Export incentives,financial constraints,and the (mis)allocation of credit: Micro-level evidence from subsidized export loans

This paper combines an exogenous shock to the supply of subsidized credit with unique loan-level data from the export sector in Pakistan to identify the impact and allocation of such financial incentives. The removal of subsidized credit causes a significant decline in the exports of privately owned firms, while the exports of large, publicly listed, and group network firms are unaffected. Publicly listed firms make no significant adjustments to their balance sheets, and only their profits are reduced, indicating that they are financially unconstrained. Nearly half of all subsidized loans are assigned to such firms, implying a substantial misallocation of credit and an output loss to privately owned firms of 0.75% of GDP. Productivity differences do not explain the heterogeneous effects across firms.     

High-frequency financial data modeling using Hawkes processes

Intraday Value-at-Risk (VaR) is one of the risk measures used by market participants involved in high-frequency trading. High-frequency log-returns feature important kurtosis (fat tails) and volatility clustering (extreme log-returns appear in clusters) that VaR models should take into account. We propose a marked point process model for the excesses of the time series over a high threshold that combines Hawkes processes for the exceedances with a generalized Pareto distribution model for the marks (exceedance sizes). The conditional approach features intraday clustering of extremes and is used to calculate instantaneous conditional VaR. The models are backtested on real data and compared to a competitor approach that proposes a nonparametric extension of the classical peaks-over-threshold method. Maximum likelihood estimation is computationally intensive; we use a differential evolution genetic algorithm to find adequate starting values for the optimization process.     

Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of Japanese regional banks

We examine the determinants of Japanese regional bank pricing-to-market decisions and their impact on the intensity of depositor discipline, in the form of the sensitivity of deposit growth to bank financial conditions. To obtain consistent estimates, we first model and estimate the bank pricing-to-market decision and then estimate the intensity of depositor discipline after conditioning for that decision. We find that banks were less likely to adopt market price accounting the larger were their unrealized securities losses. We also find statistically significant evidence of depositor discipline among banks that elected to price to market. Our results indicate that depositor discipline was more intense for the subset of banks that adopted market price accounting.     

Basel-2 capital adequacy: Computing the ‘fair’ capital charge for loan commitment ‘true’ credit risk

This research makes two contributions: (i) to price analytically put option and extension premium embedded in a borrower-extendible commitment, and (ii) to compute the ‘fair’ capital charge that corresponds to the commitment ‘true’ credit risk. In doing so, the procedure replaces the BIS accounting-based concepts of credit-conversion factor, principal-risk factor, and initial term to maturity of irrevocable commitments with the market-based concepts of exercise-cum-takedown proportion and put value implicit in the borrower-extendible commitment, respectively. Finally, the approach is developed one step further to account for the borrowers' risk ratings by public credit agencies; this results in a two-dimensional (time-state of nature) risk-weighting system that applies to all commitment types.     

Marking-to-model credit and operational risks of loan commitments: A Basel-2 advanced internal ratings-based approach

Within a marking-to-model framework, this research computes the bank's capital charge for credit and operational risks of loan commitments at Basel-2 fixed audit date. This is done in three steps. The first one prices commitment credit risk as a Gram-Charlier put value and determines the commitment forward-funding proportion. In the second one, put value and funding proportion are combined to compute Basel-2 ‘fair’ capital charge for credit and operational risks. By producing a moderate total capital charge, marking-to-model offers substantial capital relief with respect to the corresponding charge computed with Basel-2 simplified approach. Both charges are however larger than the corresponding nil charge arrived at in Basel-1. In the third step, marking-to-model reveals its flexibility by showing how banks can determine the cost of their exposure to borrowers' credit-rating downgrades and how they can also hedge any exposure to commitment default risk.     

SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET PURCHASE COMMITMENT YIELDS

We provide empirical evidence that quoted secondary market mortgage yields conform to the predictions of option theory. We compare Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac origination yields offered in the secondary market from 1985 to 2003 with the predictions of a two‐state binomial mortgage option valuation model. Our two‐state approach considers a mean‐reverting interest rate process as well as a stochastic housing price. Using predictions from option simulations, we find strong links between market practice and mortgage option prepayment and default factors over time. We also find cross‐sectional differences that are consistent with the institutional structure of the markets.     

On the Role of Futures Trading in Spot Market Fluctuations: Perpetrator of Volatility or Victim of Regret?

We examine the role of index futures trading in spot market volatility. We use the exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) approach to measure volatility, analyze causality and feedback relations between volatilities in the spot and futures markets, and test various hypotheses in the context of a multivariate model that incorporates other macrostate variables. Our empirical results suggest index futures trading may not be blamed for the observed volatility in the spot market. Rather, we find stronger and more consistent support for the alternative posture that volatility in the futures market is an outgrowth of a turbulent cash market. We use the regret (cognitive dissonance) theory to explain our results.     

Effects of the volatility smile on exchange settlement practices: The Hong Kong case

The well-documented volatility smile phenomenon in the US options market has affected the option settlement practices of other markets. To settle Hang Seng Index (HSI) options, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange artificially builds in a piecewise linear “smile” or “sneer” volatility function, which is determined daily by market makers rather than directly by market forces. In this study, we investigate the time-varying settlement function and find the following economic determinants of the volatility function: lag parameters, current-day HSI returns, the distribution of HSI returns, transaction costs as proxied by the bid-ask spread, and the “Monday effect”. For evaluation purposes, we use as a benchmark the estimated piecewise linear volatility function as directly driven by market forces. The comparison analyses show that base volatilities set by market makers run somewhat high, while downside slopes are not steep enough. This results in the overpricing of the lion’s share of traded options. An economic determinants analysis of market-force-driven parameters reveals that market makers can better align artificial volatility parameters both by reducing reliance on the function parameters of prior days and by more precisely accounting for current-day HSI returns, option time-to-maturity, bid-ask spreads and buying pressure.     

Bank governance,regulation and risk taking

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.     

Industrial Loan Companies: Where Banking and Commerce Meet

Should commercial firms be prohibited from owning banking institutions? Should the United States remain the only G20 country opposed to the “mixing of banking and commerce”? These questions have assumed new urgency as the Dodd Frank Act of July 2010 imposed a moratorium on the commercial ownership of industrial loan companies (ILCs), which was the last remaining entry point for commercial firms into banking. This paper specifically examines the role of ILCs in America's financial system from its beginnings in 1910 to the present. Special attention is paid to the performance of commercially owned ILCs prior to, during and after the most recent financial crisis. The examination is based upon both survey data and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) data, which represents a database of the ILC industry that is the most comprehensive one available to date. The paper also reviews the laws and regulations regarding the mixing of banking and commerce, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of allowing commercial ownership of banks.     

Does it help to have friends in high places? Bank stock performance and congressional committee chairmanships

Does a politician with power in the U.S. Congress positively affect the value of firms headquartered in their home state? We investigate this question by examining the profitability and stock performance of commercial banks. Banks can be enormously influenced by the political and regulatory environment. We find that banks headquartered in states where a Senator or member of the House of Representatives serves as the chairman on their respective banking committee in Congress outperform banks headquartered in other states. In addition, we find that this “chair effect” is more pronounced when the committee chairs are strongly aligned with other politicians in Congress, when they are more experienced, and when banks are clustered in the home state, suggesting that the potential benefits generated from chairmanship are in more demand. Overall, our results suggest that there are some important value implications of a local politician’s power in Congress.     

Operational risk

This paper provides an economic and mathematical characterization of operational risk useful for clarifying the issues related to estimation and the determination of economic capital. The insights for this characterization originate in the corporate finance literature. Operational risk is subdivided into two types, either: (i) the risk of a loss due to the firm’s operating technology, or (ii) the risk of a loss due to agency costs. These two types of operational risks generate loss processes with different economic characteristics. We argue that the current methodology for the determination of economic capital for operational risk is overstated. It is biased high because the computation omits the bank’s net present value (NPV) generating process. We also show that although it is conceptually possible to estimate the operational risk processes’ parameters using only market prices, the non-observability of the firm’s value makes this an unlikely possibility, except in rare cases. Instead, we argue that data internal to the firm, in conjunction with standard hazard rate estimation procedures, provides a more fruitful alternative.     

The price-setting behavior of banks: An analysis of open-end leverage certificates on the German market

This paper presents the first analysis of open-end leverage certificates on the German market. The major innovations of these certificates are twofold. First, issuers announce a price-setting formula according to which they are willing to buy and sell the certificates over time. Second, the product’s lifetime is potentially endless. Our main findings are that the price-setting formula is (i) designed to strongly favor the issuer and (ii) is consistent with the main outcome of the ‘life cycle hypothesis’ for structured financial products [Stoimenov, P.A., Wilkens, S., 2005. Are structured products ‘fairly’ priced? An analysis of the German market for equity-linked instruments. Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 2971–2993]. (iii) This holds for different product features and also in the presence of issuers’ credit risk and jump risk in the underlying.     

Cross-selling,switching costs and imperfect competition in British banks

This paper attempts to evaluate the competitiveness of British banking in the presence of cross-selling and switching costs during 1993–2008. It presents estimates of a model of banking behaviour that encompasses switching costs as well as cross-selling of loans and off-balance sheet transactions. The evidence from panel estimation of the model indicates that the consumer faced high switching costs in the loan market in the latter part of the sample period, as a result of weaker competitiveness in the loan market. Additionally, the weaker competitiveness in the loan market appears to facilitate the cross-selling behaviour of British banks, which helps explain the rapid growth of non-interest income during the last two decades.     

Competition among regulators and credit market integration

We analyze the incentives for independent bank regulators with financially integrated jurisdictions to form a regulatory union. Externalities lead competing regulators to choose suboptimally low standards. Centralized regulation, however, entails a loss of flexibility if equal standards must be applied across jurisdictions. We find that, first, centralized regulation will more likely emerge among relatively homogeneous jurisdictions/countries. Second, centralized regulation will be unanimously preferred to independence only if it entails standards higher than those of the country with the highest individual standards. Third, financial integration among more than two jurisdictions may prevent partial unions, which, in turn, may prevent more comprehensive agreements.     

The effect of banking regulation on cross-border lending

Banking regulations often differ between countries: Some regulators require banks to document their evaluation of firms’ creditworthiness, which determines the banks’ choice of lending technology. In a theoretical model, we study how differences in regulation influence competition between domestic and foreign banks and analyze the effect of regulatory harmonization on cross-border lending. We predict that lending rates are lower and access to credit is easier for firms in a border region if the national regulations differ. Using unique bank- and firm-level data from Germany, we show that firms in a border region have better access to credit if regulation differs.