The Post‐Cost Profitability of Momentum Trading Strategies: Further Evidence from the UK

This paper examines the post‐cost profitability of momentum trading strategies in the UK over the period 1988–2003 and provides direct evidence on stock concentration, turnover and trading cost associated with the strategy. We find that after factoring out transaction costs the profitability of the momentum strategy disappears for shorter horizons but remains for longer horizons. Indeed, for ranking and holding periods up to 6‐months, profitable momentum returns would not be available to most average investors as the cost of implementation outweighs the possible returns. However, we find post‐cost profitability for ranking and/or holding periods beyond 6 months as portfolio turnover and its associated cost reduces. We find similar results for a sub‐sample of relatively large and liquid stocks.     

Investor Conferences,Firm Visibility,and Stock Liquidity

We examine the influence of investor conferences on firms’ stock liquidity. We find that firms participating in conferences experience a 1.4% to 2.8% increase in stock liquidity compared to nonconference firms. Consistent with investor conferences improving firm visibility, the increase in liquidity is larger for firms with low pre‐conference visibility and varies predictably with conference characteristics that affect the ability of investors to revise their beliefs about the firm. However, for firms with a large investor base and high visibility, conference participation is associated with a decline in stock liquidity, consistent with investor conferences exacerbating the information asymmetry among investors.     

Price Momentum and Idiosyncratic Volatility

We find that returns to momentum investing are higher among high idiosyncratic volatility ( IVol) stocks, especially high IVol losers. Higher IVol stocks also experience quicker and larger reversals. The findings are consistent with momentum profits being attributable to underreaction to firm‐specific information and with IVol limiting arbitrage of the momentum effect. We also find a positive time‐series relation between momentum returns and aggregate IVol. Given the long‐term rise in IVol, this result helps explain the persistence of momentum profits since Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) study.     

Cross‐Listed Bonds,Information Asymmetry,and Conservatism in Credit Ratings

We propose information asymmetry as an additional explanation for rating conservatism. Because information asymmetry is likely higher for cross‐listed bonds than for U.S. bonds, we expect and find that cross‐listed bonds are rated more conservatively than U.S. domestic bonds at issuance. Further, cross‐listed bonds receive less frequent upgrades and take longer to be upgraded after issuance. Because lower ratings might also reflect higher default risk based on agencies’ private information, we conduct additional tests to discriminate between the rating conservatism and private information explanations. The results are consistent with ratings conservatism and inconsistent with the private information explanation.     

Shareholder Coordination,Information Diffusion and Stock Returns

We show that the quality of information‐sharing networks linking firms’ institutional investors has stock return predictability implications. We find that firms with high shareholder coordination experience less local comovement and less post‐earnings announcement drift, consistent with the notion that information‐sharing networks facilitate information diffusion and improve stock price efficiency. In support of the view that coordination acts as an information diffusion channel, we document that the stock return performance of firms with high shareholder coordination leads that of firms with low shareholder coordination.     

Information,sophistication, and foreign versus domestic investors’ performance

Using an intraday transaction dataset with trader identity, we study foreign and domestic investors’ trading activities and investment performance ahead of open-ending events of Taiwanese closed-end funds. Simply buying the funds at a discount and holding until open-ending generates large abnormal returns. All information required to execute this strategy is made public, so the events set up natural experiments to examine how investors trade, holding constant access to information. Foreign investors are net buyers ahead of the open-endings, more than doubling their positions and earning large abnormal returns. Domestic investors are net sellers while the discounts are still large, and forego large abnormal returns. The results suggest that investor sophistication in interpreting the same information is potentially an important determinant of investment performance differences across foreign and domestic investors.     

Trend‐Following Trading Strategies in U.S. Stocks: A Revisit

We show that previous findings regarding the profitability of trend‐following trading rules over intermediate horizons in futures markets also extend to individual U.S. stocks. Portfolios formed using technical indicators such as moving average or channel ratios, without employing cross‐sectional rankings of any kind, tend to perform about as well as the more commonly examined momentum strategies. The profitability of these strategies appears significant, both statistically and economically, through 2007, but evidence of profitability vanishes after 2007. Market‐state dependence, while clearly present, does not explain the post‐2007 reduction in returns to these strategies.     

Investor Sentiment and the Closed‐end Fund Puzzle: Out‐of‐sample Evidence

In this paper we examine the proposition that small investor sentiment, measured by the change in the discount/premium on closed‐end funds, is an important factor in stock returns. We conduct an out‐of‐sample test of the investor sentiment hypothesis in a market environment that is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment than the USA. We fail to provide supporting evidence for the claim of Lee et al. (1991) that investor sentiment affects the risk of common stocks. Consistent with Elton et al. (1998) , who show that investor sentiment does not enter the return generating process, our tests do not detect investor sentiment in a capital market that is more susceptible to small investor sentiment. Our results provide additional support against the claim that investor sentiment represents an independent and systematic asset pricing risk.     

投资者保护、终极控制人性质与会计信息可比性

通过测度中国上市公司的会计信息可比性值,实证考察了投资者保护对可比性的影响.结果显示:投资者保护程度与会计信息可比性显著正相关,即在我国投资者保护程度较强的地区,企业管理层能更严格遵守会计准则规定,会计信息可比性较高.进一步检验发现,相对于国有控股公司,投资者保护程度与会计信息可比性的正相关关系在非国有控股公司中更加显著,因此,投资者保护制度对国有控股公司管理层会计行为的约束能力较弱.稳健性检验结果发现,这种正相关关系在中央政府控股公司与地方政府控股公司间不存在显著差别.     

Reversal and momentum patterns in weekly stock returns: European evidence

We analyze short‐term reversal and medium‐term momentum patterns in weekly stock returns in Europe. Focusing on raw and stock‐specific returns, our empirical results show for both return specifications (a) a negative relation between weekly past returns and future returns in the short run and (b) a positive relation in the medium run. However, returns from reversal and momentum strategies based on stock‐specific returns are less volatile. In further analyses, we find short‐term reversal and medium‐term momentum patterns to be connected to stock characteristics. Looking at the potential causes of these effects, our results do not support the idea that short‐term reversal in weekly stock returns is due to an over‐ or underreaction to firm‐specific news nor that it is mainly driven by illiquidity. Medium‐term momentum in weekly stock returns, on the other hand, can be connected to behavioral biases. Our concluding tests confirm that our findings are robust among industries, in subperiods, for the January effect and in varying market states. Finally, while medium‐term momentum strategies remain profitable after accounting for transaction costs, short‐term reversal strategies can be mainly explained by transaction costs due to their high turnover.     

Bid-Ask Spreads,Information Asymmetry,and Abnormal Investor Sentiment: Evidence from Closed-End Funds

Using a sample of closed-end equity funds listed on the NYSE from 1994 to 1999, we investigate differences in spreads and adverse selection costs between the closed-end funds and a matched sample of common stocks. We find that spreads and adverse selection costs for the closed-end funds are significantly lower than those of control stocks. The results are consistent for the subperiods both before and after the minimum tick size change on NYSE on June 24, 1997. The differences of spreads and adverse selection costs cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the closed-end funds and the matched sample of common stocks. Lastly, we find that abnormal investor sentiment and adverse selection costs of closed-end funds are positively correlated over time.     

Investor Sentiment,Trading Behavior and Informational Efficiency in Index Futures Markets

This paper shows that traders in index futures markets are positive feedback traders—they buy when prices increase and sell when prices decline. Positive feedback trading appears to be more active in periods of high investor sentiment. This finding is consistent with the notion that feedback trading is driven by expectations of noise traders. Consistent with the noise trading hypothesis, order flow in index futures markets is less informative when investors are optimistic. Transitory volatility measured at high frequencies also appears to decline in periods of bullish sentiment, suggesting that sentiment‐driven trading increases market liquidity.     

The Pitch Rather Than the Pit: Investor Inattention,Trading Activity,and FIFA World Cup Matches

This paper analyzes stock market trading in 15 countries during the 2010 and 2014 soccer FIFA World Cups. We find evidence for substantial investor inattention during these major sporting events. The lack of attention for the trading pit is particularly large when the national soccer team is competing, with traded volumes declining by as much as 48%. During national team matches, prices on local stock markets can temporarily decouple from global financial market developments. These findings suggest that major sporting events can act as a laboratory in which to investigate investor inattention.     

The Moving Average Ratio and Momentum

I show the ratio of the short‐term moving average to the long‐term moving average (moving average ratio, MAR) has significant predictive power for future returns. The MAR combined with nearness to the 52‐week high explains most of the intermediate‐term momentum profits. This suggests that an anchoring bias, in which investors use moving averages or the 52‐week high as reference points for estimating fundamental values, is the primary source of momentum effects. Momentum caused by the anchoring bias do not disappear in the long‐run even when there are return reversals, confirming that intermediate‐term momentum and long‐term reversals are separate phenomena.     

Information percolation,momentum and reversal

We propose a joint theory of time-series momentum and reversal based on a rational-expectations model. We show that a necessary condition for momentum to arise in this framework is that information flows at an increasing rate. We focus on word-of-mouth communication as a mechanism that enforces this condition and generates short-term momentum and long-term reversal. Investors with heterogeneous trading strategies—contrarian and momentum traders—coexist in the marketplace. Although a significant proportion of investors are momentum traders, momentum is not completely eliminated. Word-of-mouth communication spreads rumors and generates price run-ups and reversals. Our theoretical predictions are in line with empirical findings.     

Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias

We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution. Self‐attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long‐term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high‐order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three‐year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low‐order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high‐order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self‐selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.     

Financial literacy,information flows,and caste affiliation: Empirical evidence from India

This paper empirically investigates the relevance of social interaction and caste affiliation for individual awareness of financial instruments and investment behavior of households in India. The results of our empirical analysis, which is based on a large scale survey on saving patterns of Indians, suggest a positive relationship between financial literacy and social interaction. However, especially backward caste people living in regions with a large fraction of backward castes have a lower probability of being aware of various financial instruments. In contrast, we find only weak empirical evidence for a direct effect of caste affiliation and social interaction on investment behavior.     

Abnormal Returns from Takeover Prediction Modelling: Challenges and Suggested Investment Strategies

While takeover targets earn significant abnormal returns, studies tend to find no abnormal returns from investing in predicted takeover targets. In this study, we show that the difficulty of correctly identifying targets ex ante does not fully explain the below‐expected returns to target portfolios. Target prediction models’ inability to optimally time impending takeovers, by taking account of pre‐bid target underperformance and the anticipation of potential targets by other market participants, diminishes but does not eliminate the potential profitability of investing in predicted targets. Importantly, we find that target portfolios are predisposed to underperform, as targets and distressed firms share common firm characteristics, resulting in the misclassification of a disproportionately high number of distressed firms as potential targets. We show that this problem can be mitigated, and significant risk‐adjusted returns can be earned, by screening firms in target portfolios for size, leverage and liquidity.     

Return predictability: The dual signaling hypothesis of stock splits

This paper aims to differentiate between optimistic splits and overoptimistic/opportunistic splits. Although markets do not distinguish between these two groups at the split announcement time, optimistic (overoptimistic/opportunistic) splits precede positive (negative) long‐term buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns. Using the calendar month portfolio approach, we show that the zero‐investment, ex ante identifiable, and fully implementable trading strategy proposed in this paper can generate economically and statistically significant positive abnormal returns. Our findings indicate that pre‐split earnings management and how it relates to managers’ incentives, is an omitted variable in the studies of post‐split long‐term abnormal returns.