Private enforcement,corruption, and antitrust design

We examine how the rationale for enabling versus precluding private antitrust enforcement depends on whether antitrust enforcement is corruption-free or plagued by corruption. Corruption in courts affects the incentives to bring forth private antitrust lawsuits. This, in turn, along with corruption in antitrust agency enforcement, alters the incentives to commit antitrust violations. The social welfare effect of enabling private antitrust enforcement in the presence of corruption depends on whether corrupt officials in the ensuing bribery contests favor a particular firm and if so which one and to what extent. Under some circumstances, corruption actually increases the social desirability of private antitrust enforcement relative to the no-corruption scenario. Our analysis highlights that the effects of a given legal arrangement for antitrust enforcement critically depend on the corruption environment and, thus, that the appropriate design of antitrust institutions is context-specific.     

The Determinants of Tying Litigation, 1961–2001

The idea that changes in Supreme Court decision rules should have measurable effects on the volume of cases litigated has a compelling plausibility, and several models of litigation predict this result. The prediction is a fragile one, however, because it implies very restrictive assumptions about the probability distributions of the cases subject to dispute. The period studied includes four Supreme Court decisions widely regarded as changing the rules and altering the level of uncertainty surrounding the legality of the anti-tying provisions of the antitrust laws. Broad trends in antitrust activity generally and changes in firm profitability statistically explain over three-quarters of the observed variation in tying litigation. Changes in legal precedent have only modest effects upon litigation.

Harmonisation of Old-age Security Within the European Union

Not sufficiently harmonised national pension systems withinthe European Union distort the allocation of labour and endangerredistributive activities. This paper identifies the most decentralisedlevel of harmonisation which guarantees efficient allocationand enables redistribution. For this, we build on theoreticalresults from the literature to evaluate the realised distributionof the legal power between the European Union and the MemberStates and the resulting level of harmonisation. We find thatharmonisation is sub-optimally low. Binding rules guaranteedby the European Union are needed implying that the Member Stateshave to concede more fundamental responsibilities to the EuropeanUnion. (JEL F22, H55, K33, N34)     

Legal tradition and antitrust effectiveness

This article uses cross-country data to empirically investigate through which channel legal origin can influence antitrust effectiveness. The evidence shows that the adaptability channel (legal flexibility) is more important for explaining antitrust effectiveness than the political channel (authority independence). The evidence also suggests that countries in which a judicial decision is a source of law will provide more legal flexibility and will adapt more easily to changing economic circumstances. They will therefore also have better enforcement of antitrust rules. On the other hand, a legal tradition that takes no formal notice of legal precedent will make the competition environment much less predictable. To the extent that these findings are true, one would expect competition agencies in Common law countries to perform better than those in Civil law countries.     

Labor Market Institutions, Wages, and Investment: Review and Implications

Labor market institutions, via their effect on the wage structure,affect the investment decisions of firms in labor markets withfrictions. This observation helps explain rising wage inequalityin the US, but a relatively stable wage structure in Europein the 1980s. These different trends are the result of differentinvestment decisions by firms for the jobs typically held byless skilled workers. Firms in Europe have more incentives toinvest in less skilled workers, because minimum wages or unioncontracts mandate that relatively high wages have to be paidto these workers. I report some empirical evidence for investmentsin training and physical capital across the Atlantic, whichis roughly in line with this theoretical reasoning. (JEL E22,E24, J23, J24, J31)     

EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution

The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting fromEU Eastern enlargement on the welfare states of Western Europe.Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gainsfrom trade and specialization for all countries involved, itdoes so only if it meets with flexible labour markets and ifit is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state.This is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe.In addition to measures that make labour markets more flexible,the introduction of delayed integration of working migrantsand the home country principle for nonworking migrants is arational reaction of the state. The proposed new EU constitution,which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union,should be amended accordingly. (JEL E2, F2, H0, J3, J6)     

The Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics

There have been strong ties between the Cambridge Journal ofEconomics (CJE) and the Cambridge School of Keynesian Economics,from the very beginning. In this paper, the author investigatesthe environment that saw the birth of the CJE at Cambridge (UK),in 1977, and the relationship that linked it to the direct pupilsof Keynes. A critical question is explicitly examined: why didn'tthe ‘Keynesian revolution’ succeed in becoming apermanent winning paradigm? Some behavioural mistakes of themembers of the Keynesian School may explain this lack of success,but only to a certain extent. In any case, there were and therestill are remedies too. But what we are inheriting is a uniqueset of analytical building blocks (the paper lists eight ofthem) that makes this School of economics a viable (and in somedirections definitely superior) alternative to mainstream economics.Admittedly, there is some important work still to be done. Thepaper highlights the need for a two-stage approach, addressingpure theory and extensive institutional analysis. It is arguedthat a combination of the two would strengthen the coherenceof the theoretical foundations, and at the same time would providea fruitful extension of economic analysis to empirical, institutionaland economic dynamics investigations.     

Environmental self-auditing: setting the proper incentives for discovery and correction of environmental harm

Many firms conduct 'environmental audits' to test compliancewith a complex array of environmental regulations. Commentatorssuggest, however, that self-auditing is not as common as itshould be, because firms fear that what they find will be usedagainst them. This article analyzes self-auditing as a two-tieredincentive problem involving incentives both to test for andto effect compliance. After demonstrating the inadequacy ofconventional remedies, we show that incentives can be properlyaligned by conditioning fines on firms' investigative effort.In practice, however, the regulator may not be able to observesuch effort. Accordingly, we propose and evaluate the use ofthree observable proxies for self-investigation: the mannerin which the regulator detected the violation; the firm's owndisclosure of violations; and the firm's observed correctiveactions. Each method has its own efficiency benefits and informationalrequirements, and each is distinct from EPA's current auditpolicy.     

Oil explains all: desirable organisation of the Russian fuel markets (on the data of three waves of antitrust cases against oil companies)

This article considers the mutual influence of antitrust enforcement in the petroleum product markets and competition legislation in Russia. An analysis of infringement decisions by the Russian competition authority allows us to understand the perceived goals of economic policy in this sector. The shift from antitrust investigations and infringement decisions to a very specific set of remedies is explained by the desire to maintain low retail prices under increasing concentration without price subsidisation or promotion of entry at the refining stage of the value chain. The article highlights the specific use of antitrust legislation to maintain low fuel prices and support independent retailing companies. We also note the limitation this policy faces. The goals and effects of antitrust enforcement in the industry explain, in turn, the specific path of competition legislation development in Russia.     

Antitrust Enforcement and Nonenforcement as a Barrier to Imports – with Illustrations from the Japanese Film Dispute

The role of antitrust in opening foreign markets to imports is a strong yet often unpredictable undercurrent in international trade disputes. The U.S. government may seek to protect its exporters who are denied access to a foreign market either by enforcing U.S. antitrust laws or by using trade law remedies against the importing country for not enforcing its antitrust laws. Both actions raise issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction and comity.The primary goals of antitrust law and trade law are sometimes complementary but often diverge. Antitrust is primarily intended to benefit consumer welfare, while the purpose of trade law is to gain access to foreign markets for the benefit of domestic enterprises and their workforces. Consequently foreign market access pursued under antitrust law can raise novel issues when there is no apparent injury to domestic consumer welfare suffers from too little competition, whereas trade law pursue market access strictly as principles of fairness that have no necessary relationship with consumer welfare anywhere.This paper examines two aspects of antitrust law – (1) non-enforcement by the importing country, and (2) enforcement of U.S. law to compel access to the foreign market – and discusses the current dispute between Eastman Kodak Co. and Fujji Photo Film Co. as an illustration of the issues introduced above.     

Marx's value forms and Hayek's rules: a reinterpretation in the light of the dichotomy between physis and nomos

This paper argues that both Marx and Hayek objected to the dichotomybetween physis and nomos, and offered concepts which integrate,or mediate between, the two. Marx's value forms and Hayek'srules aim to grasp something neither purely natural nor purelyartificial or social, but ‘socially natural’. Valueforms and rules are natural in the sense that they pre-existagents and are taken by agents as given. On the other hand,forms and rules are social in that production relations or spontaneousorder are reproduced as the unintended consequences of agents'using forms or following rules. Thus value forms and rules standas links between agents and production relations or spontaneousorder.     

Institutional individualism and institutional change: the search for a middle way mode of explanation

After noting the lack of enthusiasm of several well-known scholarsconcerning the adoption of both methodological holism and methodologicalindividualism in its several versions, this paper shows thatinstitutional individualism is a different mode of explanationfrom both of these and also that it is not the same thing asthe so-called Popperian programme of situational analysis. Institutionalindividualism is a mode of explanation that yields non-systemicand non-reductionist explanations at the same time as it allowsfor the incorporation into economic theories and models of themany formal and informal institutional aspects surrounding allhuman interactions, whether these interactions take place withinstable structures of legal rules and social norms or whetherthey attempt to change the said rules and norms. Finally, thepaper shows that it is possible for old institutionalists tomake institutional individualist analyses of institutional changeswhile retaining the remaining methodological assumptions ofthe school. The same is true for new institutionalists. Someexamples are offered from both camps.     

Total repeal of antitrust legislation: A critique of Bork,Brozen, and Posner

Conclusion We have discussed the works of three eminent, conservative, free market oriented economists. Certainly, they constitute a reasonable sample of this universe of discourse. We have found that however profoundly they defend market institutions in other contexts, they fail to do so in the case of antitrust. Why this lacunae should exist on the part of people otherwise concerned with economic freedom is for another day's analysis. But that this is so is the only conclusion that may be fairly drawn from the discussion above.Walter Block is associate professor of economics at the College of the Holy Cross and executive editor of theReview of Austrian Economics. The author wishes to thank two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions, many of which are incorporated here into this paper. The usual caveat of course applies. I have liberally footnoted this paper with the writings of Murray N. Rothbard on the topic of monopoly and antitrust, but these few citations are far from adequate to express the degree to which I rely on his pathbreaking work in this field.     

Law and Preferences

Legal rules do more than provide incentives, they change people.When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via aprocess of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affectingthe market outcome, may affect the dynamics of preference formation.Analyzing the effect of different legal rules should thereforego beyond the analysis of the incentives they provide. It shouldalso include an analysis of their effect on the distributionof preferences and norms of behavior. We illustrate this claimby considering a simple market game in which individuals mayhave preferences that include fairness concerns. We show thatdifferent legal rules change not only the pattern of trade ina market game, but also individuals' fairness concerns. Thatis, different rules may eventually make individuals care more(or less) about a fair outcome. Specifically, our model suggeststhat enhanced remedies for breach of contract may reduce equilibriumpreferences for fairness.     

Robust political economy: The case of antitrust

The notion of robust political economy is applied to antitrust. It is argued that the universalizability of policy rules is crucial if both the knowledge problem and the incentive problem in antitrust are taken seriously. Policy recommendations of Williamson are compared with those of Hayek. It is further argued that the notion of universalizability is central not only with regard to antitrust but also with regard to a host of other policy areas. JEL Code B52, B53, D02, D80, K21, K40, L40. The author thanks his collaborators Lorenz Blume, Kim Eun Young, Janina Satzer and Michael Seebauer as well as Anne van Aaken for helpful comments and suggestions.     

IMPACT OF JOINING THE WTO ON CHINA's ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Abstract.  This essay applies a historical–institutional approach to assess the impact of WTO membership on China's economic, legal and political institutions. In each case historical and institutional trends are described, and the effects of WTO membership on these trends are examined. The topics include changes in economic structure and the rate of growth of GDP, formal legal institutions and the legal behavior of the Chinese people, and the forces contributing to the development of democratic political institutions in China.     

How Political Institutions Determine Corporate Governance Reforms: The Polity,Law and Corporate Practices in the Case of Switzerland

The aim of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the role that political institutions play in the reform processes of national corporate governance regimes. I argue that existing theories are limited in that they conceive of political institutions' impact on corporate governance largely in terms of a deterministic influence on the political coalitions that emerge and on the policy outcomes. Based on the analysis of the paradigmatic case of a consensual democracy – Switzerland – I show that the consensual polity does not directly determine the outcome of a reform process, but rather the direction of causality between legal changes and changes in practices as well as the nature of the changes. Consensual polities require large parliamentary majorities for legal change to happen. Therefore, corporate practices are likely to change before legal rules and less demanding forms of institutional change, such as ‘layering’, are favoured.     

CARTELISING GROUPS IN DYNAMIC HYPERBOLIC OLIGOPOLY WITH ANTITRUST THRESHOLD

Empirical evidence, and theoretical results have shown that, in an industry, higher concentration index indicates higher price‐cost margin. In order to detect collusive behaviour the antitrust authorities often monitor the Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index. We consider N‐firm oligopolies where a group of firms partially cooperate with each other, and monitor the Herfindahl‐Hirschman Index as well. After suspecting that the authorities might notice the violation of antitrust regulations, they stop their cooperation. The group will not cooperate again until the Index moves back to the legal domain. This flip‐flop dynamical model is formulated, the equilibria are determined, and the asymptotic properties of the system are examined.     

Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets

Although flat fees are common for divorces, wills and trusts,and probate, lawyers in personal injury cases generally arepaid by contingency fee or at an hourly rate. Arguments havebeen made that contingency fees increase low-quality, "frivolous"litigation but counterarguments suggest that contingency feesactually limit such litigation and instead it is hourly feesthat increase low-quality litigation. Using a difference indifferences test and data on a cross section of states in 1992,we test whether legal quality is lower under contingency orhourly fees. We also examine medical malpractice claims in Floridausing a time series centered around a law change that limitedcontingency fees. We also examine the impact of fee arrangementson the expected time to settlement. We find that hourly feesencourage the filing of low-quality suits and increase the timeto settlement (i.e., contingency fees increase legal qualityand decrease the time to settlement).     

医疗机构从零售药店购进药品所涉及的法律问题

目的：理清医疗机构从零售药店购进药品所涉及的相关法律问题，为正确适用法律提供参考。方法：案例研究、探索性的逻辑分析和法条分析方法。结果与结论：医疗机构从零售药店购进药品不具有违法性，不需要承担法律责任。零售药店在医疗机构要求的情况下，向医疗机构销售少量药品，也不具有违法性，不应当进行处罚。这一结论也适用于零售药店从其他零售药店购进药品的处理。