Explaining underpricing of IPOs in frontier markets: Evidence from the Nigeria Stock Exchange

The paper provides empirical analyses of IPO underpricing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, from the period 1990 to 2006. The results indicate an average abnormal initial day returns of 43.1%. There is evidence of long-run underperformance of 0.6%. Results from our regression model explaining initial abnormal returns for the IPOs of Nigeria show that size of firm and audit quality are important variables affecting underpricing. The results also show the presence of a non-linear relationship between the offer price and underpricing.     

The Role of Insider Influence in Mutual-to-Stock Conversions

Using a sample of 347 demutualizing thrifts from 1991 to 2004, we show that the level of inside participation is not a traditional signal of firm performance. We conclude that unanticipated inside participation reflects the incentives of insiders to reduce the size of the offer to influence the level of expected initial public offer (IPO) returns. We find unanticipated inside participation is related to lower offer size and higher initial returns, but we do not find a relationship between inside participation and post-IPO performance.     

INVESTORS ADJUST EXPECTATIONS AROUND SELL-SIDE ANALYST REVISIONS IN IPO RECOMMENDATIONS

In this article I compare investor response to sell-side analyst recommendation revisions of initial public offering (IPO) firms in the first three years after issue with that of a benchmark control sample of firms that have been public longer. I test whether investors in IPO firms adjust their initially optimistic expectations as information about new issues is released and uncertainty is resolved. In support of my hypothesis that investors adjust expectations downward, I find abnormally negative returns around analyst revisions of IPO firm recommendations. Additionally, I find the effect of analyst revisions on long-run performance of IPO firms is economically significant.     

Laddering in initial public offerings

Laddering is a practice whereby the allocating underwriter requires the ladderer to buy additional shares of the issuer in the aftermarket as a condition for receiving shares at the offer price. This paper identifies factors that create incentives to engage in this type of manipulation and models the effect of laddering on initial public offering (IPO) pricing. I show that laddering has a bigger effect on the market price of IPOs with greater expected underpricing (without laddering) and greater expected momentum in the aftermarket; laddering increases the IPO offer price, the aftermarket price, and the money left on the table but does not necessarily increase the percentage underpricing; laddering contributes to long-run underperformance and creates a negative correlation between short-run and long-run returns; and profit-sharing increases the extent of laddering and the percentage underpricing.     

An empirical analysis of Mexican and US closed-end mutual fund IPOs

We examine 135 Mexican closed-end fund IPOs and 370 Mexican non-fund IPOs that issued between 1994 and 2003 along with 217 contemporaneous US fund IPOs and document three primary results. First, we find that Mexican IPOs in the aggregate experience no significant underpricing, unlike their US IPO counterparts. Both Mexican and US IPOs experience significantly negative long-run performance. Second, Mexican closed-end fund IPOs experience positive long-run performance, significantly better than Mexican non-fund IPOs which experience negative long-run performance. Unlike Mexican fund IPOs, US fund IPOs experience negative long-run performance. Third, we find that both Mexican and US debt-backed closed-end fund IPOs significantly outperform equity-backed closed-end IPOs. In Mexico, debt-backed funds experience positive abnormal returns, compared to negative abnormal returns for Mexican equity-backed funds, US debt-backed funds, and US equity-backed funds.     

What comprises IPO initial returns: Evidence from the Chinese market

We studied the IPO price and long-term performance in China after the adoption of the book-building pricing mechanism. Using comparable firm value, we separated the IPO initial returns into pre-market deliberate underpricing and aftermarket overpricing. This separation enables us to clearly test different theories regarding high IPO initial returns. We find little evidence supporting the classic information theory on IPO underpricing but strong evidence supporting the behavioral arguments regarding IPO overpricing. Even though the results are specific to the Chinese market, we find some general results on what composes and drives IPO initial returns that have been lacking in the IPO literature.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

Bankruptcy spillover effects on strategic alliance partners

This paper examines whether a party to a strategic alliance or joint venture suffers from spillover effects when the other partner files for bankruptcy. We find that the non-bankrupt strategic alliance partners, on average, experience a negative stock price reaction around their partner firm's bankruptcy filing announcement. This negative effect is strongest for longer partnerships and those with higher returns at the announcement of the initial alliance formation. Furthermore, horizontal alliance firms in declining industries have lower returns, indicating that industry conditions can exacerbate expected problems for the non-bankrupt firm. Non-bankrupt partners also experience drops in profit margins and investment levels in the subsequent two years with the worst performance concentrated among the longer-term agreements. There is very little impact on the returns or performance for joint venture partners, which suggests that these agreements are more insulating for the partner firm.     

Founder CEO management and the long-run investment performance of IPO firms

This study provides a comparative analysis of the long-run investment performance of founder and non-founder CEO led IPO firms in high and low technology environments. We find weak evidence of superior long-run investment performance on the part of founder CEO led IPO firms, since the significance of the results are sensitive to choice of benchmark, portfolio weighting method, and factor regression model. However, in the context of high technology IPO firms, we find consistent evidence to indicate that founder CEO led firms provide significantly higher long-run returns relative to non-founder CEO led firms. Our results suggest that the unique nature of founder CEO leadership is particularly beneficial to IPO firms in high technology environments.     

Long‐term Performance of Greek IPOs

We analyse the long‐run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–2002, computing buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international evidence and reveal long‐term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. We also find that long‐term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross‐sectional regressions of long‐run performance disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is due to excessive supply of issues during the ‘hot IPO period’. Results associated with pricing during the ‘hot IPO period’ indicate positive short‐ (1‐year), medium‐ (2‐year) and negative long‐term (3‐year) performance.     

Do secondary shares in the IPO process have a negative effect on aftermarket performance?

We revisit and extend the topic of secondary share sales and revisions in IPOs. First we test to determine if secondary share sales constitute a negative signal that is captured in aftermarket performance. We find secondary share sales in general are not correlated with poorer initial or long-run performance, but selling by officers and directors is associated with poorer long-run returns. Second, we examine if secondary share revisions (1) reflect selling shareholders’ attempts to conceal private information or (2) are contingent upon whether a firm can reach its goal of raising sufficient capital. We find empirical support for a capital goal, but not for concealment.     

Firm characteristics and long-run stock returns after corporate events

The well-documented abnormal long-run buy-and-hold returns to firms issuing equity in initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings, firms bidding in mergers, and firms initiating dividends can be attributed to imperfect control-firm matching. In addition to firm size and market-to-book ratio, event firms on average differ from control firms in terms of idiosyncratic volatility, liquidity, return momentum, and capital investment, each of which also explains returns. We propose a simple regression-based approach to control for differences in firm characteristics across event and control firms, and we show that long-run abnormal returns do not differ significantly from zero for event firms in the 1980 to 2005 period. The returns to event firms are, therefore, consistent with patterns known to exist for the broad stock market and do not require event-specific explanations.     

IPO限价发行与新股二级市场价格泡沫——论股票市场“弹簧效应”

本文通过对比2009年7月1日至2014年6月30日IPO市场化定价发行阶段与2014年7月1日至2018年6月30日IPO限价发行阶段共1950个IPO样本,发现IPO限价发行对于新股在二级市场股价表现具有"弹簧效应":即抑制股票一级市场发行价格会造成新股在二级市场价格短期内超涨,限价发行新股的二级市场定价显著高于市场化定价发行新股的二级市场定价。限价发行引起的过高二级市场定价最终导致股票长期回报率低下。另外,创业板公司"弹簧效应"显著强于主板公司。这些实证结果都可以被本文提出的一级市场价格压抑造成二级市场非理性投资者上涨预期一致、盲目追涨的理论模型所解释。本文的研究指出抑制股票一级市场定价虽然形式上可以解决新股发行价过高问题,但是却造成二级市场更大的价格扭曲。这一发现为进一步完善我国IPO发行定价机制提供了依据。     

HIGH-TECH IPOS: A TALE OF TWO CONTINENTS

The typical price behavior of an initial public offering (IPO), consisting of a price upsurge on the first trading day followed by subpar performance in the (longer-run) after-market, is one of the most intriguing puzzles in corporate finance. This study focuses on high-tech IPOs in Europe and the U.S. over the period 1998–2001, both to compare the European and U.S. IPO markets and to determine how the price behavior of high-tech IPOs compares to that of IPOs in general. Average initial-day returns were 39% and 64% for the European and U.S. samples, respectively. The median returns were significantly lower, however, indicating that the sample averages are affected by a small group of exceptionally strong performers. But, for the first full year of trading, the median market-adjusted returns were negative for both samples. Not surprisingly, this substandard aftermarket performance was most apparent in companies that failed to generate operating profits.
As with IPOs in general, high-tech IPOs showed higher initial-day returns in "hot" markets than in "cold." Strong first-day performance was a good predictor of IPO volume in the high-tech market, with strong first-day returns triggering a flood of IPOs in subsequent months. Overall, then, the authors' study concludes that the price behavior of high-tech IPOs provides an exaggerated version of the general tendency of IPOs to be underpriced initially but underperform over the longer term.     

Buyback behavior of initial public offering firms

We examine the motives behind the share repurchase decisions of initial public offering (IPO) firms by studying the stock and operating performance after the IPO date. We find that IPO firms that announce repurchases within 3 years of IPO dates exhibit poorer long-run abnormal operating performance than other IPO firms. These IPO firms also experience poorer stock return performance and downward analyst forecast revisions. Moreover, these firms show intensive insider selling transactions after the IPO date. These results for IPO announcing repurchase firms are consistent with the misleading hypothesis, which suggests that these IPO firms mislead investors by announcing repurchases as false signals.     

上市首日“破发”股票长期表现更差吗？

以2009年7月至2012年5月间上市发行股票为样本,采用随机前沿模型进行定价分析,以新股发行定价类型,首日发行抑价率正负进行分类.选取折价发行且上市首日"破发"(即首日收盘价低于发行价)公司样本,将其与溢价发行且上市首日未"破发"公司样本,按照"行业-收入规模"标准进行样本配对,计算两组公司上市后1~5年买入与持有收益(BHAR)并进行差异性检验.结果表明:新股上市后前三年均表现不佳,折价发行且首日"破发"的股票在上市后前两年表现更差.这为新股定价与长期表现相关研究提供了新的实证.     

Ownership structure and performance: Evidence from the public float in IPOs

We investigate whether the post-IPO market performance of IPO stocks is related to the percentage of shares issued to the public, namely, the public float. We demonstrate that a non-linear relation exists between the public float and post-IPO returns. Specifically, as public float increases, long-run returns decrease for low levels of public float and increase for high levels of public float. This relation persists even after controlling for various firm characteristics. The best long-term performers are firms that sell either very little or sell most of their stock in the IPO. We suggest that the choice of public float level creates a trade-off between incentives to insiders and power granted to outsiders. This trade-off determines the non-linear relation found between the public float and long-run returns.     

The Variability of IPO Initial Returns

The monthly volatility of IPO initial returns is substantial, fluctuates dramatically over time, and is considerably larger during “hot” IPO markets. Consistent with IPO theory, the volatility of initial returns is higher for firms that are more difficult to value because of higher information asymmetry. Our findings highlight underwriters’ difficulty in valuing companies characterized by high uncertainty, and raise serious questions about the efficacy of the traditional firm‐commitment IPO process. One implication of our results is that alternate mechanisms, such as auctions, could be beneficial for firms that value price discovery over the auxiliary services provided by underwriters.     

Perceptions and Price: Evidence from CEO Presentations at IPO Roadshows

This paper examines the relation between cognitive perceptions of management and firm valuation. We develop a composite measure of investor perception using 30‐second content‐filtered video clips of initial public offering (IPO) roadshow presentations. We show that this measure, designed to capture viewers’ overall perceptions of a CEO, is positively associated with pricing at all stages of the IPO (proposed price, offer price, and end of first day of trading). The result is robust to controls for traditional determinants of firm value. We also show that firms with highly perceived management are more likely to be matched to high‐quality underwriters. In further exploratory analyses, we find the impact is greater for firms with more uncertain language in their written S‐1. Taken together, our results provide evidence that investors’ instinctive perceptions of management are incorporated into their assessments of firm value.