How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?

We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity‐linked pay and exhibit higher pay‐performance (delta) and pay‐risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity‐linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost.     

Pay at the executive suite: How do US banks compensate their top management teams?

This study examines how a large sample of US banks compensates their top management teams (i.e., the top four to five highest ranking executives in each bank). We observe two tiers of compensation in the executive suite: the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the rest of the top management team. CEOs receive not only greater pay in absolute dollar, but are also rewarded more in relation to performance, as manifested in having a larger portion of their pay in performance contingent compensation. Below the CEO, top executives have similar compensation structure and pay to performance elasticities. The results are robust to a significant size effect, and alternate measures of performance.     

Justifying top management pay in a transitional economy

We investigate some aspects of top management pay in China's listed firms. We find positive pay and performance sensitivities and elasticities for top executives. In terms of magnitude, these sensitivities are similar to those reported in U.S. firms during the 1970s. However, the pay and performance relation is slightly weaker for firms located in less developed provinces. We also find that the pay disparities between top managers and employees are positively related to a firm's performance. Thus, it appears that any deviation away from a manager-worker compensation norm has to be justified by superior firm performance. In additional analyses, we find that managers' perquisites are not related to performance.     

Underwater Options and the Dynamics of Executive Pay-to-Performance Sensitivities

We empirically analyze the dynamics of executives' pay‐to‐performance sensitivities. Option pay‐to‐performance sensitivities become weaker as options fall underwater, often leading to pressures to reprice options or restore pay‐to‐performance sensitivity in other ways. Building a detailed data set on executives' portfolios of stock and options, we find that the responsiveness of pay‐to‐performance sensitivities (created by all executive holdings of stock and options) to changes in stock price is large. The elasticity of pay‐to‐performance sensitivities with respect to stock price decreases is about 0.7 and is larger for high‐option executives and for executives with high percentages of options already underwater. The dominant mechanism through which companies offset declines in option pay‐to‐performance sensitivities is larger option grants following stock price declines; on average, these larger grants restore approximately 40% of the stock‐price‐induced pay‐to‐performance sensitivity declines. Option repricings are inconsequential in this regard, despite the attention they have attracted. In looking at positive returns, we find the reverse: higher returns both directly increase pay‐to‐performance sensitivities and lead to larger option grants, which raise pay‐to‐performance sensitivities further. Thus, option grants to executives tend to be largest following large stock price increases or large stock price decreases.     

Contestability and Pay Differential in the Executive Suites

In comparison to the abundant evidence on CEOs' compensations, little is known about the compensation of other senior executives, and on how the pay differential between CEO and other senior executives affects firm performance. We examine several potential explanations of the pay differential in the executive suite, using a sample of 367 Israeli firms listed on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The empirical results fail to support the tournament and pay equity models. Instead, our evidence suggests a model where senior executives are encouraged (by the structure implied in their pay contract) to cooperate with each other (the team playing model). In a subset of firms managed by their owners we observe greater pay differentials between the owner-CEO and other senior executives. Interestingly, only in this subset of owner-managed firms, higher pay differentials can be associated with better firm performance.     

Confucian culture and the external pay gap

We examine the impact of Confucian philosophy on external pay gaps, and find that a Confucianist atmosphere is negatively associated with firms’ external pay gaps for both executives and employees. Mechanistically, the Confucian concept of “righteousness” reduces the self-interested motivation of management, in turn reducing executives’ external pay gap; “humaneness” causes management to focus on protecting employees’ rights and interests, benefiting employees’ compensation; and “honesty” improves information disclosure, reducing the external compensation gap for both executives and general employees. The inhibitory effect of Confucian culture on the external pay gap is greater in regions with weak formal institutions and non-state-owned firms, while foreign cultural shocks attenuate the Confucian influence. Finally, the Confucian culture-driven reduction of the external pay gap improves enterprises’ economic efficiency.     

Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section

Little evidence exists that firms index executive compensation to remove the influence of marketwide factors. We argue that executives can, in principle, replicate such indexation in their private portfolios. In support, we find that market risk has little effect on the use of stock‐based pay for the average executive. But executives' ability to “undo” excessive market risk can be hindered by wealth constraints and inalienability of human capital. We replicate the standard result that there is little relative performance evaluation (RPE) for the average executive, but find strong evidence of RPE for younger executives and executives with less financial wealth.     

商业银行管理层股票期权激励:特征及其影响因素——基于美国银行业的实证研究

本文以1996～2005年间美国43家代表性商业银行和98家制造业企业为样本,实证分析了商业银行管理层股票期权补偿激励的特征和影响因素。结果表明:商业银行管理层股票期权补偿占总报酬补偿比例的变化呈现出先升后降的倒U型趋势,商业银行管理层股票期权补偿占总报酬补偿的比例显著地低于制造业的这一比例;管理层股票期权补偿与商业银行成长机会、外部董事比例存在着显著的正相关关系,而与杠杆比率呈显著负相关;资产规模、管理层股票补偿对股票期权补偿水平的影响为负,但不显著;行业管制与管理层股票期权补偿费用的会计处理方法对银行业股票期权补偿有显著的影响。     

Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

Six Factors That Explain Executive Pay (and its Problems)

The authors start by showing that six factors—responsibility (i.e., position and company size), industry, pay inflation, business risk, performance and company pay policy—explain over 75% of the variation in the pay of top-five U.S. executives for a sample of 75,000 cases during the years 1997–2008. They also show that the current structure of top-executive pay creates a stronger incentive for revenue growth than for shareholder value growth, and that a 10% increase in shareholder value increases incentive compensation by only 3%. Moreover, their research suggests that the “value incentive” of the average U.S. executive is only one third as strong as the incentive that would be provided by simple “sharing” concepts, such as those provided by plans that give executives a fixed percentage of economic profit or annual grants of a fixed number of shares of stock. The article concludes by reviewing some recent research on incentives and company performance and offering suggestions to help investors identify companies with strong and cost-efficient shareholder value incentives.     

Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad

Principal-agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm's own performance. Recently, it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests; that is, they can enjoy “pay for luck” as well as “pay for performance.” We first show that this argument is incomplete. The positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk. If executives’ pay is tied to market movements, they can only expect to receive the market-determined return for risk-bearing. This argument, however, assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck. If executives can truly influence the setting of their pay, they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest, namely, when the benchmark has fallen. Using industry benchmarks, we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down (in which case, pay for luck would reduce compensation) than when it is up. These empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks, and they suggest that the average executive loses 25–45% less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck.     

Executive compensation and aspirational peer benchmarking

Using novel data on explicit compensation benchmarking peer groups, I document that small public firms engage in upward compensation benchmarking to a much greater extent than larger firms. Small firms choose aspirational peers that reflect their executives’ shifting opportunity sets. For these firms, compensation benchmarking is indicative of future growth and performance, and the rate at which pay adjusts toward peer levels is sensitive to executives’ outside employment opportunities. Growing and outperforming small firms strategically use upward benchmarking to adjust pay in an effort to retain valuable managerial talent.     

Managerial compensation: Luck,skill or labor markets?

Luck, skill and labor markets all have empirical support as determinants of managerial compensation. We examine the relative importance of pay for luck, managerial skill and labor market opportunities in determining compensation. We measure luck as the predictable component of firm performance, measure skill using managerial fixed effects and measure labor market opportunities as the compensation of executives at matched firms. Our results imply that managerial skill is the most important determinant of managers' compensation, followed by firm size and labor market opportunities, and that luck is not an important determinant of managerial compensation.     

Firm-supplier relations and managerial compensation

In this paper we examine customer firms’ managerial compensation policies when they have important supplier relations. We show that firms with greater reliance on their suppliers tend to offer higher total- and equity-based pay but lower risking-taking incentives to its top executives. Our results are consistent with the argument that suppliers making firm-specific investments are concerned about the customer firm’s prospects. Therefore, firms with important supplier relations use the compensation policies of their top executives (more equity-based and less risk-taking) to signal their commitment to a stable and promising performance in the future. To address endogeneity issues arising out of time-varying omitted variables, we exploit a 2SLS procedure to supplement our baseline OLS findings. Our results are robust alternate measures of suppliers’ relationship-specific investments and econometric models. Overall, our results indicate that some of the heterogeneity in managerial compensation can be attributed to characteristics of the firm’s supply-chain relations.     

How to Tie Equity Compensation to Long-Term Results

Companies, investors, and regulators around the world are now seeking to tie executives' payoffs to long-term results and avoid rewarding executives for short-term gains. Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of top executives' pay, the authors analyze how such compensation should best be structured to provide executives with incentives to focus on long-term value creation.
To improve the link between equity compensation and long-term results, the authors recommend that executives be prevented from unwinding their equity incentives for a significant time period after vesting. At the same time, however, the authors suggest that it would be counterproductive to require that executives hold their equity incentives until retirement, as some have proposed. Instead, the authors recommend that companies adopt a combination of "grant-based" and "aggregate" limitations on the unwinding of equity incentives.
Grant-based limitations would allow executives to unwind the equity incentives associated with a particular grant only gradually after vesting, according to a fixed, pre-specified schedule put in place at the time of the grant. Aggregate limitations on unwinding would prevent an executive from unloading more than a specified fraction of the executive's freely disposable equity incentives in any given year.
Finally, the authors emphasize the need for effective limitations on executives' use of hedging and derivative transactions that would weaken the connection between executive payoffs and long-term stock values that a well-designed equity arrangement should produce.     

Are long-tenured CEOs rent seekers? Analysis of cash compensation and post disposal performance

Are typical long-tenured CEOs rent-seekers? Do compensation committees consider undiversified risk for veteran executives and design their cash pay to limit their risk exposure? Because an exit decision requires board approval, discontinued operations provide a unique setting to analyze intervention by compensation committees. Seasoned managers should require less oversight because their ability has been revealed over time. However, as CEOs advance in their careers, they are more likely to acquire power to influence board decisions. They are also more risk averse and potentially more myopic than younger CEOs because they hold a large undiversified portfolio. Lucrative labor markets for talented retired executives can incentivize long-tenured CEOs to maintain a solid reputation. I reexamine the previously reported differential sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to positive or negative-valued disposal decisions, which can be viewed as rent-seeking. I show that cash pay for veteran CEOs are shielded from the effect of both negative and positive-valued discontinued operations, suggesting that compensation committees alter their cash pay. This evidence does not support rent-seeking. I also find strong evidence that long-tenured CEOs make better exit decisions to improve future firm performance than less experienced executives.     

The Subjective Valuation of Indexed Stock Options and Their Incentive Effects

We analyze the potential role of indexed stock options in future pay‐for‐performance executive compensation contracts. We present a unified framework for index‐linked stock options, discuss their incentive effects, argue that indexation schemes based on the capital‐asset pricing model (CAPM) are the most suitable for executive compensation, and derive a subjective pricing model for the class of CAPM‐based indexed stock options. Contrary to earlier work, executives would not be motivated to take on investment projects with high idiosyncratic risk once their lack of wealth diversification and degree of risk aversion are factored into the analysis.     

关键下属高管晋升锦标赛的创新激励效应研究

本文以2006-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,探讨关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距如何影响企业创新.研究发现:关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距越大,企业创新产出越高.进一步地,相比整个高管团队内部的薪酬差距,关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响更强;关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距对企业创新的激励效应主要体现在关键下属高管晋升CEO的机会较大时,以及国有企业和技术密集型行业中.此外,降低代理成本是关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进企业创新的重要作用机制,且关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进了企业创新对企业价值的提升作用.本文研究结论对推动企业创新及优化上市公司高管薪酬激励体系具有重要的现实意义.     

The Relation Between Insider-Trading Restrictions and Executive Compensation

In this study I investigate the relation between firm‐level insider‐trading restrictions and executive compensation. Using a trading‐window proxy for the existence of such restrictions, I test predictions that insiders will demand compensation for these restrictions and that firms will need to increase incentives to restricted insiders. I find that firms that restrict insider trading pay a premium in total compensation relative to firms not restricting insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of pay. Furthermore, these firms use more incentive‐based compensation and their insiders hold larger equity incentives relative to firms that do not restrict insider trading. These results hold after controlling for the endogenous decision to restrict insiders and are consistent with the notion that insider trading plays a role in rewarding and motivating executives.     

企业内部薪酬差距与人力资本结构调整

本文考察薪酬差距如何影响企业内部的人力资本结构变动。基于员工不同教育程度划分人力资本层次,本文研究发现:(1)薪酬差距的增加显著降低了大学学历员工的比例,同时提升了高中及以下学历员工的比例;(2)通过构造工具变量和基于全球性经济危机的场景设定,我们发现薪酬差距和人力资本结构之间存在显著的因果关系;(3)在薪酬差距水平较高的情况下,薪酬差距的增加显著吸引了更有可能进入企业中高层的高学历员工。在薪酬差距水平较低的情况下,扩大薪酬差距显著提升(降低)了高中及以下学历(大学学历)员工比例,一个可能原因在于不同学历员工的议价能力存在差异。(4)薪酬差距与人力资本结构变化之间的相关性主要体现在规模较大、管理者平均年龄较低的企业。(5)人力资本结构在薪酬差距影响创新的过程中发挥了显著的中介效应,薪酬差距提升了研究生和本科学历员工比例,促进了企业创新。