高管宏观认知具有管理者“烙印”吗？——基于管理者风格效应的实证检验

本文利用“管理层讨论与分析”(MD&A)中的文本信息构造高管宏观认知指标(MMC),研究高管宏观认知是否具有管理者风格效应及其作用机理。研究发现,高管宏观认知具有明显的管理者个体“烙印”,会受到管理者个人风格的显著影响,表现为管理者风格效应。进一步研究发现,管理者个人背景特征对高管宏观认知的管理者风格效应具有显著影响,管理者风格效应主要受管理者后天因素的影响。管理者能力与高管宏观认知的管理者风格效应显著正相关。     

Optimal Disbursement of a Sunk Resource and Decentralised Cost Allocation

We consider whether the allocation of the sunk cost of a central resource to operating divisions can be consistent with economically optimal resource consumption decisions. When it is recognised that the central resource is scarce, one may, in principle, defend the allocation of sunk cost, if it measures the opportunity cost of usage. However, typically it has been proposed that such allocations are, at best, a proxy for opportunity cost. Applying classical control theory techniques in a wide range of operating environments, we are able to identify cost allocations that exactly equal opportunity cost. Hence, for our model environment, we provide a rationale for sunk cost allocation in terms of guiding optimal decisions, in contrast to the traditional defence in terms of providing a proxy for opportunity cost. We demonstrate clearly how cost allocations are related to opportunity costs, and identify the circumstances under which the allocation of full costs or alternatively a fixed proportion (related to acquisition conditions) of costs, results in the implementation of economically optimal resource consumption decisions.     

The influence of self-interest and ethical considerations on managers’ evaluation judgments

Recent empirical studies support self-interest as the sole basis for economic decisions (as predicted by agency theory). However, cognitive moral development (CMD) theory suggests that decision makers will allow ethical/moral considerations to constrain their economic behaviour. The purpose of this study is to resolve the essential conflict between the tenets of agency theory and CMD theory. The results of a laboratory experiment suggest that both moral reasoning level and adverse-selection conditions (self-interest) can have a significant effect on managers’ project evaluation decisions. Specifically, managers are likely to continue a project that is expected to be unprofitable only when adverse selection conditions are present and moral reasoning level is low. Thus, agency theory may not be generalizable to accounting-based economic performance.     

On the role of sunk costs and asset specificity in outsourcing decisions: a research note

The accounting literature has argued that firms overengage in outsourcing because they tend to ignore the transaction costs involved in buying services from external suppliers. A field experiment with managers of health care organizations shows that decision makers are actually quite sensitive to the asset specificity associated with the “buy” option in an outsourcing decision. However, they also appear inappropriately sensitive to the sunk costs inherent in most real-life outsourcing decisions, and may actually underengage in outsourcing. Prior commitment to internal procurement systematically reduced the willingness to outsource, relative to a pure “make or buy” scenario.     

The effect of obedience pressure and authoritarianism on managers' project evaluation decisions

This study examines the effects that obedience pressure and the personality trait of authoritarianism have on managers' project evaluation decisions. A laboratory experiment was conducted to test the various hypotheses formulated in this study. The results suggest that project managers have a higher inclination to escalate their commitment to a failing project in the presence of obedience pressure. The results further reveal that project managers' tendency to escalate is most prominent in a private information situation and in an obedience pressure condition. In addition, the results suggest that low authoritarian project managers exhibited a greater tendency to continue a failing project regardless of the extent of obedience pressure under private information conditions. Furthermore, high authoritarian project managers exhibited a greater tendency to continue a failing project only when obedience pressure was present under private information conditions.     

Are scale economies in banking elusive or illusive?: Evidence obtained by incorporating capital structure and risk-taking into models of bank production

This paper explores how to incorporate banks' capital structure and risk-taking into models of production. In doing so, the paper bridges the gulf between (1) the banking literature that studies moral hazard effects of bank regulation without considering the underlying microeconomics of production and (2) the literature that uses dual profit and cost functions to study the microeconomics of bank production without explicitly considering how banks' production decisions influence their riskiness.Various production models that differ in how they account for capital structure and in the objectives they impute to bank managers – cost minimization versus value maximization – are estimated using U.S. data on highest-level bank holding companies. Modeling the bank's objective as value maximization conveniently incorporates both market-priced risk and expected cash flow into managers' ranking and choice of production plans.Estimated scale economies are found to depend critically on how banks' capital structure and risk-taking are modeled. In particular, when equity capital, in addition to debt, is included in the production model and cost is computed from the value-maximizing expansion path rather than the cost-minimizing path, banks are found to have large scale economies that increase with size. Moreover, better diversification is associated with larger scale economies while increased risk-taking and inefficient risk-taking are associated with smaller scale economies.     

Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates

We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerateswhen managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisionalcash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability,we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocateunobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions.Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's ownersto also overallocate observable capital to the more informativedivisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialismand corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segmentreporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managersto distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors.     

The costs of organization structure: Dispelling the myths of independent divisions and organization-wide decision making

For theoretical and methodological convenience, accountants often assume that the divisions of an organization are largely independent of one another and that divisional managers therefore can make decisions consistent with global optimality. Along with these assumptions, accountants have taken the structure of an organization as fixed and not changeable. This paper suggests a framework and method for assessing the costs resulting from non-independent divisions, as a component of organization productivity. Also offered is a methodology for changing the structure of organizations so that these hidden “conversion costs” first will be exposed and then can be managed for productivity improvements. Structural change thus becomes an alternative to designing elaborate information/control systems as a way of managing interdependency problems. Furthermore, as organizations are redesigned to make divisions more independent, accountants can concentrateon more intermediate matters, such as procedures for optimally determining joint-cost allocation and transfer prices, with minimal interference from the divisional structure of the organization.     

Collective Bargaining and Cost Accounting: The Case of the US Men's Clothing Industry

The attributes and rationales of modern cost accounting procedures are not unequivocal. Some scholars underscore the adversarial relationship between accounting and labour (Bougen, 1989; Owen and Lloyd, 1985; Ogden and Bougen, 1985) while others contend that accounting data were used as much for social, political and ideological purposes as for efficiency concerns (Hopper and Armstrong, 1991; Ezzamel et al., 1990; Hoskin and Macve, 1988a and 1988b; Stewart, 1992). Alternatively, several researchers have re-examined the origins of cost accounting and more recent costing developments (Fleischman and Parker, 1991; Fleischman and Tyson, 1993; and Tyson, 1990 and 1992). The present paper further explores the development of modern cost accounting practice. It presents a detailed analysis of the US men's clothing industry between 1919 and 1926 and assesses over 1,200 arbitration decisions to determine how piece rates, production standards and standard costs were developed, implemented and carried out in practice. It finds that collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration significantly moderated these procedures such that workers and owner/managers received tangible economic benefits.     

国有商业银行客户经理绩效管理机制的构建

客户经理是商业银行最小而最重要的经营单位和价值创造主体.当前客户经理绩效管理存在着管理空间断层、考核体系不合理、与利益分配联动度不高及内部机构设置耗散客户经理工作效率等问题.据此,本文作者提出了改进客户经理绩效管理机制的基本思路,即以突出贡献,统一考核,定量分配为基本思路,优化客户经理绩效考核机制,并建立相关配套制度.同时,就客户经理绩效目标的确立、大型客户的绩效在有关人员之间的分割、潜在绩效的考核分配、人力费用资源紧缺矛盾制约客户经理报酬兑现等问题提出了解决方略.     

Race to the top or bottom? Corporate governance,freedom of reincorporation and competition in law

Summary This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms’ technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context of a model of the firm in which there are agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. We show that the allocation of control over firms’ reincorporation decisions determines the corporate governance choice ex ante and the outcome of the competition between legal regimes ex post. When managers have control over reincorporation then competitive deregulation and “runs to the bottom” ensue. When shareholders have partial or full control then there is diversity in governance structures. Runs to the bottom are not necessarily socially undesirable but they have a feedback effect on firms’ choices of technologies that may make the party in control worse off ex ante. We show that it is impossible for any country to achieve social welfare maximization of its existing and new enterprises. With competition between legal regimes, start-up and mature companies incorporate in different jurisdictions even when reincorporation is correctly anticipated.     

HOW DO MANAGERS BEHAVE IN STOCK OPTION PLANS? CLINICAL EVIDENCE FROM EXERCISE AND SURVEY DATA

We use unique case study data to analyze the behavior of top managers in an executive stock option plan. We gather questionnaire data on the managers' traits and combine it with exercise data. Managers in our sample expect low volatilities (compared to historical estimates) and are well diversified and modestly risk averse. This implies that the value–cost wedge of options can be smaller than usually assumed. The exercise decisions vary with expected volatility, managerial wealth, and mental accounting. Managers expecting lower volatility exercise earlier. This result is consistent with the predictions of expected utility models using our managers' survey parameters.     

The average hospital

In 1998, the UK government introduced the National Reference Costing Exercise (NRCE) to benchmark hospital costs. Benchmarking is usually associated with “excellence”; the government emphasised the raising of standards in the 1997 White Paper “The New NHS: Modern, Dependable” that heralded the NRCE. This paper argues that the UK “New Labour” government's introduction of, and increasing reliance on, hospital cost benchmarking is promoting “averageness”. Average hospitals will be cheaper to run and easier to control than highly differentiated ones; they may also score more highly on certain measures of service improvement. The paper aims, through empirical investigation, both to demonstrate how the activities and processes of hospital life “become average” as they are transformed to comply with the cost accounting average and to indicate how the “average” is being promoted as the norm for hospitals to aspire to. To benchmark to average costs, comparisons are necessary. To compare hospital costs involves the creation of categories and classification systems for clinical activities. Empirical evidence shows that as doctors, patients and clinical practices are moulded into costed categories, they become more standardized, more commensurate and the average hospital is created.     

A cash flow cost-volume-profit model

The traditional cost-volume-profit (CVP) model assumes the accounting flows follow the accrual accounting model. No distinction is made between accrual cost flows and cash flows. This paper looks at several different cash flow break-even models.One model assumes there is no opportunity to use an accrual accounting taxable loss by other profitable product lines or through a tax loss carryback. When graphed, this model presents a “dog-leg” at the accrual accounting breakeven point. A more general model assumes that an accrual tax loss is usable. When graphed, this model presents a line parallel to the after-tax accrual-based cost line, shifted downward in the amount of the noncash fixed costs.     

Do Earnings Targets and Managerial Incentives Affect Sticky Costs?

This study explores motivations underlying managers’ resource adjustments. We focus on the impact of incentives to meet earnings targets on resource adjustments and the ensuing cost structures. We find that, when managers face incentives to avoid losses or earnings decreases, or to meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, they expedite downward adjustment of slack resources for sales decreases. These deliberate decisions lessen the degree of cost stickiness rather than induce cost stickiness. The results suggest that efforts to understand determinants of firms’ cost structures should be made in light of the managers’ motivations, particularly agency‐driven incentives underlying resource adjustment decisions.     

Sourcing parts of complex products: evidence on transactions costs, high-powered incentives and ex-post opportunism

This paper revisits evidence on the correlates of sourcing decisions in the US auto industry to see whether adoption of new contracting terms and early involvement of suppliers in design activities (e.g. “relational contracting”) yields different results as compared to previous findings. Previous studies find that US auto firms insource complex parts that require investments in specific assets. Absent large differences in production costs, the results suggest that transactions costs associated with external suppliers exceed transactions costs associated with internal suppliers (e.g. loss of high powered incentives). Using data on 156 sourcing decisions for process tooling (dies) of a new car program we find that under the new relational contracting regime, transaction cost theory continues to have explanatory power for sourcing decisions; however, attributes that favored insourcing in previous studies favor outsourcing in this setting. Moreover, more complex subassemblies are associated with fewer distinct suppliers than expected — evidence of a tendency to co-locate decision rights to reduce transactions costs related to system interactions. After controlling for transaction characteristics that are associated with the sourcing decision, we find no evidence that outsourcing is associated with increased ex post opportunism by the firm (e.g. agreement about contract completion); however, outsourced parts are submitted by suppliers for evaluation significantly later than insourced parts (e.g. delivery holdup).     

Activity-based costing systems and incremental costs

This article derives, in a comprehensive but informal way, the essential conditions for activity-based costing (ABC) and for costs proportional with output volume (CVO), such as variable material and component costs, to measure economic costs defined as incremental costs. Without this property these costing systems may give incorrect signals in decision making, such as in pricing, in altering the product portfolio, in make or buy and outsourcing decisions and in cost management. In contrast to the existing literature, these conditions are found to be extensive and to require a fairly detailed exploration of the complex and multifaceted nature of technology. Conditions on technology to allow the usual definition of cost pools are shown to require that production involves neither cost complementarities nor non-complementarities, that inputs in a cost pool are independent of those in other cost pools and that technology takes the form that the input mixes for a cost pool are fixed and invariant with volume. Essential conditions on the input market and the costing system are also considered. It will be indicated that a perfect market for inputs is required and that cost drivers are required to be linear homogeneous in the inputs in their cost pools. It is also shown that the type of cost function that can be entertained is restricted by those permissible technologies which allow incremental costs to be generated. These assumptions are thus imported into all the uses of these methods. Failure to satisfy these conditions suggests that many costs cannot be easily treated using ABC or CVO. Such failure also leads to distorting accounting numbers away from economic costs.     

Issuance Decisions and Strategic Focus: The Case of Long-Term Care Insurance

Increasing costs of long-term care are placing ever greater burdens on state and federal budgets, yet private long-term care insurance remains a relatively minor financing vehicle. Although many researchers provide rationales for the limited private market, some life–health insurers have forged ahead into this relatively new and risky line of business. We investigate what makes these insurers different and whether managers are following a diversification or strategic focus strategy. We find that strategic focus is a consistently important factor and that managers' participation and volume decisions are made independently.     

Influence Costs and Capital Structure

This paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making. This creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management's discretionary decisions. As a result, divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm, or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm. This incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs, for example in the event of a divestiture. Since the firm's capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions, it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers' incentives to influence top management's decisions. The control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions. Hence, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. The findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations. We identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure: the top management's prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division; the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers; and the difference in the valuation of the division's assets in the current firm and under alternative uses.     

Six dangerous myths about pay

Every day, executives make decisions about pay, and they do so in a landscape that's shifting. As more and more companies base less of their compensation on straight salary and look to other financial options, managers are bombarded with advice about the best approaches to take. Unfortunately, much of that advice is wrong. Indeed, much of the conventional wisdom and public discussion about pay today is misleading, incorrect, or both. The result is that business people are adopting wrongheaded notions about how to pay people and why. In particular, they are subscribing to six dangerous myths about pay. Myth #1: labor rates are the same as labor costs. Myth #2: cutting labor rates will lower labor costs. Myth #3: labor costs represent a large portion of a company's total costs. Myth #4: keeping labor costs low creates a potent and sustainable competitive edge. Myth #5: individual incentive pay improves performance. Myth #6: people work primarily for the money. The author explains why these myths are so pervasive, shows where they go wrong, and suggests how leaders might think more productively about compensation. With increasing frequency, the author says, he sees managers harming their organizations by buying into--and acting on--these myths. Those that do, he warns, are probably doomed to endless tinkering with pay that at the end of the day will accomplish little but cost a lot.