Determinants of cost efficiencies in the mutual fund industry

We evaluate determinants of cost efficiencies in the U.S. mutual fund industry for 1998-2003. Our empirical results show that cost increases in this industry have been less than proportional to increases in assets. We find that funds without a 12b-1 plan show larger economies of scale than funds with a 12b-1 plan; institutional funds show greater economies of scale than do retail funds; and that fund families that are more focused in their investment objectives reap benefits of lower fund management costs than do fund families that are more diversified in their investment objectives.     

Are mutual fund fees excessive?

There is a long running debate over whether competition in the mutual fund industry limits the ability of investment advisors to charge fees that are disproportionate to the services they provide. We posit that disproportionately high fees are prevalent in funds with multiple share classes and those with weak governance structures. Using a comprehensive sample of index mutual funds for the from 1998 to 2007, we find that internal governance mechanisms matter primarily for funds with relatively small share classes where investors often face increased search costs and/or restricted access to competitive mutual funds. Additionally, we find that funds managed by publicly held sponsors are associated with disproportionately higher fee spreads (about 28 basis points). The results are robust to the inclusion of board characteristics, share class structure, and investment objectives. Overall, our findings suggest that competition and agency considerations are important determinants in the pricing of mutual funds.     

Commonalities in investment strategy and the determinants of performance in mutual fund mergers

This paper examines the determinants of cross-sectional variation in post-merger mutual fund performance. Mergers between funds with similar management objectives, as reflected by average portfolio book-to-market ratio, price–earnings ratio, beta and market capitalization values, outperform mergers between funds with dissimilar strategies. This superior performance transcends lower portfolio rebalancing costs which might be realized between merging funds which hold more assets in common. These results suggest that mutual fund mergers create collaborative benefits between funds with similar strategies. We also examine if fund governance structures influence the fund pairing process, testing if stronger fund oversight mitigates pairing mismatches. We find that less independent boards of trustees and boards with higher compensation are related to greater strategic mismatches between funds. These results suggest that more entrenched boards are more tolerant of fund mismatches which benefit the investment company, yet are not in investor’s best interests.     

Mutual fund trades and the value of contradictory private information

We investigate the performance of mutual funds that trade using private information. These funds are uniquely identified from a set of 2730 funds with 44,315 fund-periods between 1994 and 2005. We compare the alignment of fund trades with brokers’ recommendations, which we regard as “public information” in the universe of informed and uninformed mutual funds. Funds that systematically trade counter to the public information form a homogenous subset of the privately informed funds. By using private information that contradicts the public information, these funds exhibit a superior average performance. After we control for serial correlation in fund returns, we assess this advantage as being an economically significant 1.7% per annum. We also show empirically that smaller funds are better able to capture the benefit of private information.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting

We address how mutual funds vote on shareholder proposals and identify factors that help determine support of wealth-increasing shareholder proposals. We examine 213,579 voting decisions made by 1799 mutual funds from 94 fund families for 1047 shareholder proposals voted on between July 2003 and June 2005. In an analysis of voting across funds within the same fund family, we find significant divergence in voting within families, emphasizing the importance of focusing on voting by individual funds. We also find that, in general, mutual funds vote more affirmatively for potentially wealth-increasing proposals and funds' voting approval rates for these beneficial resolutions are significantly higher than those of other investors. Our results suggest that funds tend to support proposals targeting firms with weaker governance. We also find that funds with lower turnover ratios and social funds are more likely to support shareholder proposals. Finally, fund voting approval rates significantly impact whether a proposal passes and whether one is implemented.     

Public versus Private Ownership and Fund Manager Turnover

We examine the correlation between organizational structure (public vs. private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of United States offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded and privately held firms have different incentive structures and, as such, should differ in their treatment of internal control mechanisms, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive to prior fund performance when making replacement decisions and experience smaller post turnover performance improvements. Additional testing suggests a greater likelihood of fund manager replacement when mutual funds are team managed and when fund boards are more independent.     

Better than the original? The relative success of copycat funds

We construct hypothetical copycat funds to investigate the performance of free-riding strategies that duplicate the disclosed asset holdings of actively managed mutual funds. On average, copycat funds are able to generate performance that is comparable to their target mutual funds, taking into account transaction costs and expenses. However, their relative success increased significantly after 2004 when the SEC imposed quarterly disclosure regulations on all mutual funds. We also find substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the relative performance of copycat funds. Free-riding on the portfolios disclosed by past winning funds and funds that disclose representative holdings generates significantly better performance net of trading costs and expenses than the vast majority of mutual funds. The results indicate that free-riding on disclosed fund holdings is an attractive strategy and suggest that mutual funds can suffer from the information disclosure requirements.     

Best-performing US mutual fund families from 1993 to 2008: Evidence from a novel two-stage DEA model for efficiency decomposition

When analyzing relative performance, especially at the institutional level, the traditional data envelopment analysis (DEA) models do not recognize vastly different and important activities as separate functions and therefore cannot identify which function may be the main source of inefficiency. We propose a novel two-stage DEA model that decomposes the overall efficiency of a decision-making unit into two components and demonstrate its applicability by assessing the relative performance of 66 large mutual fund families in the US over the period 1993–2008. By decomposing the overall efficiency into operational management efficiency and portfolio management efficiency components, we reveal the best performers, the families that deteriorated in performance, and those that improved in their performance over the sample period. We also make frontier projections for poorly performing mutual fund families and highlight how the portfolio managers have managed their funds relative to the others during financial crisis periods.     

Gains to Mutual Fund Sponsors Offering Multiple Share Class Funds

Although the number of mutual funds grew during the 1990s, much of the growth is attributable to the introduction of multiple share class (MS) funds. Proponents argue that the MS structure leads to cost savings, which can be passed onto investors as lower expenses. However, if the structure lowers costs, sponsors are likely to profit from it. Though investors are concerned about the base expense ratio, the sum of administrative and management fees, fund sponsors generate profits from the management fees. As such, they would prefer to increase the management fee if they can simultaneously lower administrative fees. Our results indicate that MS fund investors pay lower administrative fees, but management fees are approximately 7 basis points higher than single-class funds. Overall, base expense ratios are higher than for single-class funds, suggesting fund sponsors capture the cost benefits the MS structure provides. Our results are robust to different model specifications and different estimation techniques.     

Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?

We examine the performance and investment behavior of female fixed‐income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed‐income mutual fund managers. We find that male‐ and female‐managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Our results suggest that differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Despite the similarities between male and female managers, we find evidence that gender influences the decision making of mutual fund investors. We find that the net asset flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial year managing the fund.     

Red and blue investing: Values and finance

Using data on the political contributions and stock holdings of U.S. investment managers, we find that mutual fund managers who make campaign donations to Democrats hold less of their portfolios (relative to non-donors or Republican donors) in companies that are deemed socially irresponsible (e.g., tobacco, guns, or defense firms or companies with bad employee relations or diversity records). Although explicit socially responsible investing (SRI) funds are more likely to be managed by Democratic managers, this result holds for non-SRI funds and after controlling for other fund and manager characteristics. The effect is more than one-half of the underweighting observed for SRI funds.     

The Performance,Asset Allocation,and Investment Style of International Equity Managers

This paper evaluates the performance of 114 international equity managers over the January 1988–December 1997 period. Performance tests are conducted using Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) performance methodologies. The managers are divided into mutual fund (n=54) and separately managed fund (n=60) investment management categories. Each management category is further divided by foreign and world (global) investment objectives. Three major findings are reported. First, international equity managers, on average, were unable to outperform the MSCI World market proxy during the sample period. However, world managers did perform better than their foreign counterparts. Second, geographic asset allocation and equity style allocation decisions enhanced the performance of international managers during the sample period. Third, separately managed funds outperformed mutual funds during the period studied when mutual fund returns are measured net of management fees. The apparent managed performance advantage abates, however, when mutual fund returns are adjusted to include management fees. Thus, we find no significant difference in the performance of the management categories when returns are measured gross of fees.     

Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds

The magnitude of mutual funds’ business ties with their portfolio firms is documented and is linked to funds’ proxy votes at specific firms and to overall voting practices. Aggregate votes at the fund family level indicate a positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with management. Votes at specific firms, however, reveal that funds are no more likely to vote with management of client firms than of non-clients. Because the votes took place when funds knew their votes would be publicly scrutinized, fund families with a larger client base may have adopted voting policies that led to less frequent opposition to management at all firms.     

Prudent man or agency problem? On the performance of insurance mutual funds

Active equity mutual funds managed by insurance companies underperform peer funds by over 1% per year. There is no evidence that insurance funds make less risky investments; instead they have lower risk-adjusted returns and their fund flows are less sensitive to performance when they perform poorly. Across insurance funds, those with heavy advertising, directly established by insurers or using parent firms' brandnames, and those whose managers simultaneously manage substantial non-mutual-fund assets, are more likely to underperform. We conclude that insurers' efforts to cross-sell mutual funds aggravate agency problems that erode fund performance.     

Management sub-advising in the mutual fund industry

This is a study of how contractual mechanisms can mitigate agency conflicts in sub-advised mutual funds. Sub-advising contracts allow fund families to expand their product offerings to include new investment styles and thereby gain market share. We show that costly contractual arrangements, such as co-branding, multi-advising, and performance-based compensation, can mitigate agency conflicts in outsourcing and protect investors from potential underperformance. Fund families will find it cost-effective to implement such incentive mechanisms only when investors are sophisticated in assessing manager skill. The findings help to explain why a large percentage of fund families outsource their funds to advisory firms.     

Selling winners, holding losers: Effect on fund flows and survival of disposition-prone mutual funds

Recent studies suggest that presence of a disposition effect in a large subset of investors can create stock mispricings, which has serious implications for market efficiency. We examine whether US equity mutual funds are disposition-prone, how that effect influences performance, investor flows and fund survival, and whether the disposition orientation of mutual funds affects stock prices in a sustained manner.We find that about 30% of all funds exhibit some degree of disposition behavior and that such funds underperform funds that are not disposition-prone by 4-6% per year. Moreover, after controlling for performance, tax overhang and other factors that potentially affect flows, disposition-prone funds attract significantly smaller flows than other funds. The results suggest that mutual fund investors are smart enough to minimize investment in disposition-prone funds. Consequently, disposition-prone funds have significantly higher rates of failure than other funds, thereby reducing the impact of such trading behavior on security prices.     

Strategic behavior within families of hedge funds

The paper investigates the strategic behavior of hedge fund families. It focuses on decisions to start and liquidate family-member funds. Hedge fund families tend to liquidate funds that underperform compared to other member funds, and to replace them by new ones. By choosing a launch time after a short period of superior performance by their member funds, families extend the spillover to new funds. Hedge fund families seem to be more experienced in promoting their funds and attracting fund inflow than in generating superior performance. This results in higher dollar compensation earned by managers within multi-fund families than in stand-alone funds.     

Tailored versus Mass Produced: Portfolio Managers Concurrently Managing Separately Managed Accounts and Mutual Funds

Using a matched sample of separately managed accounts (SMAs) and mutual funds (MFs) with the same portfolio manager and investment style, we find that concurrently managed MFs consistently underperform their SMA counterparts and generate more negative return gaps. Fund characteristics and liquidity betas fail to fully explain the underperformance. An event‐study analysis finds that the weights placed into top (bottom)‐performing stocks increase for existing SMAs (MFs) and negative return gaps increase for the MFs after the onset of concurrent management. We find that higher compensation collected by SMA fund managers are associated with more unseen managerial actions which positively contribute to the SMA return gap. Our results suggest that when managers concurrently manage both SMAs and MFs, they favor SMA performance over their MF performance.     

Mutual fund flows and investor returns: An empirical examination of fund investor timing ability

We examine the timing ability of mutual fund investors using cash flow data at the individual fund level. Over 1991–2004 equity fund investor timing decisions reduce fund investor average returns by 1.56% annually. Underperformance due to poor timing is greater in load funds and funds with relatively large risk-adjusted returns. In particular, the magnitude of investor underperformance due to poor timing largely offsets the risk-adjusted alpha gains offered by good-performing funds. Investors in both actively managed funds and index funds exhibit poor investment timing. We demonstrate that our empirical results are consistent with investor return-chasing behavior.