Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer – that is, maximize put option value – by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing charter value. Focusing on the relationship between Tobin’s q and an ex ante measure of the failure probability, this paper develops a semi-parametric model for estimating the critical level of bank risk at which put option value starts outweighing charter value. From these estimates, we infer the prevalence of moral hazard. Examining publicly held bank holding companies (BHC) during the tumultuous 1986–1992 period, we find that shareholders’ risk-taking incentives were confined to a small fraction of highly risky institutions. Furthermore, our analysis shows that the inflection point at which banks begin to tilt in favor of moral hazard increased substantially in 1993–2005. These findings are encouraging to bank regulators and legislators because they indicate that tighter capital rules and more rigorous supervision introduced by several legislative initiatives in the 1990s have helped squeeze a lot of the moral hazard incentives out of the banking system.     

Modelling the economic value of credit rating systems

In this paper we develop a model of the economic value of credit rating systems. Increasing international competition and changes in the regulatory framework driven by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel II) called forth incentives for banks to improve their credit rating systems. An improvement of the statistical power of a rating system decreases the potential effects of adverse selection, and, combined with meeting several qualitative standards, decreases the amount of regulatory capital requirements. As a consequence, many banks have to make investment decisions where they have to consider the costs and the potential benefits of improving their rating systems. In our model the quality of a rating system depends on several parameters such as the accuracy of forecasting individual default probabilities and the rating class structure. We measure effects of adverse selection in a competitive one-period framework by parameterizing customer elasticity. Capital requirements are obtained by applying the current framework released by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Results of a numerical analysis indicate that improving a rating system with low accuracy to medium accuracy can increase the annual rate of return on a portfolio by 30–40 bp. This effect is even stronger for banks operating in markets with high customer elasticity and high loss rates. Compared to the estimated implementation costs banks could have a strong incentive to invest in their rating systems. The potential of reduced capital requirements on the portfolio return is rather weak compared to the effect of adverse selection.     

Offsetting the implicit incentives: Benefits of benchmarking in money management

Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management. This gives a manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk exposure. The misaligned incentives create potentially significant deviations of the manager’s policy from that desired by fund investors. In the context of a familiar continuous-time portfolio choice model, we demonstrate how a simple risk management practice that accounts for benchmarking can ameliorate the adverse effects of managerial incentives. Our results contrast with the conventional view that benchmarking a fund manager is not in the best interest of investors.     

Contingent convertibles. Solving or seeding the next banking crisis?

A recent proposal to enhance banking stability recommends the use of contingent convertibles (CoCos). Since these hybrid securities are mandatorily converted into equity when banks are in need of a recapitalization, they are credited for reducing banks’ likelihood of financial distress. In this paper, we show within a continuous-time framework that this allegedly beneficial impact hinges critically on the assumption of complete contracts. If contracts are incomplete in the sense that manager-owners enjoy discretion over the risk of the investment program, our analysis shows that CoCo bonds always distort risk taking incentives. Our main contribution is to demonstrate that there exist conditions under which CoCo bond financing increases investors’ wealth, but also increases the bank’s probability of financial distress, so that the banking system as a whole will be destabilized. Thus, individually rational decisions can have systemically undesirable outcomes. Further results indicate that CoCos should be used only in conjunction with devices to control risk shifting incentives.     

Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks

Empirical evidence is presented to show that in modern times banks can hedge liquidity shocks but could not do so prior to FDIC insurance. However, the government's limitations in properly pricing FDIC insurance are leading to many current examples of moral hazard. A model is presented to show that if insurance premiums are set to be “actuarially fair,” incentives for banks to take excessive systematic risks remain. Motivated by empirical evidence that money market mutual funds also can hedge liquidity shocks, I consider an alternative government insurance system that mitigates distortions to risk-taking yet preserves liquidity hedging and information synergies.     

Understanding merger incentives and outcomes in the US mutual fund industry

This paper examines the incentives of acquirers and targets in the merger market. Using data on acquisitions among mutual fund management companies from 1991 to 2004, I estimate a two-sided matching model of the merger market jointly with equations representing merger outcomes. According to the empirical investigation, although the desire to achieve a sufficient scale to attract investors is a key driver for mergers, some mergers seem to be driven by objectives other than shareholder value maximization. I find that companies that are potentially prone to misaligned incentives between owners and managers are more acquisitive than others, yet have significantly worse post-merger operating performance. I also find that these acquirers, despite their higher willingness to pay for targets, are not any more likely to match with high-quality targets, potentially due to targets’ incentive to avoid bad organizations.     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

Ironing out the kinks in executive compensation: Linking incentive pay to average stock prices

Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.     

The effect of ownership on the prudential behavior of banks – The case of China

Although the relationship between bank ownership and performance is the current focus of much research, this paper investigates the relationship between ownership and the prudential behavior of banks. Using Chinese data, I show that lending by state-owned banks has been less prudent than lending by joint-equity banks, but has improved over time. This is consistent with the hypothesis that accountability to shareholders and depositors gives joint-equity banks a better incentive than state-owned banks to engage in prudent lending, and with the hypothesis that the reform of the banking system has improved the incentive for state-owned banks to behave more prudently in their lending.     

Market response to bank relationships: Evidence from Korean bank reform

This paper examines how the forced closure of failing banks and the transfer of their loans to surviving banks affect the market value of firms that borrow from the closed banks. Pre-existing relationships between firms and the banks that acquire their loans are detrimental to the positive valuation effects of the event. Banks may have an incentive to favor pre-existing relationships to increase the value of previously extended loans. Therefore, loan renewals to firms with prior relationships do not signal borrower quality to the market, which is aware of the banks’ conflicts of interest. This study highlights the importance of the specific mechanisms employed to replace failed banks without decreasing the value of their client firms.     

Information Contagion and Bank Herding

We show that the likelihood of information contagion induces profit-maximizing bank owners to herd with other banks. When bank loan returns have a common systematic factor, the cost of borrowing for a bank increases when there is adverse news on other banks since such news conveys adverse information about the common factor. The increase in a bank's cost of borrowing relative to the situation of good news about other banks is greater when bank loan returns have less commonality (in addition to the systematic risk factor). Hence, banks herd and undertake correlated investments so as to minimize the impact of such information contagion on the expected cost of borrowing. Competitive effects such as superior margins from lending in different industries mitigate herding incentives.     

Private equity and regulatory capital

Regulatory capital requirements for European banks have been put forward in the Basel II Capital Framework and subsequently in the capital requirements directive (CRD) of the EU. We provide a detailed discussion of the capital requirements for private equity investments under different approaches. For the internal model approach we present a structural model that we calibrate to a proprietary dataset. We modify the standard Merton structural model to make it applicable in practice and to capture stylized facts of private equity investments. We also implement the early default feature with a fast simulation algorithm. Our results support capital requirements lower than in Basel II, but not as low as in CRD, thereby giving adverse incentives to banks for using advanced risk models. A sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is robust to parameter uncertainty and stress scenarios.     

Breaking down the barriers: Competition,syndicate structure,and underwriting incentives

We argue that the entry of commercial banks into bond underwriting led to the evolution of co-led underwriting arrangements and lowered the screening incentives of underwriters. Lead underwriters in co-led syndicates faced weaker incentives to screen issuer quality. In boom markets, issues underwritten by co-led syndicates were more likely to be involved in financial misrepresentation events. Underwriter incentives in co-led syndicates were particularly weak in industries where commercial banks stole substantial market share. Similar patterns do not hold in bust markets where investors are likely to engage in their own information collection efforts. Our results suggest that competition may have an adverse effect on the incentives of financial intermediaries in market environments where their information production is more valuable to investors.     

Adverse Selection and Competing Deposit Insurance Systems in Pre-Depression Texas

In 1910, Texas instituted a unique deposit insurance program for its state chartered banks by providing a choice between two separate plans: the depositors guaranty fund, similar to insurance schemes in several other states, and the depositors bond security system, which required the procurement of a privately issued guarantee of indemnity. While, under most deposit insurance schemes, the incentive to monitor the financial condition of individual banks simply devolves from depositors to regulators, the bond security system established in Texas distinguished itself by attempting to reintroduce market discipline through the indemnity requirement. Using a probit model with heteroscedasticity, we find evidence that the choice of insurance coverage led to risk-sorting among the banks, with relatively conservative and financially secure institutions opting for the comparatively rigorous bond security system. In addition, the bank failure record indicates the risk differentials between banks in the two plans persisted over time and even possibly grew, suggesting the bond security system at least partially avoided the moral hazard incentives associated with the fixed-rate depositors guaranty plan. These findings support the general view that market discipline is effective in banking.     

When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks' reputations suffered substantial damage upon the announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also document reputational contagion spread from banks that manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.     

CoCo Bonds,Conversion Prices and Risk Shifting Incentives. How Does the Conversion Ratio Affect Management's Behaviour?

The aim of this paper is to analyze risk shifting incentives for managers and shareholders of the financial institution issuing a CoCo bond. We assess the role of the conversion price settlement in enhancing both shareholders’ and management's discipline. Three recent contingent reverse convertible deals are analyzed, with the intention of showing how shareholder conversion returns are linked to the conversion ratio. The findings demonstrate that, in the case of an ingoing or ongoing crisis, a poor settlement of the conversion ratio could exacerbate both debt overhang and risk shifting issues. This will end in discouraging bank management from issuing new equity and from investing in low risk assets. We argue that a contingent bond triggered on Basel III capital requirement ratios and having a significantly discounted conversion price reduces risk shifting incentives. Moreover, we illustrate how the unexpected wealth transfers between CoCo bondholders and shareholders tends to zero when the bond face value is higher than the current stock market price and there is a concentration of bond subscribers. Accordingly, regulators should consider and oversee not only the conversion trigger but also all the other features of a contingent capital security, especially the conversion ratio.     

The incentive to give incentives: On the relative seniority of debt claims and managerial compensation

We show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications for the design of remuneration contracts. Whereas the traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration, there are in reality many cases in which remuneration contracts are de facto senior to debt claims in financially distressed firms and in workouts. We theoretically show that risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with performance-related incentives (a “contract substitution” effect). In other words, the relative degree of seniority of managers’ claims and creditors’ claims in case a bankruptcy procedure starts is crucial to determine the optimal incentive contract ex-ante. If managerial compensation is more senior than debt, higher leverage leads to lower power incentive schemes (lower bonuses and option grants) and a higher base salary. In contrast, when compensation is junior, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives in highly-levered firms.     

我国股份制商业银行薪酬激励有效性研究

我国股份制商业银行薪酬激励存在一些不足,原因在于薪酬激励的自身因素和薪酬环境因素两方面。自身因素主要包括忽视长期行为激励、缺乏同业竞争优势、轻视普通员工激励;环境因素主要有银行治理结构不完善、市场非充分有效、法规制度不健全等。本文通过对商业银行高管人员及普通员工的薪酬与业绩相关性进行实证检验,认为我国商业银行薪酬激励基本上是有效的,但是其有效性并不十分理想。据此,本文提出了提升我国商业银行薪酬激励有效性的具体建议:从微观层面看,优化薪酬激励机制;从中观层面看,强化商业银行治理结构;从宏观层面看,改善外部相关环境。     

Bank incentives and suboptimal lending decisions: Evidence from the valuation effect of bank loan announcements in Japan

Using a sample of bank loan announcements in Japan, we examine whether or not banks have incentives to engage in suboptimal lending that results in wealth transfer from the banks to the borrowing firms. We find that abnormal returns for borrowing firms are significantly positive, but those for lending banks are sometimes significantly negative. Furthermore, the announcement returns for borrowing firms are negatively related to those for lending banks, especially when poorly performing firms borrow from financially healthy (low-risk) banks. Our results suggest that the positive valuation effect of bank loan announcements for borrowing firms is mainly due to a wealth transfer from lending banks.     

Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads

Deteriorating public finances around the world raise doubts about countries’ abilities to bail out their largest banks. For an international sample of banks, this paper investigates the impact of bank size and government deficits on bank stock prices and CDS spreads. We find that a bank’s market-to-book value is negatively related to the size of its liabilities-to-GDP ratio, especially in countries running large public deficits. CDS spreads appear to decrease with stronger public finances. These results suggest that systemically important banks can increase their value by downsizing or splitting up, especially if they are located in countries with weak public finances. We document that banks’ average liabilities-to-GDP ratio reached a peak in 2007 before a significant drop in 2008, which could reflect these private incentives to downsize.