A geographically weighted approach to measuring efficiency in panel data: The case of US saving banks

This paper discusses a new approach to controlling for the environment when estimating efficiency. In response to the literature on the international comparison of bank efficiency, we draw the attention to a local dimension of comparison. By introducing geographical weights and estimating local frontiers for each US savings bank in the 2001–09 period, we find that the bank technical performance is higher for most banks in comparison to a fixed-effects approach. This result highlights the importance of taking into account the local environment and constraints while analyzing banks’ performance, so as not to consider the factors that are exogenous to these institutions as inefficiencies. Further analysis could improve the weighs calculation by employing other measures of interconnectedness besides geographical distance.     

Credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk: How banks became less risky individually but posed greater risks to the financial system at the same time

A main cause of the crisis of 2007-2009 is the various ways through which banks have transferred credit risk in the financial system. We study the systematic risk of banks before the crisis, using two samples of banks respectively trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and issuing Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). After their first usage of either risk transfer method, the share price beta of these banks increases significantly. This suggests the market anticipated the risks arising from these methods, long before the crisis. We additionally separate this beta effect into a volatility and a market correlation component. Quite strikingly, this decomposition shows that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations. Thus, while banks may have shed their individual credit risk, they actually posed greater systemic risk. This creates a challenge for financial regulation, which has typically focused on individual institutions.     

The impact of European bank mergers on bidder default risk

We analyze the implications of European bank consolidation on the default risk of acquiring banks. For a sample of 134 bidding banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that, on average, bank mergers are risk neutral. However, for relatively safe banks, mergers generate a significant increase in default risk. This result is particularly pronounced for cross-border and activity-diversifying deals as well as for deals completed under weak bank regulatory regimes. Also, large deals, which pose organizational and procedural hurdles, experience a merger-related increase in default risk. Our results cast doubt on the ability of bank merger activity to exert a risk-reducing and stabilizing effect on the European banking industry.     

Systemic risk and diversification across European banks and insurers

The mutual and cross company exposures to fat-tail distributed risks determine the potential impact of a financial crisis on banks and insurers. We examine the systemic interdependencies within and across the European banking and insurance sectors during times of stress by means of extreme value analysis. While insurers exhibit a slightly higher interdependency in comparison with banks, the interdependency across the two sectors turns out to be considerably lower. This suggests that downside risk can be lowered through financial conglomeration.     

Systemic risk contributions: A credit portfolio approach

We put forward a framework for measuring systemic risk and attributing it to individual banks. Systemic risk is coherently measured as the expected loss to depositors and investors when a systemic event occurs. The risk contributions are calculated so as to ensure a full risk allocation among institutions. Applying our methodology to a panel of 54–86 of the world’s major commercial banks for a 13-year time span with monthly frequency not only allows us to closely match the list of G-SIBs; we can also use individual risk contributions to compute bank-specific surcharges: systemic capital charges as well as countercyclical buffers. We therefore address both dimensions of systemic risk – cross-sectional and time-series – in a single integrated approach. As the analysis of risk drivers confirms, the main focus of macroprudential supervision should be on a solid capital base throughout the financial cycle and de-correlation of banks’ asset values.     

Systemically important banks and financial stability: The case of Latin America

This paper addresses the issue on how bank size and market concentration affect performance and risks in 17 Latin American countries between 2001 and 2008. The objective is to evaluate whether a too-big-to-fail behavior has been present in the region. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence to support a higher fragility of large Latin American banks. Our results show that systemically important financial institutions appear to outperform others in terms of both cost and profit without the need of taking more risks. This result holds even in concentrated markets, i.e., where there are few dominant banks and many others with small size in relation to the market. A highly unequal banking market in terms of assets, however, is detrimental for the performance of smaller banks and it also decreases stability of the whole system. We conclude that regulators should deal with market concentration by reducing the size gap between large and small banks, instead of dealing specifically with systemically important banks.     

Improvements in loss given default forecasts for bank loans

An accurate forecast of the parameter loss given default (LGD) of loans plays a crucial role for risk-based decision making by banks. We theoretically analyze problems arising when forecasting LGDs of bank loans that lead to inconsistent estimates and a low predictive power. We present several improvements for LGD estimates, considering length-biased sampling, different loan characteristics depending on the type of default end, and different information sets according to the default status. We empirically demonstrate the capability of our proposals based on a data set of 69,985 defaulted bank loans. Our results are not only important for banks, but also for regulators, because neglecting these issues leads to a significant underestimation of capital requirements.     

Loss given default of high loan-to-value residential mortgages

This paper studies loss given default using a large set of historical loan-level default and recovery data of high loan-to-value residential mortgages from several private mortgage insurance companies. We show that loss given default can largely be explained by various characteristics associated with the loan, the underlying property, and the default, foreclosure, and settlement process. We find that the current loan-to-value ratio is the single most important determinant. More importantly, mortgage loss severity in distressed housing markets is significantly higher than under normal housing market conditions. These findings have important policy implications for several key issues in Basel II implementation.     

First Financial Restructuring and operating efficiency: Evidence from Taiwanese commercial banks

This paper investigates the effect of the “First Financial Restructuring” (FFR) on the operating efficiency of commercial banks in Taiwan. Applying data envelopment analysis (DEA) to operations data for 40 commercial banks over the 6-year period 2000–2005, we find that while the banks have lower operating efficiency on average during the reform period (2002–2003) compared to the pre-reform period (2000–2001), improved operating efficiency is reflected in the post-reform period (2004–2005). Our results remain unchanged even after controlling for the non-performing loan ratio, capital adequacy ratio, bank ownership, size, and GDP growth rate. These results suggest that the improved efficiency in the post-reform period is possibly due to enhanced banking and risk management practices and benefits obtained from compliance with the FFR.     

What explains the low profitability of Chinese banks?

This paper analyzes empirically what explains the low profitability of Chinese banks for the period 1997–2004. We find that better capitalized banks tend to be more profitable. The same is true for banks with a relatively larger share of deposits and for more X-efficient banks. In addition, a less concentrated banking system increases bank profitability, which basically reflects that the four state-owned commercial banks – China’s largest banks – have been the main drag for system’s profitability. We find the same negative influence for China’s development banks (so-called Policy Banks), which are fully state-owned. Instead, more market-oriented banks, such as joint-stock commercial banks, tend to be more profitable, which again points to the influence of government intervention in explaining bank performance in China. These findings should not come as a surprise for a banking system which has long been functioning as a mechanism for transferring huge savings to meet public policy goals.     

Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks

The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for European and US publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.     

Effects of debt collection practices on loss given default

In this article, we propose an LGD model that is solely based on legal and internal debt collection actions. Our model is supported by empirical tests in which it performs better than a usual firm specific model. This result is noteworthy when we recall that the model has only binary variables that indicate whether an action was taken. Our model can be applied to update the LGD of distressed firms in a timely manner reflecting the actions taken during the debt collection period. It also can be used to assess the effect of a recovery action and to determine whether to apply an action to certain types of debt.     

Recovery rates,default probabilities,and the credit cycle

In recessions, the number of defaulting firms rises. On top of this, the average amount recovered on the bonds of defaulting firms tends to decrease. This paper proposes an econometric model in which this joint time-variation in default rates and recovery rate distributions is driven by an unobserved Markov chain, which we interpret as the “credit cycle”. This model is shown to fit better than models in which this joint time-variation is driven by observed macroeconomic variables. We use the model to quantitatively assess the importance of allowing for systematic time-variation in recovery rates, which is often ignored in risk management and pricing models.     

Small European banks: Benefits from diversification?

Motivated by the liberalisation and harmonisation of financial systems in Europe, we investigate whether the observed shift into non-interest income activities improves performance of small European credit institutions. Using a sample of 755 small banks for the period 1997–2003, we find no direct diversification benefits within and across business lines and an inverse association between non-interest income and bank performance. Our findings are robust to a set of sensitivity analyses using alternative samples and controlling for the regulatory environment. Furthermore, the results provide circumstantial evidence for the presence of economies of scale. The absence of benefits of diversification confirms findings for other banking markets and suggests small European banks enter lines of business where they currently lack expertise and experience. These results have implications for bank supervisors, regulators and bank managers.     

Business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms

We investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms. Private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller, more informationally opaque, riskier, and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms. Based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries, we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions. The improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability, and depends on the sharing of firms’ payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office. The value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office. Furthermore, in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates. Our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength.     

Finance and growth in the EU: New evidence from the harmonisation of the banking industry

This paper presents an investigation of the finance–growth nexus by analysing the growth effect of the harmonisation of banking laws in the EU-15 over the period 1960–2001. The main findings point to the existence of a positive growth impact from banking harmonisation. These results are robust to controlling for other growth determinants, unobserved heterogeneity, potential simultaneity bias and business-cycle effects. The analysis of the transmission channels indicates that the harmonisation process influences economic growth mainly through the increase in the efficiency of financial intermediation.     

Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks

Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995-2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.     

The emergence of market monitoring in Japanese banks: Evidence from the subordinated debt market

This paper uses a unique data set on the spreads of subordinated debts issued by Japanese banks to investigate the presence of market monitoring. The results show that subordinated debt investors punished weak banks by requiring higher interest rates. Moreover, I find that the spreads and the sensitivity of spreads to Moody’s bank ratings both increased dramatically after the Japanese government allowed a large city bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, to fail and passed the Financial Reform Act and the Rapid Revitalization Act in the late 1990s. These results suggest that the decline of conjectural guarantee led to the emergence of market monitoring. In addition, I find the relationship between spreads and accounting measures of bank risk to be quite fragile.     

The level and quality of Value-at-Risk disclosure by commercial banks

In this paper we study both the level of Value-at-Risk (VaR) disclosure and the accuracy of the disclosed VaR figures for a sample of US and international commercial banks. To measure the level of VaR disclosures, we develop a VaR Disclosure Index that captures many different facets of market risk disclosure. Using panel data over the period 1996–2005, we find an overall upward trend in the quantity of information released to the public. We also find that Historical Simulation is by far the most popular VaR method. We assess the accuracy of VaR figures by studying the number of VaR exceedances and whether actual daily VaRs contain information about the volatility of subsequent trading revenues. Unlike the level of VaR disclosure, the quality of VaR disclosure shows no sign of improvement over time. We find that VaR computed using Historical Simulation contains very little information about future volatility.     

The performance of banks around the receipt and repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers

In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (“over-achiever”) versus the least healthy (“under-achiever”) banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers’ loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.