Globalisation—New Demands on Public Enterprises

The globalisation of the economy and society reduces the economic policy capabilities of the state with its public enterprises considerably, but at the same time it triggers fundamental pressure on the government to compensate for the negative economic, political and social effects of the globalisation process. Using a system-theoretic framework, requirements for the public economy can be developed reaching from a social coordination function to an evolutionary-based industrial policy function of public enterprises. These functions and instrumental targets have to be implemented in a system of an internationalised public economy based on an appropriate institutional foundation. This in turn means focusing on a mixed system of public and non-profit organisations combined with market type institutions. By no means is an erosion of the public sector in the sense of radical privatisation strategies as propagated by the IMF and other prominent institutions implied. Rather a social need for public action must be considered mainly due to the public interest (Gemeinwohl). In this context, the socio-political competence of the public and nonprofit economy can be revitalised in an innovative way.     

Economic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparisons and Lessons

Abstract
There are three features which distinguish the global transition in Central and Eastern Europe: both economic and political systems are the focus of radical transformation, this institutional revolution has been largely peaceful, and a pluralistic political system emerged faster than capitalism in the economic sphere. The initial conditions, for example the inherited economic structure, the macroeconomic situation and the type of economic system, have an important impact upon the pace and effects of the subsequent market-oriented reform. There are four important reasons why the state should concentrate its activity on the sphere of its natural competence. These reasons are even more important in economies of transition. The speed of the subordinate processes of transition differs which gives rise to important issues of phasing. Macroeconomic stabilisation, microeconomic liberalisation and privatisation should be implemented at a speed close to maximum. The Polish economic reform shows that a radical and comprehensive economic program introduced in an initially socialist economy, under extremely difficult macroeconomic conditions, can be successful in spite of powerful external shocks .     

Regulation and shadow economy: empirical evidence for 25 OECD-countries

New empirical findings for the impact of regulations on economic activities in the shadow economy are presented here. A comprehensive regulation index covering major fields (e.g. labour and product market regulation and the quality of institutions) has been used to analyze the relationship between the density of regulations and the size of shadow economies. The empirical results from 25 OECD countries for the time period 1995–2005 show that—apart from tax burden and tax moral—main causes for the development of the size of shadow economies are labour and product market regulations, overall regulations and poor quality of official public institutions and administration. These findings can provide additional information on policy measures to tackle the problem of growing shadow economies.     

DEMOCRACY IN REFORMING COLLAPSED COMMUNIST ECONOMIES: BLESSING OR CURSE?

From a political standpoint, post-communists systems include both democratic and non-democratic nations. From an economic standpoint, they include both collapsing and expanding economies. All four logical possibilities exist for post-communist political and economic systems. The Czech Republic is an example of a democratic political system and an expanding economic system. Russia is an example of a democratic political system and a collapsing economic system. China is an example of a non-democratic political system and an expanding economic system. North Korea is an example of a non-democratic political system and a collapsing economic system. The fact that all four logical possibilities exist suggests that democracy is neither necessary nor sufficient for good economic performance. However, democracy is certainly a value in itself that requires certain basic institutions, including free and fair elections, the orderly transfer of power to those elected, the rule of law and the separation of powers, and the protection of individual freedoms and basic liberties, including those of speech, press, religion, assembly, property, and economic opportunity. Economic policies, rather than the form of government, determine the results for an economy. Russia and China, the two largest socialist economies, followed very different economic policies and experienced radically different outcomes. The failure of “shock therapy” economic policies for transition to a market economy in Russia is related to its use of the Washington Consensus SLP package of stabilization, liberalization, and privatization, as recommended by the World Bank and the IMF. The success of Deng's economic policies for transition to a market economy in China is related to its rejection of the SLP in favor of the ICG approach of institutions, competition, and government. Other interesting cases are those of the Czech Republic and North Korea. Those nations in which both political and economic reforms have been simultaneously successful, such as the Czech Republic, are generally small, homogeneous European nations with a historic work ethic, with a relatively short period of socialism, and with support from neighboring advanced industrialized nations. There is great difficulty in simultaneously establishing both democracy and a market economy without a very special set of circumstances. Thus, it is necessary to determine a sequence for political and economic reform. Ultimately, however, the ideal of both democracy and a market economy may be attained even in nations without special circumstances and external assistance, with Russia eventually turning its economy around and with China eventually reforming politically into a democratic nation.     

Privatisation and Crime

Abstract
While criminalisation of the Russian economy can partly be explained by privatisation in conditions of underdevelopment of free market institutions, the emphasis on privatisation as the prime cause of crime may lead to gross oversimplification. The present article claims that faster and more radical, rather than slower and partial, privatisation could create less room for criminal behaviour in Russia. Half-measures applied to privatise the Russian economy have contributed to prolonged uncertainty and to a blurred demarcation between the private and government sectors as well as between management and ownership in business enterprises. Prolonged coexistence of the two sectors creates too much opportunity for criminal behaviour. Moreover, an explanation of the growth in crime in Russia is impossible without analysing the legacies of the former communist system, the developments in politics (including demoralisation of the ex-communist state apparatus), cultural factors and the specific features of the privatisation as actually conducted .     

历史视角中的美国和世界的危机

新古典宏观经济学和数理金融学都没能预期到2008年的这场危机，也没能解释为何这场危机是如此严重。这是因为他们只考虑纯粹的市场经济，完全不考虑制度，也缺乏分析当代经济的历史视角和结构变迁的视角。这就为政治经济学的分析留下了空间。分析从福特制结束以来的社会-政治联盟的变迁开始，转向以金融体制、金融自由化和全球化为基础的市场，赋予国际金融家以前所未有的权力，并导致了当前的经济和金融危机。控制金融部门要求当权者强有力的行动，以及公民的社会运动施压。金融再调节基本等同于民族国家与国际金融资本的博弈。     

Understanding china's economic performance

Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged to interpret China's rapid growth since 1978: the experimentalist school and the convergence school. The experimentalist school attributes China's successes to the evolutionary, experimental, and incremental nature of China's reforms. Specifically, the resulting non-capitalist institutions are claimed to be successful in (a) agriculture where land is not owned by the fanners; (b) township and village enterprises (TVEs) which are owned collectively by rural communities; and (c) state owned enterprises (SOEs) where increased competition and increased wage incentive, but not privatization, have been emphasized.

The convergence school holds that China's successes are the consequences of its institutions being allowed to converge with those of non-socialist market economies, and that China's economic structure at the start of reforms is a major explanation for the rapid growth. China had a high population density heavily concentrated in low-wage agriculture, a condition that was favorable for labor-intensive export-led growth in other parts of East Asia. The convergence school also holds that China's gradualism results primarily from a lack of consensus over the proper course, with power still divided between market reformers and old-style socialists; and that the “innovative” non-capitalist institutions are responses to China's political circumstances and not to its economic circumstances.

Perhaps the best test of the two approaches is whether China's policy choices are in fact leading to institutions harmonized with normal market economies or to more distinctive innovations. In this regard, the recent policy trend has been towards institutional harmonization rather than institutional innovation, suggesting that the government accepts that the ingredients for a dynamic market economy are already well-known.     

The co‐development of economies and institutions

In this study, we model the Schumpeterian growth theory in a simple discrete‐time framework in which both economies and institutions need to be developed. Individuals need to borrow from an imperfect financial market to develop an economy. A government can adopt two potential strategies for improving the borrowing capacity of individuals and, as a result, enhancing economic performance: ‘the rule of law’ and ‘industrial policies’. We interpret market‐oriented reform in transition economies as a shift from ‘industrial policies’, exemplified at the extreme by the traditional planned economy, to ‘the rule of law’. The presented model shows that both strategies could be the best choice at different stages of development.     

Inflation,a disease of society

This paper focuses on financing the welfare state expenditures in the UK. It offers a comprehensive analysis of social expenditures and taxes paid by the working population families, and an estimation of the net benefits received by them. While the subsequent analysis of the welfare state and its development primarily concentrates on the British experience, it has a broader application to other OECD countries. The UK as the most egalitarian “liberal market economy,” offers an interesting case for the study of the interaction between the welfare state expansion and economic growth. In terms of her capitalist economic structure, (interaction between market and economy) she is relatively closer to the USA and other Angelo-Saxon (liberal market) economies. In terms of her level of social expenditures, she is much closer to the European “social market economies” than the USA and other more egalitarian “liberal market economies.”     

Growth and employment differentials under alternative wage-setting institutions and integrated capital markets

This paper compares the effects of different labor market institutions on economic growth and employment. In the general equilibrium model here presented, a mechanism causing persistence (on-the-job training) interacts with the strategic complementary between investors’ decisions on capital accumulation and workers’ decisions on labor-market participation. Within this framework (i) structurally and institutionally similar economies preserve forever their differences in output and employment levels, (ii) the steady-state growth rate is higher in an economy with competitive wage determination than in an unionized economy, (iii) this growth differential enlarges when the product and the capital markets of these two economies are integrated.     

Rural development and financial markets in Romania

In the transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy, such as in Romania, the domestic financial market plays two important roles. First, the financial market itself must be fundamentally restructured. Second, its efficient functioning is a crucial precondition for economic transformation. In transition economies, however, financial market institutions tend to concentrate their services on urban or larger rural enterprises. So far, small rural enterprises, even those with profitable investment plans, often do not have access to the financial market. This paper briefly characterizes the key issues of agricultural production units and their institutional environment and analyzes the depth and the efficiency of rural finance and its effect on Romania's rural economic transformation. It concludes with policy and institutional recommendations to strengthen rural finance.     

The Challenge of Market Power under Globalization

The legacy of Adam Smith leads to a false confidence on the optimality of laissez faire policies for the global market economy. Instead, the polarized character of current globalization deeply affects both developed and underdeveloped economies. Current globalization is characterized by factor exchange between economies of persistently unequal development. This implies the existence of persistent extraordinary market power in transnational corporations, reflected in their disproportionate participation in income and policy. These are shown to be steady‐state features of globalization in a convergence club model of development and underdevelopment including trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Moreover, results in tax competition explain how the increased share of transnational profits under globalization leads to lower corporate taxes, more conservative policies, and weaker institutions for balancing market power. The increased level of market power under globalization poses a serious challenge for national and global governance that deeply impacts economic development, distribution, sustainability, and democracy everywhere.     

经济转型理论评析

经济转型之初 ,一些经济学家基于新古典经济学信条提出 ,可以通过“激进”措施将原来的计划体制一次性破除而重建一个全新的市场经济。但迅速私有化并没有带来企业治理结构的改善和原国有资产的有效重组。与此形成鲜明对照的是 ,中国的渐进改革却取得了成功 ,并得到了越来越广泛的认可。 2 0世纪 90年代中期以来 ,经济转型理论开始发生变化 ,“制度演进主义”的影响日渐扩大 ,经济学家开始强调市场经济支持性制度的重要性以及制度变革的长期性 ,认为分权、激励、竞争、良好的司法和会计制度等比私有化更重要 ,并在政治经济学层面上分析了不确定性、利益集团、政府、改革秩序与步骤对制度变迁的影响。     

Thomas DeGregori’s “Back to the Future”: A Comment

A fundamental principle of Karl Polanyi's institutional outlook is that any economic system has to be considered as a whole and as a historically specific social organization. This principle implies a comparative method and a critique of conventional economics. Besides, the problem of the interrelation between the economic system and other aspects of social life cannot be avoided. On this basis, Polanyi points out the peculiar "economic" nature of the market-capitalist society and explains the institutional transformations characterizing its history. The opposition "embedded/disembedded," used by Polanyi to distinguish pre-modern economies from the market economy, has been widely adopted in recent times, particularly by economic sociologists, as a key for understanding current complex economic phenomena. However, the reference to Polanyi often presupposes a distorted interpretation of his theory, and a different kind of institutional approach.     

Institution building and growth in transition economies

Drawing on the recent literature on economic institutions and the origins of economic development, we offer a political economy explanation of why institution building has varied so much across transition economies. We identify dependence on natural resources and the historical experience of these countries during socialism as major determinants of institution building during transition. Using natural resource reliance and the years under socialism to extract the exogenous component of institution building, we also show the importance of institutions in explaining the variation in economic development and growth across transition economies during the first decade of transition.     

Did support for economic and political reforms increase during the post‐communist transition,and if so,why?

We study the dynamics of individual support for changes in the economic and political system, using a unique dataset for 12 transition economies over the period 1991–2004. We document that support for transition was initially lower in the CIS countries and that there has been a converging trend in the support for reforms between the CIS and the Baltic and Central and Eastern European countries. We suggest several explanations for the initial divergence and the post‐98 convergence in support for transition between these three groups of countries, and show that economic growth, declining income inequality and improving quality of governance have contributed to increase the support for transition. In addition, we find that increased support for the market economy and democracy in the CIS is accompanied by a larger increase in trust towards the political institutions. Our results also confirm the implications of Aghion et al. ( 2010 )'s model of a negative correlation between trust and the demand for government regulation.     

Privatisation and Transition in Albania

This article considers the privatisation policy and its role in the transition to a market economy in Albania. The disintegration of the old regime took place over a much longer time than in other Central and East European countries, resulting in chaos and a political vacuum in which no systematic or effective policy could be formulated. The new government, committed to fundamental reforms necessary for a market economy, did not take power until after the second general election in March 1992. One outcome of this long pre-transition period was that the privatisation programme had to evolve gradually in the course of transformation, without ever having been planned in a comprehensive and integrated manner. Privatisation proceeded on five different fronts: small privatisation, privatisation of agriculture, housing, small and medium-sized enterprises and mass privatisation. The article discusses the progress of each aspect and provides up-to-date information and data on their progress. The privatisation of agriculture and housing were the most crucial aspects of the overall policy, with significant impacts on economic growth and the progress of the transformation programme. The privatised agricultural sector grew very rapidly and made a major contribution to pulling the whole economy out of the 'transformational recession'. Privatised housing created a significant wealth effect amongst the urban population, providing many of them with collateral or start-up capital. The privatisation of state-owned enterprises, however, was carried out with much more difficulty and controversy. Although auctions were to be the main method of transfer, ensuring a significant income for the treasury, in practice many enterprises were privatised through other methods, bringing in less income and giving rise to allegations of political favouritism. Another aspect of privatisation was the weak corporate governance mechanism which replaced state ownership. Many small and medium-sized enterprises (probably about half) were sold or transferred to their employees, without any outsider interest. The performance of this sector has to be monitored closely in order to assess the impact of massive insider privatisation, reminiscent of Russia's privatisation programme. Mass privatisation too, by distributing enterprise shares amongst the general public, resulted in the increased power of insiders. The shares of nearly 100 enterprises were transferred to the private sector over the first year of the implementation of this programme. Although the privatisation programme progressed very rapidly, no serious attention was paid to problems of corporate governance. Without concentrated ownership or the involvement of financial intermediaries to oversee and monitor the managers, it is unlikely that the expected efficiency gains will be realised. The political crisis resulting from the collapse of informal financial schemes brought the whole reform process, including the privatisation programme, to a halt in early 1997. It is expected that, with a new government in power, there will be a new push for reforms and an increased pace of privatisation. It is hoped that the renewed efforts will also deal with the shortcomings of the previous schemes-particularly the corporate governance issues.     

WHO SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE FOREIGN AID?

Abstract. This paper presents a simple model to investigate the effectiveness of foreign aid. It shows that foreign aid is most effective if it is given to a market economy with relatively high transaction efficiency. If transaction efficiency in a market economy is low due to, for instance, bad institutions or policies, then foreign aid will either be largely dissipated as transaction costs or can even lead to retrogression of market activities. In either case, it will be more effective to give foreign aid to poor primitive economies with no developed markets.     

Money Talks: Moral Economies of Earning a Living in Neoliberal East Africa

Neoliberal restructuring has targeted not just the economy, but also polity, society and culture, in the name of creating capitalist market societies. The societal repercussions of neoliberal policy and reform in terms of moral economy remain understudied. This article seeks to address this gap by analysing moral economy characteristics and dynamics in neoliberalised communities, as perceived by traders in Uganda and sex workers in Kenya. The interview data reveal perceived drivers that contributed to a significant moral dominance of money, self-interest, short-termism, opportunism and pragmatism. Equally notable are a perceived (i) close interaction between political–economic and moral–economic dynamics, and (ii) significant impact of the political–economic structure on moral agency. Respondents primarily referred to material factors usually closely linked to neoliberal reform, as key drivers of local moral economies. We thus speak of a neoliberalisation of moral economies, itself part of the wider process of embedding and locking-in market society structures in the two countries. An improved political economy of moral economy can help keep track of this phenomenon.