Ricardo on machinery: an analysis of Ricardo's examples

The examples that are reported in the famous chapter “On Machinery” added by Ricardo in the third edition of his Principles are reconstructed and analyzed. Two sets of assumptions that rationalize the examples presented by Ricardo are identified: a) the innovation concerns an agricultural commodity and does affect neither which land is marginal nor the technology applied on the marginal land; b) the innovation concerns a non-basic commodity. Ricardo was aware of these two facts and he seems to have used them respectively in the first and second of his examples.     

Ricardo's discovery of comparative advantage revisited: a critique of Ruffin's account

Abstract

In an influential paper, Ruffin has attempted to reconstruct the circumstances of Ricardo's discovery of the law of comparative advantage. Ruffin's paper has inspired a number of further contributions on the precise nature, logical structure, and analytical significance of Ricardo's formulation of the law of comparative advantage. This paper re-examines Ruffin's reconstruction, and in particular his interpretation of Ricardo's three letters of October 1816 and suggests that it lacks textual and contextual support.     

A calm investigation into Mr Ricardo's principles of international trade

Abstract

This paper deals with some difficulties presented by Ricardo's texts on international trade, taking seriously Ricardo's account of the systematic interaction of real and monetary phenomena. After a brief reassessment of the main features of Ricardo's views on foreign trade, some basic questions are examined, concerning the method of analysis and the alleged invalidity of the labour theory of value at the international level. The enquiry goes on to state that, for Ricardo, there are no significant differences between domestic and international exchanges, and on this basis, proposes a simple and general rule explaining the flows of trade. The “principle of comparative advantage” and the “gains from trade” thus appear as simple unintended consequences of the decisions of agents in free markets. Finally, the characteristics of an international equilibrium and the nature and impact of destabilising shocks are analysed.     

Say's involvement in the 1819 French edition of Ricardo's Principles and the issue of rent

This paper focuses on Say's contribution to the first French edition of Ricardo's Principles and on the analytical consequences of his involvement on the issue of rent. Part one investigates the “story” of this edition. It stresses Say's friendship with the translator, his involvement in this publication and his attitude toward Ricardo. Part two analyses how elements from Say's thought were introduced into Ricardo's theory of rent through this edition. These elements conveyed ideas which were definitely at odds with Ricardo's theory and misrepresented Ricardo's true concept of differential rent which was central to his theory.     

Interpreting Ricardo: a rejoinder to Peach

This note answers Terry Peach's (1998) response to our criticismsof his interpretation of Ricardo. We show that the availableevidence supports Sraffa's interpretation. The arguments putforward by Peach, far from undermining that interpretation orfurthering an understanding of Ricardo's project, do littlemore than catalogue the already well-known difficulties thatRicardo encountered as he grappled toward a clearer accountof the laws that regulate distribution and prices.     

Interpreting Ricardo: a further reply to Sraffians

The paper contains a further defence of those aspects of theinterpretation of Ricardo advanced in Peach (1993) that havebeen subjected to criticism by writers of a Sraffian persuasion.It is argued that the latest criticisms, from Heinz Kurz andGary Mongiovi, serve best to illuminate the problems with theSraffa-derived view of Ricardo.     

Charles Kingsley and the Theological Interpretation of Natural Selection

Synopsis This paper questions the common view that Darwinian biology is a straighforward extension of classical political economy. Our analysis contrasts the economists’ classification scheme – whereby all humans were presumed natural kinds, to be equally competent for economic and political decision making – with the post-Darwinian classification scheme that developed. When the tools of political economy were imported into biology, the presumption of homogeneity of competence was denied. Charles Kingsley played a significant role in the transition from one sort of classificatory scheme to another, in the overthrow of the economists’ notion that humans are the same in their capacity for trade and moral judgment. Darwin sent Kingsley a presentation copy of Origin of Species and quoted him in the second edition as the ‘celebrated author and divine’ who had sketched a theology in which Providence used natural selection in the creation process. The economists’ doctrine that all people form a natural kind had many opponents. Biologists agreed with economists that, whatever differences existed between races of people, none put a person outside the protection of law. Other opponents, e.g., Thomas Carlyle, criticized both the economists’ premise and their conclusion regarding protection under the law. Kingsley moved from a Carlylean to a Darwinian opposition to natural kinds.     

政治经济学的批判性理论起点——浅谈马克思对斯密和李嘉图的批判

马克思对于资产阶级古典政治经济学斯密和李嘉图的认识与批判,是其政治经济学的批判性理论起点,而之后对于小资产阶级社会主义者尤其是对于蒲鲁东的批判,乃是其在一般方法论上将归纳法和演绎法融合在一起的连接点。马克思认为,资产阶级经济学的发展经历了两个阶段,即古典经济学和庸俗经济学。古典经济学是资产阶级处于上升时期的经济理论,而庸俗经济学则是资产阶级从革命走向保守的经济理论。     

Labour employed in production and labour commanded: a Ricardian conjecture

This paper explains the origin of some important ambiguitiesin the analysis of value and prices put forward by Smith inhis Wealth of Nations by considering the possibility that theyreflect a previous draft of the book where the quantity of labouremployed in production was indicated as the sole determinantof real price and exchange ratios. This conjecture is evidencedindirectly by the way in which Smith presented his own analysisat the end of Book I, Chapter IV; by some passages containedin Book I and Book II which suggest that the quantity of labouremployed in production should play a crucial role within theanalysis of exchangeable value; and by the important modificationsintroduced by Smith in Book I, Chapter VI, after the first editionof the Wealth of Nations was published.     

Robert Torrens and the Ricardian model of dynamic equilibrium growth

This paper reconstructs Torrens's dynamic theory of distribution which is based on three notions of wages. In the early stages of growth, capital increases faster than population, so the actual wage rises above the minimum. Thereafter, the economy grows with a tendency for the population to increase faster than the capital while limiting the actual wage below the decreasing maximum until it enters a stationary state and the actual wage and profit rates are reduced to their minimum. Such a theory has been attributed to Ricardo by some scholars, but Torrens proposed a more fully developed account than Ricardo's.     

How to pay for the war in times of imperfect commitment: Adam Smith and David Ricardo on the sinking fund

The paper proposes a comparative analysis of Smith's and Ricardo's views on the sinking fund. It shows that Smith and Ricardo agreed in stressing the ineffectiveness of the sinking fund as a policy instrument targeted at public debt repayment and tax-burden relief, pointing out that its actual workings had paradoxically helped to increase rather than reduce British total debt-load. Moreover, their explanation of the sinking fund paradox integrates a defective fiscal commitment technology with powerful politicians’ incentives to siphon off the money stored in the sinking fund to meet sudden increases of public expenditure whenever the occasion arose.     

Keynes and Sraffa's 'Difficulties with J. H. Hollander'

The paper reports on Jacob H. Hollander's cooperation with John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa in the preparation of the latter's edition of The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo. The report is based on archive material from various sources, including the unpublished papers of Edwin Cannan, Piero Sraffa, Jacob H. Hollander, John Maynard Keynes, and Jacob Viner, and the archive of the Royal Economic Society. The archive material consulted by us shows that, put mildly, Jacob H. Hollander did not promote Sraffa's editorial project: he held back material which he had received from Frank Ricardo and did not disclose to Sraffa that he owned several important letters which he had privately purchased. Moreover, Sraffa was refused access to Ricardiana even after he had traced them down in laborious detective work to be in Hollander's possession. Hollander's unwillingness to cooperate with Sraffa considerably delayed the publication of the Ricardo edition.     

创新发展中国特色社会主义政治经济学需处理好十个方面的关系

中国特色社会主义政治经济学是当代中国经济学的理论基础,是理论经济学与应用经济学相关学科的"硬核"部分.创新发展中国特色社会主义政治经济学需要处理好若干重要的关系,例如价值理性与工具理性的关系、马克思主义政治经济学原理与中国特色社会主义实践的关系、马克思主义政治经济学原理与中国特色社会主义政治经济学的关系、文本研究与实证...     

The Dutch and Portuguese-Jewish background of David Ricardo

This article deals with the Dutch and Portuguese-Jewish background of David Ricardo. The important pieces of information, found in the Amsterdam municipal archives, on the one hand correct, and on the other complement, the data presented by P. Sraffa. Recently, new evidence has been found on Ricardo's stay in Amsterdam in the years 1783?–?85. This evidence throws new light on Ricardo's relationship with his uncle Moses in Amsterdam. It is shown that his formal education was poor, but that his informal education may have been rich. The question of whether Ricardo visited the famous Talmud Tora in Amsterdam is settled in the negative.     

Remittances and incumbency: Theory and evidence

By raising household income, remittances lower the marginal utility of targeted electoral transfers, thus weakening the efficacy of vote buying. Yet, remittances make individuals wealthier and believe the national economy is performing well, which is positively attributed to the incumbent. Building on these insights, I show that the confluence of these divergent channels generate a surprising result that at increasingly higher levels of dissatisfaction with the incumbent, a remittance recipient is more likely to vote for the incumbent than a non‐remittance recipient. These predictions and their underlying mechanisms are substantiated across 18 Latin American countries.     

From endogenous growth to stationary state: The world economy in the mathematical formulation of the Ricardian system

We analyse international trade in a Pasinetti–Ricardo growth model in the world economy scenario in which several small trading countries coexist and international commodity prices are determined by the interplay of supply and demand amongst them. We demonstrate that all the trading countries eventually reach the stationary state, though this process is not monotonic and the dynamics of capital and population may actually push some countries towards the stationary state and others away from it. We also use our model to assess an argument which Malthus employed in the second edition of An Essay on the Principle of Population (1803) to support a policy of agricultural protectionism.     

Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows,financial market structure,and banking crises

An emerging consensus among scholars and policy‐makers identifies foreign capital inflows as one of the primary determinants of banking crises in developed countries. We challenge this view by arguing that external imbalances are destabilizing only when banks face substantial competition from securities markets in the process of financial intermediation. We assemble a dataset of banking crises covering the advanced industrialized countries from 1976 to 2011 and find evidence of a conditional relationship between capital inflows, a well‐developed securities market, and the incidence of banking crises. We further explore the impact of capital inflows on banks’ actual risk taking as indicated by their capital adequacy levels and measures of insolvency risk. Our results demonstrate that prudential capital cushions tend to decline with the combination of capital inflows and prominent securities markets. We highlight the political decisions—often made during the early days of a country's financial development—that determine the relative prominence of banks vs. non‐bank financial institutions and conclude with policy recommendations.     

Police Violence and the Underreporting of Crime

This paper examines the relationship between police violence and the reporting of crime. Utilizing original data from a large‐scale household survey conducted in Costa Rica from October 2013 to April 2014 (n = 4,200), we find that the observation of police violence significantly reduces citizens’ willingness to report crime. The implications of this finding are explored using a game‐theoretic model of crime, crime reporting, and police misconduct. The model reveals that although the prospect of police violence against criminals may generate a degree of deterrence for criminal behavior, permissiveness toward police violence also raises expectations about the likelihood of police abuse against law‐abiding citizens. Consistent with our empirics, this reduces citizens’ propensity to report crime, thereby fostering a climate of impunity for criminal activity.     

Protecting Property: The Politics of Redistribution,Expropriation, and Market Openness

This paper develops a formal model to disentangle the competing political incentives for redistribution, expropriation, and market openness. Although redistribution and expropriation are both types of government extraction, redistribution re‐allocates wealth within the citizenry, while expropriation re‐allocates wealth from citizens to the government. Representative political institutions increase redistribution and reduce expropriation. Market openness changes these incentives, as foreign investors prefer reductions in both redistribution and expropriation. When political institutions are representative, the government will rely more on reducing expropriation, rather than limiting redistribution, to attract foreign investment. Under representative institutions then, openness partially reinforces the preferences of voters rather than undermining them. In addition, market liberalization occurs only when the policy changes needed to attract foreign investment are relatively small. If existing policies are satisfactory to foreign investors, moves toward openness may be accompanied by greater redistribution and expropriation, as governments are tempted by a larger base for extraction. Thus, openness has ambiguous effects on economic policy, at times encouraging and at times constraining extraction.     

Lobbying and innovation in the European Union

Aside from anecdotal evidence, lobbying activities and the role of vested interests in the EU have not been scrutinized. This article attempts to cast focus on the relationship between lobbying and aspects of innovation in the EU. The modest performance of the EU compared to the innovation frontier has been attributed to an array of factors, one of which is the adverse effect of vested interests. The lack of new, innovative enterprises has been identified as a decisive factor behind the productivity stagnation and lobbying by incumbents poses as a credible culprit. In this article, I create a novel firm-level database through the cross-fertilization of data from the growing Transparency Register (EC and EP), AMADEUS (BvD), the OECD, Eurostat, and the European Commission in order to address the complex relationship between vested interests, innovation, and competition. The preliminary findings indicate that more R&D intensive firms tend to spend significantly larger amount of funds on lobbying, primarily competing for EU grants and government procurement. Using data for country-sector concentration, I find that the relationship is stronger in the presence of low competition. Despite the improvements required in the documentation of lobbying activities, these results provide preliminary tangible evidence on the effect of vested interests on innovation performance.