On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5], [6] and [7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.     

中国农村金融资源配置的区域效率比较

采用数据包络分析（DEA）方法对全国各地区的农村金融资源配置效率作整体的评价和比较。分析表明：影响东部地区农村金融资源配置效率的主要是制度建设和管理水平的滞后,规模效率是阻碍西部金融资源配置效率的主要障碍。各地区在加大金融支农投入的同时,提高农村金融资源配置效率才是改善农村金融环境的重点。     

不确定性、经济选择方式与资源配置效率

在充分分析行为人信息处理能力局限性的前提下,结合心理因素提出了行为人选择中的非对称序贯决策与行为中的试验性动机,非对称序贯决策最基本的功能包括两个方面,一是行为人主观概率判断的改善,另一是基于不确定程度变化的风险有效控制;试验性动机最显著的特点是,行为人以可接受的成本为代价,通过试探性过程的实践学习,达到降低不确定性程度,并以此实现追求确定性收益最大化的目的。以试验性动机为前提的非对称序贯决策,在资源配置上虽不一定是最优的,但其与竞争性市场的结合却是相对有效的;同时,正是人类的这种试验性动机,构成了经济进步的原动力。     

Culture-related differences in process efficiency in corporations as a competitive factor

This paper focuses on cultural influences on the effectiveness of organizational processes in companies. At this time, there is a predominant emphasis on culture-related differences of processes and workflows in companies in the main body of articles on cross-cultural management research. This paper proposes an extension of these research efforts in that case that the different efficiencies of these processes, resulting from cultural influences, should be examined in more detail. Based on the beginnings of organizational theory and with practical examples, it has been already verified that cultural influences shape organizational structures as well as organizational processes. This kind of fact should lead to the assumption that these cultural influences should also create differences in their efficiency, depending on what kind of culture the companies are. These differences in efficiency can be regarded as opportunities for success from which further competitive advantages can be derived. As that the examination of differences in efficiency of processes is still a rarity in the field of cross-cultural management research this should be developed further.     

Trade openness and the informational efficiency of emerging stock markets

This paper examines the empirical link between trade openness and the informational efficiency of stock markets in 23 developing countries. Our fixed effects panel regression results document a significant negative relation between trade openness and stock return autocorrelations only when the de facto measure is used. On this basis, we argue that a greater level of de facto trade openness is associated with a higher degree of informational efficiency in these emerging stock markets because the former signals higher future firm profitability, and investors tend to react faster to information when there is less uncertainty about a firm's future earnings or cash flows. Further analyses find no significant association between the extent of financial openness and the degree of informational efficiency.     

A note on the informational efficiency of Austrian economic forecasts

Zusammenfassung Aus der rationalen Erwartungshypothese abgeleitete Kriterien werden dazu verwendet, sieben regelmäßig veröffentlichte Prognosereihen des Österreichischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung auf effiziente Informationsverarbeitung zu testen. Die Arbeit diskutiert zuerst die Beziehung zwischen den Konzepten Optimale Prognose und Rationale Erwartungen und beschreibt daran anschließend die verwendeten Testverfahren. Besondere Beachtung finden mögliche Schwierigkeiten bei der Anwendung der Tests. Für drei der sieben getesteten Prognosereihen muß die Hypothese der Informationseffizienz verworfen werden. Als Erklärung für diese Ergebnisse wird auf die Möglichkeit hingewiesen, daß Prognosehersteller zu pessimistischen Einschätzungen der Wirtschaftsentwicklung tendieren oder, technisch ausgedrückt, asymmetrische Verlustfunktionen besitzen. Die Arbeit schließt mit einem Plädoyer für die Erweiterung der traditionellen Genauigkeits-und Treffsicherheitsanalysen von Prognosen durch Tests auf Informationseffizienz. Nur diese Tests berücksichtigen die stochastischen Eigenschaften der zu prognostizierenden Variablen, was für die Beurteilung der Prognosegüte jedoch von entscheidender Bedeutung sein kann.

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I am indebted to several persons for helpful comments on earlier versions of this note. Obstinate but always constructive criticism by K. Neusser is gratefully acknowledged. The usual proviso applies.     

Expectations equilibrium and informational efficiency for stochastic environments

This paper studies the existence of expectations equilibria for message processes on stochastic exchange environments. A message process which permits the general existence of expectations equilibria is termed admissible. The main results are: (1) Every admissible process satisfies a weakened version of the Hurwicz “privacy” condition. (2) The competitive process is admissible, and has a message space of locally minimal size among admissible nonwasteful processes. (3) The only admissible condensations of the competitive process are constant functions.     

On the informational size of message spaces

In a recent paper, Mount and Reiter established that, in a certain sense, the competitive mechanism is an “informationally most efficient” procedure for allocating resources. This result, of course, depends upon the way in which we characterize the notion of informational efficiency. Several alternative characterizations, and the relationships among them, are given here, and it is shown under which characterizations the above result is true, and under which it is false. It is shown that there is an intuitively appealing “best” characterization for which it is true.     

On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions

We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory-price auctions in a common value setting where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. We show that the average price paid in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. We show that conditional on a signal that falls below a threshold, a bidder bids no more than the expected value of an object conditional on the signal and winning; while conditional on any signal that lies above the threshold the bid is strictly lower than the expected value conditional on the signal and winning.     

Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand

We study resource allocation with multi-unit demand, such as the allocation of courses to students. In contrast to the case of single-unit demand, no stable mechanism, not even the (student-proposing) deferred acceptance algorithm, achieves desirable properties: it is not strategy-proof and the resulting allocation is not even weakly efficient under submitted preferences. We characterize the priority structure of courses over students under which stability is consistent with strategy-proofness or efficiency. We show that stability is compatible with strategy-proofness or efficiency if and only if the priority structure is essentially homogeneous. This result suggests that efficient allocation under multi-unit demand is difficult and that the use of stable mechanisms may not deliver desirable outcomes.     

A DEA model for resource allocation

This paper concerns inverse DEA. The aim is to estimate input/output levels of a given Decision Making Unit (DMU) when some or all of its input/output levels are changed, under preserving the efficiency index. We show that in the case of estimating increased required input vector when the output vector is increased, the current method which uses weakly efficient solution of the relevant multiple objective optimization problem may fail. We propose some sufficient conditions for input estimation.     

Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns

We study the possibility of designing a decentralized resource allocation mechanism that yields optimal solutions in economies with increasing returns. After a brief review of the mechanisms already designed to cope with nonconvexities, we find out that either they fail to provide efficient solutions in Koopmans' sense, or else they use extremely complex messages. The question arises whether it is possible to define a nonwasteful and privacy-preserving mechanism over a class of environments with increasing returns using finite-dimensional vectors as messages. We show that the answer is no.     

Industrial incentives,domestic resource costs and resource allocation in Madagascar

This paper uses 104 episodes from the Hufbauer et al. (1985, 1990) dataset to examine the correlates of classes of outcomes of economic sanctions. The parsimonious equations presented identify the characteristics of sanctions episodes conducive to success rather than marginal success, and the characteristics productive of failure rather than marginal failure. Failure is most likely if there is significant third party assistance to the target, and if the pre-existing trade linkage between sender and target is small. Success is most easily achieved when the objective is not classified as 'modest', and when pre-sanction relations between sender and target are cordial or neutral. The equations presented overcome data and methodological flaws of earlier studies, exhibit reasonable predictive accuracy, and satisfy a battery of tests of statistical significance, hypothesized coefficient sign, goodness of fit, high likelihood and informational efficiency.     

A competitive partnership formation process

A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.