Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation

We consider the role that seller motivation plays in determining selling time, list price and sale price. A new survey of home sellers suggests that sellers are heterogeneous in their motivation to sell. Our findings are that a seller who, at the time of listing, has a planned date to move sells more quickly than one who does not. Also, the shorter the planned time until a move at the time of listing, the shorter the actual duration of marketing time. We find that seller motivation affects sale price, but not the list-price markup. Our results suggest that theoretical models of the housing search process should be recast to allow for heterogeneous sellers.     

The Strategic Role of Listing Price in Marketing Real Estate: Theory and Evidence

The seller of a real estate property and his broker have two primary goals: to sell the properly for as high a price as possible and as quickly as possible. While these are separate objectives, they are closely related through the listing price of the seller. The listing price affects how long it takes to find a buyer (i.e., Time On the Market = TOM), and TOM influences the price that results from the bargaining between the seller and the buyer. This leaves the seller and his agent with an important question: What is the optimal price to be asked for the property? The objective of this research is to provide a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of listing price on TOM and the transaction price.     

Housing Market Conditions, Listing Choice and MLS Market Share

In some housing markets, a seller may hire a broker to multiple list or exclusively list a property for sale or may bypass the brokerage industry and list the property privately as a "sale by owner." This article introduces a new model that illustrates the factors which will impact on the broker's and seller's preferred type of listing. An implication of the model is that if the choice is available, sellers and real estate brokers will employ a multiple listing service more often during slower market periods where the volume of sales is low and properties are more difficult to sell. An empirical analysis of Vancouver data yields results consistent with these arguments.     

Optimal Price and Selling Effort from the Perspectives of the Broker and Seller

This paper uses numerical solutions of a dynamic optimization model to examine the principal-agent relationship between the seller and broker in residential real estate markets. Potential conflict of interest is quantified in two dimensions, the level of selling effort the broker puts forth, and the reservation price for the property. The dynamic optimization model reveals that the use of a finite duration listing contract will induce the broker to increase his or her effort level compared to an unlimited duration contract, and that the broker's optimal effort will increase over time, becoming greater as the listing contract expiration time draws nearer ("rational procrastination"). The numerical analysis indicates that with plausible parameter values, conflict of interest problems regarding broker effort level are minor or nonexistent near the end of the listing contract, but potentially important near the beginning of the contract. In contrast, the conflict of interest regarding reservation price is more severe near the end of the listing contract and is exacerbated by the use of finite duration contracts, the more so the shorter the contract.     

The burgeoning role of iBuyers in the housing market

We examine the iBuyers’ business model and their impact on housing markets. We find that iBuyers tend to enter neighborhoods that have more easily priced and homogeneous homes, as price discovery is simpler and more consistent with their pricing algorithm in those areas. iBuyers purchase homes at lower prices than individual owner-occupiers, and this acquisition discount reflects the benefits iBuyers offer to motivated sellers rather than distressed home purchases or unobserved lower-quality housing characteristics. Last, a greater presence of iBuyers results in a higher volume of local housing transactions and encourages more home sellers to sell without listing.     

Price negotiation under uncertainty

This paper examines supply contract negotiation when buyer's revenue and seller's cost are uncertain. In these circumstances, both the seller and the buyer have an option to determine when to sell and buy, which may influence negotiation outcomes. Thus, we developed a bilateral negotiation model to derive the optimal selling (buying) rule considering the option. Our results show that the options of waiting to sell and to buy (1) narrow the traditional zone of possible agreement and (2) lower the probability of negotiation agreement. It is also shown that impasses can occur due to uncertainty, even when a purchase price is lower than the buyer's future revenue and higher than the seller's future cost.     

The Effects of Charm Listing Prices on House Transaction Prices

As is the case for many different goods and services, it is common practice in many real estate markets for sellers to offer properties for sale at listing prices just below some round number price ( e.g. , $99,900 instead of $100,000). The academic marketing literature refers to this practice as "charm" pricing and suggests that this strategy is an attempt by sellers to take advantage of buyers' cognitive processes in which charm prices affect buyers' perceptions about the seller or the item being offered for sale. Although numerous papers in the housing economics literature have addressed the impact of the magnitude of listing price on observed house transaction prices, no prior published study has considered the impact of the design of listing prices in housing markets. This paper presents an empirical investigation of the effects of charm pricing on house transaction prices using sample data. The results provide some evidence that houses listed at certain charm prices sell for significantly greater transaction prices than those listed at round number prices.     

Time on the Market and Selling Price

This study is primarily an analysis of tradeoff between selling time and price, both on a nominal and real basis. Sellers are seen as desiring to maximize their discounted real selling price and trading off the nominal selling price with expected selling time. The time a property remains on the market is important, not only because of its reflection on price, but also because of its possible reflection on the issue of submarket equilibrium—an assumption in most urban price studies. The empirical results of this study shed light on how similar studies can easily misinterpret the implications of time on the market on price and how further work may be improved.     

High Leverage and Willingness to Pay: Evidence from the Residential Housing Market

I document a strong correlation between paying the full listing price on homes and borrowing 100% loan‐to‐value. Homebuyers who do both overpay by 2.8% to 3.9% ($4,800 to $6,700) and are 22.7% more likely to have their properties foreclosed within one year. The correlation is not mechanical: there is a discontinuity in the average leverage around the full listing price. The correlation is stronger in areas with a high fraction of financially constrained and unsophisticated residents, and in areas of high past price growth (potentially indicative of buyer optimism).     

List Prices,Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets

Many goods are marketed after first stating a list price, with the expectation that the eventual sales price will differ. In this article, we first present a simple model of search behavior that includes the seller setting a list price. Holding constant the mean of the buyers’ distribution of potential offers for a good, we assume that the greater the list price, the slower the arrival rate of offers but the greater is the maximal offer. This trade‐off determines the optimal list price, which is set simultaneously with the seller's reservation price. Comparative statics are derived through a set of numerical sensitivity tests, where we show that the greater the variance of the distribution of buyers’ potential offers, the greater is the ratio of the list price to expected sales price. Thus, sellers of atypical goods will tend to set a relatively high list price compared with standard goods. We test this hypothesis using data from the Columbus, Ohio, housing market and find substantial support. We also find empirical support for another hypothesis of the model: atypical dwellings take longer to sell.     

Search Benefit in Housing Markets: An Inverted U‐Shaped Price and TOM Relation

The nature of the relationship between a property's selling price and its marketing time in the housing market remains an open question to date, despite almost 40 years of inquiry and hundreds of regressions conducted on various data sources. This study attempts to settle the long‐standing open question by examining the issue from a new perspective. We demonstrate that the true price–TOM relationship should be nonlinear and characterized by an inverted U‐shaped curve wherein the selling price increases with TOM up to a certain threshold, reflective of a positive exposure effect and decreases thereafter to reflect a negative stigma effect. This relationship is borne out in an empirical analysis using a large sample of home sales from the Hampton Roads, Virginia metropolitan area during an extended period of time. We then formulate hypotheses about the benefit of search by home sellers, which are subsequently confirmed by the empirical findings.     

Discount Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Markets

Transaction costs are thought to affect asset prices and market liquidity, but the direction and magnitude of these effects continue to be the subject of debate. In the single‐family residential market, discount brokers offer to list a house for a lower price and thus reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining a match. In this article we obtain empirical estimates of the price and liquidity impact of a seller selecting a discount broker to market a single‐family residential property. The unique data set allows for the identification of residential properties that were listed by a discount brokerage firm. The empirical results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. Using a sample of 318,221 listings and 243,625 sales, we find that houses listed by discount brokers sell at prices similar to non‐discount brokerage listings, but are less likely to sell, and when they do sell, take approximately three days longer to sell. The results indicate that lower transaction costs do not impact housing prices in this market, but that they are related to asset liquidity.     

Are New Homes Special?

This article describes alternative ways of identifying new homes and, using a large dataset of property sales in Las Vegas, Nevada, tests for the extent to which new homes sell at a price premium relative to otherwise similar existing homes. We also investigate whether the results differ across time and location, including before and after the housing bust. Our results suggest that price premia for new homes arise primarily in circumstances in which the supply of new houses is relatively low. In some cases rising to over 20% relative to otherwise similar existing homes. When new homes are plentiful, they are not special and the premium disappears.     

Optimal Selling Mechanism,Auction Discounts and Time on Market

This article examines the optimal selling mechanism problem in real estate market using mean‐variance analysis and downside risk analysis. When sellers can choose between accepting the first offer above a reservation price or auctions (waiting an optimal and fixed time), sellers having higher risk aversion choose auctions and wait a fixed time while sellers having lower risk aversion choose an optimal reservation price and wait a random time. Positive auction discounts are compensated by reduced risks, and there exists a connection between liquidity risk and conditional auction discount. More (Fewer) sellers will choose to sell their houses through auctions in a hot (cold) market or when holding cost increases (decreases). When sellers choose auctions, sellers having higher risk aversion who have lower holding cost wait longer and obtain higher sale price. Loss‐averse sellers unanimously choose the mechanism of setting an optimal reservation price.     

Ethnicity in housing markets: Buyers,sellers and agents

This paper examines how ethnicity related to cultural differences arising from ethnic background affects housing market transactions in the Atlanta metro area. Using both the US Census and Wikipedia approaches to infer ethnicity from individuals' names, we find that the interplay of buyer, seller, and agent ethnicity composition affects interaction in the housing market. Sellers working with listing agents in the same ethnic group set higher listing prices and enjoy higher selling prices and quicker sales. Agents working with same ethnicity buyers yield higher prices and liquidity. Even though sellers only communicate with buyers through their agents, houses sold by sellers to buyers of same ethnicity have higher prices and sell faster. And while the ethnic mix of agents and their clients matter, the ethnic mix of agents in the transaction does not.     

The Gender Gap in Real Estate Sales: Negotiation Skill or Agent Selection?

This study examines differences in net selling price for residential real estate across male and female agents. A sample of 2,020 home sales transactions from Fulton County, Georgia, are analyzed in a two‐stage least squares, geospatial autoregressive corrected, semi‐log hedonic model to test for gender and gender selection effects. Although agent gender seems to play a role in naïve models, its role becomes inconclusive as variables controlling for possible price and time on market expectations of the buyers and sellers are introduced to the models. Clear differences in real estate sales prices, time on market and agent incomes across genders are unlikely due to differences in negotiation performance between genders or the mix of genders in a two‐agent negotiation. The evidence suggests an interesting alternative to agent performance: that buyers and sellers with different reservation price and time on market expectations, such as those selling foreclosure homes, tend to select agents along gender lines.     

Renegotiation of Listing Contracts, Seller Opportunism and Efficiency: An Economic Analysis

When a property owner engages a real estate broker to sell his or her property, the parties enter into a listing contract which entitles the broker to a commission if a ready, willing and able buyer is found before the contract expires. While a limit on the duration of the contract provides the broker with an incentive to work hard to find a buyer, it also creates the potential for seller opportunism. In particular, sellers have an incentive to renegotiate a lower commission as the end of the contract approaches. The paper concludes that, from an efficiency perspective, courts should generally enforce such renegotiations, given that transaction costs between brokers and sellers are ordinarily low.     

Search and Liquidity in Single-Family Housing

A two-stage least squares model of housing prices is estimated with data collected from 3358 single-family home transactions. The results provide evidence for an optimal marketing period and indicate that a liquidity premium is priced in single-family home sales. Consistent with the hypothesis derived from economic search models, the model shows higher selling prices for houses having longer expected marketing periods. The model also shows a price premium for houses that sell faster than expectations. This effect supports the concept that liquidity is a value-enhancing characteristic.     

Price authority and information sharing with competing supply chains

We characterize the degree of price discretion that two competing manufacturers grant their retailers in a framework where demand is uncertain and privately observed by the retailers, while manufacturers only learn it probabilistically. In contrast with the consolidated vertical contracting literature, we assume that manufacturers cannot use monetary incentives to align the retailers’ incentives to pass on their unverifiable distribution costs to consumers. Our objective is to study how, in this context, an information-sharing agreement according to which manufacturers share their demand information affects prices, profits and consumer surplus. While equilibria with full price delegation never exist, regardless of whether manufacturers share information, partial delegation equilibria may exist with and without the exchange of information. These equilibria feature binding price caps (list prices) that prevent retailers from passing on their distribution costs to consumers, and are more likely to occur when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they do not share this information. Manufacturers profit from exchanging demand information when products are sufficiently differentiated, and retailers’ distribution costs are high enough. Yet, expected prices are unambiguously lower when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they don’t, making the information exchange beneficial to consumers.     

The Impact of a Multiple Listing Service

This article offers a theoretical investigation of the impact of a multiple listing service (MLS) and its optimal size. We study a principal‐agent model of real estate brokerage with multiple agents, where the entry of new agents imposes externalities on the other agents. We solve simultaneously for the equilibrium and socially efficient levels of agents’ effort choices, the size of the MLS and the commission rate. Introducing an MLS reduces the number of agents, increases agents’ effort levels and improves total surplus. Current commission rates of 5–7% appear much higher than the competitive commission rate, leading to too many agents, too much effort by agents and a lower overall surplus. We also find that giving a greater portion of the commission to the selling agent increases effort levels, reduces the number of agents and improves total surplus.