Are regulatory capital adequacy ratios good indicators of bank failure? Evidence from US banks

Motivated by massive bank failures during the financial crisis, this paper examines whether capital adequacy ratios required by regulators are associated with bank failure. It investigates whether the association is affected by the bank's proximity to the minimum required capital ratios. If results show a significant association between regulatory capital and failure of banks falling below the minimum capital ratios, then the ratios are set at an adequate level. Examining a sample of 560 US bank holding companies for the period 2003–2009, results reveal that the association between the core (Tier 1) capital ratio and bank failure becomes significant only if the bank holding company has a Tier 1 capital ratio of less than 6%. This is the level below which US bank regulators do not regard banks as being well capitalized. During the financial crisis period of 2007–2009, there is a significant association only when the criterion is set at or above 8%. Market-based probability of default is more significantly associated with failure relative to Tier 1 capital ratio. The findings of this paper are relevant to regulatory policy discussions and Basel III deliberations on capital adequacy at times of financial turmoil.     

What determines the profitability of banks? Evidence from Spain

This paper empirically analyses the factors that determine the profitability of Spanish banks for the period of 1999–2009. We conclude that the high bank profitability during these years is associated with a large percentage of loans in total assets, a high proportion of customer deposits, good efficiency and a low doubtful assets ratio. In addition, higher capital ratios also increase the bank’s return, but only when return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure. We find no evidence of either economies or diseconomies of scale or scope in the Spanish banking sector. Finally, our study reveals differences in the performance of commercial and savings banks.     

Did capital infusions enhance bank recovery from the great recession?

This paper investigates the long-run recovery experience of US banks that received capital infusions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Based on a dynamic recovery model, our results show that recovering CPP banks tended to be in better financial condition than other CPP banks. Long-run event study analyses of common stock prices reveal that, in the quarter after repayment of TARP funds, CPP banks experienced economically large and significant buy-and-hold wealth gains of 14%, equivalent to approximately $329 billion. We conclude that TARP was successful in fostering bank financial and stock price recovery.     

Does the ownership structure matter for banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking behavior? Empirical evidence from a developing country

This paper applies the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to examine the bi-directional relationship between banks’ capital regulation and risk-taking behavior concerning the impact of ownership structure. We have used a balanced panel dataset of banks from a developing country over the most recent period between 2006 and 2014. The empirical findings of this study suggest that higher capital regulation enhances banks’ stability when it combats with credit risk but higher credit risk often persuades abating capital ratio. Particularly, the key results are as follows: (i) the higher association of minority active shareholding in stability issues is positive; (ii) the higher contribution of active share holding promotes banks’ capital ratio; (iii) the lower ownership concentration prevents credit risk; (iv) private commercial banks are more risk averse and stable than state-owned banks and other type of banks; and (v) notably, Islamic banks show their superiority through overall performance despite their lower capital stability than conventional banks. Besides, no models show significant non-linear relationship between capital regulation and risk-taking except models of stability show a U-shaped relation in capital equation, indicating that when regulatory pressure works in a country then bank lose solvency at the initial stage. Finally, it also provides some imperative policy implications which will be very useful for a wide range of stakeholders.     

What makes a leader?

Superb leaders have very different ways of directing a team, a division, or a company. Some are subdued and analytical; others are charismatic and go with their gut. And different situations call for different types of leadership. Most mergers need a sensitive negotiator at the helm, whereas many turnarounds require a more forceful kind of authority. Psychologist and noted author Daniel Goleman has found, however, that effective leaders are alike in one crucial way: they all have a high degree of what has come to be known as emotional intelligence. In fact, Goleman's research at nearly 200 large, global companies revealed that emotional intelligence--especially at the highest levels of a company--is the sine qua non for leadership. Without it, a person can have first-class training, an incisive mind, and an endless supply of good ideas, but he still won't make a great leader. The components of emotional intelligence--self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill--can sound unbusinesslike. But exhibiting emotional intelligence at the workplace does not mean simply controlling your anger or getting along with people. Rather, it means understanding your own and other people's emotional makeup well enough to move people in the direction of accomplishing your company's goals. In this article, the author discusses each component of emotional intelligence and shows through examples how to recognize it in potential leaders, how and why it leads to measurable business results, and how it can be learned. It takes time and, most of all, commitment. But the benefits that come from having a well-developed emotional intelligence, both for the individual and the organization, make it worth the effort.     

Does foreign bank penetration affect the risk of domestic banks? Evidence from emerging economies

We investigate whether foreign bank penetration affects the risk of domestic banks in emerging economies. By using bank-level data from 35 markets during the period of 2000–2014, we find significant evidence that the risk of domestic banks increases with the presence of foreign banks in the host economy, and this finding is shown to be consistent in a series of robustness tests. We also find that the incidence of such effects is more pronounced for domestic banks which are less efficient and less based on traditional activities. Foreign banks exert more pronounced impacts on domestic banks’ risk when they enter the host market via M&A, as opposed to greenfield investments, and when they belong to foreign conglomerates which provide strong internal support.     

What drives portfolio investments of German banks in emerging capital markets?

After decades of steady liberalization and financial market development, emerging capital markets experienced unparalleled capital inflows in the aftermath of the emerging markets crisis of the 1990s. This paper studies portfolio investment decisions of German banks in emerging capital markets from 2002 to 2007. The use of a dynamic time-series cross-section framework and the micro database External Position Report provided by Deutsche Bundesbank permit insights into the various determinants of portfolio investments in ECMs. For example, there is evidence that German banks take into account the various dimensions of financial market development in their portfolio investment decisions and anticipate the special risks inherent in emerging markets. Proxies for the overall development and efficiency of capital markets have the highest economic significance of all variables. The introduction of depositary receipts programs has a positive impact on stock market investment. Moreover, there is evidence that global risk aversion exerts a significant influence in times of financial turmoil.     

Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix

While bank capital requirements permit a bank to freely substitute between equity and subordinated debt, lenders and investors view debt and equity as imperfect substitutes. It follows that, after controlling for the level of regulatory capital, the mix of debt in capital isolates the role that the market plays in disciplining banks. I document that the mix of debt in capital affects bank behavior, but only when investors can impose real constraints. In particular, the mix of debt reduces the probability of failure and future distress for BHC-affiliated institutions (where the investor has control rights through an equity position) and for stand-alone banks before the Basel Accord (when debt issues included restrictive covenants). However, substituting equity for subordinated debt at the bank holding company level or in stand-alone banks since the Basel Accord (where the investor has few protections) only increases the probability of distress and failure.     

Capital structure of Islamic banks: How different are they from conventional banks?

This paper uses comprehensive data for 112 Islamic and 709 conventional banks from 23 countries over 1995–2015 to compare the capital structure of Islamic banks (IBs) and conventional banks (CBs) from several perspectives. We find that IBs and CBs seem to face different cost pressures in the process of adjusting towards the target capital structure. Asset growth is a key driver of capital structure change, and CBs adjust leverage more aggressively in response to changes in total assets compared to IBs, because they have an advantage in obtaining external funds and can achieve leverage adjustments faster and at a low cost. IBs have more regulatory capital, but their ability to respond to risks is weaker than traditional banks. The results of this paper suggest that Islamic banks are in a disadvantaged position compared to CBs in capital structure management. The conclusion suggests that IBs need to expand its financing tools and funding sources to reduce adjustment costs and improve their capability to deal with asset risk.     

Culture and capital structure: What else to the puzzle?

This paper investigates four of Hofstede's cultural dimensions –individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation– influence on firms' choices of short-term and long-term capital structures. Cultures influence on corporate risk-taking may drive their debt-to-equity mix based on the higher of their equity book or market value. We empirically test culture influence with a sample of 5968 firms from five industry sectors, across 33 countries, over 2009–2017. We find firms national culture influencing their choices of short-term and long-term debt to book and market value of equity. The influence is more significant on the short-term than the long-term capital structures. Furthermore, it is more significant on the short-term debt to market value of equity and on the long-term debt to book value of equity. Our robustness checks at the firm-level, country-level and sample-level confirm and reinforce our main results. These findings would provide financial analysts, investors, and creditors an in-depth understanding when comparing international firms' capital structures.     

Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.     

Can machine learning models save capital for banks? Evidence from a Spanish credit portfolio

We study the impact of machine learning (ML) models for credit default prediction in the calculation of regulatory capital by financial institutions. We do so by using a unique and anonymized database from a major Spanish bank. We first compare the statistical performance of five models based on supervised learning like Logistic Lasso, Trees (CART), Random Forest, XGBoost and Deep Learning, with a well-known model like Logit. We measure the statistical performance through different metrics, and for different sample sizes and features available. We find that ML models outperform, even when relatively low amount of data is used. We then translate this statistical performance into economic impact by estimating the savings in capital when using an advanced ML model instead of a simpler one to compute the risk-weighted assets following the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach. Our benchmark results show that implementing XGBoost instead of Logistic Lasso could yield savings from 12.4% to 17% in terms of regulatory capital requirements.     

Does bank loan supply affect the supply of equity capital? Evidence from new share issuance and withdrawal

We examine the hypothesis that fluctuations in the aggregate supply of bank loans influence the supply of new equity capital. Using residual lending standards as a clean measure of aggregate loan supply and a VAR framework to aid identification, we find that a one-standard-deviation shock to lending standards results in 15% fewer IPOs. Shocks elicit strong responses from IPO-firms that are highly dependent on external capital and increase the number of withdrawals, strengthening the interpretation that the above is driven by changes in the supply of equity. Our results suggest that credit conditions are important to a well-functioning IPO market.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Do different forms of government ownership matter for bank capital behavior? Evidence from China

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.     

What’s the contingency? A proposal for bank contingent capital triggered by systemic risk

Contingent capital (coco) automatically recapitalizes the banking system during financial crises if the trigger mechanism is properly designed. We propose a dual trigger mechanism based on: (1) aggregate systemic risk in the banking system, measured using CATFIN, and (2) the individual bank’s contribution to overall systemic risk, measured using delta CoVaR. The dual trigger is highly correlated with system-wide insolvency risk and prices systemic risk. We set different triggers for banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers. Using the 99% cut-off, systemic coco issued by Lehman and Bear Stearns would have been triggered in November 2007, months prior to their actual demise.     

Do personal taxes affect capital structure? Evidence from the 2003 tax cut

Because the personal tax treatments of interest and dividend income likely affect the relative cost of debt and equity financing, a sharp change in tax treatment could affect firms' optimal leverage. This paper examines the effect of the 2003 equity income tax cut on firms' debt usage. Because this tax cut affected only individual investors, we can use a difference-in-differences method to identify the effect of personal tax on firms' leverage. Previous research has found that the 2003 tax cut encouraged dividend payouts and reduced the cost of equity, but it provides no link to equilibrium leverage ratios. We estimate that the tax cut causes the affected firms' leverage to decrease by about 5 percentage points. Furthermore, we show that the effects of the tax cut are stronger for firms with lower marginal corporate tax rates and for firms that are not financially constrained, consistent with our theoretical predictions. Overall, we find strong evidence that personal tax is an important determinant of firms' optimal leverage.     

Does competition from new equity mitigate bank rent extraction? Insights from Japanese data

Previous research shows that bank information production mitigates asymmetric information problems. However, this literature has ignored the concern that firms with better growth prospects are more vulnerable to bank rent extraction. This paper points out that funding competition from new equity as an effective natural mechanism solves this important concern. Using Japanese data from 1983 to 1997, we show that the relationship between loan-to-debt ratio and growth, while starting significantly negative (consistent with holdup theory), turns significantly positive towards the high end of the growth spectrum. We confirm that high-growth firms raise more new equity than do low growth firms and use more equity relative to bonds in external finance. This is consistent with a generalized Myers–Majluf framework. These results suggest that for high growth firms, when competition from public debt lessens due to increased growth-based valuations, competition from new equity steps in to restrain bank rent extraction.     

What drives the cost of US dollar bond funding for banks?

This paper decomposes issue spreads on US dollar-denominated bonds issued by LIBOR panel banks into credit risk and liquidity premium components. We attribute the recent increase in issue spreads to the investor perception that banks are less creditworthy than in the past. Although the behaviour of the credit risk component is well-explained by a structural model of default, this mechanism is nullified by the introduction of government guarantees. The behaviour of the liquidity premium component is partially explained by the bid/ask spread in the secondary market and issue size. Government guarantees also reduce the liquidity component of the issue spread.