Determinants of bribery in international business

Levels of perceived bribe taking in 54 countries in two time periods were analyzed with respect to two independent variables—their level of human development measuring education, wealth, and health (Human Development Index) and the level of economic freedom measuring the extent to which a nation's economy is open to market forces. The results indicate that lower levels of bribe taking are associated with high human development and greater economic freedom. Developed countries that have shown improvements on the two variables over a five‐year period also show a reduction in their perceived levels of bribe taking. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Determinants of Bribery in International Business: The Cultural and Economic Factors

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for 47 countries reported by Transparency International were used to ascertain determinants of bribe taking in international business. Two sets of independent variables – economic and cultural – were used in a multiple regression analysis. Results indicate that bribe taking was more likely to be prevalent in countries with low per capita income and lower disparities in income distribution. Cultural factors such as high power distance and high masculinity in a country were also likely to be associated with high level of bribe taking. Both economic and cultural factors were important explanatory factors of bribery. Implications of the findings for combating bribery are discussed. Rajib Sanyal is an American Council of Education Fellow at George Mason University for 2004–2005, on leave from The College of New Jersey, where he is a professor of management. Dr. Sanyal has published widely, and is the author of a textbook on International Management.     

A comparison of Nigerian to American views of bribery and extortion in international commerce

This study investigates the differences in the way bribery and extortion is perceived by two different cultures — American and Nigerian. Two hundred and forty American business students and one hundred and eighty Nigerian business students were presented with three scenarios describing a businessman offering a bribe to a government official and three scenarios describing a businessman being forced to pay a bribe to an official in order to do business. The Reidenbach-Robin instrument was used to measure the ethical reactions of the two samples to these scenarios. Results indicate that ethical reactions to bribery and extortion vary by (a) the nationality of the person offering the bribe, and (b) the country where the bribe is offered. In addition, Nigerians perceived some of the scenarios as being less unethical than did Americans. John Tsalikis is an Assistant Professor of Marketing at Florida International University. His research interests include marketing ethics, international marketing, and direct marketing. His articles have appeared in the Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Business Ethics, Psychology and Marketing, and the Journal of International Consumer Marketing. Osita Nwachukwu is an Assistant Professor of Management at Western Illinois University. His research interests include marketing ethics, and business policy. His articles have appeared in the Journal of Business Ethics, and the Journal of International Consumer Marketing.     

Bribery and extortion in international business: Ethical perceptions of Greeks compared to Americans

This study investigates the differences in he way bribery and extortion is perceived by two different cultures — American and Greek. Two hundred and forty American business students and two hundred and four Greek business students were presented with three scenarios describing a businessman offering a bribe to a government official and three scenarios describing a businessman being forced to pay a bribe to an official in order to do business. The Reidenbach-Robin instrument was used to measure the ethical reactions of the two samples to these scenarios. Results indicate that ethical reactions to bribery and extortion vary by (a) the nationality of the person offering the bribe, and (b) the country where the bribe is offered. In addition, Greeks perceived some of the scenarios as being less unethical than did Americans.John Tsalikis is an Associate Professor of Marketing at Florida International University. His research interests include marketing ethics, international marketing, and direct marketing. His articles have appeared in theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Business Ethics, Psychology and Marketing, and theJournal of International Consumer Marketing.Michael S. LaTour is an Associate Professor of Marketing at Auburn University. His research interests include marketing ethics, and emotional responses to advertising. His articles have appeared in theJournal of Business Ethics, Psychology and Marketing, Journal of Health Care Marketing, and theJournal of Advertising.The authors contributed equally to this article.     

用经济模型分析中国的反腐败问题

在分析腐败问题的数学模型中 ,有四个变量在发挥作用 ,它们是 :可以收到的贿赂金额、受贿后被查处的概率、官员的薪水以及距离退休的时间。在符合“经济人”假定的条件下 ,必须使得官员不受贿时的期望收益大于受贿时的期望收益 ,他们才不会选择受贿。为了有效遏制中国腐败问题 ,需要采取一些措施标本兼治     

Bribery,consent and prima facie duty: A rejoinder to Carson

Responding to my paper Bribery Tom Carson argues that bribe takers violate promisory obligations in a wider range of cases than I acknowledge and insists that bribe taking is prima facie wrong in all contexts. I argue that he is wrong on both counts. Michael Philips is a Professor of Philosophy at Portland State University. Recent papers by him have appeared in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophical Studies, Nous, Law and Philosophy, The Journal of Business Ethics, and several other journals. He is currently at work an a book in moral theory.     

Influencing MNC strategies for managing corruption and favouritism in Pacific Asia countries: a multiple-theory configurational perspective

ABSTRACT

The research gap addressed here concerns how to encourage multinational corporations (MNCs) to combat corruption and favouritism. This study’s rationale is that MNCs can have a highly influential role in supporting or opposing such practices globally. The study examines how MNCs might choose flexibly among alternative strategies but could be encouraged positively. Three illustrative strategies are described in detail using theoretical propositions: (1) anti-corruption reform; (2) ‘tightrope’ balancing; and (3) tolerance for corrupt practices. A proposed multiple-theory configurational perspective is consistent with secondary data and reported cases about domestic corruption and MNC propensity to bribe focused on Pacific Asia countries.     

转轨国家经济绩效的动态比较分析

作为经济转轨的两种方式,渐进式改革和激进式改革孰优孰劣,一直是转轨经济学理论争论的焦点之一,围绕此形成了两种截然不同的学术观点。那么,到底哪种观点更能得到实践的支持,针对该研究问题,以24个转轨国家作为研究样本,运用整体比较和分阶段比较的研究方法,从整体上和分阶段两个方面对渐进式改革的国家和激进式改革的国家的经济绩效进行评价和比较,研究结论基本支持渐进式改革方式从整体上更有利于经济发展的观点。但是作为对现有研究的补充和发展,发现个别激进式改革的苏东国家在转轨后的第四个阶段其经济绩效水平要高于渐进式改革的国家。     

受贿罪罪刑规范构成要件要素研究

-我国刑法受贿罪罪刑规范所规定的构成要件要素,作为受贿罪构成要件的基本组成部分,对受贿罪罪刑规范的犯罪规制能力具有直接的影响作用。通过对现行刑法受贿罪罪刑规范之“犯罪主体”、“利用职务上的便利”、“为他人谋取利益”、“贿赂”、“主观”等构成要件要素立法运行效果的考察,可以发现我国受贿罪构成要件要素在犯罪规制能力方面存在明显不足。为扩大中国刑法受贿罪罪刑法规范的犯罪规制能力,有必要对受贿罪罪刑规范进行五个方面的立法完善：一是简化犯罪主体的认定标准,二是明确职务行为的内涵,三是删除“为他人谋取利益”要素,四是扩大受贿罪行为对象的范围,五是明确受贿罪犯罪主观要件的内涵,以整体提高我国刑法受贿罪罪刑规范的犯罪规制能力。     

Trade barriers in East and South East Asia: the implications for retailers

Many countries in East and South East Asia have erected trade barriers at various times since 1945. Many retail markets have therefore been closed to outside influence and investment. In the 1990s however such measures are being reversed and markets in East and South East Asia are becoming increasingly open. This openness is both a willing embrace of outside investment and a less willing acceptance of external pressures. This paper reviews the changes taking place and concludes that those retailers taking advantage of the opportunities are faced with a variety of problems. Indeed, it would seem that the removal of international trade barriers simply leads to their replacement with more difficult domestic market policies.     

Bribery and implicit agreements: A reply to Philips

The author has elsewhere defended the view that accepting a bribe involves the violation of an implicit or explicit promise or understanding associated with an office or position that one occupies and that therefore it is prima facie wrong to accept a bribe. Michael Philips has criticized this position in a recent paper. He argues that (a) there are cases in which accepting a bribe violates no promises or agreements, and (b) there are cases in which there is no prima facie duty to refuse an offer of a bribe. The author offers replies to both of these objections.Thomas L. Carson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Loyola University in Chicago. He was awarded the NEH Fellowship for College Teachers. He is the author of The Status of Morality (D. Reidel, Philosophical Studies Series, 1984), and he has written numerous articles concerning both ethical theory and applied ethics.     

Gender gap in latent and nascent entrepreneurship: driven by competitiveness

This study highlights the relevance of gender differences in competitiveness for the gender gap in latent and nascent entrepreneurship. Using data obtained from a recent large-scale survey conducted in 36 countries, we find that individuals who like situations in which they compete with others are more likely to have a preference for being self-employed (latent entrepreneurs) and are also more likely to take steps to start new businesses (nascent entrepreneurs). Moreover, our results suggest that women are less competitively inclined than men in almost all countries in our sample and are also less willing to take risks. The results of a decomposition analysis suggest that gender differences in competitiveness and risk taking contribute significantly to the gender gap in latent and nascent entrepreneurship. Gender differences in competitiveness seem to be relevant, especially for the gender gap in nascent entrepreneurship.     

Bribery in International Business Transactions

Globalization leads to cross-border business transactions between societies with very different norms and regulations regarding bribery. Bribery in international business transactions can be seen as a function of not only the demand for such bribes in different countries, but the supply, or willingness to provide bribes by multinational firms and their representatives. This study addresses the propensity of firms from 30 different countries to engage in international bribery. The study incorporates both domestic (economic development, culture, and domestic corruption in the supplying country) and international factors (those countries’ patterns of trade and involvement in international accords) in explaining the willingness to bribe abroad. The propensity to provide bribes was the lowest when corruption was not tolerated in the multinational firms’ home countries, when the firms’ countries were signatories of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) anti-bribery convention, and when those countries traded heavily with wealthier nations. Further, these findings are maintained when controlling for levels of economic development and cultural values in the supplying country. In terms of culture, firms from high power distance countries showed a somewhat greater propensity for providing bribes in transactions with less-developed nations.     

An Empirical Investigation on Firms’ Proactive and Passive Motivation for Bribery in China

This research investigates firms’ bribery motivations in China. Based on resource dependence theory and anomie theory, we identify resource conditions as firms’ proactive motivation to bribe and firms’ perceived institutional environment as their passive motivation to bribe. We use the data from 2002 World Business Environment Survey, collected by the World Bank, to investigate firms’ bribery in the world’s largest emerging market, China. We employ a multi-level logistic model to test our hypotheses. The results show that unsatisfactory general and task environmental conditions may trigger firms to bribe in order to compete for better resources and opportunities; institutional conditions such as the security expenditure and anomie climate may make firms perceive bribery as a common phenomenon and thus induce firms to bribe. This research provides some insights to understand business bribery behaviors in emerging market. It also discusses some managerial implications and guidelines for policy-making from the findings.     

Gender equality's impact on female directors’ efficacy: A multi-country study

This paper studies the role of gender equality in female directors’ efficacy and its subsequent effects on firms. Female directors in more gender equal societies should possess greater skills and exert more influence due to better access to educational/professional opportunities and more amicable boardroom dynamics. Therefore, we hypothesize that gender equality serves as an important moderator in the relation between female board representation and firm outcomes. Using a multi-national panel comprising 1986 public firms from 24 countries or areas spanning from 2007 to 2016, we obtain results that firms with higher female board representation exhibit higher overall performance, less earnings management, and less excessive risk taking, in which all three relations are stronger in countries with greater gender equality. Taken together, our paper implies that the impact of female directors on firm outcomes depends on a country's overall level of gender equality.     

Consolidation and market structure in emerging market banking systems

This paper examines the evolution of market structure in emerging markets banking systems during the 1990s. While a significant process of bank consolidation has been taking place in these countries, reflected in a sharp decline in the number of banks, this process has not systematically been associated with increased concentration as measured by standard indices. Moreover, econometric estimates based on the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology suggest that overall, markets have not become less competitive in a sample of eight European and Latin American countries. Lowering barriers to entry, such as allowing increased participation of foreign banks, appears to have prevented a decline in competitive pressures associated with consolidation.     

Crossing the Boundaries of Obligation: Are Corporate Salaries a Form of Bribery?

Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) pay relatively high salaries to local people in host countries. TNCs assume that such employees will accept an employeeÇôemployer relationship similar to that which exists in North America, but the obligations and personal interests that such a relationship create often directly conflict with systems of obligation already established in the host country. When TNCs do business across the boundaries of systems of obligation, corporate salaries can be seen as a form of unethical bribery. In this paper, the core case of business bribery is described consistent with the usual philosophical analysis of bribery, and the grounds for thinking bribery is unethical are made clear. The amount of a bribe is irrelevant to the ethical analysis. Bribery is distinguished from tips and grease on structural grounds. The concept of a system of obligation is defined, and examples given that show the variability of systems of obligation in host countries. Arguments are given to show that salaries paid by TNCs create obligations and personal interests which sometimes conflict with existing systems of obligation, and that such payments have the same structure as more traditional forms of bribery. The ethical issues of corporations crossing the boundaries of systems of obligations are discussed.     

Does empathy matter in corporate social responsibility? Evidence from emerging markets

This paper explores how cross-country differences in empathy can explain variations in corporate social responsibility (CSR). We show that empathy is positively associated with overall CSR, as well as with its social and environmental components. Our results are robust to using the two components of empathy, empathic concern and perspective taking. Our findings are further corroborated by evidence from a quasi-natural experiment based on the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake. We find that during the year of the disaster and the following year, firms located in countries with high levels of empathy donated more money than firms located in countries with less empathy.     

The Impact of Normative Influence and Locus of Control on Ethical Judgments and Intentions: a Cross-Cultural Comparison

The study extends the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) in a cross-cultural setting, incorporating ethical judgments and locus of control in a comparison of Taiwanese and US businesspersons. A self-administered survey of 698 businesspersons from the US and Taiwan examined several hypothesized differences. Results indicate that while Taiwanese respondents have a more favorable attitude toward a requested bribe than US counterparts, and are less likely to view it as an ethical issue, their higher locus externality causes ethical judgments and behavioral intentions to conform to normative influences of in groups and superiors. In the Taiwanese sample, locus externality effectively functions as a countervailing pressure against the unethical behavior in the scenario. No such effect is found in the US sample. A path model fitted to the data shows that locus internals exhibit more consistency among attitudes, judgments, and behavioral intentions than locus externals. Implications for managers and researchers are discussed, and suggestions and precautions for development of efficacy-enhancement programs are offered.     

When is a Bribe a Bribe? Teaching a Workable Definition of Bribery

This paper presents an outline forteaching about bribery. The outline is based onthe presumption that a payment, once defined asa ``bribe' is by definition unethical. Inaddition, the paper develops a simple yetworkable definition of bribery based on theprincipal-agent framework. The idea is that anypayment made to a principal, for any purpose,is not by definition a bribe; however, anypayment made to an agent is a bribe if theagent retains the payment.