Central bank interventions and jumps in double long memory models of daily exchange rates

In this paper, we estimate ARFIMA–FIGARCH models for the major exchange rates (against the US dollar) which have been subject to direct central bank interventions in the last decades. We show that the normality assumption is not adequate due to the occurrence of volatility outliers and its rejection is related to these interventions. Consequently, we rely on a normal mixture distribution that allows for endogenously determined jumps in the process governing the exchange rate dynamics. This distribution performs rather well and is found to be important for the estimation of the persistence of volatility shocks. Introducing a time-varying jump probability associated to central bank interventions, we find that the central bank interventions, conducted in either a coordinated or unilateral way, induce a jump in the process and tend to increase exchange rate volatility.     

Fundamentalists,chartists and asset pricing anomalies

This paper investigates whether excess volatility of asset prices and serial correlations of stock monthly returns may be explained by the interactions between fundamentalists and chartists. Fundamentalists forecast future prices cum dividends through an adaptive learning rule. In contrast, chartists forecast future prices based on the observation of past price movements. Numerical simulations reveal that the interplay of fundamentalists and chartists robustly generates excess volatility of asset prices, volatility clustering, trends in prices (i.e. positive serial correlations of returns) over short horizons and oscillations in prices (i.e. negative serial correlations of returns) over long horizons, often observed in financial data. Moreover, we find that the memory of the learning rule plays a key role in explaining the above-mentioned stylized facts. In particular, we establish that excess volatility of asset prices; volatility clustering and autocorrelation of returns at different horizons emerge when fundamentalists have short memory. However, volatility clustering as well as short-run and long-run dependencies, observed in financial time series, are more pronounced when fundamentalists have longer memory.     

异质预期条件下中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的影响

在外汇市场交易者预期异质性的假设条件下,以2005年7月至2015年12月中国人民银行沟通频数和人民币汇率数据为样本,采用异质预期汇率模型考察中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的总体影响。研究发现：在异质预期条件下,中央银行沟通通过信息机制和协调机制影响外汇市场交易者的异质预期,从而对人民币汇率波动产生较为显著的影响,但由于我国外汇交易者预期向基本面预期转换的发生概率小于技术分析交易者预期,中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的平稳作用效力受到一定的局限。     

Behind the scenes of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime

This paper explores the process of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime during sudden stops in a small open economy. The Bank of Korea’s exchange rate policy reports during the East Asian crisis suggest that its fixed exchange rate regime was forced to collapse due to the depletion of usable foreign reserves, which resulted from the credit policy of the Korean central bank to support domestic banks in need of foreign currency liquidity. To capture the Korean crisis experience, I build a quantitative small open economy model in which, in response to the country risk premium shock, the foreign-currency credit policy of a central bank under fixed regime leads to the exhaustion of international reserves and consequent exchange rate regime shift. This model does well at replicating the observed contraction in Korean aggregate variables.     

Determinants of periodic volatility of intraday exchange rates in the Taipei FX Market

Using the periodic GARCH (P-GARCH) model, this paper investigates the cause of the volatility seasonality of intraday Taiwan dollar/U.S. dollar (NTD/USD) exchange rate. We study the intraday volatility of NTD/USD exchange rate by considering impacts from public news arrivals, inventory risk and central bank interventions. The estimation results indicate that news arrivals at the market open may induce traders to adjust their inventory position and result in higher NTD/USD volatility on days with reported central bank interventions.     

To intervene,or not to intervene: Monetary policy and the costs of currency crises

In case of speculative attacks, the central banks' decisions to intervene or not to intervene seem to play an important role for the economic costs of currency crises. The central bank can either abstain from intervening or start an intervention, which in turn can be successful or unsuccessful. Therefore, an adequate analysis of the costs of currency crises has to take into account three different types of currency crises: (i) an immediate depreciation without any central bank interventions, (ii) a successful defense, and (iii) an unsuccessful attempt to defend the exchange rate. We find that the decision of the central bank to intervene or to remain passive is risky. If the central bank intervenes and succeeds she can achieve the best growth performance on average. However, if the interventions are not maintained and the currency depreciates the subsequent output loss is particularly severe. Abstaining from an intervention yields a scenario with a relatively small drop in output. Giving in to a speculative attack rather than trying to fight it can thus be a suitable option for a risk-averse central bank.     

Uncovering the Hit List for Small Inflation Targeters: A Bayesian Structural Analysis

We estimate underlying structural macroeconomic policy objectives of three of the earliest explicit inflation targeters within the context of a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We assume central banks set policy optimally, such that we can reverse engineer policy objectives from observed time series data. Joint tests of the posterior distributions of these policy preference parameters suggest that the central banks are very similar in their overall objective. None of the central banks show a concern for stabilizing the real exchange rate. All three central banks share a concern for minimizing the volatility in the change in the nominal interest rate. We also show that the resulting optimal policy rule responds to exchange rate movements, even in the case where the central banks do not explicitly care about exchange rate stabilization. This result is also corroborated by results from an alternative simple-rule characterization and estimation of central bank behavior. These last two findings point to the pitfalls of making inferences, from the level of ad hoc simple rules, about what central banks may care about.     

Conditional covariances and direct central bank interventions in the foreign exchange markets

In this paper, we investigate the effects of central bank interventions (CBIs) on the ex post correlation and covariance of exchange rates. Using a multivariate GARCH model with time-varying conditional covariances, we estimate the effects of CBIs on both the variances and covariance between the yen and the deutsche mark (the Euro) in terms of the US dollar. Our results suggest that coordinated CBIs not only tend to increase the volatility of exchange rates but also explain a significant amount of the covariance between the major currencies. We show that this result can be useful for short-run currency portfolio management.     

Do jumps mislead the FX market?

This paper investigates the link between jumps in the exchange rate process and rumours of central bank interventions. Using the case of Japan, we analyse specifically whether jumps trigger false reports of intervention (i.e. an intervention is reported when it did not occur). Intraday jumps are extracted using a non-parametric technique recently proposed by Lee and Mykland in 2008 and by Andersen et al. in 2007, and later modified by Boudt et al. in 2011. Rumours are identified by using a unique database of Reuters and Dow Jones newswires. Our results suggest that a significant number of jumps on the YEN/USD have been falsely interpreted by the market as being the result of a central bank intervention. The paper has policy implications in terms of central bank interventions. We show that in times where the central bank is known to intervene, some investors may attach a lot of weight to central bank interventions as a source of exchange rate movement, leading to a false ‘intervention explanation’ for observed jumps.     

Home bias,exchange rate disconnect,and optimal exchange rate policy

This paper examines how much the central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to real exchange rate fluctuations. The paper first demonstrates, in a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, that home bias in consumption is important to replicate the exchange rate volatility and exchange rate disconnect documented in the data. When home bias is high, the shock to Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP) can substantially drive up exchange rate volatility while leaving the volatility of real macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, almost untouched. The model predicts that the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to that of GDP increases with the extent of home bias. This relation is supported by the data. A second-order accurate solution method is employed to find the optimal operational monetary policy rule. Our model suggests that the monetary authority should not seek to vigorously stabilize exchange rate fluctuations. In particular, when the central bank does not take a strong stance against the inflation rate, exchange rate stabilization may induce substantial welfare loss. The model does not detect welfare gain from international monetary cooperation, which extends Obstfeld and Rogoff's [Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K.,2002. Global implications of self-oriented national monetary rules, Quarterly Journal of Economics May, 503–535] findings to a DSGE model.     

Interventions in the Yen–dollar spot market: A story of price,volatility and volume

We test the effectiveness of Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s foreign exchange interventions on conditional first and second moments of exchange rate returns and traded volumes, using a bivariate EGARCH model of the Yen/USD market from 5-13-1991 to 3-16-2004. We also estimate a friction model of BOJ’s intervention reaction function based on reducing short-term market disorderliness and supplementing domestic monetary policy. Important finding of this study are that: (i) we find ineffectiveness of BOJ interventions in influencing exchange rate trends pre-1995, in general, but effectiveness post-1995; (ii) FED intervention amplified the effectiveness of the BOJ transactions; (iii) interventions amplified market volatility and volumes through a ‘learning by trading’ process; (iv) BOJ’s interventions were based on ‘leaning against the wind’ motivations on the exchange rate trend and volumes; and (v) BOJ interventions were vigorously used in support of domestic monetary policy objectives post-1995. Though some of our findings confirm recent studies, our analysis goes deeper to provide new findings with important implications for central banks and foreign exchange market participants.     

Changing Monetary Policy Rules, Learning, and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics

When the exchange rate is priced by uncovered interest parity and central banks set nominal interest rates according to a reaction function such as the Taylor rule, the real exchange rate will be determined by expected inflation and the output gap or the unemployment gap of the home and foreign countries. This paper examines the implications of these Taylor rule fundamentals for real exchange rate determination. Because the true parameters in central bank policy rules are unknown to the public and change over time, the model is presented in the context of a least squares learning environment. This simple learning model captures the volatility and the major swings in the real deutschemark/euro–dollar exchange rate from 1976 to 2007.     

Convergence,capital accumulation and the nominal exchange rate

This paper develops a flexible price, two-sector growth model with a nominal side to study the role of the exchange rate in transition dynamics. We adopt a standard small open economy model with traded and nontraded goods, where the engines of growth are exogenous productivity improvements and capital accumulation. We enhance this standard framework by adding a preference for real money holdings, captured by money-in-the-utility. We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and assume that the interest rate on bonds issued by the small open economy is debt-dependent, and interpret it as a simple financial friction. We show analytically that the choice of the exchange rate regime influences the transition dynamics of a small open economy through the balance sheet of the central bank. We then calibrate the model to explore the quantitative significance of our results. We find that the choice of the exchange rate regime has significant and lasting effects on prices, consumption, investment and sectoral allocations, and the composition of financial assets.     

Central bank interventions and exchange rates: an analysis with high frequency data

We use high frequency data for the mark–dollar exchange rate for the period 1992–1995 to evaluate the effects of central bank interventions on the foreign exchange market. We estimate an unobserved component model that decomposes volatility into non-stationary and stationary parts. Stationary components in turn are decomposed into seasonal and non-seasonal intra-day parts. Our results confirm the view that interventions are not particularly effective. The exchange rate moves in the desired direction for only about 50% of the time, and often with a substantial increase in volatility. The model suggests that the two components, which are affected the most by interventions, are the permanent and the stochastic intra-day.     

Official interventions and the forward premium anomaly

This paper presents evidence that the forward premium anomaly intensifies during those times when a central bank intervenes. A model of exchange rate determination is presented to explain this and other features of the dollar–deutschemark and dollar–yen markets. In the model, the forward premium anomaly is caused by surprise central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market. Because interventions are pure surprises, the violations of uncovered interest parity that they create do not represent ex ante profit opportunities. Simulations of the model are found to match the forward premium anomaly and several other notable features of the data. The model also provides a theoretical basis for ARCH effects in exchange-rate returns.     

Central bank FOREX interventions assessed using realized moments

This paper assesses the impact of G3 official central bank interventions on daily realized moments of DEM/USD exchange rate returns obtained from intraday data, 1989–2001. Event studies of the realized moments for the intervention day, the days preceding and following the intervention illustrate the shape of this impact. Rolling regressions results for an AR(FI)MA model for realized moments are used to measure the impact and its significance. The analysis confirms previous empirical findings of a temporary increase of volatility after a coordinated central bank intervention. It highlights new findings on the timing and the temporary nature of the impact of coordinated interventions on exchange rate volatility and on cross-moments between foreign exchange markets.     

Heterogeneous Market-Making in Foreign Exchange Markets: Evidence from Individual Bank Responses to Central Bank Interventions

Using high-frequency data this article provides evidence that, on average, central bank interventions lead to increased volatility and a widening of bid–ask spreads in the intra-day market for foreign exchange. The results also show that there is dispersion in the bid–ask spread revisions posted by individual banks in response to the central bank entering the market. The findings are consistent with predictions from standard models of market microstructure with heterogeneous agents and have implications for the market power of central banks as well as the payoff generated by trading large amounts of international reserves.     

Do Markets Care about Central Bank Governor Changes? Evidence from Emerging Markets

Based on a new daily data set for 20 emerging markets over the period 1992–2006, we examine the reactions of foreign exchange markets, domestic stock markets, and sovereign bond spreads to central bank governor changes. We find that the replacement of a central bank governor negatively affects financial markets on the announcement day, which is in line with the hypothesis that newly appointed central bank governors suffer from a systematic credibility problem at the beginning of their tenure. We also find some evidence that changes in perceived central bank independence affect markets.     

A friction model of daily Bundesbank and Federal Reserve intervention

This paper takes a novel approach to derive a central bank intervention reaction function. A GARCH model for exchange rates is amended to allow interventions to have an effect on both the mean and the variance of exchange rate returns. An intervention reaction function is obtained by combining the model with a loss function for the central bank. Estimation results for the implied friction model reproduce the familiar ‘leaning against the wind’ policy by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, the central banks appear to have reacted to increases in the conditional variance of daily DM/$-returns.     

Definition-consistent measurement of exchange market pressure

Currencies can be under severe pressure, but in a managed exchange rate regime that is not fully visible via the change in the exchange rate. The literature has proposed a way to measure such exchange market pressure (EMP) indirectly, by adding interest rate changes and forex interventions to the exchange rate change. We demonstrate that this measure is not consistent with the definition of EMP and develop a new measure that is consistent. This is first derived within the commonly used monetary exchange rate model. Then we generalize the analysis by avoiding the use of an exchange rate model. We find that the interest rate should not be taken in the first-difference form used so far, but rather in level form and relative to the interest rate chosen if the country had no exchange rate objective. Applications on the European Monetary System and East Asian crises confirm that this improvement is highly relevant in practice.