Cost behavior and executive bonus compensation

Prior literature provides compelling evidence of an asymmetric relation between executive bonus compensation and earnings performance. In particular, this literature reports that compensation committees assign greater weight to good (positive) earnings performance than poor (negative) earnings performance. Taken together, the prior literature provides strong support for critics who claim that compensation committees blindly protect executives from earnings underperformance. We further examine this issue by investigating whether a firm's cost behavior (i.e., the relation between expenses and sales) provides an explanation for the apparent inefficiency in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that executives are rewarded more for increases in ROA that arise from normal cost behavior than other increases in ROA consistent with these increases being perceived as more persistent. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship for decreases in ROA which suggests that executives are largely shielded from decreases in ROA that follow normal cost behavior. We examine two factors suggested by the prior literature, expected future sales and the extent of capacity utilization, which may provide an explanation for why executives are shielded from normal cost behavior decreases in ROA. When these additional factors are included in our empirical models, our evidence suggests that the asymmetric relation between changes in CEO bonus compensation and increases and decreases in earnings performance documented in prior literature goes away. That is, our results suggest that compensation committees do not blindly protect executives for earnings underperformance. On the contrary, our evidence suggests that these committees take into account other non-earnings information when deciding how much weight to give to a decrease in earnings and that executive compensation may not be as inefficient as suggested by prior research.     

我国金融类上市公司高管薪酬激励机制实证分析

采用面板数据模型对我国整体金融类上市公司高管薪酬进行分析,并以银行业作为子样本进行具体探讨,结果表明我国金融类上市公司高管薪酬形式单一且基本上与经营业绩相联系,为此,应对银行业的高管薪酬应加强监管。     

CEO Compensation and Fair Value Accounting: Evidence from Purchase Price Allocation

This study investigates the impact of CEO compensation structure on post‐acquisition purchase price allocation, an accounting procedure that involves fair value estimation of various assets and liabilities. We find that CEOs whose compensation packages rely more on earnings‐based bonuses are more likely to overallocate the purchase price to goodwill, the largest asset recorded post‐acquisition. Because goodwill is not amortized, the overallocation likely increases post‐acquisition earnings and bonuses. We also find that, when the acquirer's CEO bonus plan includes performance measures that are not affected, or are less affected, by the overstatement of goodwill, such as cash flows, sales, or earnings growth, the overallocation to goodwill motivated by bonus plans diminishes.     

Better sales networks

Anyone in sales will tell you that social networks are critical. The more contacts you have, the more leads you'll generate, and, ultimately, the more sales you'll make. But that's a vast oversimplification. Different configurations of networks produce different results, and the salesperson who develops a nuanced understanding of social networks will outshine competitors. The salesperson's job changes over the course of the selling process. Different abilities are required in each stage of the sale: identifying prospects, gaining buy-in from potential customers, creating solutions, and closing the deal. Success in the first stage, for instance, depends on the salesperson acquiring precise and timely information about opportunities from contacts in the marketplace. Closing the deal requires the salesperson to mobilize contacts from prior sales to act as references. Managers often view sales networks only in terms of direct contacts. But someone who knows lots of people doesn't necessarily have an effective network because networks often pay off most handsomely through indirect contacts. Moreover, the density of the connections in a network is important. Do a salesperson's contacts know all the same people, or are their associates widely dispersed? Sparse networks are better, for example, at generating unique information. Managers can use three levers--sales force structure, compensation, and skills development--to encourage salespeople to adopt a network-based view and make the best possible use of social webs. For example, the sales force can be restructured to decouple lead generation from other tasks because some people are very good at building diverse ties but not so good at maintaining other kinds of networks. Companies that take steps of this kind to help their sales teams build better networks will reap tremendous advantages.     

Motivating salespeople: what really works

No sales force consists entirely of stars; sales staffs are usually made up mainly of solid perfomers, with smaller groups of laggards and rainmakers. Though most compensation plans approach these three groups as if they were the same, research shows that each is motivated by something different. By accounting for those differences in their incentive programs, companies can coax better performance from all their salespeople. As the largest cadre, core performers typically represent the greatest opportunity, but they're often ignored by incentive plans. Contests with prizes that vary in nature and value (and don't all go to stars) will inspire them to ramp up their efforts, and tiered targets will guide them up the performance curve. Laggards need quarterly bonuses to stay on track; when they have only annual bonuses, their revenues will drop 10%, studies show. This group is also motivated by social pressure-especially from new talent on the sales bench. Stars tend to get the most attention in comp plans, but companies often go astray by capping their commissions to control costs. If firms instead remove commission ceilings and pay extra for overachievement, they'll see the sales needle really jump. The key is to treat sales compensation not as an expense to rein in but as a portfolio of investments to manage. Companies that do this will be rewarded with much higher returns.     

Compensation contracts and fire sales

This paper analyzes the impact of remuneration practices on banks’ risk-taking in a model with fire sales externalities. When these externalities are not internalized by a bank's shareholders and executives, borrowing and fire sales are higher than the socially optimal level. Our analysis shows that plain-vanilla equity fails to internalize fire sales externalities. Deferred equity and long-term bonuses unrelated to short-term profits can restore social efficiency. Bail-in bonds can achieve efficiency at a smaller cost since they allow for state-contingent payments. It is not the level but the composition of variable compensation that determines the inefficiency. Excessive regulation may lead to suboptimal levels of risk-taking. Government guarantees reinforce the fire sales externalities and the need for regulation.     

The informativeness and ability of independent multi-firm directors

Motivated by SEC regulations requiring a majority of independent directors on corporate boards, we examine director informativeness and ability by observing the trading performance of independent directors who serve on multiple boards. As a proxy for informativeness, we find positive trading performance relative to purchases and sales. More impressive, these performance opportunities appear to be available to market participants who observe directors' Form 4 trades. We do not find evidence that diversification motives or busyness affects director trading performance. On the other hand, we do find that audit and compensation committee memberships enhance director trading performance on the sales side but that committee membership does not affect the profitability of director purchases. In comparison, multi-firm directors out-perform single-firm directors and this performance differential seems to be more attributable to superior ability than to better information.     

Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation

We examine how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in continental Europe affects the contractual usefulness of accounting information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay‐performance sensitivity (PPS) and relative performance evaluation (RPE). The empirical evidence indicates a weak increase in accounting‐based PPS in the post‐adoption period, primarily driven by countries with large differences between IFRS and their previously adopted local accounting standards. We also document a significant increase in accounting‐based RPE using foreign peers after the adoption. Additional analysis shows that the increase in RPE is greater for firms with more foreign sales, and for those with lower availability of domestic peers of comparable size. The overall results are consistent with the compensation committees in those countries perceiving earnings after IFRS adoption to be of higher quality and comparability. Our paper highlights an important benefit of IFRS largely ignored by the literature, that is, the higher earnings quality and comparability brought by the adoption of IFRS facilitate executive compensation contracting.     

Financial crisis and bank executive incentive compensation

We study the executive compensation structure in 14 of the largest U.S. financial institutions during 2000–2008. We focus on the CEO's purchases and sales of their bank's stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital losses these CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008. We consider three measures of risk-taking by these banks. Our results are mostly consistent with and supportive of the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010), that is, managerial incentives matter — incentives generated by executive compensation programs are correlated with excessive risk-taking by banks. Also, our results are generally not supportive of the conclusions of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) that the poor performance of banks during the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk. We recommend that bank executive incentive compensation should only consist of restricted stock and restricted stock options — restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years after their last day in office. The above incentive compensation proposal logically leads to a complementary proposal regarding a bank's capital structure, namely, banks should be financed with considerably more equity than they are being financed currently.     

Changes in earnings announcement tone and insider sales

The evidence from prior literature suggests that insider trading is related to firms' reported financial results and disclosure choices. I contribute to the literature by examining the association between narrative disclosure in earnings announcements and insider trading. Specifically, I hypothesize and find a positive association between changes in the optimistic tone of earnings announcements and CEOs' subsequent equity sales. In addition, I hypothesize and find that this relation is mitigated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and litigation risk. CEOs' financial gain from selling equity after more optimistic earnings announcements is small relative to their total compensation.     

Information Production, Insider Trading, and the Role of Managerial Compensation

We analyze the information production decision of a manager who can trade on this information and whose compensation is increasing in the stock price. The amount of information produced increases with the stock's volatility and liquidity and decreases with the manager's pay-performance sensitivity. Insider trading regulations that symmetrically inhibit the manager's ability to buy and sell stock cause her to produce less information. But asymmetric insider trading regulations like the short sales prohibition have an ambiguous effect inducing her to produce more or less information depending on her pay-performance sensitivity. This contradicts the standard argument made by opponents of insider trading regulations that such regulations always reduce information production.     

The timeliness of performance information in determining executive compensation

We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO) throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important to CEOs.     

How right should the customer be?

If your salespeople aren't sure who their boss is--the district manager? the regional manager? the customer?--it could be a sign that your company's sales force controls are working at cross-purposes and that your sales function is in trouble. Sales force controls are the policies and practices that govern the way you train, supervise, motivate, and evaluate your sales staff. They include the types of compensation you offer your people and the criteria your sales managers use to evaluate the reps' performance. These controls let salespeople know which trade-offs the company would prefer them to make when the inevitable conflicts arise between what they want to do (spend lots of time and money to get a sale) and what they actually can do (use limited resources and still get the sale). When sales force controls aren't aligned--when, say, the system simultaneously encourages reps to be entrepreneurial but also to file detailed call reports and check in frequently with their bosses--individuals become discouraged and unproductive, and they eventually leave the company. The authors' research suggests there are significant differences between the control systems of companies that encourage salespeople to put the customer first-outcome control (OC) systems--and those that encourage reps to put their managers first--behavior control (BC) systems. In this article, they list the characteristics of OC and BC systems, describe the potential fallout from conflicts within these systems, and explain how you can tell which control system is appropriate for your firm. In most cases, the right choice will be a consistent system somewhere in the middle of the OC-BC continuum.     

What Public Companies Can Learn from Private Equity Pay Plans

Studies of private equity pay, including one by current SEC commissioner Robert Jackson, have pointed to restrictions on equity sales as a key difference between private equity and public company pay. In this article, the author argues that there is another very important difference: equity compensation in PE pay plans is typically front loaded, with top executives of portfolio companies often required to buy shares, and receiving upfront option grants on three times the number of shares they purchase. Such front‐loaded equity compensation allows PE pay plans to avoid the unintended effects of the “competitive pay policy” that have been embraced by public companies for the past 50 years. Competitive pay—targeted, for example, to provide 50th percentile total compensation regardless of past performance—has the effect of creating a systematic “performance penalty,” rewarding poor performance with more shares and penalizing superior performance with fewer shares. The author's research shows that, for public companies during the past decade or so, the number of shares granted has fallen by 7% for each 10% increase in share prices—and that, primarily for this reason, the front loaded option grants used by PE firms have provided five times more incentive (“pay leverage”) than the average public company's annual series of equity grants. What's more, to the extent that PE pay has been guided by partnership and fixed‐sharing concepts rather than competitive pay, it is the spiritual heir to the value‐sharing concepts that guided public company pay in the first half of the 20th century. For 60 years, General Motors used value sharing in “economic profit”—10% of GM's profit above a 7% return on capital was the formula for the bonus pool for many years—as the basis for all incentive compensation. The author uses the GM history to highlight four ways to improve public company incentives and corporate governance.     

Understanding what your sales manager is up against

Every year, the research firm CSO Insights publishes the results of its Sales Performance Optimization survey, an online questionnaire given to more than 1,000 sales executives worldwide that seeks to examine the effectiveness of key sales practices and metrics. In this article, two partners from CSO provide the 2005 and 2006 survey highlights, which describe the challenges today's sales organizations face and how they're responding. An overall theme is the degree to which the buy cycle has gotten out of sync with the sell cycle. Buyers have always had a buy cycle, starting at the point they perceive a need. Sellers have always had a sales cycle, starting at the point they spot a prospect. Traditionally, the two have dovetailed--either because the seller created the buyer's perception of need or because the buyer pursued a need by contacting a salesperson (often for product information). Now the buy cycle is often well under way before the seller is even aware there is a cycle--in part because of the information asymmetry created by the Internet. The implications for managing a sales organization are profound in that sales training must now address how reps handle an environment in which buyers have more knowledge than they do. The authors offer evidence that sales executives are taking--and should take--aggressive action to train and retain sales talent, manage the sales process, and use sales support technologies to meet the challenges of this new environment.     

Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues

In their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation , the authors of this article provided a comprehensive critique of U.S. executive pay practices and the corporate governance processes that produce them, and then offered a number of proposals for improving both pay and governance. This article presents an overview of their analysis and proposals.
The authors' analysis suggests that the pay-setting process in U.S. public companies has strayed far from the economist's model of "arm's-length contracting" between executives and boards in a competitive labor market. In place of this conventional model, which is standard in corporate law as well as economics, the authors argue that managerial power and influence play a major role in shaping executive pay, and in ways that end up imposing significant costs on investors and the economy.
The main concern is not the levels of executive pay, but rather the distortion of incentives caused by compensation practices that fail to tie pay to performance and to limit executives' ability to sell their shares. Also troubling are "the correlation between power and pay, the systematic use of compensation practices that obscure the amount and performance insensitivity of pay, and the showering of gratuitous benefits on departing executives."
To address these problems, the authors propose three kinds of changes:

• 1)

  increases in transparency , accomplished in part by new SEC rules requiring annual corporate disclosure that provides "the dollar value of all forms of compensation" (including "stealth compensation" in the form of pensions and other post-retirement benefits) and an analysis of the relationship between the past year's pay and performance, as well as more timely and informative disclosure of insider stock purchases and sales;

       
  
  

The sales learning curve

When a company launches a new product into a new market, the temptation is to immediately ramp up sales force capacity to gain customers as quickly as possible. But hiring a full sales force too early just causes the firm to burn through cash and fail to meet revenue expectations. Before it can sell an innovative product efficiently, the entire organization needs to learn how customers will acquire and use it, a process the authors call the sales learning curve. The concept of a learning curve is well understood in manufacturing. Employees transfer knowledge and experience back and forth between the production line and purchasing, manufacturing, engineering, planning, and operations. The sales learning curve unfolds similarly through the give-and-take between the company--marketing, sales, product support, and product development--and its customers. As customers adopt the product, the firm modifies both the offering and the processes associated with making and selling it. Progress along the manufacturing curve is measured by tracking cost per unit: The more a firm learns about the manufacturing process, the more efficient it becomes, and the lower the unit cost goes. Progress along the sales learning curve is measured in an analogous way: The more a company learns about the sales process, the more efficient it becomes at selling, and the higher the sales yield. As the sales yield increases, the sales learning process unfolds in three distinct phases--initiation, transition, and execution. Each phase requires a different size--and kind--of sales force and represents a different stage in a company's production, marketing, and sales strategies. Adjusting those strategies as the firm progresses along the sales learning curve allows managers to plan resource allocation more accurately, set appropriate expectations, avoid disastrous cash shortfalls, and reduce both the time and money required to turn a profit.     

线上销售与未来股票收益

本文通过分析相关上市公司在电商平台的线上销售数据,发现线上销售增长可以预测未来股票收益。根据线上销售增长率构建投资组合可以获得月均1.27%的超额收益,经三因子、五因子模型调整后收益率分别为1.40%和1.35%,并且该超额收益在较长时间内不会逆转。横截面回归结果显示,线上销售增长与未来股票收益显著正相关,并在控制其他市场异象因子后仍然显著。此外,本文还发现线上销售数据的预测能力主要集中在投资者关注有限、线上销售占比高以及套利成本高的公司,其投资价值来源于对公司未来基本面信息的预测能力。进一步研究表明,同时利用线上销售指标和营业收入指标进行投资可以获得更高的超额收益。在考虑业绩预告和业绩快报对线上销售指标预测能力的潜在影响后,结果依然稳健。     

Can third-party online sales disclosure help reduce earnings management? Evidence from China

Alternative data plays an increasingly important role in investment and commodities market analysis. This study empirically investigates the effect on earnings management of disclosure of third-party online sales as a type of alternative data. We show that earnings management is reduced with the public disclosure of a firm’s third-party online sales data in a well-known Chinese financial database. Our results are robust to a series of endogeneity corrections and robustness checks. We also find that the negative association between third-party online sales disclosure and earnings management is more pronounced in firms with an opaque external information environment, weaker corporate governance, a higher proportion of online sales relative to total sales, and when sales are more likely to be the target of manipulation. Our results indicate that third-party online sales disclosure reduces earnings management by decreasing its benefits and increasing the risk of its detection. Our findings yield important implications for regulators and policy makers.     

The predictive ability of entity-wide geographic sales disclosures: IAS 14R versus IFRS 8

This report examines the predictive value of geographic revenue disclosures under IFRS 8 in forecasting company revenues using four forecast models. The findings show that the predictive accuracy of IFRS 8 entity-wide geographic sales significantly outperform consolidated sales in forecasting consolidated sales one year out. The results indicate that the predictive ability of country specific entity wide geographic sales improves on average by six percent when geographic sales are reported for country of domicile or by each individually material country. The study also finds that geographic sales disclosures by companies located in countries with high and moderate enforcement regimes improve the predictive accuracy of geographic sales by five percent. These results provide evidence that the disclosure of finer geographic sales data is more decision useful and associated with improved predictive accuracy for large listed companies in Europe, Australia and New Zealand.