关于地方财政收入预决算偏离问题及对策探究

预决算偏离是地方财政收入预决算工作中不可忽略的一个问题,预决算工作的好坏直接反映了地方财政管理水平,事关地方经济的发展.因此,合理控制地方财政收入预决算偏离度至关重要.本文就地方财政收入预决算偏离问题及对策作了相关分析.     

西藏财政支出预决算偏离问题研究

西藏自治区财政支出是国家重点关注的内容。财政支出偏离问题与财政支出效率挂钩，过高的偏离度不仅影响财政管理水平和支出绩效，甚至会影响西藏自治区的经济发展。文章根据西藏自治区2011—2022年相关数据，从西藏财政支出预决算典型特征及形成过程、偏离的整体状况与结构分析偏离特征，并从预算管理内部因素、财政支出管理体制因素、预决算外部监督与配套措施因素三个方面探索存在预决算偏离过大的成因，进而提出相应的解决措施。     

新《预算法》能够降低地方政府预决算偏离度吗?——来自四川省市州的证据北大核心CSSCI

预算法是约束政府收支行为的基本制度规范。本文利用2015年新《预算法》实施这一准自然实验,构建了"类政策实验"的强度DID模型。运用四川省21个市州2008-2018年的预决算数据,评估了新《预算法》对地方政府预决算偏离度的影响。研究发现,新《预算法》的实施降低了地方政府收支预决算偏离度。机制检验发现,新《预算法》通过增强收入预算编制的科学性,降低了收入预决算偏离度;通过强化预算执行约束,降低了支出预决算偏离度。本研究不仅丰富了预算研究文献,而且对今后的预算改革及建立现代预算制度具有重要启示。     

财政透明度对政府预决算偏离的影响效应研究

预算是政府调控经济增长、稳定经济发展以及加强政府治理的重要方式,而预决算的执行偏差会影响政府的治理能力和公信度。基于此,本文通过构建我国31个省市2009—2020年的面板数据,实证探究财政透明度与地方政府预决算偏离的关系,研究结果表明：财政透明度的提高对地方政府收入与支出预决算的偏离度均产生明显的负向效应。进一步研究发现,中国东部省市财政透明度的提高对地方财政收入预决算的偏离度产生的负向效应较中西部地区更为突出;而财政透明度的提升对中西部地区政府预决算支出偏离的负向影响效应较东部地区更加明显。为持续发挥财政透明的积极作用,应当不断拓宽预算信息公开的方式和渠道、积极发扬媒体社交等公众平台的降低信息专业壁垒的作用,并建立科学合理的预算绩效指标评价体系。     

县级财政预算支出绩效评价工作的实践探索

随着经济的发展,国家对民生问题的关注力度逐渐增加,从城市基础设施的投资量不断增加就不难看出,"民生财政"建设大轮廓日益清晰。当前,随着财政收入的不断增加也产生了一些问题,预决算偏离度不断增大,专项资金管理不善,对于县级财政的发展是十分不利的。对此,加强县级财政预算支出绩效评价工作是解决这一问题的有效措施,笔者从县级财政预算支出绩效评价的实际情况出发,结合绩效评价过程中存在的问题,提出适当的改进措施,为提升县级财政预算管理水平提供一些参考和借鉴。     

陕西省财政预决算差异的成因

近年来我国的财政预决算之间一直呈现较高的偏离，追根究底既包括制度原因，也包括管理原因。这些原因导致的结果会进一步对国家的经济建设和事业发展严重影响。因此，需要对产生差异的原因进行分析，以尽量减少预算与决算之间的偏差。本文考察了2007年陕西省各部门财政收支预决算之间偏离状况、影响偏差的主要部门，由此分析本省财政收支预决算偏差的原因及提出建议。     

高培勇:取消利息税应审慎从事

近一段时间,是否应该取消利息税的讨论引起越来 越多的人的关注。本刊就此问题专门采访了著名财税专 家--中国社科院财政与贸易经济研究所副所长高培 勇,他从税收制度建设层面和利息税的历史背景论述了 不能取消利息税的原因。 在阐述自己的观点之前,高培勇首先介绍了利息税 在国家整体税制中的地位及其在我国税制发展中的历史 沿革。     

地方政府财政预决算偏离分析——以西藏自治区为例

目前,财政预决算之间仍然存在一定偏差,政府预算管理能力有待加强。本文通过分析西藏自治区2010—2020年的财政预决算偏离情况,探讨工作过程中存在的一些问题,并提出完善措施。     

工会预决算说明的结构安排与分析

工会预决算说明是工会预决算编制的重要组成部分,在实际工作中,不少工会组织在编制工会预决算时,重报表编制而忽视了预决算说明,说明时用数字罗列,无内容、无分析、无建议,内容空洞,偏离主题,把说明写成工作总结或工作计划,因此,工会预决算说明极待改善和加强。     

存款偏离度新政影响浅析

目前我国金融行业存款"冲时点"问题得到普遍关注,国家出台新政策加强了管理。本文对存款偏离度新政影响进行分析,并提出了银行的应对策略。     

Bookbuilding,the option to withdraw,and the timing of IPOs

The ability to withdraw IPOs when demand is weak increases expected proceeds and provides issuers with option value. To enhance this value, the SEC adopted in 2001 the ‘public-to-private’ safe harbor Rule 155 and simplified Rule 477 for withdrawing offerings. The option value can exceed the underpricing associated with soliciting investor demand. Hence, issuers might prefer bookbuilding despite the associated underpricing even if they could sell via fixed price at full expected value. The option value increases faster than underpricing with ex ante uncertainty, generating predictions regarding the use of bookbuilding and the timing of IPOs, and leading to a distinct theory of hot IPO markets.     

Access to financing,rents, and organization of the firm

This paper provides a theory for the choice of an organizational structure by the headquarters of a unitary structure concerned about overload. The headquarters can avoid overload by delegating operational decisions to divisions, i.e., moving the firm to a multidivisional structure. We show that, under moral hazard, these divisions receive rents for incentive purposes, and that the multidivisional structure is able to invest more. Thus, there is a trade-off between increasing investment and paying rents. We also show that this trade-off applies to situations where firms consider engaging in acquisitions and joint ventures, or where entrepreneurs consider resorting to venture capitalists.     

Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm

Based upon a large data set of public and private firms in the United Kingdom, I find that compared to their public counterparts, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, leading to a greater sensitivity of their capital structures to fluctuations in performance. I argue that these differences are due to private equity being more costly than public equity. I further examine the private firms subsample to show that private equity is more costly than its public counterpart due to information asymmetry and the desire to maintain control.     

Risks and threats to civilization, humankind, and the earth

This paper is a brief look at a wide range of risks that are said to present great threats to humankind. It was stimulated by several interacting factors. First, too many books and articles about astrophysical catastrophes, in the scientific and semi-scientific press, give relatively little attention to their timeframe or the measures to anticipate and prepare for them. Second, and most important, is that the overblown effects of 9/11 have distorted the United States of America's perspective and agenda on catastrophes. The result is that billions of dollars have been wasted and attention turned away from threats that could be truly catastrophic for the United States and, in many cases, for the rest of the world. Third, are books that have become popular by raising the threat that what will happen to us will be similar to what happened to earlier societies such as the Maya and the Easter Islanders. Most notably among these is Jared Diamond's Collapse [Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, Penguin Group, 2005]. The failure in these doomsday arguments is to overlook the greater sophistication, knowledge, awareness, monitoring and preparation currently in the United States and in other parts of the globe. The institutional structure and scientific knowledge today would either prevent or deal with the kind of socio-economic decline anticipated by the “collapse” arguments. In contrast several geophysical and celestial risks do imply global catastrophe. The value of this paper is as broad background to the specific scenario papers that follow. While it leans heavily on the work of others, it offers three new features for the analysis of any extreme risk. First is a scale of devastation, based on deaths. Second is a comprehensive time frame—now to the end of the Earth. Third is an outline of general questions that must be addressed for any risk, however large or small, if it is to provide insight into policy choices and promote systemic thinking.     

Exchange risk, exposure, and the option to trade

Rather than impeding trade, increased exchange rate uncertainty may on average create trade as it implies a higher probability that ex post deviations from Commodity Price Parity will exceed tariffs and transportation costs. We demonstrate such an effect in a small-country, short-term model, under the alternative assumptions of perfect competition and of a monopolist trader-producer. The proofs rely on the fact that such firms' exposures can be replicated (and hedged) by standard options. Under partial monopoly scenarios, the effect of volatility is ex ante unclear, though. (JEL F31)     

Access to capital,investment, and the financial crisis

During the recent financial crisis, corporate borrowing and capital expenditures fall sharply. Most existing research links the two phenomena by arguing that a shock to bank lending (or, more generally, to the corporate credit supply) caused a reduction in capital expenditures. The economic significance of this causal link is tenuous, as we find that (1) bank-dependent firms do not decrease capital expenditures more than matching firms in the first year of the crisis or in the two quarters after Lehman Brother's bankruptcy; (2) firms that are unlevered before the crisis decrease capital expenditures during the crisis as much as matching firms and, proportionately, more than highly levered firms; (3) the decrease in net debt issuance for bank-dependent firms is not greater than for matching firms; (4) the average cumulative decrease in net equity issuance is more than twice the average decrease in net debt issuance from the start of the crisis through March 2009; and (5) bank-dependent firms hoard cash during the crisis compared with unlevered firms.     

Population,wealth, and resources up to the year 2000

The authors use the second-generation Mesarovic-Pestel model to produce global scenarios. In the first (open-loop) case there is little interaction between different areas (eg agriculture, energy, or resources). The results are similar to forecasts made by other research groups. The authors show that in the long run this open-loop approach is implausible. The closed-loop approach significantly alters the scenarios. This is highlighted by the combined-problem scenario, which adopts some of the more pessimistic assumptions from the other organisations' projections while retaining the interactions between areas. The authors stress the importance of the closed-loop approach when considering global futures. They also examine the regional trends which may be masked by the global figures.     

Bailouts,the incentive to manage risk,and financial crises

A firm's termination leads to bankruptcy costs. This may create an incentive for outside stakeholders or the firm's debtholders to bail out the firm as bankruptcy looms. Because of this implicit guarantee, firm shareholders have an incentive to increase volatility in order to exploit the implicit protection. However, if they increase volatility too much they may induce the guarantee-extending parties to “walk away.” I derive the optimal risk management rule in such a framework and show that it allows high volatility choices, while net worth is high. However, risk limits tighten abruptly when the firm's net worth declines below an endogenously determined threshold. Hence, the model reproduces the qualitative features of existing risk management rules, and can account for phenomena such as “flight to quality.”     

Underpricing, Overhang, and the Cost of Going Public to Preexisting Shareholders

Abstract:  IPO underpricing has been extensively studied; however, its impact on the wealth of preexisting shareholders has not been closely examined. We address the question of whether or not periods of high underpricing adversely affect preexisting shareholders. We find that high levels of underpricing are associated with increased share retention, which effectively offsets much of the potential cost. Overall, we find that the percentage of shareholder wealth lost is surprisingly stable over time, unlike underpricing itself. We also find that many factors known to be related to underpricing are not significant determinants of the cost of going public to preexisting owners.