Voter reaction to tax change: the case of the poll tax

The introduction of the poll tax has furnished a rare opportunity of providing some British evidence of the differences in voter reaction to tax change at a much more disaggregated level than hitherto. The opportunity arises because of the availibility of data on the changes in average local tax bills in the switch from the domestic rates (property tax) to the poll tax for each of the 39 electoral districts in the City of Birmingham. Local elections took place within one month of the introduction of the new tax in May 1990. The data are used to estimate differential reaction to the tax change by the voters in the electoral districts. The estimates throw light on both the different interpretations of the failure of the poll tax and the broader controversy regarding the question of whether voters are motivated primarily by self-interest or by the wider public interest.     

Income distribution and tax structure: Empirical test of the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis

The Meltzer-Richard hypothesis that more unequal income distribution will create a majority for more redistribution has generated much research, but little empirical support. The empirical literature has concentrated on cross-country studies and the size of the public sector, and the results broadly do not indicate more redistribution with more inequality. This analysis suggests that the hypothesis should be investigated in a more homogenous setting with comparable institutions and with an explicit decision about redistribution (here tax structure). New data on poll tax and property tax in decentralized government in Norway are exploited. We show how the multi-dimensional decision can be analyzed as majority rule assuming intermediate preferences. In the econometric analysis, instruments are used to account for endogeneity of income level and income distribution. The estimated model supports the understanding that more unequal income distribution implies a shift in the tax burden from poll tax to property taxes and thereby gives more redistribution.     

The effect of potential emigration on the optimal linear income tax

This paper amends a standard model of optimal linear income taxation to allow individuals to escape taxation by migrating. The income tax is used only to redistribute income in this model. It is found that, if individuals with low and high ability levels are prevented from migrating, then the optimal marginal tax and poll subsidy increase. But preventing migration at ability levels in some intermediate interval lowers the optimal marginal tax.     

A many-person Ramsey tax rule

Define the social marginal utility of an individual's income as the gain to society of a unit of consumption by the individual plus the value of his marginal propensity to pay taxes out of income. This concept rather than the social marginal utility of consumption (equal to the first term above) seems helpful in understanding optimal tax first order conditions. For example, with many consumers (and a poll tax as well as excise taxes) the change in aggregate compensated quantity demanded is proportional to the covariance between individual quantities demanded and social marginal utilities of income.     

Consumer mobility and community tax bases : The financing of local public goods

In a model of economic ‘clubs’, size is fixed and members consuming a public good raise the question of composition; with whom would they rather consume? This depends on the way collective consumption is financed, and three results are proven With a poll tax, clubs must be homogeneous in income for all to be satisfied With a marginal benefit (Lindahl) tax, no consumer is ever satisfied with any composition; and with an income tax, at least one consumer in each club is always dissatisfied. Satisfaction implies there exists no club composition preferred to the existing one.     

The Superiority of Environmental Federalism in the Presence of Lobbying and Prior Tax Distortions

It is generally believed that environmental federalism tends to generate greater pollution emissions than centralized policymaking. This paper demonstrates that the opposite can occur in the presence of lobbying. Although the decentralized regime gives rise to a tax‐interaction effect, which induces policymakers to set lax environmental policies, it may also reduce the political pressure on enlarging allowed emissions. If the latter outweighs the former, then the decentralized regime will generate less pollution than the centralized regime. Moreover, we also show that the decentralized regime can be more efficient than the centralized regime, which provides an alternative theoretical support for the superiority of environmental federalism.     

Democratic reversals and the size of government

While the fiscal and redistributive consequences of democracy is one of the central debates in political economy, most empirical studies analyze this question solely in the context of transitions to democracy. In this paper, we explore the consequences to taxation of democratic reversal using the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans in the US South between 1880 and 1910. Following the federally-imposed extension of the franchise to the former slaves during Reconstruction (1865–1877), Southern states erected a series of legal restrictions, such as literacy tests and poll taxes, aimed primarily at preventing Southern African Americans from registering to vote. Using an original dataset of local and state taxes and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, we demonstrate that the adoption of literacy tests for voting eligibility in each state was followed by a significant decline in tax revenues that is highly correlated to the share of each county's population who was African American. We also find that black disenfranchisement led to a shift of the tax burden onto urban counties and a greater reliance on indirect taxation. Our results survive a battery of robustness checks, alternative specifications and additional tests of the redistributionist thesis. The findings are not only consistent with standard models of redistribution following democratization, but also indicate that the elasticity of taxes with respect to enfranchisement is substantial and larger than the one suggested by the cross-national literature.     

Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework

We investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to inform their selection of policy platforms. Focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space, single peaked preferences and two office-seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from polls that ask respondents their preferences, we find that for most environments honest poll response cannot occur in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, simple partially-revealing equilibria exist when the poll only asks respondents which party or candidate they prefer. When the candidates learn the sample average or see all the data, there are partially revealing equilibria that mimic those of the binary message game. Interpretation of polling data requires knowledge of the equilibrium played as the meanings of poll responses are endogenously determined. The analysis suggests that naive use of polling data may be misleading.     

Exit polls,turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 11 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.     

The estimation of British local government expenditure decisions under a piecewise linear budget constraint

In the light of the reforms that have affected local government finance in Britain, the empirical analysis of local government responses to the changes in the grant system has become a topical subject because of its policy implications. Barnett et al.proposed different models to predict the likely impact of the reforms on local government expenditure but never tested ofr the validity of the functional form used in their model. The main reason for this omission is related to the piecewise nature of the budget constraint faced by local authorities which complicated the estimation techniques and restricted the choice of the functional forms that could be used. The presented here tests for the validity of the functional form using data for the three fiscal years that preceded the poll tax reform, namely 1986–87 to 1988–89 and suggests specific tests to compare the parameters obtained using different models. The main conclusion of the analysis is that only the behaviour of metropolitan districts is consistent with utility maximization.     

A case study of long-term Delphi accuracy

We evaluated the long-term accuracy of predictions from a Delphic poll of the future of the mental health profession [1]. Six hundred participants provided predictions about the likely occurrence and probable time courses for 18 scenarios that could possibly have occurred over the 30-year interval between 1981 to present. Each of the panelists was polled twice with distributional feedback from the first poll provided on the second poll questionnaires. The data from the second polling was used to make predictions regarding the future of various issues that may have affected the mental health profession over the forecast interval. It has now been 30 years since the original poll was conducted; the purpose of this study was to evaluate the accuracy of the original group predictions. Results indicated that the Delphi panelists correctly predicted the occurrence of 14/18 scenarios. For those scenarios that did occur, the time course predictions were accurate within approximately 1-5 years.     

税收负担的结构性失衡与调整——基于结构性减税视角

当前我国税收负担结构失衡现象比较突出:在中观层面表现为税收负担的税种结构失衡、产业结构失衡、地区结构失衡;在微观层面表现为不同类型企业的税收负担失衡、各收入阶层居民的税收负担失衡。结构性减税与税收负担结构具有内在关联性:实施结构性减税是基于税负结构失衡的现实所作出的理性政策选择;同时,结构性减税的基本特征也使其具有调整税负结构的功能。今后,结构性减税应将税收负担结构合理化作为政策目标,通过全面推进"营改增"改革、实行综合与分类相结合的个人所得税制、稳步推进房产税改革等一揽子政策措施,积极调整税收负担结构,使其更加公平合理。     

制造业企业会计政策选择之纳税筹划研究

纳税人在进行纳税筹划过程中都普遍认为,只要进行纳税筹划就可以减轻税收负担,增加自身收益,而很少甚至根本不考虑纳税筹划的风险。其实,纳税筹划作为一种计划决策方法,本身也是有风险的。当然,制造业企业生产经营中的具体纳税筹划应在企管中统筹安排。     

Informational roles of pre-election polls

This paper introduces a pre-election polling stage to Feddersen and Pesendorfer's two-candidate election model in which some voters are uncertain about the state of the world. While Feddersen and Pesendorfer find that less informed, indifferent voters strictly prefer abstention, which they refer to as the swing voter's curse, I show that there exists an equilibrium in which everyone truthfully reveals his or her preference in the pre-election poll and participates in voting. Moreover, even in the truth-telling equilibrium, the candidate who leads in the poll may lose the election. However, polls can help elections aggregate information more successfully.     

邓子基的社会主义治税观

邓子基教授是我国社会主义税收理论的奠基人之一,他的治税思想是社会主义市场经济实践的主要指导思想。回顾邓子基教授的社会主义治税观,包括社会主义税收基础理论、社会主义治税思想、税利分流的理论依据、流转税和所得税并重(双主体)的税制模式、相对独立的特区税制模式、涉外税收和新一轮税制改革等七个方面,对于税收理论和实践的创新与发展,具有重要的现实意义。     

内、外资企业所得税合并中的几个理论问题探讨

中国正经历着新一轮的税制改革,而内、外资企业所得税的合并成为人们关注的焦点问题。从纳税人、税率、税前扣除和税收优惠等几个基本理论问题的界定,分析内、外资企业所得税存在的差异以及合并中存在的问题,进而为内、外资企业所得税的合并提供一个理论框架。     

The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale

In this paper we argue that tax enforcement is an additional contextual factor affecting tax morale, one of the most important determinants of tax compliance. By using a unique dataset that merges a representative sample of Italian households with administrative data on tax enforcement, we first find that tax morale is positively correlated with tax enforcement. Second, to deal with possible endogeneity of tax enforcement, we show that results are confirmed in an IV specification using the change in the tax gap at the provincial level as an instrument for tax enforcement. Finally, we provide evidence that the impact of tax enforcement and social environment is stronger at low quantiles of tax morale. Our results show that besides that of lowering the expected value of tax evasion, tax enforcement has an additional and indirect effect on tax compliance through its effect on tax morale.     

中国个人所得税的性质及其效果分析

以工资薪金税收为主体的个人所得税是一种消费者税。由于起征额的存在,个人所得税并不是一种完全的所得税,而是一种个人收入调节税。基于消费者税的理论基础,提出了关于中国代表性居民纳税人的理论平均税负的一个简单模型,以及一个关于中国个人所得税对全部税收的贡献率的理论计算公式。中国个人所得税改革应着眼于如何改善工薪所得税的累进性,增强税收的收入再分配职能,相对提高低收入劳动者的实际报酬。为此,应将个人所得税易名为个人收入调节税,减少税率档次,提高免征额。     

中国税制改革的路径与现实选择

在经济全球化的国际形势下,中国税制改革势在必行。基于税制优化理论,借鉴大多数市场经济国家的成功做法,建立以增值税、所得税和社会保障税为主体的税制结构,取消不合理的税种,调整并增加一些税种是中国税制改革的现实选择。     

On Teaching a Fractured Macroeconomics

One of the most interesting results in the tax evasion literature is that an increase in the income tax rate would increase tax compliance. Despite its peculiarity, this result has gained acceptance as a cornerstone for further developments of the rational tax evasion model. However, because of the mathematical format by which it is conveyed, this counterintuitive result has remained inaccessible to undergraduate students as well as to noneconomists. The author first introduces the rational tax evasion model in a nonmathematical style that is accessible to any reader. Second, he shows that the behavioral predictions of the rational tax evasion model can easily be obtained using a simple graphical representation of the optimum condition that involves the derivation of a demand curve for tax compliance.