games with private and public information under general conditions. Under the additional assumptions of finiteness of action spaces and diffuseness and conditional independence of private information, a strong purification result is obtained for the mixed strategies in such games. As a corollary, the existence of pure-strategy equilibria follows. I am very grateful to Yeneng Sun, Nicholas C. Yannelis and M. Ali Khan for helpful discussions and suggestions. I also wish to thank an anonymous referee whose comments led to many improvements in the paper.  相似文献   

18.
This paper provides explanations for Pareto’s apparently contradictory approach to demand theory in simultaneously insisting that measurability of utility is not needed to explain the equilibrium of consumers in competitive markets, and embracing concavifiability and thus measurability of utility when this implies restrictions on consumers’ behavior such as the law of demand. It also treats his method of calibrating an aggregate demand function by employing his law of income distribution, so as to reproduce “Gregory King’s law”. Finally, some disputed issues are dealt with concerning the nature of Pareto’s contributions to welfare economics. (JEL: B13, D11, D60).  相似文献   

19.
This paper presents a hybrid equilibrium notion that blends together the ‘cooperative’ and the ‘noncooperative’ theories of competition. In particular, the Mas-Colell bargaining set has been modified in order to accommodate the features of strategic market games. In other words, allocations, objections and counter objections of the standard bargaining set theory are described for an economy, where trades among groups of individuals are conducted via the Shapley–Shubik mechanism. In the main part of the paper, it is proved that in atomless economies the allocations resulting from this equilibrium notion are competitive.  相似文献   

20.
Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
A central concept in evolutionary game theory is that of an evolutionarily stable strategy. However, many games of interest for economics have only strategies which meet the weaker requirement of neutral stability. While neutral stability implies Lyapunov stability under the replicator dynamics in pairwise interactions, we give here an example in which an evolutionarily stable strategy is not Lyapunov stable in a more general context. We propose to use instead the notions of (strong) uninvadability and (strong) unbeatability, refinements of evolutionary and neutral stability, respectively. Strong uninvadability implies asymptotic stability, and strong unbeatability implies Lyapunov stability under the replicator dynamics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.  相似文献   

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