Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union

This paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilization in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union, which incorporates persistence in inflation and non-Ricardian consumers, and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy can play an important role in reacting to inflation, output, and the terms of trade, but that not much is lost if national fiscal policy is restricted to react, on the one hand, to national differences in inflation and, on the other hand, to either national differences in output or changes in the terms of trade. However, welfare is reduced if national fiscal policy responds only to output, ignoring inflation.     

Determinacy and Learnability of Monetary Policy Rules in Small Open Economies

This paper evaluates under which conditions different Taylor-type rules lead to determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in a simple "New Keynesian" small open economy model, developed by Gali and Monacelli (2005) . In particular, we extend Bullard and Mitra (2002) results of determinacy and E-stability in a closed economy to this small open economy framework. Our results highlight an important link between the Taylor principle and both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium in small open economies. More importantly, the degree of openness coupled with the nature of the policy rule adopted by the monetary authorities might change this link in important ways. A key finding is that, contrary to Bullard and Mitra, expectations-based rules that involve the consumer price inflation and/or the nominal exchange rate limit the region of E-stability and the Taylor Principle does not guarantee E-stability. We also show that some forms of managed exchange rate rules can help to alleviate problems of both indeterminacy and expectational instability, yet these rules might not be desirable since they can promote greater volatility in the economy.     

Globalization, Macroeconomic Performance, and Monetary Policy

The paper argues that many of the exaggerated claims that globalization has been an important factor in lowering inflation in recent years just do not hold up. Globalization does, however, have the potential to be stabilizing for individual economies and has been a key factor in promoting economic growth. The paper then examines four questions about the impact of globalization on the monetary transmission mechanism and arrives at the following answers: (i) Has globalization led to a decline in the sensitivity of inflation to domestic output gaps and thus to domestic monetary policy? No. (ii) Are foreign output gaps playing a more prominent role in the domestic inflation process, so that domestic monetary policy has more difficulty stabilizing inflation? No. (iii) Can domestic monetary policy still control domestic interest rates and so stabilize both inflation and output? Yes. (iv) Are there other ways, besides possible influences on inflation and interest rates, in which globalization may have affected the transmission mechanism of monetary policy? Yes.     

Monetary Policy and Stock Prices in an Open Economy

This paper studies monetary policy in a two-country model where agents can invest their wealth in both stock and bond markets. In our economy the foreign country hosts the only active equity market where also residents of the home country can trade stocks of listed foreign firms. We show that, in order to achieve price stability, the Central Banks in both countries should grant a dedicated response to movements in stock prices driven by relative productivity shocks. Determinacy of rational expectations equilibria and approximation of the Wicksellian interest rate policy by simple monetary policy rules are also investigated.     

Monetary Policy, Determinacy, and Learnability in a Two-Block World Economy

We study how determinacy and learnability of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium may be affected by monetary policy in a simple, two-country, New Keynesian framework under both fixed and flexible exchange rates. We find that open economy considerations may alter conditions for determinacy and learnability relative to closed economy analyses and that new concerns can arise in the analysis of classic topics such as the desirability of exchange rate targeting and monetary policy cooperation.     

Monetary Policy Choices in Emerging Market Economies: The Case of High Productivity Growth

We develop a general equilibrium model of an emerging market economy where productivity growth differentials between tradable and non-tradable sectors result in an equilibrium appreciation of the real exchange rate—the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect. The paper explores the dynamic properties of this economy and the welfare implications of alternative policy rules. We show that the real exchange rate appreciation limits the range of policy rules that, with a given probability, keep inflation and exchange rate within predetermined numerical targets. We also find that the B–S effect raises by an order of magnitude the welfare loss associated with policy rules that prescribe active exchange rate management.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with an Uncertain Cost Channel

The cost channel of monetary transmission describes a supply-side effect of interest rates on firms' costs. Previous research has found this effect to vary, both over time and across countries. Moreover, the cyclical nature of financial frictions is likely to amplify the cost channel. This paper derives optimal monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty about the true size of the cost channel. In a min–max approach, the central bank derives an optimal policy plan to be implemented by a Taylor rule. It is shown that uncertainty about the cost channel leads to an attenuated interest rate setting behavior. In this respect, the Brainard (1967) principle of cautious policy in the face of uncertainty continues to hold in both a Bayesian and a min–max framework.     

Monetary Policy in a Forward-Looking Input–Output Economy

This paper examines the implications for monetary policy of sticky prices in both final and intermediate goods in a New Keynesian model. Both optimal policy under commitment and discretionary policy under simple loss functions are studied. Household utility losses under alternative loss functions are compared; additionally, the robustness of policy performance to model and shock misperceptions and parameter uncertainty is examined. Targeting inflation in both consumer and intermediate goods performs better than targeting inflation in one sector; targeting price levels of both final and intermediate goods performs significantly better. Moreover, targeting price levels in both sectors yields superior robustness properties.     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.     

Economic Policy and the Great Depression in a Small Open Economy

We use a standard New Keynesian model of a small open economy, extended to include a government sector, to investigate the Great Depression in Australia. A calibrated model with a fixed exchange rate regime, similar to the gold standard, does well in replicating the dynamics of output during the interwar period. We then ask to what extent shocks to the economy would have been moderated by adopting modern‐day policies. We find that if policymakers had adopted a flexible exchange rate with a Taylor rule policy that output fluctuations during the Great Depression would have been moderated by up to 25%. Changes in government fiscal policy would also have moderated output fluctuations, but by a slightly smaller amount. Overall, we find that improved policy could have reduced output fluctuations by almost 50%.     

Do the ECB and the fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world

A two-country model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness is employed to investigate the implications for macroeconomic stability and the welfare properties of three international policy arrangements: (a) cooperative, (b) non-cooperative and (c) monetary union. I characterize the conditions under which there is scope for policy cooperation and quantify the costs of non-cooperation and monetary union. The non-cooperative equilibrium may be suboptimal because of terms of trade spillover effects, while monetary union may be suboptimal because of the sluggishness of relative prices. Both the costs of policy competition and of a monetary union are sensitive to the values assumed for the intertemporal and international demand elasticity and the degree of openness of the economy. Independently of the calibration scenario adopted, the ECB has little to gain by coordinating with the Fed.     

Home bias,exchange rate disconnect,and optimal exchange rate policy

This paper examines how much the central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to real exchange rate fluctuations. The paper first demonstrates, in a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, that home bias in consumption is important to replicate the exchange rate volatility and exchange rate disconnect documented in the data. When home bias is high, the shock to Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP) can substantially drive up exchange rate volatility while leaving the volatility of real macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, almost untouched. The model predicts that the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to that of GDP increases with the extent of home bias. This relation is supported by the data. A second-order accurate solution method is employed to find the optimal operational monetary policy rule. Our model suggests that the monetary authority should not seek to vigorously stabilize exchange rate fluctuations. In particular, when the central bank does not take a strong stance against the inflation rate, exchange rate stabilization may induce substantial welfare loss. The model does not detect welfare gain from international monetary cooperation, which extends Obstfeld and Rogoff's [Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K.,2002. Global implications of self-oriented national monetary rules, Quarterly Journal of Economics May, 503–535] findings to a DSGE model.     

Ben Bernanke in Doha: The Effect of Monetary Policy on Optimal Tariffs

Trade liberalization can imply slow and long adjustment processes. Taking account of these adjustment processes can change the evaluation of trade policy, especially when policymakers care more about the next couple of years than the infinite future. In this paper, I analyze the setting of tariffs in a two‐country model taking account of adjustment processes with special emphasis on the effects of nominal price rigidity and monetary policy. I show that nominal price rigidity induces policymakers with a short planning horizon to set lower tariffs because it enhances the short‐run drop in consumption following an increase in tariffs. Monetary policy that aggressively fights deviations from its inflation target implies even lower optimal tariffs.     

Phillips Curve Instability and Optimal Monetary Policy

Empirical evidence suggests the Phillips curve has flattened over the past few decades. To capture this feature of the data, I develop a framework where firms face a changing cost of price adjustment, which produces a Phillips curve with a slope coefficient that varies over time. To evaluate the implications for monetary policy, I construct the utility‐based welfare criterion where the relative weight on output gap deviations changes synchronously with the slope of the Phillips curve. The systematic component of the rule that implements optimal policy is constant under discretion and commitment.     

Changing Monetary Policy Rules, Learning, and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics

When the exchange rate is priced by uncovered interest parity and central banks set nominal interest rates according to a reaction function such as the Taylor rule, the real exchange rate will be determined by expected inflation and the output gap or the unemployment gap of the home and foreign countries. This paper examines the implications of these Taylor rule fundamentals for real exchange rate determination. Because the true parameters in central bank policy rules are unknown to the public and change over time, the model is presented in the context of a least squares learning environment. This simple learning model captures the volatility and the major swings in the real deutschemark/euro–dollar exchange rate from 1976 to 2007.     

The Effects of Bank Lending in an Open Economy

This article assesses the effects of bank lending in a small open economy with a floating exchange rate and sticky prices. A theoretical model with costly financial intermediation is developed for New Zealand. The results show that the long-run and business cycle effects of bank lending are small. Whether firms borrow from financial intermediaries or public debt markets is unlikely to affect economic activity. In other words, the financial structure, or degree to which a country's financial system is intermediary based or market based, does not matter.     

Monetary Policy Trade-Offs with a Dominant Oil Producer

We model oil production decisions from optimizing principles rather than assuming exogenous oil price shocks and show that the presence of a dominant oil producer leads to sizable static and dynamic distortions of the production process. Under our calibration, the static distortion costs the U.S. around 1.6% of GDP per year. In addition, the dynamic distortion, reflected in inefficient fluctuations of the oil price markup, generates a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and aligning output with its efficient level. Our model is a step away from discussing the effects of exogenous oil price variations and toward analyzing the implications of the underlying shocks that cause oil prices to change in the first place.     

Monetary Policy Transmission with Interbank Market Fragmentation

This paper shows how interbank market fragmentation disrupts the transmission of monetary policy. Fragmentation is the fact that banks, depending on their country of location, have different probabilities of default on their interbank borrowings. Once fragmentation is introduced into standard theoretical models of monetary policy implementation, excess liquidity arises endogenously. This leads short-term interest rates to depart from the central bank policy rates. Using data on monetary policy operations, I show that this mechanism has been at work in the euro area since 2008. The model is used to analyze conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures.     

Quantitative Goals for Monetary Policy

We study empirically the macroeconomic effects of an explicit de jure quantitative goal for monetary policy. Quantitative goals take three forms: exchange rates, money growth rates, and inflation targets. We analyze the effects on inflation of both having a quantitative target and hitting a declared target. Our empirical work uses an annual data set covering 42 countries between 1960 and 2000, and takes account of other determinants of inflation (such as fiscal policy, the business cycle, and openness to international trade) and the endogeneity of the monetary policy regime. We find that both having and hitting quantitative targets for monetary policy is systematically and robustly associated with lower inflation. The exact form of the monetary target matters somewhat (especially for the sustainability of the monetary regime) but is less important than having some quantitative target. Successfully achieving a quantitative monetary goal is also associated with less volatile output.