Bank credit risk and structural credit models: Agency and information asymmetry perspectives

This work investigates the effects of agency and information asymmetry issues embedded in structural form credit models on bank credit risk evaluation, using American bank data from 2001 to 2005. Findings show that both the agency problem and information asymmetry significantly cause deviations in the credit risk evaluation of structural form models from agency ratings. Five independent factors explain a deviation of 42.6–78.3% and should be incorporated into future credit risk modeling. Additionally, both the effects of information asymmetry and debt-equity agency positively relate to the deviation while that of management-equity agency relates to it negatively.     

The effects of reform on China’s bank structure and performance

This paper investigates the relationship between market structure and performance in China’s banking system from 1985 to 2002, a period when this sector was subject to gradual but notable reform. Using panel data estimation techniques, both the market-power and efficient-structure hypotheses are tested. In addition, the model is extended to consider issues such as the impact of bank size/ownership and whether the big four banks enjoy a “quiet life”. On average, X-efficiency declined significantly and most banks were operating below scale efficient levels. Estimation of the structure–performance models lends some support to the relative market-power hypothesis in the early period. The reforms had little impact on the structure of China’s banking sector, though the “joint stock” banks became relatively more X-efficient. There was no evidence to support the quiet-life hypothesis, probably because strict interest rate controls prevented the state banks from earning monopoly profits. Thus the ongoing liberalisation of interest rates should be accompanied by reduced concentration. Overall, to improve competitive structure, new policies should be directed at encouraging market entry and increasing the market share of the most efficient banks.     

Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.     

Japan’s banking crisis: An event-study perspective

We calculate abnormal stock returns for Japanese non-financial companies around major events associated with the banking crisis (1995–2000), and find that not all companies were equally sensitive to the malaise of the banking sector: the most affected were small, leveraged, low-tech companies with low credit ratings and low market to book ratios. This is consistent with “credit crunch” theories (companies with limited access to financial markets are sensitive to changes in bank lending) and with claims that innovation is rarely financed by bank debt. We do not find much evidence on the alleged misallocation of loans to support ailing bank clients.     

Informed finance and technological change: Evidence from credit relationships

This paper empirically investigates the effect of “informed finance” on technological change. The theoretical literature offers conflicting predictions on whether the information of financiers fosters or inhibits firms’ innovation. Using data from a sample of Italian manufacturing firms, we find that the information of firms’ main banks, proxied by the duration of credit relationships, promotes innovation. This positive effect is economically and statistically more significant for product than for process innovations. Nonetheless, the role of relationship banks in innovation is quite unsophisticated: they do not foster internal research but rather fund the relevant investments that the introduction and acquisition of new technologies entails.     

The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post-FDICIA Period

In this article we examine whether the federal safety net is viewed by the market as being extended beyond de jure deposits to other bank debt and even the debt of bank holding companies (BHCs). We extend previous research by focusing on the post‐FDICIA period and by examining the risk‐return relation of bonds issued directly by banks, not BHCs. Our results provide evidence that both bank and BHC bonds are priced by the secondary market in relation to their underlying credit risk, particularly for less capitalized issuers, suggesting that proposals requiring banks to issue subordinated debt may enhance market monitoring and discipline and be useful in supplementing regulatory discipline.     

Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements

Using a large sample of private credit agreements between U.S. publicly traded firms and financial institutions, we show that over 90% of long-term debt contracts are renegotiated prior to their stated maturity. Renegotiations result in large changes to the amount, maturity, and pricing of the contract, occur relatively early in the life of the contract, and are rarely a consequence of distress or default. The accrual of new information concerning the credit quality, investment opportunities, and collateral of the borrower, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations in credit and equity market conditions, are the primary determinants of renegotiation and its outcomes. The terms of the initial contract (e.g., contingencies) also play an important role in renegotiations; by altering the structure of the contract in a state contingent manner, renegotiation is partially controlled by the contractual assignment of bargaining power.     

Relationship lending,hierarchical distance and credit tightening: Evidence from the financial crisis

This paper examines the firms’ credit availability during the 2007–2009 financial crisis using a dataset of 5331 bank–firm relationships provided by borrowers’ credit folders of three Italian banks. It aims to test whether a strong lender–borrower relationship can produce less credit rationing for borrowing firms even during a credit crunch period. The results show that exclusivity of the relationship can mitigate the firm credit rationing. We also verify the influence of lending organizational structure during crisis. A new measure of distance in lending technologies has been introduced: the hierarchical distance calculated as the distance between the branch that originates the loan and the location of the hierarchical level responsible for financing decision. Our findings document a negative impact of distance on credit availability, consistent with the idea that proximity facilitates the transmission of soft information.     

Bank capital regulation and credit supply

Banks can meet the need to increase their capital ratio either by issuing new equity or by reducing loans. It is generally known that banks prefer to reduce assets due to the high cost of equity. With a simple banking model we show that, if incumbent shareholders are to benefit, banks may prefer to reduce loans, even though they can recapitalize by issuing new equity without any cost. The result holds when banks hold relatively small amounts of long-term loans, or when the economy is in downturn.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Practical methods for measuring and managing operational risk in the financial sector: A clinical study

This paper analyzes the implications of the advanced measurement approach (AMA) for the assessment of operational risk. Through a clinical case study on a matrix of two selected business lines and two event types of a large financial institution, we develop a procedure that addresses the major issues faced by banks in the implementation of the AMA. For each cell, we calibrate two truncated distributions functions, one for “normal” losses and the other for the “extreme” losses. In addition, we propose a method to include external data in the framework. We then estimate the impact of operational risk management on bank profitability, through an adapted measure of RAROC. The results suggest that substantial savings can be achieved through active management techniques.     

The regulator’s trade-off: Bank supervision vs. minimum capital

We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of intermediation and is costly for taxpayers. We show that a mix of both instruments minimises the costs of preventing the collapse of financial intermediation. Once we allow for cross-border banking, the optimal policy is not feasible. If domestic supervisory effort is not observable, our model predicts a race to the bottom in capital requirement regulation. Therefore, countries are better off by harmonising regulation on an international standard.     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.     

Bank profitability and taxation

This paper investigates how banks’ activity is affected by the corporate income tax. For this purpose it uses aggregate data on all main components of the profit and loss account and on the interest rate applied on loans and on deposits for the banking sector of the main industrialized countries during the period 1981–2003. With such information we are able to disentangle the extent to which a bank is able to shift its tax-burden forward to its borrowers, depositors, and purchasers of fee-generating services. The main result is that the taxation of banks’ profit is equivalent to a taxation on loans and as such it exerts a substantial impact on the composition of banking sector revenues. However credit intermediaries have the ability to shift a substantial part of their corporate income tax burden and therefore differences in the level of taxation cannot explain the dispersion observed in banks’ net profitability across industrialized countries.     

Business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms

We investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms. Private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller, more informationally opaque, riskier, and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms. Based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries, we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions. The improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability, and depends on the sharing of firms’ payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office. The value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office. Furthermore, in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates. Our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength.     

Concentrated control,institutions, and banking sector: An international study

Using a broad sample of listed commercial banks in East Asia and Western Europe, this paper investigates the relations among concentrated control, a set of bank operating characteristics, and legal and regulatory regimes. We find that banks with concentrated control exhibit poorer performance, lower cost efficiency, greater return volatility, and higher insolvency risk, relative to widely held ones. We also document that legal institutions and private monitoring effectively reduce the detrimental effects of concentrated control and that official disciplinary power plays a weak governance role, whereas government intervention exacerbates the adverse effects. Further evidence shows that the relations between control concentration and bank operating characteristics are curvilinear and vary according to the types of controlling owners. Overall, our findings support the contention that country-level institutions play important roles in constraining insider expropriation, and that private monitoring mechanisms are more effective than are public rules and supervision in governing banks.     

Bank ownership,privatization, and performance: Evidence from a transition country

This paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in China over 1995–2010, reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries – joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks – relative to state-owned commercial banks. However, publicly traded banks, subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets, perform better regardless of ownership status. The privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short- or long-run (initial public offerings). The positive long-run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership. Moreover, this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non-interest income efficiency at the same time. The results suggest that Chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non-interest revenue, although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period.     

Financial constraints of private firms and bank lending behavior

We investigate whether and how financial constraints of private firms depend on bank lending behavior. Bank lending behavior, especially its scale, scope and timing, is largely driven by bank business models which differ between privately owned and state-owned banks. Using a unique dataset on private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) we find that an increase in relative borrowings from local state-owned banks significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints, while there is no such effect for privately owned banks. Improved credit availability and private information production are the main channels that explain our result. We also show that the lending behavior of local state-owned banks can be sustainable because it is less cyclical and neither leads to more risk taking nor underperformance.     

Foreign bank entry,credit allocation and lending rates in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from Poland

Earlier studies have documented that foreign banks charge lower lending rates and interest spreads than domestic banks. We hypothesize that this may stem from the superior efficiency of foreign entrants that they decide to pass onto borrowers (“performance hypothesis”), but could also reflect a different loan allocation with respect to borrower transparency, loan maturity and currency (“portfolio composition hypothesis”). We are able to differentiate between the above hypotheses thanks to a novel dataset containing detailed bank-specific information for the Polish banking industry. Our findings demonstrate that banks differ significantly in terms of portfolio composition and we attest to the “portfolio composition hypothesis” by showing that, having controlled for portfolio composition, there are no differences in lending rates between banks.     

Are current syndicated loan alliances related to past alliances?

The odds of a current syndicate relationship between two lenders depend upon their previous alliances. The odds are significantly higher [lower] and strongest for a current lead–participant relationship with a continuation [reversal] of their previous roles. To illustrate, the odds are nearly four times higher when two lenders have allied in the previous 5 years. The strength of lead–participant syndicate relationships between two lenders with same-ordered roles is most sensitive to the lead bank’s reputation and informationally opaque participants tend to have stronger relationships with lead banks. Lenders exhibit home bias in their syndicate alliances since ongoing relationships are stronger with domestic counterparts.