Self-selecting tariffs under pure preferences among tariffs

The behavioral assumptions for welfare analysis of self-selecting tariffs are generalized to be consistent with those maintained in empirical models of tariff choice. When customers have pure preferences among tariffs, it is shown that the optimal self-selecting tariffs provide strictly greater welfare than mandatory marginal cost prices, contain marginal prices that do not equal marginal cost, and can Pareto dominate an existing tariff. As an illustration of the theoretical results, optimal self-selecting tariffs are calculated empirically for a local telephone company.     

Multiproduct tariffs

Necessary conditions characterizing optimal nonlinear multiproduct tariffs are derived from aggregate data about customers' responses to linear tariffs. These conditions are amenable to numerical solution with standard software by using a discrete formulation of an associated nonlinear optimization problem cast in terms of the marginal prices charged for incremental bundles. This approach avoids integrability restrictions that otherwise encumber the computations. However, this method does not ensure that customers' second-order conditions for optimality of their demands are satisfied. Some numerical examples are provided, and the extension of the method to Ramsey pricing is also demonstrated.     

On tariffs and smuggling

The purpose of this paper is to show that if a country wants to eliminate smuggling, it may have to increase rather than decrease the tariff. This paradoxical case could take place if the country in question is large and the foreign elasticity of demand for imports is inelastic.     

Environmental tariffs on polluting imports

This paper examines the implications for the use of trade measures as weapons to address global environmental concerns. There are already proposals in the U.S. senate to impose an environmental tariff against foreign nations whose cost advantages stem from less stringent environmental standards than the U.S. The paper argues that trade policy measures typically are not the first best instruments for achieving environmental objectives. Even theoretically they could be shown to be welfare improving only under a very narrow range of circumstances. Their use in place of more efficient policy instruments may not only end up distorting the patterns of world trade but also may worsen the overall patterns of environmental quality. Simulation exercises undertaken here suggest that it is highly unlikely that countries would alter their environmental behavior because of the imposition of the proposed U.S. tariff. Hence the proposed legislation has very uncertain environmental consequences. Even if the policy has been mainly designed to protect domestic industries, it would only provide a minor margin of protection because the costs of complying with the environmental standards represent a relatively small element in the total costs. The analysis suggests that trade policy introduced in this fashion will have no significant impact on the patterns of world trade and pollution.     

Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products; and under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power.     

Growth,expectations and tariffs

We present a growth model of international trade in which expectations about profitability and growth influence innovation and investment. Adaptive learning dynamics determine transition paths for countries with differing structural parameters. Countries limiting trade by tariffs on imports of capital goods can experience gains in growth and perceived utility for a finite time, whereas the rest of the world is adversely affected. Asymmetric gains persist longer when structural advantages of the country applying tariffs are larger. Substantial differences in levels of innovation, output and utility can appear within our asymmetric country setting.     

Optimal tariffs with inframarginal exporters

This paper shows that an importing country can have an incentive to impose a tariff to extract rents earned by foreign exporters even in a perfectly competitive setting. To demonstrate this, I develop a new model of international trade that incorporates fixed costs of exporting and firm heterogeneity within a perfectly competitive framework. In this setting, despite the fact that there are no preexisting distortions, the optimal tariff is positive even for a small country with no world market power. In the limit, as either firm heterogeneity or the fixed costs of exporting vanish, the optimal tariff approaches zero.     

More on tariffs and non-traded goods

The general equilibrium effects of a small tariff on relative prices are analysed within a demand and supply model which provides further insights into Dornbusch's (1974) results. It is shown that the elasticity of the price of non-traded goods with respect to the tariff is a weighted average of the degree of substitutability between non-traded goods and importables on the supply side and that on the demand side. When complementarity is ruled out, the price of non-traded goods increases with the tariff, but less than proportionally.     

The structure of Nash equilibrium tariffs

This paper examines theoretically the structure of optimal (Nash equilibrium) tariff rates in a two-country economy with more than two traded goods. We provide a condition under which the equilibrium tariff rates are uniform in both countries, and explore the relative size of the equilibrium tariff rates in each country when the uniform tariff condition is not satisfied. The elasticities of compensated excess demand for goods play an important role in characterizing the structure of the equilibrium tariff rates. This paper undertakes the analysis using a dual approach.     

Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger.     

Distributional and revenue raising arguments for tariffs

This paper (1) analyzes distributional and revenue-raising arguments for tariffs in a general equilibrium model of a small open economy, (2) characterizes tariff rates in an interesting special case to gain greater insight into their determinants, (3) uses numerical examples calibrated on Brazilian and Turkish data to illustrate the sensitivity of optimal policies to underlying economic characteristics and objectives of policy, and (4) quantifies the losses from unavailability of tariffs in small open economies.     

Two-part tariffs set by a risk-averse monopolist

This paper revisits the classical issues of two-part tariffs by considering risk aversion of a monopolistic seller. Under demand uncertainty, equilibrium unit price declines and approaches towards marginal cost as the seller becomes more risk averse. Marginal-cost pricing prevails, irrespective of the seller’s risk attitude, if clients are homogenous. Under cost uncertainty, unit price is higher than marginal cost and monotonically increases in risk aversion. The model is then extended to accommodate buyers’ risk aversion and it is found that demand uncertainty makes unit price decline in the seller’s risk aversion again but increase in buyers’ risk aversion.     

The incidence of tariffs: Simulation results

By simulating a general equilibrium model, it is shown that about two-thirds of the burden of an import tariff is shifted on to exporters.     

Industrial labour productivities and tariffs in South Africa

The analysis of the effect of tariffs for labour productivity faces the challenge of tariff policy endogeneity. Tariff policy is designed to promote economic development and the industrial sector tariff structure may reflect characteristics of the industries protected. We seek to identify the effect of tariffs by taking advantage of multilateral tariff liberalization using reductions in industrial sector tariffs in other world regions as instruments for sectoral tariff reductions in South Africa. The data cover 28 manufacturing sectors over the period 1988–2003. We find that tariff reductions have stimulated labour productivity when instrumented by multilateral tariffs. The ordinary least‐squares estimates show downward bias and this confirms the endogeneity of tariffs. Investigation of channels of effects shows some support for the importance of competitive pressure and technology spillover from trade liberalization.     

The theory of tariffs in a monetary economy

A two country two commodity model of international trade in a monetary context is utilized for the re-evaluation of the classical propositions in international trade theory which are usually derived under barter. A comparison of results under alternative exchange rate regimes is given. The effects of tariffs on the balance of payments and on domestic price levels is also studied.     

Can R&D-inducing green tariffs replace international environmental regulations?

This paper investigates the link between trade and environment by exploring the effects of green tariffs on innovation, location of production and the environment. It shows that tariffs levied on polluting goods could result in less world pollution than global harmonization of environmental standards by inducing more pollution-abatement R&D effort and generating lower unit emissions from production. Specifically, green tariffs reduce pollution by (1) shifting production to the region where environmental standards are respected, (2) inducing the firm in the clean country to engage in more abatement R&D by granting it a higher market power/share in its home market, (3) instigating green R&D investment by deterring delocation. When these outweigh the R&D-creating effect of environmental harmonization in the dirty country, green tariffs bring about a cleaner environment.     

Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms

The majority of research to date investigating strategic tariffs in the presence of multinationals finds a knife-edge result where, in equilibrium, all foreign firms are either multinationals or exporters. Utilizing a model of heterogeneous firms, we find equilibria in which both pure exporters and multinationals coexist. We utilize this model to study the case of endogenously chosen tariffs. As is standard, Nash equilibrium tariffs are higher than the socially optimal tariffs. Unlike existing models with homogeneous firms, we find that non-cooperative tariffs promote the existence of low-productivity firms relative to the socially optimal tariffs. This highlights a new source of inefficiency from tariff competition not found in models of homogeneous firms. In addition, we find that in many cases the Nash equilibrium tariff when FDI is a potential firm structure is lower than when it is not. As a result, FDI improves welfare by mitigating tariff competition.