Respecting entitlements in legislative bargaining: A matter of preference or necessity?

We investigate whether fairness concerns overrule strategic behaviour in legislative bargaining with entitlements. In a lab experiment, we vary bargaining power by using either majority rule or dictator rule to implement a division. We apply coarse measures in order to assess whether entitlements are respected. Our results show that with experience over one third of proposers make “extreme” offers, assigning at most 10% of the surplus to partners whose consent is not needed under the respective rule. Having observed extreme outcomes in the past increases the likelihood of own extreme proposals. Overall, we find significant limitations in the acknowledgment for others' entitlements, in particular for groups in which individual contributions differ.     

Same process,different outcomes: group performance in an acquiring a company experiment

It is still an open question when groups perform better than individuals in intellective tasks. We report that in an Acquiring a Company game, what prevailed when there was disagreement among group members was the median proposal and not the best proposal. This aggregation rule explains why groups underperformed with respect to a “truth wins” benchmark and why they performed better than individuals deciding in isolation in a simple version of the task but worse in the more difficult version. Implications are drawn on when to employ groups rather than individuals in decision making.     

Mapping the theory of political representation to the empirics: An investigation for proportional and majoritarian rules

We combine roll call votes and referendum decisions on identically worded legislative proposals to identify the effect of electoral rules on the way Swiss Members of Parliament (MPs) represent their constituents’ preferences. We exploit the fact that MPs in both Houses of Parliament are elected in the same electoral districts (the cantons). Yet, in the Lower House, MPs are elected using a proportional rule, while in the Upper House they are elected employing a majoritarian rule. We find that electoral rules matter strongly for political representation. The voting patterns of MPs are fully in line with three theoretical predictions regarding the influence of electoral rules on representation of constituents’ preferences: 1) The probability that a proportional-elected MP accepts a legislative proposal closely follows the share of voters that accept the proposal in the referendum. 2) In contrast, for majority-elected MPs the probability of acceptance is strongly increasing in the share of voter acceptance if the latter is close to the 50% threshold. 3) The estimated probability that an Upper House MP votes “yes” as a function of the share of voters voting “yes” in the referendum has an S-shape form with an inflection point close to 50%.     

The 100% money proposal and its implications for banking: the Currie–Fisher approach versus the Chicago Plan approach

The literature on the 100% money proposal often reveals some confusion when it comes to its implications for the banking sphere. We argue that this can be partly explained by a failure to have distinguished between two divergent approaches to the proposal: the “Currie–Fisher” (or “transaction”) approach, on the one hand, which would preserve banking; and the “Chicago Plan” (or “liquidity”) approach, on the other hand, which would abolish banking. This division among 100% money proponents stemmed, in particular, from different definitions of money, and different explanations of monetary instability. The present paper attempts to clarify this divergence of views.     

PREFERENCES UNDER IGNORANCE

A decision maker (DM) makes choices from different sets of alternatives. The DM is initially ignorant of the payoff associated with each alternative and learns these payoffs only after a large number of choices have been made. We show that, in the presence of an outside option, once payoffs are learned, the optimal choice rule from sets of alternatives can be rationalized by a DM with strict preferences over all alternatives. Under this model, the DM has preferences for preferences while being ignorant of what preferences are “right.”     

A formal psychological theory for evolutionary economics

The purpose of this paper is to seek to rise to the challenge posed by Harstad and Selten by providing a single unifying model of the psychological processes underlying the behaviour which drives the process of economic evolution. It seeks, in short, to make evolutionary economics yet more intellectually competitive. A self-contained account is given of a new model of the psychology of economic behaviour developed at the University of Queensland as part of the legacy of the Brisbane Club of evolutionary economists. Two results derived within this model are presented - the “Schumpeter” and “Made to Stick” theorems - and are used to elaborate the centrality of knowledge and its growth to the behaviour which drives evolutionary processes in the economy. A core contribution of this paper is to identify the way in which knowledge thus evolves. These are then used to elaborate explanations of evolutionary economic behaviour on both sides of the production-consumption dichotomy, in particular the manner in which the growth of knowledge may be facilitated by interpersonal interaction and particular conditions in the mind, or personality types. We discuss some relevant policy aspects of the model before concluding. The intention of this paper is to provide a basis for future research aiming to build a more coherent, more comprehensive and more simple view of the behaviour driving evolutionary dynamics.     

POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES

May's theorem shows that if the set of alternatives contains two members, an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule is positively responsive if and only if it is majority rule. We show that if the set of alternatives contains three or more alternatives only the rule that assigns to every problem its strict Condorcet winner satisfies the three conditions plus Nash's version of “independence of irrelevant alternatives” for the domain of problems that have strict Condorcet winners. We show also that no rule satisfies the four conditions for domains that are more than slightly larger.     

Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition

Sortition is the process of selecting decision makers or senators by a lottery. We introduce sortition in implementation theory by augmenting a mechanism with a kleroterion or lottery machine p that selects the senators. An outcome is implemented after consulting only the opinions of the senators. We call the corresponding notion of implementation as “p-implementation”, and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for p-implementation. Our main result is that in “economic” environments, every Nash implementable social choice rule (SCR) is also p-implementable if p selects every quartet of players with positive probability and always selects at least three senators. We apply this result to two kleroteria: “oligarchic democracy” and “random sampling”. In economic environments, every Nash implementable SCR can be implemented by oligarchic democracy of three oligarchs. In economic environments, every Nash implementable SCR can be implemented by randomly selecting four senators.     

Transplants and Implants: The Economics of Self‐Improvement

This article examines equilibrium self‐improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated—some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self‐improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self‐improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain “acceptable.” But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self‐improvement.     

What to stabilize in the open economy*

We consider the question how “best” to maintain price‐level stability in an open economy, and evaluate three possible policy choices: (a) a constant money growth rate rule; (b) a fixed exchange rate; and (c) a policy of explicit commitment to a price‐level target. In each case we assume that policy is conducted by injecting reserves into or withdrawing reserves from the “banking system.” In evaluating the three regimes, we adopt the criterion that the “best” policy should leave the least scope for indeterminacy and “excessive” economic volatility. In a steady‐state equilibrium, the choice of regime is largely irrelevant; any steady‐state equilibrium under one regime can be duplicated by an appropriate choice of the “control” variable under any other regime. However, we show that the sets of equilibria under the three regimes are dramatically different. When all countries follow the policy of fixing a constant rate of money growth, there are no equilibria displaying endogenously arising volatility and there is no indeterminacy of equilibrium. Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, indeterminacies and endogenously arising fluctuations are impossible if and only if the country with the low “reserve‐to‐deposit” ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate. Finally, when one country targets the time path of its price level, under very weak conditions, there will be indeterminacy of equilibrium and endogenously arising volatility driven by expectations.     

Suit the action to the word,the word to the action: Eliciting motives for trust and reciprocity by attitudinal and behavioural measures

Two important primitives of social capital are the disposition to trust and to reciprocate manifested in social life. In this paper, attitudinal and behavioural evidence is used to investigate the nature of the motivations underlying behaviour in Trust and Dictator games. In doing so, we have three aims. First, to find out whether, and to what extent, answers to a questionnaire about attitudes towards trust and civicness predict subjects’ behaviour. Second, to disentangle strategic from other-regarding motivations by comparing behaviour in Trust and Dictator Games. Third, to investigate to what extent a correspondence could be found between subjects’ attitudinal ‘type’ and their behaviour in the two interactive experimental settings. The paper builds on previous work in the area and in particular finds that using surveys to distinguish between the behavioural responses of different attitudinal types–“Trusting” or “Prudent” on the one hand and “Trustworthy” or “Untrustworthy” on the other, allows us to dig deeper into the underlying motivations of the experimental subjects. The self-declared trusting tend to manifest trust by investing more in the risky interaction than the prudent, and the self-declared trustworthy are inclined to return more than the untrustworthy. Moreover, the self-reported trustworthy and untrustworthy tend to manifest positive or negative reciprocity, respectively. The evidence suggests that the former are moved by the intention to reward and the latter by the desire to punish a stingy Sender by returning an even smaller amount than received. This seems to confirm the “multiple self” view (Elster, 1986), whereby in the personality of each individual many components–possibly distant in terms of the motivating sentiments–are gathered together.     

When is There a Unique Equilibrium in Less Structured Bargaining?

We study two-person complete-information bargaining games in a non-cooperative setting. The alternating-offers model in Rubinstein (1982) is modified so that players negotiate each time about who will make the next proposal. Under this rule, there are multiple equilibria and there can be a prolonged delay. The multiplicity and the possibility of delay remain either when offers have to be made alternately (under Restriction A) or when the players cannot increase their demands over time (under Restriction N). Only when both of these restrictions are imposed does the immediate settlement predicted by Rubinstein's original model emerge as the unique equilibrium.
JEL Classification Number: C78.     

The Exchange Rate and its Fundamentals in a Complex World

We develop a nonlinear exchange rate model with heterogeneous agents. Some agents adopt a “fundamentalist” forecasting rule, while others use a “chartist” forecasting rule. We show that the model is capable of explaining the empirical puzzles relating to exchange rate movements. In particular, the model explains the “exchange rate determination” and PPP puzzles, the excess volatility, and fat tails in exchange rate returns.     

Cost-effectiveness Analysis of Demand- and Supply-side Education Interventions: the Case of PROGRESA in Mexico

The paper is concerned with the issue of the most cost‐effective way of improving access to education for poor households in developing countries. The authors consider two alternatives: extensive expansion of the school system (i.e., bringing education to the poor), and subsidizing investment in education by the poor (i.e., bringing the poor to the education system). To this end, the authors evaluate PROGRESA, a large poverty‐alleviation program recently introduced in Mexico, which subsidizes education. Using double‐difference regression estimators on data collected before and after the program for randomly selected “control” and “treatment” households, the relative impacts of the demand‐ and supply‐side program components are estimated. Combining these estimates with cost information, it is found that the demand‐side subsidies are substantially more cost‐effective than supply‐side expansions.     

Committees with supermajority voting yield commitment with flexibility

A fundamental problem for government is how to combine commitment to certain policies with the flexibility required to adjust them when needed. Rogoff (1985) [Rogoff, K., 1985. The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target, Q. J. Econ. 100(4) 1169–1189] showed that a way to strike the right balance is to appoint an optimally “conservative” policy-maker. In real life, however, policy-makers also have power over decisions where optimal plans are time-consistent, so delegating to a conservative person could be undesirable. A flexible delegation device can be found in a large committee of randomly appointed members voting over policy after observing a shock. When facing dynamic inconsistency, under a single-crossing property, there exists a supermajority rule that implements the population median's optimally conservative policy-maker with certainty. Another single-crossing property guarantees that if simple majority voting is used to select the voting rule that will govern policy choice, the supermajority preferred by the median is chosen. For problems where dynamic inconsistency vanishes, the committee will choose to make decisions by simple majority, implementing median outcomes. An application to monetary policy is developed. We show that the optimal supermajority is higher when dynamic inconsistency is more severe, when preferences are more homogeneous, and when the economy is less volatile.     

Constitutional craftsmanship and the rule of law

Is “rule of law” anything more than a fictional allusion? After all, “law” is an abstract noun, and abstract nouns can’t rule. Only people can rule. The conceptual framework of constitutional political economy invokes a central distinction between choosing rules and playing within those rules. Claims on behalf of a rule of law require a sharp distinction between the enforcement of agreed-upon rules and arbitrary changes in those rules. This paper explores whether there are constitutional arrangements under which it could reasonably be claimed that governance reflects a deep level operation of a rule of law despite the surface level recognition that it is men who rule. With the exercise of rulership being a social process and not a matter of individual action, the network pattern through which rules are enforced takes on particular significance. In particular, polycentric architectures are generally more consistent with rule of law than monocentric architectures.     

Fiscal space on the eurozone periphery and the use of the (partially) balanced-budget multiplier: The case of Spain

This article adopts the “functional finance” approach to consider the utilization of expansive fiscal policies in the members of the European Monetary Union most affected by high unemployment. As they do not have their own monetary policy, fiscal deficits require the issuing of public debt without the support of the central bank. The authors consequently incorporate the notion of a (partially) balanced-budget expansion to achieve the desired stimulus in gross domestic product (GDP) with the least possible effect on public debt. Their proposal is only a sort of “imperfect” balanced-budget expansion: It is based on the idea that simultaneous increases in public revenue and expenditure can boost GDP, but without any pretension of keeping public deficit unchanged. Specifically, the authors use the case of Spain to show that a more expansive fiscal policy is desirable on economic grounds, and that only institutional constraints prevent it. They do it presenting two alternative scenarios for the coming years and analyzing their different impact on unemployment and fiscal sustainability. The first represents a firm commitment to budget consolidation, whereas the second is based on this “imperfect” application of the balanced budget multiplier. The main conclusion is that a more expansive fiscal policy is perfectly compatible with finance sustainability.     

Effectiveness of Weighted Majority Rules with Random Decision Power Distribution

There is a large body of research studying the conditions under which majority decisions are best. In particular, in many circumstances, the probability of a group to decide correctly is higher than that of a random subgroup. Moreover, the latter probability increases as the subgroup size grows. Here we generalize those results by showing that, in the same setup, the simple majority rule is the most effective of all weighted majority rules when weights are distributed randomly between group members. For special families of weighted majority rules, rule effectiveness increases as we get “closer” to the simple majority rule.