The Austrian theory of relational goods

In modern rich societies, the traditional positive correlation between income and happiness seems to have disappeared: even though their income keeps rising, people do not declare themselves to be happier. This problem, which is known in literature as the “paradox of happiness”, has been thoroughly studied. One of the possible explanations is based on the observation that an income increase can sometimes entail the destruction of those relational goods on which happiness largely relies: relationships of family, friendship, love and fellowship. This research aims to show how, in the age of Marginalism, the most important attempt at establishing if and in which sense relational goods are economic goods is carried out by the very Austrian economists who led Robbins to write the epistemological statute of modern economic science.     

The demand for relational goods: empirical evidence from the European Social Survey

How are happiness and the demand for relational goods and status goods related? Using cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey, this relationship is investigated for European countries. The main result is that the demand for relational goods is not reduced by high opportunity costs of time. Rather, both wage rate and income are positively related to the frequency of social contacts. In contrast to financial means, while status is more important for happiness in richer European countries than in poorer ones, social status is not decisive for the frequency of meeting friends regardless of the home country’s economic well-being. Thus, while no crowding out of relational contacts by status could be observed, relational goods are even boosted by material well-being.     

Happiness and relational goods: well-being and interpersonal relations in the economic sphere

The present paper provides an introduction to this special issue devoted to Happiness and Relational Goods. We start by presenting a few concepts that have recently appeared in the economic literature with the aim of capturing some of the peculiarities of personalised interactions. We claim that these concepts can be subsumed fairly well under the concept of ‘relational goods’. We then review the recent empirical literature on happiness and relational goods. Finally, we briefly introduce the papers contained in this special issue by outlining their respective contributions.     

On Giffen-like goods

This paper provides, as a counter example to the Alchian-Allen theorem, a theory of Giffen-like goods: a per unit charge to two similar goods raises the relative price of the lower quality good and yet increases the (relative) demand of the good.     

Auctioning divisible goods

Summary. We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and explicit allowances for the winner's curse. When the bidders' information is symmetric, the strategic aspects of bidding imply that there always exist equilibria of a uniform-price auction with lower expected revenue than provided by a discriminatory auction. When bidders are risk averse, there may exist equilibria of the uniform-price auction that provide higher expected revenue than a discriminatory auction. Received: November 4, 1999; revised version: March 9, 2001     

Public goods in networks

This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network.     

Respect and relational contracts

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect in a labor market context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect by giving the employee costly symbolic rewards after observing his level of effort. We study whether symbolic rewards are used by the employers mainly to praise employees or as a coordination device to build relational contracts by manipulating the balance between labor demand and supply in the market. We find that a high proportion of long-term relationships have been initiated by the assignment of symbolic rewards. However, the assignment of symbolic rewards decreases when it becomes clear that the relationship is durable, suggesting that employers mainly use symbolic rewards as a coordination device to initiate relational contracts. Compared to the balanced market condition, assigning symbolic rewards in initial relationships is less likely when there is excess demand in the market and more likely when there is excess supply, i.e., when the relationship is more valuable. Receiving symbolic rewards increases the employees’ likelihood of accepting to continue the relationship with the same employer. It also motivates them to increase their effort further but only when the market is balanced. Overall, the ability to assign symbolic rewards does not give rise to higher profits because it is associated with lower rents offered to the employees on average, leading to lower effort levels.     

Technology and public goods

This paper presents a theory of public goods based on production theory where public goods are viewed as inputs to the production process. We examine the pure case of public inputs (no private inputs) as well as the mixed case (private and public inputs). We show how the case of public inputs is related to certain forms of nonjoint production, and we characterize it in terms of variable profit and joint cost functions. Comparative statics results are derived graphically in the two-by-two case.     

Intraindustry trade in intermediate goods

Since intermediate goods play such a vital role in foreign trade, this paper develops a model that explains the benefits from intraindustry trade in differentiated intermediate goods. In comparison with a situation of autarchy, this type of trade causes an increase in the number of intermediate good varieties. In this way, the producers of final goods will benefit from intermediate good varieties, which are closer to the ideal for a specific production process. At the same time, the producers of intermediate goods will, under conditions of international division of labor, benefit from economies of scale.     

Public goods and joint supply

An example is presented which illustrates how analysis of the core of an economy can be used to clarify the debate between Demsetz and Samuelson on the relationship between public goods and joint supply. The core converges to the competitive allocation in an economy with joint supply but the core of a public goods economy does not converge to the Lindahl allocation. The example should prove useful as a pedagogic device, serving as a simple introduction to the technical literature on the core of an economy with public goods.     

Public goods and public bads

In many empirically relevant situations agents in different groups are affected by the provision of a public characteristic in divergent ways. Whereas for one group it represents a public good, it is a public bad for another group. Applying Cornes and Hartley's aggregative game approach, we analyze a general model in which such contentious public characteristics are present and are provided cooperatively. In particular, we establish neutrality results with respect to redistribution and growth of income, infer the effects of preference changes and coalition formation, and present a technology paradox. Finally, we compare the outcome of voluntary provision of the contentious public characteristic with the Pareto‐optimal solution, highlighting a potential conflict between equity and efficiency in this case.     

Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used.     

Durable goods with quality differentiation

We study the optimal strategy of a durable-goods monopolist who can offer goods in different qualities. The key finding is that the presence of the additional sorting variable further undermines the firm's commitment problem, leading to results that contrast sharply with those of standard durable-goods models or those of models where the firm can commit.     

Location and ownership of public goods

We introduce location choice for the public good in the property rights framework. We find that it can be optimal to separate location from ownership.     

Private provision of discrete public goods

We investigate private provision of discrete public goods under refund and cost-sharing. If it is commonly believed that individuals may be warm-glow altruists and the group-size is a Poisson random variable, then the equilibrium distribution of collected contributions is uniquely determined. If composition uncertainty is very small and the expected group-size sufficiently large, the distribution of contributions can be described by concentrating in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. As the expected group-size increases, the probability a randomly selected player contributes and the associated expected number of contributions converge to the corresponding ones in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game with no uncertainty.     

Public provision of private child goods

This paper analyzes the public provision of private goods for children in a politico-economic model with endogenous fertility. The government provides every child with goods that can also be purchased by parents in private markets, and the level of provision is determined by majority rule. Households with many children benefit from the public provision more than those with fewer children; thus, a political conflict arises between them. The distribution of the number of children across households, which is a crucial factor for determining which group is politically dominant, is endogenously determined by households' fertility decision. The sequential interaction between fertility and political decisions might lead to multiple equilibria: equilibrium with high fertility and low-private/public-spending ratio and equilibrium with low fertility and high-private/public-spending ratio. Our model could explain the large differences in fertility and structure of child-related spending across countries.     

Public goods in directed networks

We study the provision of a public good in a social network where links are directed, i.e., the information flows one way. Our results relate, through stochastic dominance, the equilibrium outcome of such a process with the out-degree distribution of the network.     

Giffen goods and market making

Summary. This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible for the Giffen goods anomaly affecting traders demands in multi asset noisy, rational expectations equilibrium markets. The role that information plays in traders strategies also matters. In a market with risk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents have a dual trading motive: speculation and market making. The former entails using prices to assess the effect of error terms; the latter requires employing them to disentangle noise traders demands within aggregate orders. In a correlated environment this complicates the signal extraction problem and may generate upward sloping demand curves. Assuming (i) that competitive, risk neutral market makers price the assets or that (ii) uninformed traders risk tolerance coefficient grows unboundedly, removes the market making component from informed traders demands rendering them well behaved in prices.Received: 30 April 2002, Revised: 3 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: G100, G120, G140.Support from the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA and the Ente per gli Studi Monetari e Finanziari Luigi Einaudi, are gratefully acknowledged. I thank Anat Admati, Jordi Caballé, Giacinta Cestone, and Xavier Vives for useful suggestions. The comments provided by the Associate Editor and an anonymous referee greatly improved the papers exposition.