The importance of higher-order beliefs to successful coordination

Beliefs about other players’ strategies are crucial in determining outcomes for coordination games. If players are to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium, they must believe that others will coordinate with them. In many settings there is uncertainty about beliefs as well as strategies. Do people consider these “higher-order” beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) when making coordination decisions? I design a modified stag hunt experiment that allows me to identify how these higher-order beliefs and uncertainty about higher-order beliefs matter for coordination. Players prefer to invest especially when they believe that others are “optimistic” that they will invest; but knowledge that others think them unlikely to invest does not cause players to behave differently than when they do not know what their partners think about them. Thus resolving uncertainty about beliefs can result in marked efficiency gains.     

Suit the action to the word,the word to the action: Eliciting motives for trust and reciprocity by attitudinal and behavioural measures

Two important primitives of social capital are the disposition to trust and to reciprocate manifested in social life. In this paper, attitudinal and behavioural evidence is used to investigate the nature of the motivations underlying behaviour in Trust and Dictator games. In doing so, we have three aims. First, to find out whether, and to what extent, answers to a questionnaire about attitudes towards trust and civicness predict subjects’ behaviour. Second, to disentangle strategic from other-regarding motivations by comparing behaviour in Trust and Dictator Games. Third, to investigate to what extent a correspondence could be found between subjects’ attitudinal ‘type’ and their behaviour in the two interactive experimental settings. The paper builds on previous work in the area and in particular finds that using surveys to distinguish between the behavioural responses of different attitudinal types–“Trusting” or “Prudent” on the one hand and “Trustworthy” or “Untrustworthy” on the other, allows us to dig deeper into the underlying motivations of the experimental subjects. The self-declared trusting tend to manifest trust by investing more in the risky interaction than the prudent, and the self-declared trustworthy are inclined to return more than the untrustworthy. Moreover, the self-reported trustworthy and untrustworthy tend to manifest positive or negative reciprocity, respectively. The evidence suggests that the former are moved by the intention to reward and the latter by the desire to punish a stingy Sender by returning an even smaller amount than received. This seems to confirm the “multiple self” view (Elster, 1986), whereby in the personality of each individual many components–possibly distant in terms of the motivating sentiments–are gathered together.     

Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives

Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a “blinding effect” on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.     

Trust in the image of God: Links between religiosity and reciprocity in Haiti

Are religious believers more prosocial than other people? In a trust game field experiment with 774 subjects in Haiti, we elicit willingness to pay to play in the presence of religious images, and argue that this can be interpreted as a measure of the strength of religiosity. More religious individuals trust others more and reciprocate more than others, with effect sizes between 14% and 21% of mean behaviour depending on the measure. They do not reciprocate more in the presence of religious images than without them, nor towards members of the same denomination as themselves. The results support the view that religious affiliation is correlated with intrinsic trustworthiness. We show that lab behaviour correlates with intuitive measures of religiosity outside the lab and with participation in borrowing and lending networks.     

The institutional determinants of self-governance: a comment on Edward Stringham’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis>

Many pages would be require to discuss Private Governance’s important contributions, so I focus on a relatively minor flaw: chapter 9 on moral beliefs is inconsistent with Stringham’s general treatment of private governance institutions as endogenous. Moral beliefs are essentially depicted as unchanging, but they actually are endogenous too. Individuals can pursue wealth through cooperative interaction, which requires trust, creating incentives to develop beliefs that encourage ethical and benevolent behavior. Alternatively wealth can be taken from others through force and/or guile. Beliefs to facilitate involuntary transfers also are institutionalized. For instance, in order to benefit from coercive wealth transfers “in good conscience,” recipients have incentives to see their victims as enemies to justify a moral “right” to transfers. Changing moral beliefs is costly, however, so they tend to be fixed in the short term. Once it becomes apparent that existing beliefs significantly conflict with an individual’s interests, she is forced to question those beliefs. The impetus for rationalizing new beliefs arises. The direction of evolution can be predicted with a rational decision-making model. To illustrate the endogeneity of moral beliefs, three institutional settings are examined: “dignity culture,” “honor culture,” and “victimhood culture”.     

信任及其解释:来自中国的跨省调查分析

“信任”被普遍认为是除物质资本和人力资本之外决定一个国家经济增长和社会进步的主要社会资本。华人社会在许多跨文化研究中被认为是低信任度的社会 ,而在国内 ,许多学者已用“信任危机”概括人与人关系的现状。本文试图通过中国跨省的信任调查数据 ,揭示信任对一个地区的经济绩效 ,例如企业规模、企业发展速度、引进外资等的影响 ,进一步分析影响信任的因素。我们的发现表明 ,一个地区能否被人们所信任与地域文化并不紧密相关 ,更重要的是跟人们之间的交易被重复的可能性、交易的发达程度、教育水平等因素有关。这些证据支持了经济学理论中关于重复博弈导致信任的基本假说。     

员工的信任结构与知识共享

信任是员工在组织内实现知识共享的重要心理机制。本文通过对208个样本的基于认知的普遍信任和基于组织成员身份的组织信任的测量,证明了普遍信任与组织信任相互独立并存在一定程度的相关。通过回归分析,普遍信任中性善认知因素、组织信任中组织行为信任因素对于员工知识共享的意愿与行为有着更高程度的影响。从一个角度说明中国人不仅不缺乏普遍信任,而且与他人共享知识的行为也不完全以“情感关系”为特征。     

Breaking the norm: An empirical investigation into the unraveling of good behavior

We present results from an artefactual field experiment conducted in rural Peru that considers whether observing non-reciprocal behavior influences an individual's decision to reciprocate. Specifically, we consider the behavior of second movers in a trust game, assessing whether their decision to reciprocate is influenced by the observed reciprocity of others. In documenting the impact of an external shock to observed reciprocity, this paper shows that small increases in non-reciprocal behavior result in an unraveling of the norm of reciprocity. Survey data is used to explore mechanisms by which this occurred. Results are not consistent with learning effects, suggesting that preferences may be changed by observing others deviating from a norm of reciprocity. These results suggest that investing in encouraging trustworthy behavior can have large benefits in situations where individuals are observing each other's behavior, such as may be the case in a new market institution.     

Promises and lies: can observers detect deception in written messages

We design a laboratory experiment to examine predictions of trustworthiness in a novel three-person trust game. We investigate whether and why observers of the game can predict the trustworthiness of hand-written communications. Observers report their perception of the trustworthiness of messages, and make predictions about the senders’ behavior. Using observers’ decisions, we are able to classify messages as “promises” or “empty talk.” Drawing from substantial previous research, we hypothesize that certain factors influence whether a sender is likely to honor a message and/or whether an observer perceives the message as likely to behonored: the mention of money; the use of encompassing words; and message length. We find that observers have more trust in longer messages and “promises”; promises that mention money are significantly more likely to be broken; and observers trust equally in promises that do and do not mention money. Overall, observers perform slightly better than chance at predicting whether a message will be honored. We attribute this result to observers’ ability to distinguish promises from empty talk, and to trust promises more than empty talk. However, within each of these two categories, observers are unable to discern between messages that senders will honor from those that they will not.     

It takes two to cheat: An experiment on derived trust

Social life offers innumerable instances in which trust decisions involve multiple agents. Of particular interest is the case when a breach of trust is not profitable if carried out in isolation, but requires an agreement among agents. In such situations the pattern of behaviors is richer than in dyadic games, because even opportunistic trustees who would breach trust when alone may act trustworthily based on what they believe to be the predominant course of action. Anticipating this, trusters may be more inclined to trust. We dub these motivations derived trustworthiness and derived trust. To capture them, we design a “Collective Trust Game” and study it by means of a laboratory experiment. We report that overall levels of trustworthiness are almost thirty percentage points higher when derived motivations are present, and this generates also higher levels of trust. In our set-up, the effects of derived trustworthiness are comparable in size to positive reciprocity, and more important than concerns for equality.     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

Do reputation feedback systems really improve trust among anonymous traders? An experimental study

Feedback systems are claimed to be a crucial component of the success of electronic marketplaces like eBay or Amazon Marketplace. This article aims to compare the effects of various feedback systems on trust between anonymous traders, through a set of experiments based on the trust game. Our results indicate that trust is significantly improved by the introduction of a reputation feedback system. However, such mechanisms are far from being perfect and are vulnerable to strategic ratings and reciprocation. Our findings indicate that some changes in rating rules may significantly improve the efficiency of feedback systems, by avoiding strategic rating or reciprocation, and hence stimulate trust and trustworthiness among traders. In particular, a system in which individuals are not informed of their partner's rating decision before making their own decision provides better results, both in terms of trust and earnings.     

The Influence of Others on Migration Plans

The willingness to migrate and locational choice may be influenced by others’ choices or plans, particularly if the “other people,” such as family and friends, are migrants, former migrants, or potential migrants themselves. We examine the roles “other people” play in influencing an individual’s potential migration decision. In analyzing the influence of others on migration decisions, we rely on the concepts of migration networks and herd effects.     

网络环境下消费者信任影响因素研究———以产品类型为调节变量

信任已成为电子商务研究领域的重要议题。本研究通过对文献的梳理发现,已有研究主要源自社会交换理论、期望－确认理论、合理行动理论、计划行为理论与科技接受模式5种理论基础,理论基础的差异致使在消费者信任影响因素的研究成果中存在重复与分歧。本文以一个新的视角对已有研究成果进行整合,构建出一个理论模型,并获得实证支持。其中,信任的影响因素被划分为感知网站投入、声誉及信任倾向,信任本身被划分为信任信念与信任意图。该模型被证明是一个有完全中介效应的调节变量,即感知网站投入、声誉及信任倾向都完全通过信任信念的中介作用对信任意图产生显著的正向影响,而这一影响过程会受到产品类型的调节：在购买高涉入－理性类产品时,感知网站投入与声誉都对消费者的信任意图发挥着重要的影响,在购买低涉入－理性类产品时,消费者更愿意依照自己的信任倾向做出决策。     

FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PROVISION: DOES TRUST MATTER?

Ecosystem service provision in agriculture may require cooperation between farmers. Trust fosters cooperation in many economic and social interactions and is important to the success of traditional agricultural cooperatives. Little is known about how trust affects farmers’ willingness to cooperate to provide an ecosystem service, what types of trust are most important, and under what conditions trust may matter. In this study, we present results of a survey of Missouri crop farmers exploring the role trust plays in farmers’ stated willingness to cooperate to control pests. We find that most farmers say they are willing to cooperate, and most farmers are willing to trust others. However, we find little evidence that trust positively influences farmers’ willingness to cooperate to control pests. Instead, we find that trust may only matter under certain conditions, such as when participants’ farms are dissimilar, and that other determinants, such as the perceived benefit of cooperation and environmental concern, are more important than trust to farmers who are contemplating cooperation to control pests.     

Increases in trust and altruism from partner selection: Experimental evidence

This paper examines how selection affects trust and altruism in a Trust and Modified Dictator Game. Past Trust and Dictator game experiments not allowing partner selection show substantially more trust and altruism than equilibrium predicts. We predict partner selection will cause sorting in which behavior across partner types without selection will be positively correlated with partner choice. This selection pattern will cause trust and altruism to be higher with selection and the increase will be proportional to a maximum possible gain. We find selection has all these effects. We also find greater gains in the Trust than Modified Dictator game consistent with larger possible gains in the Trust game. The results imply that theories ignoring selection will underestimate trust and altruism in markets with selection.     

Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence

Can a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerge among strangers? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects repeatedly play a two-player binary “trust” game. Players are randomly and anonymously paired with one another in each period. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (anonymous community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and whether that information must be provided freely or at some cost. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information.     

The Uncertainty of Academic Rent and Income Inequality: The OECD Panel Evidence

The article presents an alternative view on the education—income inequality relationship, which calls into question the neoclassical claim that education increases labor productivity and hence contributes to a higher output, wage and consequently more even income distribution. In the context of public policies, education needs to be seen not only as a factor of income mobility, but also as a “positional good,” which benefits graduates at the expense of non-graduates. Education generates “academic rent,” by which we mean uneven remuneration of workers based on academic signs of distinctions that do not necessarily reflect differences in productivity. Using the robust panel model on a sample of OECD (Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development) countries from 1980 to 2015, we show that investments in human capital lead to lower inequality, but overinvestments tends to increase income inequality, which may be related to academic rent. In discussing this result, we consider that uncertainty of academic rent under the condition of a rapid transformation of the workplace caused by the fourth industrial revolution.     

Reciprocity under moral wiggle room: Is it a preference or a constraint?

We analyze reciprocal behavior when moral wiggle room exists. Dana et al. (Econ Theory 33(1):67–80, 2007) show that giving in a dictator game is inconsistent with distributional preferences as the giving rate drops when situational excuses for selfish behavior are provided. Our binary trust game closely follows their design. Only a preceding stage (safe outside option vs. enter the game) is added in order to introduce reciprocity. We find significantly lower rates of selfish choices in the trust baseline in comparison to our treatments that feature moral wiggle room manipulations and a dictator baseline. It seems that reciprocal behavior is not only due to people liking to reciprocate but also because they feel obliged to do so.     

Introduction: Reform in the Provision of Health Care

The term “sustainable consumption” is subject to many interpretations, from Agenda 21's hopeful assertion that governments should encourage less materialistic lifestyles based on new definitions of “wealth” and “prosperity”, to the view prevalent in international policy discourse that green and ethical consumerism will be sufficient to transform markets to produce continual and “clean” economic growth. These different perspectives are examined using a conceptual framework derived from Cultural Theory, to illustrate their fundamentally competing beliefs about the nature of the environment and society, and the meanings attached to consumption. Cultural Theory argues that societies should develop pluralistic policies to include all perspectives. Using this framework, the paper examines the UK strategy for sustainable consumption, and identifies a number of failings in current policy. These are that the UK strategy is strongly biased towards individualistic, market-based and neo-liberal policies, so it can only respond to a small part of the problem of unsustainable consumption. Policy recommendations include measures to strengthen the input from competing cultures, to realize the potential for more collective, egalitarian and significantly less materialistic consumption patterns.