Deregulation, liberalization and consolidation of the Mexican banking system: Effects on competition

This paper analyzes the evolution of competition in the Mexican banking system in the period 1993-2005, a period of deregulation, liberalization and consolidation of the sector. For this purpose we use two indicators of competition from the theory of industrial organization (the Lerner index and the Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic). The empirical evidence does not permit us to reject the existence of monopolistic competition. The Lerner index shows a decrease in competitive rivalry in the deposit market and an increase in the loan market, a cross subsidization strategy being observed. The results obtained call into question the effectiveness of the measures implemented hitherto, aimed at increasing the competition of the Mexican banking system.     

Strategic online banking adoption

In this paper we study the determinants of banks’ decisions to adopt a transactional website for their customers. Using a panel of commercial banks in the United States for the period 2003–2006, we show that although bank-specific characteristics are important determinants of banks’ adoption decisions, competition also plays a prominent role. The extent of competition is related to the geographic overlap of banks in different markets and their relative market share in terms of deposits. In particular, banks adopt online banking services earlier in markets where their competitors have already adopted this technology. This paper is one of the first to construct local banking markets using the geographic market definitions delimited by the CASSIDI® Database compiled at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.     

Does post-crisis restructuring decrease the availability of banking services? The case of Turkey

This study examines the relationship between post-crisis bank consolidation and the number of bank branches in Turkey. Using a unique data set, the analysis addresses several issues related to the impact of market characteristics on branching behavior. The findings suggest that sales of failed institutions by the central authority lead to branch closures in small and uncompetitive markets where the buyer does not have a prior presence. Contrary to popular belief, mergers between healthy institutions do not always cause a decrease in the number of branches; rather, they are shown to increase the availability of banking services in concentrated markets.     

Bouncing out of the banking system: An empirical analysis of involuntary bank account closures

Using a new database, we document the determinants of involuntary consumer bank account closures. During 2001–2005, approximately 30 million debit accounts were involuntarily closed for excessive overdrafting. We focus on multiple factors to explain this phenomenon: household economics and financial decision-making ability, social capital, bank policies, and the alternative financial services sector. Involuntary closures are more frequent in US counties with a larger fraction of single mothers, lower education levels, lower wealth, and higher unemployment. Closures are higher in communities with high property crime rates and low electoral participation. Bank policies have an independent relation to closures, with counties having more competitive banking markets and more multi-market banks experiencing higher closure rates; bank structure also seems to affect the speed at which banks adjust their policies to changes in household income. Finally, using both national data and a state-level shift in regulation, we find evidence that access to payday lending leads to higher rates of involuntary account closure.     

European banking: An overview

Against a background of far-reaching structural change in the banking sector, this article reviews the recent academic literature on developments in European banking. European banking markets have become increasingly integrated in recent years, but barriers to full integration, especially in retail banking, still remain. European integration has possible implications for systemic risk, and poses various challenges for the current supervisory framework. The banks’ responses to the changing competitive environment include the pursuit of strategies of diversification, vertical product differentiation and consolidation. European integration has implications for competition in banking markets, for the nature of long-term borrower-lender relationships, and for the relationships between ownership structure, technological change and bank efficiency. The article concludes by reviewing recent literature on the credit channel in the monetary transmission mechanism, and interest rate pass-through.     

Obstacles to a global banking system: “Old Europe” versus “New Europe”

“Old Europe” – the developed nations of continental Europe – averages only about 15% foreign bank ownership, whereas “New Europe” – the transition nations of Eastern Europe – averages about 70%. Similar findings hold elsewhere in the world – developed nations tend to have much lower foreign bank ownership shares than developing nations. We examine the causes of the differences within Europe with an eye toward more general conclusions. Our findings suggest that the low foreign bank shares in “Old Europe” – and perhaps developed nations more generally – may primarily result from net comparative disadvantages for foreign banks and relatively high implicit government entry barriers. The high foreign penetration in “New Europe” – and perhaps developing nations more generally – may be due to net comparative advantages for foreign banks and low government entry barriers, particularly in nations that reduced their state bank ownership.     

On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries

This paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies. It sheds light on the competition-stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators: the degree of market power, bank cost and profit efficiency, and overall firm stability. The results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency, despite significant cost efficiency losses. The findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability, and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies.     

Product differentiation and efficiencies in the retail banking industry

We empirically quantify the welfare implications of bank entry in the United States between 2000 and 2008. We use a fully structural framework that combines a differentiated demand model with an endogenous product model to investigate the market outcomes. We find no evidence for under- or over-entry. Compared with the socially efficient outcome, there is a mild welfare loss resulting from banks entering wrong locations in product space. Compared with the observed outcome, consumer surplus drops by 20–38% and bank profits decline by 48–59% when banks are homogeneous. Therefore product differentiation significantly improves welfare under free entry.     

Value creation in banking through strategic alliances and joint ventures

A large number of studies (DeYoung et al., 2009) analyze merger outcomes in the financial industry, while other forms of business cooperation are still poorly investigated. Our paper examines results of strategic alliances and joint ventures in European and US banking over the period 1999–2009. First, we estimate abnormal returns around the deal announcement date and then these are regressed on a large set of explanatory variables. We show that joint ventures create shareholder value when involving non-banking financial partners and allowing banks to expand abroad, while international strategic alliances tend to destroy shareholder value.     

A note on the price- and cost structure of retail payment services in the Swedish banking sector 2002

We estimate private costs in the Swedish banking sector for the production of payment services and investigate to what extent the price structure reflects the estimated cost structure. We find that (i) banks tend to use two-part tariffs but (ii) variable costs are poorly reflected in transaction fees towards both consumers and corporate customers. (iii) There exist large cross subsidies between different payment services, foremost from acquiring card payments to cash distribution to the public, while payment services as a whole are not subsidized.     

Cross-selling,switching costs and imperfect competition in British banks

This paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of British banking in the presence of cross-selling and switching costs during 1993–2008. It presents estimates of a model of banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross-selling of loans and off-balance sheet transactions. The evidence from panel estimation of the model indicates that the consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period, as a result of weaker competitiveness in the loan market. Additionally, the weaker competitiveness in the loan market appears to facilitate the cross-selling behaviour of British banks, which helps explain the rapid growth of non-interest income during the last two decades.     

The identification of technology regimes in banking: Implications for the market power-fragility nexus

Neglecting the existence of different technologies in banking can contaminate efficiency, market power, and other performance measures. By simultaneously estimating (i) technology regimes conditional on exogenous factors, (ii) efficiency conditional on risk management, and (iii) Lerner indices of German banks, we identify three distinct technology regimes: Public & Retail, Small & Specialized, and Universal & Relationship. System estimation at the regional level reveals that greater bank market power increases bank profitability but also fosters corporate defaults. Corporate defaults, in turn, lead to higher probabilities of bank distress, which supports the market power-fragility hypothesis.     

Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: Empirical evidence

Using aggregate balance sheet data from banks across the EU-25 over the period from 1997 to 2005 we provide empirical evidence that national banking market concentration has a negative impact on European banks’ financial soundness as measured by the Z-score technique while controlling for macroeconomic, bank-specific, regulatory, and institutional factors. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that Eastern European banking markets exhibiting a lower level of competitive pressure, fewer diversification opportunities and a higher fraction of government-owned banks are more prone to financial fragility whereas capital regulations have supported financial stability across the entire European Union.     

Managers and efficiency in banking

This paper presents evidence on the impact of managers on cost efficiency in banking. Stochastic frontier analysis is applied to a unique Finnish data set. Manager age and education have strong yet complicated effects on efficiency. The impact of age on efficiency depends on education. A university degree is useful mainly in the largest banks of the sample. Educational background seems to be less important for young managers than for mature ones. Managing director changes are systematically followed by efficiency changes. Retirement typically causes an efficiency improvement whereas other manager changes can either improve or weaken efficiency. However, in many cases mature managers outperform their young colleagues.     

Demand estimation and consumer welfare in the banking industry

This paper estimates a structural demand model for commercial bank deposit services in order to measure the effects on consumers given dramatic changes in bank services throughout US branching deregulation in the 1990s. Following the discrete choice literature, consumer decisions are based on prices and bank characteristics. Consumers are found to respond to deposit rates, and to a lesser extent, to account fees, in choosing a depository institution. Moreover, consumers respond favorably to the branch staffing and geographic density, as well as to the bank’s age, size, and geographic diversification. Consumers in most markets experience a slight increase in welfare throughout the period.     

An economic capital model integrating credit and interest rate risk in the banking book

Banks often measure credit and interest rate risk in the banking book separately and then add the risk measures to determine economic capital. This approach misses complex interactions between the two risk types. We develop a framework where these risks are analysed jointly. Since banking book positions are generally not marked to market, our model is based on book value accounting. Our simulations show that interactions matter, and that ignoring them leads to risk overstatement. The magnitude of the errors depends on the structure of the balance sheet and on the repricing characteristics of assets and liabilities.     

The cost of market power in banking: Social welfare loss vs. cost inefficiency

This paper analyses the relationship between market power in the loan and deposit markets and efficiency in the EU-15 countries over 1993–2002. Results show the existence of a positive relationship between market power and cost X-efficiency, allowing rejection of the so-called quiet life hypothesis [Berger, A.N., Hannan, T.H., 1998. The efficiency cost of market power in the banking industry: A test of the ‘quiet life’ and related hypotheses. Review of Economics and Statistics 8 (3), 454–465]. The social welfare loss attributable to market power in 2002 represented 0.54% of the GDP of the EU-15. Results show that the welfare gains associated with a reduction of market power are greater than the loss of bank cost efficiency, showing the importance of economic policy measures aimed at removing the barriers to outside competition.     

Asset management and investment banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.     

Market power and reputational concerns in the ratings industry

This paper studies the incentives of rating agencies to reveal the information that they obtain about their client firms. In the model, rating agencies seek to maximize their reputation and protect their market power. They observe public information and obtain either precise or noisy private information about a firm. Reputational concerns dictate that a rating reflects private information when it is precise. However, when private information is noisy, two situations arise. In a monopoly, the rating agency may ignore private information and issue a rating that conforms to public information. Under some conditions, it may even become cautious and issue bad ratings ignoring both types of information. With competition, however, it has incentives to contradict public information as a way to pretend that it holds precise private information. Moreover, it may become more likely to issue good ratings in an attempt to protect market power.