The impact of technical defaults on dividend policy

This paper examines how loan covenant violations impact firm dividend policy. Using contract-level loan data for nonfinancial firms in the US, this study provides evidence that the occurrence of a covenant violation significantly increases the likelihood of a dividend reduction in the subsequent quarter. Moreover, we show that the degree of creditor–shareholder conflict and firm financial constraints are important determinants of dividend cuts upon technical default. Additionally, this paper finds the tendency of dividend cuts upon technical default weakened after the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act. These findings suggest that loan covenants serve a critical role in mitigating creditor–shareholder conflicts.     

Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy

This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.     

Earned/contributed capital, dividend policy, and disclosure quality: An international study

We examine the agency cost version of the lifecycle theory of dividends by taking advantage of cross-country variations in disclosure environments. The outcome hypothesis posits that transparent disclosure environments lead to higher dividend payouts because shareholders can more accurately measure (and therefore demand) excess cash flows. In contrast, the substitute hypothesis argues that opaque disclosure environments lead to higher payouts because managers have stronger incentives to establish their reputation for fair treatment. Our empirical results confirm both hypotheses and contribute to the literature in two primary ways. First, we confirm that the lifecycle theory of dividends explains dividend payout patterns around the world. Second, and more important, we show that the firm’s disclosure environment plays a significant role in dividend payouts through its effect on agency costs; that is, we confirm an agency cost-inclusive lifecycle theory of dividends.     

Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on the determinants of dividend policy

In the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, and Japan, the propensity to pay dividends is higher among larger, more profitable firms, and those for which retained earnings comprise a large fraction of total equity. Although there are hints of reductions in the propensity to pay dividends in most of the sample countries over the 1994–2002 period, they are driven by a failure of newly listed firms to initiate dividends when expected to do so. Dividend abandonment and the failure to initiate by existing nonpayers are economically unimportant except in Japan. Moreover, in each country, aggregate dividends have not declined and are concentrated among the largest, most profitable firms. Finally, outside of the US there is little evidence of a systematic positive relation between relative prices of dividend paying and non-paying firms and the propensity to pay dividends. Overall, these findings cast doubt on signaling, clientele, and catering explanations for dividends, but support agency cost-based lifecycle theories.     

In search of a residual dividend policy

We survey 309 sample firms exhibiting behavior consistent with a residual dividend policy and their matched counterparts to learn how they set their dividend policies. The findings reveal that the sample firms are more likely than their counterparts to maintain a long-term dividend payout ratio, use long-run earnings forecasts in setting the dividend, and be unconcerned about the cost of raising external funds. Yet, firms behaving as though they follow a residual dividend policy generally do not profess to follow the policy. At best, the sample firms follow a “modified” residual policy in which they carefully manage their payout ratio and dividend trend. Although it may not be an explicit goal of such a dividend policy, consistently low free cash flow typically results.     

The dividend month premium

We find an asset pricing anomaly whereby companies have positive abnormal returns in months when they are predicted to issue a dividend. Abnormal returns in predicted dividend months are high relative to other companies and relative to dividend-paying companies in months without a predicted dividend, making risk-based explanations unlikely. The anomaly is as large as the value premium, but less volatile. The premium is consistent with price pressure from dividend-seeking investors. Measures of liquidity and demand for dividends are associated with larger price increases in the period before the ex-day (when there is no news about the dividend) and larger reversals afterward.     

The conditional nature of the value of corporate governance

Agency theory suggests that governance matters more among firms with greater potential agency costs. Rational investors are unlikely to value safeguards against unlikely events. Yet, few studies of the relation between governance and firm value control for investor perceptions of the likelihood of agency conflicts. Shleifer and Vishny [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 737–783] identify investment-related agency conflicts as the more severe type of agency conflicts in the US. We measure the perceived likelihood of this type of agency conflict using free cash flow (Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323–329). We find that firm value is an increasing function of improved governance quality among firms with high free cash flow. In contrast, governance benefits are lower or insignificant among firms with low free cash flow. We show that not controlling for this conditional relation between governance and firm value could lead to erroneous conclusions that governance and firm value are unrelated.     

The ex-date impact of special dividend announcements: A note

This study examines the impact of special dividend announcements for a sample of Australian companies on the ex date of the special dividend. This study documents that the drop-off ratio is significantly greater for special dividends that participate in DRPs than non-DRPs. Further, it reveals that the drop-off ratio is greater for resources firms than for financial and industrial firms. Finally, a cross-sectional regression model reveals that the drop in price on the ex-date is significantly related to the announcement period price reaction, DRPs versus non-DRPs, size of the company, and special dividend per share.     

Executive compensation and dividend policy

This study examines the use of dividend provisions in executive compensation contracts to influence dividend policy. A sample is constructed with the largest companies in the oil and gas, defense/aerospace and food processing industries, where dividend-related agency costs are expected to be high. The results indicate that the existence of a dividend incentive in the compensation plan is positively associated with higher dividend payouts and yields, and higher annual changes in dividend levels. Evidence is also provided on firm characteristics associated with the use of a compensation contract with a dividend provision. The results are consistent with the theory that firms link compensation incentives to dividend payments to reduce conflicts between shareholders and management over dividend decisions.     

Convergent synergies in the global market for corporate control

We investigate the informational role of the takeover premium as a forward looking price to expected synergies in the global market for corporate control. We find that premiums paid in the global market for corporate control are clustered in waves and driven to some extent by the US premium. International takeover premiums have become more responsive to US premiums as the globalization process evolved over time. Short-run divergent dynamics due to idiosyncratic or country-specific factors have become less severe, which suggests that expected synergies have become increasingly integrated in the global market for corporate control. Furthermore, we find that the region’s takeover premiums typically become more responsive to US takeover premiums when US economic conditions are relatively weak, when the US monetary policy is restrictive, when US credit risk is high, and when the region’s corporate governance (as measured by legal system quality and accounting quality) is high.     

How corporate governance affects payout policy under agency problems and external financing constraints

This paper analyzes the effect of corporate governance on the payout policy when a firm has both agency problems and external financing constraints. We empirically test whether strong corporate governance would lead to higher payout to minimize agency problems (outcome hypothesis), or to lower payout to avoid costly external financing (substitute hypothesis). We find that firms with higher (lower) external financing constraints tend to decrease (increase) payout ratio with an improvement in their corporate governance. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that the relation between payout and corporate governance is reversed depending on the relative sizes of agency and external financing costs.     

The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem

Contrary to Miller and Modigliani [1961. Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business 34, 411–433], payout policy is not irrelevant and investment policy is not the sole determinant of value, even in frictionless markets. MM ask “Do companies with generous distribution policies consistently sell at a premium above those with niggardly payouts?” But MM's analysis does not address this question because the joint effect of their assumptions is to mandate 100% free cash flow payout in every period, thereby rendering “niggardly payouts” infeasible and forcing distributions to a global optimum. Irrelevance obtains, but in an economically vacuous sense because the firm's opportunity set is artificially constrained to payout policies that fully distribute free cash flow. When MM's assumptions are relaxed to allow retention, payout policy matters in exactly the same sense that investment policy does. Moreover (i) the standard Fisherian model is empirically refutable, predicting that firms will make large payouts in present value terms, (ii) only when payout policy is optimized will the present value of distributions equal the PV of project cash flows, (iii) the NPV rule for investments is not sufficient to ensure value maximization, rather an analogous rule for payout policy is also necessary, and (iv) Black's [1976. The dividend puzzle. Journal of Portfolio Management 2, 5–8] “dividend puzzle” is a non-puzzle because it is rooted in the mistaken idea that MM's irrelevance theorem applies to payout/retention decisions, which it does not.     

Rational expectations and corporate dividend policy

The problem of expectations formation has been either ignored or treated with very restrictive assumptions in traditional dividend adjustment models. Since these models are typically used to explain the dividend decisions of individual firms, a more satisfactory treatment of the process of expectations formation is needed. In order to analyze the dynamic dividend adjustment process, this article proposes a model, more general than previous ones, that is consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis. A nonlinear regression method is used to estimate the parameters of the model and to test the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis in dividend decisions making. The partial adjustment model with rational expectations explains dividend adjustments reasonably well. The overall results suggest that firms make use of available earnings information to form optimal future earnings forecasts; specifically, a firm's dividend adjustment process is completed in about two and a half quarters. This article also finds that the fourth-order serial correlation problem disappears after a generalized Tobit model is used for the parameter estimation.     

Ownership structure and its effect on dividend policy in the Mexican context

This work focused on analyzing whether the ownership structure has any effect on the dividend policy of companies in the Mexican market. The decision of dividend payment is one of the major elements in corporate policy, as this dividend policy influences the value of the company. Therefore, decisions such as adopting a company growth policy through the reinvestment of profits, or better yet allocating them to the payment of dividends, are going to be influenced by the type of ownership structure that dominates the company. The analysis was based on three types of ownership structures such as: families, institutions (mainly banks) and small blocks of shareholders. Our results show that the concentration of property in families negatively influences the payment of dividends, whereas the presence of institutional shareholders has an inverse effect on the payment of the same. This indicates that the presence of big shareholders foreign to the families has a different effect on the payment policy of dividends in the Mexican context. This work provides literature information about the context of emerging countries as is the case of Mexico, given that much of the existing investigations focus on European or North American contexts, where the markets are well regulated and property is broadly distributed.     

The link between bank monitoring and corporate dividend policy: The case of dividend omissions

This study investigates whether bank monitoring influences investor response to a borrowing firm's decision to omit its dividend payments. We establish a new link between the theories of banking and dividend policy in an examination of how bank monitoring and firm dividend signals complement one another to resolve information asymmetries. Results indicate that, for small firms, investors interpret the dividend decision as a function of bank monitoring and the dividend signals taken together. Also reported are the results of tests examining the differences between the monitoring effects of banks versus public and private non-bank lenders.     

Detecting time-variation in corporate bond index returns: A smooth transition regression model

This paper investigates the time-varying corporate bond index returns in a multi-factor smooth transition regression model. We find that expected index returns vary between weak and strong economic regimes, where the transition from one regime to the other is governed by the 3-quartered growth of industrial production. Weak economic regimes are characterized by low growth of industrial production, vice versa for strong economic regimes. Further, risk factor sensitivities are generally more negative in strong economic regimes than in weak regimes, implying that index returns are low when economic conditions are good and high when economic conditions are poor.     

A spatial analysis of international stock market linkages

We employ spatial econometrics techniques to investigate to what extent countries’ economic and geographical relations affect their stock market co-movements. Among the relations that we analyze, bilateral trade proves to be best suited to capture co-variations in returns. We find a strong effect of a unit shock to three regionally dominant countries, namely the US, the UK, and Japan, on other countries through the trade linkage. The degree of stock market dependence increases and the importance of proximity decreases over time and during recessions. We also analyze several regional crises and find a large impact of Thailand on its trade neighbors during the Asian crisis.     

Financial reporting quality and dividend policy: New evidence from an international level

This study examines the link between financial reporting quality and dividend payout across 76 countries. We find that financial reporting quality increases dividend payout after controlling for firm and country specifics. We also investigate different channels that moderate the relation between financial reporting quality and dividend payout. We find that the positive association between high-quality financial reporting and dividend payout is more pronounced when firms have free cash flow problems, face severe information asymmetry, and are located in countries with weaker minority shareholder protection rights. Interestingly, we find evidence that high reporting quality enhances firms' payment of dividend even when these firms already overpaying their shareholders. However, the relation becomes weaker when firms overpass the optimal level of dividend payout. The findings remain consistent after several robustness checks, thus highlighting the effectiveness of more transparent disclosure of financial information in reducing information asymmetry related to firms' internal agency costs and their relationships with external parties.     

A cultural explanation of the foreign bias in international asset allocation

This paper examines the foreign bias in international asset allocation. Following extant literature in behavioral finance, we argue that a society’s culture and the cultural distance between two markets play an important role in explaining the foreign bias. In particular, we hypothesize that the degree of a nation’s uncertainty avoidance affects the foreign bias (more uncertainty-avoiding countries allocate less to foreign markets), as does the degree of a country’s individualism (in individualistic countries performance is more directly attributed to a person and less to teams, causing these individuals to be more aggressive in their foreign asset allocations). We further expect that the degree of cultural distance between two countries affects the amount of money allocated to that market. Based on extensive robustness analyses, we find support for our hypotheses on the role of culture in international asset allocation.     

Firm- and country-level determinants of corporate leverage: Some new international evidence

This research analyzes the determinants of capital structure across 37 countries. Institutional arrangements matter for capital structure decisions; however, firm-level covariates drive two-thirds of the variation in capital structure across countries, while the country-level covariates explain the remaining one-third. The observed relationships between the country-level determinants and leverage provide strong support to the predictions of both the trade-off and the pecking-order theories. Country-level determinants serve as substitute mechanisms for the firm-level, industry-level, and macroeconomic determinants by moderating their marginal impact on leverage.